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ABSTRACT 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LOBBYING SUCCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
TURKEY’S ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
EDA KUŞKU SÖNMEZ 
PhD Dissertation, Spring 2013 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Bac 
Keywords: Europeanization, interest groups, lobbying, lobbying coalitions, issue 
conflict, lobbing success, gender mainstreaming, Alevi rights, and freedom of the press 
 
Historical analysis of the relationship between the State and civil society in Turkey 
demonstrate the problematic nature of interactions between these domains. All through 
the Turkish political history, the actors within civil society had been subject to inherent 
legal and structural limits in terms of access to the political level and thus had been 
relegated to a weak-standing. This historical legacy of civil society’s portrayal as inept 
and devoid of any real role in politics had eventuated in academic lack of interest 
concerning possible transformations in the civil society’s potential. Over the last 
decade, the European Union (EU) negotiation framework has provided a new 
opportunity context enhancing the chances of decision making participation of groups 
that operate within the Turkish civil society. One should consider the positive impact of 
the EU pressures for regular and structural participation of these previously excluded 
stakeholders. Lobbying groups’ increasing access to the political level should have 
implications for policy outputs; still this access alone is not enough to determine 
lobbying success. Taking into account Turkey’s domestic political setting in flux, what 
could be some other factors easing or hindering lobbying success? This dissertation 
aims to answer this question. To this end, it provides comparative analysis of lobbying 
activities under three alternative issue areas -gender mainstreaming, Alevi rights and 
press freedoms- which heavily occupied the reform agenda of Turkey in the last decade. 
With a specific focus on the degree of conflict on these issues; the dissertation 
demonstrates that conflicts had arisen primarily due to ideology and identity based 
polarizations in Turkey such as the controversy between secularism versus religious 
conservatism. The dissertation deliberates on how such polarizations impact lobbying 
success and moderate the impact of other potential explanatory factors. In the case of an 
EU negotiating country, one should also take into account how the EU’s adaptational 
pressures determine the direction of reforms and thus lobbying success. Incorporating 
the impact of this special context, our analytical model is additionally expected to shed 
light on the literature on Europeanization that concentrate on transposition processes in 
the Turkish case. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE’NİN AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ KATILIM MÜZAKERELERİ BAĞLAMINDA 
LOBİCİLİK BAŞARISI ÜZERİNE AMPİRİK BİR ÇALIŞMA  
 
EDA KUŞKU SÖNMEZ 
Doktora Tezi, Bahar 2013 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Bac 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Avrupalılaşma, çıkar grupları, lobicilik, lobi koalisyonları, ihtilaf, 
lobicilik başarısı, toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği, Alevi hakları, basın özgürlüğü 
 
Türkiye’deki sivil toplum-devlet ilişkisinin tarihsel analizi bu iki alan arasındaki 
etkileşimin problemli olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Sivil toplum alanındaki aktörler, 
Türk siyasi tarihi boyunca siyaset alanına erişim açısından yasal ve yapısal bir takım 
sınırlamalara maruz kalmış; dolayısıyla da oldukça zayıf bir konuma indirgenmişlerdir. 
Sivil toplumu siyasette gerçek bir rol oynamaktan yoksun ve bu konuda yeteneksiz 
olarak resmeden tarihsel miras, sivil toplumun potansiyelindeki olası dönüşümlere 
yönelik akademik ilgisizlikle sonuçlanmıştır. Ancak geçtiğimiz on yılda Türkiye’nin 
Avrupa Birliği (AB) ile müzakere süreci, sivil toplumda etkin olarak çalışan gruplara 
yeni bir fırsat ortamı sağlamış ve bu grupların karar alma süreçlerine katılım şansını 
arttırmıştır. Daha önceden bu süreçlerden dışlanan bu paydaşların düzenli ve kurumsal 
katılımını sağlayacak mekanizmaların oluşturulması yönündeki AB baskılarının olumlu 
bir etkisi olduğu düşünülebilir. Lobici grupların siyaset alanına artan erişimi siyasa 
çıktılarını etkileyecektir; ancak bu erişim lobicilik başarısı için tek başına yeterli 
değildir. Türkiye’nin sürekli değişen iç politika ortamı dikkate alındığında, lobicilik 
başarısını destekleyen veya engelleyen diğer bir takım faktörler neler olabilir? Bu tez bu 
soruya cevap vermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, son on yılda Türkiye’nin 
gündeminde sıkça yer alan üç alternatif konudaki –toplumsal cinsiyet, Alevi hakları ve 
basın özgürlüğü- reform süreçlerine yönelik lobicilik faaliyetleri karşılaştırmalı olarak 
incelenmektedir. Öncelikle bu süreçlerin ne ölçüde ihtilaflı olduğuna odaklanan tez; 
Türkiye’deki ihtilafların özellikle ideoloji ve kimlik temelli laiklik-muhafazakârlık gibi 
polarizasyonlardan kaynaklandığını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu tip polarizasyonların 
lobicilik başarısına etkisi ile, lobicilik başarısını açıklamada kullanılan diğer potansiyel 
faktörlerin etkisini azaltması tartışılmaktadır. AB ile müzakere sürecinde olan bir ülke 
söz konusu olduğunda, bu sürecin adaptasyon baskıları ve bu baskıların reformların 
gidişatını ve dolayısıyla lobicilik başarısını nasıl etkilediği de dikkate alınmalıdır. Bu 
özel yapının da etkisi incelemeye dâhil edilerek oluşturulan analitik model, Avrupa 
hukukunun Türkiye’nin iç hukukuna aktarım süreçlerine yoğunlaşan Avrupalılaşma 
literatürüne de ışık tutmayı amaçlamaktadır.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The political science community has long been discussing the boundaries of 
defining a particular regime as democratic. These debates have created the need for 
concepts such as consolidation of democracy, deepening of democracy or 
institutionalization of democracy and these conceptual novelties were derived from the 
need to differentiate between advanced democracies and democratizing countries and 
laid new burdens on the shoulders of the latter. Around six hundred diminished 
subtypes of democracy were proposed in the literature (see Levitsky & Collier, 1997); 
and under this gigantic debate on democracy with adjectives, the liberal democracy was 
idealized as the most developed form (Zakaria, 1997; Diamond 1999) and differentiated 
from the least developed, electoral democracy, through incorporation of newly 
designated criteria including respect for human rights, freedom of expression, right to 
association and religion, as well as, protection of minorities and many others. Advance 
on the basis of these criteria became an index for democratic consolidation and failure 
meant relegation to the illiberal category. Under the circumstances, the countries 
aspiring for the label of liberal democracy including Turkey became no longer able to 
sell their claim of being democratic unless they comply with this ever expanding list of 
political criteria. Moreover, the so-called civil society’s regular participation into 
political decision making was propounded as yet another normative criterion 
purportedly prioritized within the club of advanced democracies. The hub of this club –
the EU- pressures Turkey to recognize this ideal that civil society should be given an 
enhanced role in the policy making processes. Also within the political science literature 
on democracy, there is this growing emphasis on civil society that it plays critical 
functions for democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1991, 1994; Linz & Stephan, 1997). 
Still, excessive belief in the goodness of this totality can be contested; as particular 
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groups within the civil societies’ of ‘countries in transition’ may lack adherence to 
democratic ideals. Moreover, problems such as their representative capacity, 
democraticness of their internal structures, and the level of their independence from 
their governments may undermine the faith in these groups as agents of democratic 
consolidation. Given these potential contradictions, the civil society’s bearing for 
democracy may turn into a normative debate.  
One could otherwise prefer to cut off from such normative discussions and 
concentrate on the implications of civil society’s decision making participation over 
policy outputs. The study of this linkage additionally puzzles one’s brain with 
definitional and analytical questions such as how to define the groups that operate 
within civil society, how to assess their interactions with the political sphere, how to 
define and assess their influence over decision making, as well as, what possible factors 
could explain such influence? 
Answers to these questions are never straightforward. For instance, problems 
associated with defining civil society per se have triggered a never ending debate since 
the period of the concept’s emergence in the West and through its subsequent usages 
and understandings in other parts of the world. Some academic and policy circles 
reckon that civil society is a political objective to be achieved for further 
democratization. According to this view, the term was seen “…mainly in ‘pragmatic’ 
terms, as a guide in formulating a social and political strategy or action programme” 
(Keane, 1998: 36). This pragmatism emanates from the scholars’ tendency to put too 
high value on the democratizing function of civil society. As John Ehrenberg puts it, 
almost all thinkers “…agree that a healthy democracy requires many voluntary 
associations and much local activity” (1999: 233). Scholars, who formulate civil society 
as a pro-democratic force, neglect the fact that much depends on other features of civil 
society such as the characteristics of its organizations and the ways in which they relate 
to the State and to their societal base. Although most scholars agree that the realm of 
civil society is outside the State, this division does not necessarily mean that the civil 
society and the State constitute opposite realms; or that the actors within the former are 
completely autonomous from the latter. Autonomy of civil society could be a criterion 
to delineate its development towards some ideal standards; however, internal power 
dynamics of civil society may turn it into a sphere of inequality and conflict contrary to 
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its portrayal as a realm of social and political tolerance, and interpersonal trust. 
Emphasizing both aspects, Ernest Gellner defines the ideal in his mind as a “…set of 
diverse non-governmental institutions, which is strong enough to counterbalance the 
State, and, whilst not preventing the State from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace 
and arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the State from 
dominating and atomizing the rest of society” (1995: 32). Besides these questions about 
autonomy and internal power dynamics, some other scholars have also concentrated on 
a set of additional attributes of civil society that raise questions about openness; 
voluntariness; ability to self-generate; self-support; and being bound by a set of shared 
values (for a detailed discussion see Diamond, 1999: 5). Building on such accounts 
about the definition of civil society, the dissertation acknowledges the necessity to 
explore not only how different groups, which operate within this so far vaguely defined 
realm, are interacting with the State; but also how they relate to their adversaries, to 
their own members, or to the public at large. An analysis of these multiple interactions 
hints about the attributes of civil society that Diamond includes in his definition. 
Parallel to this lack of consensus in the literature about what civil society really is, 
scholars also naturally diverge in their appraisal of what should be considered as the 
actors of this excessively contested realm. Some organizations can be included and 
others can be excluded given reference to and espousal of different criteria. If one’s 
conception of civil society is expansive enough; the list would include any religious, 
cultural, advocacy-oriented, commercial organizations or economic interest groups, the 
independent media, universities as well as think tanks -that is the sum of all possible 
organizational structures which epitomize a channel of communication between the 
decision-makers and the public. Depending on sampling and other methodological 
purposes, these groups were also defined and classified as ‘interest groups’, ‘non-
governmental organizations’, or as ‘civil society organizations’, or according to their 
legal status such as ‘associations’, ‘foundations’, as well as according to their target and 
scope as ‘pressure groups’ or ‘lobbying groups’. Efforts to define these concepts have 
engrossed and convoluted the literature on civil society which still lacks a unified 
understanding about the legitimate actors of the realm. Many scholars continue to 
consume their energies on these definitional problems, whereas one could look for 
quick ways out from them and attach priority to analytical puzzles -specifying relations 
between the phenomena under discussion.   
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The analytical puzzle of this dissertation is about the factors easing/hindering 
lobbying success in the Turkish case. These factors may become variegated depending 
on the alternative settings within which they are analyzed and these alternative settings 
may contest the agreement with regard to significance of particular previously tested 
factors. The literature on interest group influence is full of many such factors proposed 
to explain variations in the lobbying groups’ influence over the policy making processes 
(Dür & De Bièvre, 2008). A thorough investigation of these alternative explanatory 
factors is provided in Chapter 1 and what has attracted particular attention within these 
discussions are the lobbying coalition dynamics (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 
2011b) and issue specific factors, and among these mainly the level of conflict on policy 
issues (Mahoney, 2007; Michalowitz, 2007).  
Chapter 1 additionally reflects upon the question that ‘what, besides these factors, 
might encourage/discourage political participation of lobbyists and explain their 
lobbying success in democratizing countries such as Turkey?’ Despite Turkey’s long 
encounter with democracy; until late 1990s, the Turkish civil society had been unable to 
aspire for a role in political decision making. Confinement of Turkey’s decision making 
structures solely to the actors of the political domain has become very much questioned 
in the process of Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU. Few can deny that 
Turkey’s policy making apparatus had been inadequate in terms of availability of 
mechanisms to provide democratic participation of civil society and it is still an open 
question as to what will be the details of the future institutional cosmos of the State-civil 
society interactions in Turkey. Nevertheless, throughout 2000s actors within these 
different domains have begun to experience previously unattempted processes of 
interaction.  
Making the most of its incentives and pressures, the EU institutions have been 
instrumental in regimenting this experimental -if not regularized- dialogue between the 
traditional decision makers and policy advocates from the level of civil society. The 
literature on Turkey’s Europeanization and its linkage to civil society empowerment has 
so far provided analysis of several EU-driven factors. These include not only the EU 
pressures for changes in the structural dynamics of the interplay between the State and 
civil society –which can be alternatively defined as the new opportunity structures 
created by the EU negotiation framework-; but also the EU’s financial support, as well 
as, the EU’s political pressures and its pressures for legal compliance. The domestic 
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level lobbyists, who have been active under this context, may additionally aim to 
directly shape the policy positions of the European level institutions and yet again 
expect these institutions to pressure their EU-negotiating governments for domestic 
policy change. Among these alternative causalities, which were also discussed in the 
literature on Turkey’s Europeanization,1 it would be very challenging to demonstrate the 
causality between the EU opportunity context and lobbying success; as well as, the 
causality between the EU’s financial aid and lobbying success of domestic level 
lobbyists. Comparatively, the third dimension –the EU’s adaptational pressures- is 
expected to be more direct and critical in terms of its impact. A detailed discussion of 
the compatibility between the EU’s adaptational pressures and the issue-based 
preferences of the domestic level lobbyists would also provide insights about the 
Turkish transposition experiences under the issue fields studied in this dissertation.  
Incorporating these potential EU-driven factors into its analysis, the dissertation 
demonstrates Turkey’s uniqueness given its EU negotiation context. It, therefore, 
deviates from the interest group influence literature as it additionally scrutinizes 
lobbying under this special context and especially scrutinizes the relative impact of the 
EU’s pressures for legal adaptation.  
The main research question of this dissertation is “what kind of role, if any, these 
different factors play in providing explanations for lobbying success in alternative 
settings like Turkey?” To be able to explore the ways in which the EU relates to the 
outcome observed –that is the variation in organized interests’ ability to achieve their 
preferences in the policy outputs-; one should investigate issue areas that became 
subject to the EU reform processes. Besides, the ability to explore the impact of ‘issue 
conflict’ requires selection of policy areas including both issues over which there are 
clear demarcations within civil society and/or lack of consensus among the powerful 
actors of the decision making process, as well as, issues that did not become subject to 
such conflicts so that these empirical cases would provide us with the opportunity to 
compare. 
                                                            
1 It should be underlined that this literature does not build on the study of specifically the same kind of variables. 
There are those works which analyze, for instance, civil society empowerment or civil society’s enhanced 
participation into decision-making, yet lobbying success was not clearly defined as a dependent variable and was, 
therefore, rather loosely analzed within this literature. See in Chapter 1. 
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In conformity with these criteria, the dissertation offers empirical and comparative 
analysis of three alternative issue areas -gender mainstreaming, Alevi rights and 
freedom of the press. Chapter 1 further legitimizes the dissertation’s choice of these 
policy fields. Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are designed to trace the processes of 
lobbying by sector specific organizations for a plethora of issues under each policy 
domain and present these empirical case studies along the established analytical model. 
Comparing the process related evaluations of policy advocates which have been 
lobbying on a pleathora of issues under each policy domain; the conclusion section 
reinterprets the evidence about the lobbying success and discusses whether this 
evidence can also be linked to the normative discussions about the consolidation of 
democracy.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ANALYSIS OF INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND  
DESIGN OF INQUIRY IN THE TURKISH CASE 
 
 
The institutional structure of Turkey’s political decision making was used to be 
exceedingly exclusive precluding interest groups’ access, thus rendering the study of 
interest group influence virtually pointless. Although this structure is still decisive for 
policy outcomes, its self-enclosed profile is no longer intact and interest groups are 
growingly engaged in the business of having a say over decision making processes. This 
transformation is very much indebted to the EU criticisms concerning democratic deficit 
and consecutive measures taken to improve democratic legitimacy of Turkey -a process 
whereby the dynamics of the political space were moderately altered allowing for 
lobbying activities to play their role. The variation in this role became an important 
question and made the issue of interest group influence a highly relevant study item for 
those who work and theorize about interest groups and democratization in Turkey. Yet, 
the research on Turkey’s decision making dynamics still lack systematic analysis of 
interest group participation and the conditions under which these groups exert influence. 
This chapter is set to develop an analytical model to evaluate these conditions in the 
Turkish case building on and synthesizing the previously unassociated literatures of 
‘interest group influence’ and ‘Europeanization’ and this synthesis is expected to offer a 
new approach to advance hypothesis’ field of action in both.   
Borrowing from the literature on interest group influence, this chapter first 
deliberates on some alternative commonly studied dependent variables such as 
‘influence’, ‘preference attainment’, and ‘lobbying success’ and briefly reviews some 
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potential measurement techniques and problems. It proceeds with an exhaustive list of 
factors offered in this literature including structural, interest group specific, and issue 
specific ones that may explain interest group influence over policy outcomes (Dür & De 
Bièvre, 2008: 29). It provides focused analysis of some major research projects from 
which the dissertation derived some of its hypotheses and discusses the possibilities of 
applying their alternative methodologies in the Turkish case. To this end, three 
alternative policy areas – gender mainstreaming, Alevi rights and media freedoms- 
which are highly salient in the process of Turkey’s negotiations for the EU membership- 
are selected as empirical cases for their high potential to exhibit variations with respect 
to conditions under which lobbying activity takes places –including the degree of issue 
conflict, the constellations of the issue based coalitions, and the EU connection. 
Since Turkey is an EU negotiating country, the lobbying activity cannot be 
imagined independent of this negotiation framework. The EU preconditions 
membership to adaptation of certain EU standards and is also active in developing 
progressive regulation and policy recommendations. On the other hand, concerning 
certain policy issues the EU may lack or become unable to develop a concrete unified 
policy stance and befall estranged from the domestic level bargaining on policy 
development. Thus, the EU relates to the decision making process first through its 
standards and policy stance (or lack thereof) and plays an active role in pressuring for 
compliance with its existing standards. This emerges as a direct route of EU impact in 
explaining the variation in organized interests’ ability to exert influence upon the 
Turkey’s EU related reform process. The European level institutions also engage in 
dialogue with domestic level stakeholders contributing to development of a European 
level policy stance on certain conflict-ridden issues. In order to have their interests 
realized, some lobbying groups prefer to utilize this EU channel, bypassing the domestic 
level decision making authorities and seeking direct access to European level 
institutions. Besides directly impacting the policy process through its conditionality 
tool, the EU also pushes for structural rearrangement of the domestic level decision 
making structures to include mechanisms of consultation with stakeholders from civil 
society. Last but not least, the EU financially supports projects on human rights, 
democratization, and development of civil society. Thus the lobbyists, who can generate 
projects concerning these issues, make the most of the EU’s financial support which 
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represents another potential route of EU impact to boost the lobbyists’ ability to 
participate into the decision making processes; if not their lobbying success.  
Overall, in the Turkish case the EU negotiation context interact with every other 
possible dynamic at play in explaining interest group influence –be it structure specific, 
interest group specific or issue specific dynamics. A rigorous analysis of interest group 
influence in Turkey should mull over interest groups within this broader context and 
account for the ways in which the EU plays a causal role. To this end, this chapter also 
takes stock of and expects to contribute to the literature on Europeanization in Turkey 
which hypothesizes about the linkages between the EU level factors and domestic level 
transformations.   
 
1.1.  The Literature on Interest Group Influence 
 
What role for interest groups is a highly relevant question to ask for assessing 
whether a political decision making structure is democratic. Interest groups are formally 
organized associations or organizations representing either communal or group specific 
interests. The major objective of these groups is to exert influence over policies of 
interest either through lobbying the decision making authorities or through activities 
directed at the general public in the form of media campaigns, protests and mass 
demonstrations. The ability to engage in the former type of activity –seeking direct 
access to decision makers- and the modus operandi of this access is of the essence for 
democratic policy making. The lobbyists’ level of influence over policy making 
structures has implications for democratic policy outcomes.  
 
1.1.1. The Challenges of Assessing Interest Group Influence 
 
Despite its relevance for democratic theory, the methodological impediments 
associated with testing influence of the interest groups dissuade its empirical 
investigation (Dür & De Bièvre, 2008: 27). It would be also highly challenging to 
analyse some other loaded and vague concepts such as ‘power’ and ‘role’ of interest 
groups with respect to policy processes knowing that the study of these concepts would 
similarly beget exposure to grave measurement biases. A group of interest group 
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scholars have accepted the challenge and developed interest in combining theory with 
empirics and sought to come up with novel ways of conceptualizating and 
operationalizing influence, as well as measuring it either qualitatively or quantitatively.  
What accounts for differences in organized interests’ ability to exert influence 
upon policy outcomes? To study this question, there had been some successful attempts 
to settle on a workable definition of influence and some progress was achieved with 
respect to creation of some promising indicators. The key to success of these scholars 
was their concentration on the policy outputs. In their elaborate review of these initial 
efforts, Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre (2008: 28) define influence as ‘control over 
political outcomes.’ Prior to Dür and De Bièvre, in the sole comparative research of the 
field, Christine Mahoney (2007) compared lobbying activity in the US and EU and 
came up with an analogous definition of influence, but alternatively employed the 
concept of ‘lobbying success’. According to this definition, policy outcomes can be 
easily compared with lobbyists’ policy preferences and operationalized in an ordinal 
scale including lack of success that is lack of any preference realization, medium level 
of success when a lobbying group’s preferences are partly realized, and high level of 
success if policy outcomes highly or totally reflect the lobbying group’s preferences (for 
a similar operationalization see: Mahoney, 2007: 37). This procedure is straightforward, 
yet it leaves us with certain biases immanent to measurement which shall be addressed 
and can only be partially obviated.  
First, decision making processes involve several stages and as Andreas Dür 
(2008a: 48) argues it is unfeasible for a single research project to address and measure 
interest group influence at all of these stages; if not employ small-N qualitative 
methodology which can capitalize on information about each stage of policy making 
and which is therefore analytically more advantageous to alleviate this specific problem. 
The stages of policy making mainly involve firstly the stage of agenda-setting, then the 
process through which the policies are formulated and passed, and finally the process of 
policy implementation (Dür, 2008a: 48).  
Concentration on one of these stages may lead to underestimation of the overall 
influence of a particular interest. For instance, as demonstrated in the Figure 1.1, 
Lobbying Group 1 and Lobbying Group 4 may lack the ability to impact the process 
through which the policies are formulated. Still, these lobbyists may simply consider 
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themselves as influential; if they have a lobbying concern such as persuading the 
decision makers about the urgency of particular reforms during the very first stage of 
agenda-setting. Besides, there might be other groups lobbying at each stage of the 
policy making process, and others only concentrating on legal content, as well as, others 
who attach the utmost importance to policy implementation. Thus, although the content 
of the amended laws are in line with their preferences, some lobbyists may still consider 
their lobbying unsuccessful if they do not obtain results with respect to policy 
implementation. 
 
Figure 1.1. Lobbying at different stages of the policy making process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*LG: Lobbying Group 
 
As an example to the first scenario, consider the case when in the summer of 2012 
the AKP government made a surprise move to rearrange the legal terms for abortion in 
Turkey. But during what we can call the stage of agenda setting –that is before such 
proposal was drawn- there was heavy lobbying by women organizations against further 
limitations in the legal terms for abortion. Consequently, it could be that these reactions 
are considered and resulted in discussions at the ministerial level about the design of the 
proposal that it should not necessarily propound any change in the existing ten week 
legal period for abortion, and instead include a set of precautions to decrease abortion 
cases. Although the lobbyists could not realize their demand for further extension of this 
Policy Formulation 
Agenda-Setting 
Policy Implementation 
LG 1 
LG 5 
LG 6 
LG 2 
LG 3 
LG 4 
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period,2 they successfully reacted to the government’s proposal in its agenda setting 
stage. In light of this course of events, a major question to be answered is ‘are we going 
to consider the pro-abortion lobby as successful since it avoided further limitation of the 
abortion period or as unsuccessful since its lobbying could not render the extension of 
this period further to its ideal point?” This case demonstrates that the neglect of 
influence wielded at different stages of decision making may obscure the validity of a 
research’s findings. With this caveat in mind, the dissertation seeks to unpack the whole 
policy making processes with respect to settlement of such specific issues. However, it 
rather concentrates on lobbying success which requires more deliberation on ‘the 
lobbyists’ impact over policy outcomes’. Thus, the inferences of the dissertation will be 
more about only a particular aspect of the influence process- that is the outcome of 
policy making.  
Second, since some policy issues are extremely complex with several details, the 
policy outcome may not be wholly in line with and reflect all the preferences of a 
lobbying group. As Christine Mahoney puts it, “even knowing groups’ stated objectives 
and policy outcomes, we may still not have enough information for correct coding. If 
they got nothing but prevented something worse, have they succeeded? If they got some 
of what they wanted but not all, have they failed?” (2007: 37). A specific lobbying 
should still be considered as successful, if it draws the outcome closer to its preferences 
or even in cases where it avoids its least preferred outcome. The abortion issue again 
clearly illustrates the point. We should still consider the pro-abortion lobby as 
successful, since it avoided further limitation of the legal terms for abortion; if not 
realize their preference for its extension. If one aims to comprehend such degrees of 
success, then it has methodological implications. To better assess such differences in 
degrees, a researcher should methodologically go beyond text analysis and surveys, 
trace the process in detail, and draw on in-depth interviews with the relevant actors.  
Third, the concurrence between the issue preferences of the policy makers and a 
particular lobbying group may lead one to mistakenly exaggerate the latter’s influence. 
For instance, over the last decade some faith based interest groups in Turkey had 
become increasingly critical about the status of Diyanet (the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs) –an administrative unit under the authority of Turkish Prime Ministry through 
                                                            
2 For instance, the Turkish Penal Code Women Platform demands extension of this period to twelve weeks. A 
detailed discussion is provided in Chapter 2. 
 13 
 
which the government can oversee religious activity. Yet, there is also the Sunni 
majority which upholds a counter position on this issue as this majority has a strong 
interest in the preservation of the Diyanet which provides several religious services to 
the Suuni community. The AKP government is also naturally predisposed to opt for the 
Diyanet’s current status, since the institution represents the major apparatus through 
which the government controls religious activity. The question then is: how much 
influence can be attributed to the pro-status quo lobbying group for which the 
government’s policy stance is of best interest. This case highlights one of the gravest 
problems associated with studying influence that is a lobbying group may have done 
little to affect the decision making process, yet the outcome regarding a particular issue 
may reflect its preferences simply due to preference concurrence (For similar accounts, 
see: Barry, 1980a; Barry 1980b; Klüver, 2011: 490). Thus a research should either be 
able to delineate whether lobbyist realize their preferences simply due to luck or as a 
result of intensive lobbying; or instead make inferences only about the winners and 
losers of the decision making process -that is success/failure with respect to policy 
outcomes.  
In the case of an EU negotiating country, when analyzing such policy making 
processes, one should also take into account the EU as an external reform anchor. 
Consider now another policy issue about which there is divergence between the 
positions of the government and a particular group of lobbyists and consider as well that 
on the same issue the lobbyists’ policy position is close to that of the EU’s. For 
instance, several stakeholders along with women organizations voice their concerns 
about the AKP government’s attempt to recriminalize adultery during the Penal Code 
amendment process in Turkey. This government proposal had also led to fierce 
polemics within the political sphere. Besides, the EU launched heavy criticisms against 
the proposal and played a significant role in its withdrawal through threatening the 
government with the trump card of not to open accession negotiations. In this specific 
case, the EU pressure represented a strong disincentive for the government and a solid 
and ardent support for the lobbying against recriminalization of adultery. Combination 
of the EU’s pressures and domestic level resistance should have together been 
influential over the policy outcome. Yet, this combination leaves us with the bias that 
one can overestimate or underestimate the influence of the domestic resistance since this 
policy position converges with that of the EU, making it challenging to identify the 
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main cause of the policy shift. These problems thus further legitimize our concentration 
on lobbying success instead of influence.  
Last but not least, an organization may chose to resort to or lobby European 
supranational institutions, which are then expected to transmit their preferences back to 
domestic decision makers. For instance, in cases of human rights violations, individuals 
and NGOs may apply to European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). If this high court 
discovers a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights, it rules that the 
respondent government should revise its domestic law accordingly. Moreover, the EU 
institutions also refer to the ECHR rulings as a supplement in the absence of effective 
mechanisms of conditionality. The domestic level lobbyists of the EU-negotiating 
countires may choose to influence the policy positions of these supranational level 
institutions which are expected, due to conditions of power asymmetry, to act as more 
effective drivers of domestic policy change in comparison to the lobbyist’s strategy of 
directly lobbying their governments. The inability to assess such indirect channels of 
success may also radically obscure the validity of a research’s findings.  
Overall, it is exigent to assess interest group influence which is an extremely 
complex process. First, there are different stages -such as agenda-setting, formulation 
and implementation of policies- at each of which policy advocates lobby to wield 
influence. In order to improve validity and reliability of its findings, a research on 
lobbying success may either account for participation at these different stages; or in 
order to stand aloof from this process related complexity, it may -as this dissertation 
opts for in making its inferences- concentrate on the outcome of the process that is 
lobbying success defined as preference realization in the policy outputs. An additional 
complexity arises from the fact that several actors actively take part within these 
processes. The lobbying groups may chose to interact with and impact not only the 
governmental structures but also they may choose to strive for the support of some other 
actors of the process including other groups within civil society, the political parties in 
the opposition, the EU institutions, as well as supranational courts such as the ECHR 
through whom they may expect to indirectly impact decisional outcomes. ‘How the 
ability to influence these potential different players of the process interacts with 
lobbying success?’ is another critical question. Finally, some policy issues are many-
sided and involve several details. Bearing in mind this issue complexity, one should be 
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able to address the differences in degrees of success with respect to reform of different 
aspects of these complex issues.  
 
1.1.2. Alternative Methods of Influence Measurement 
 
The literature measuring interest group influence had been so far sophisticated 
with qualitative and quantitative techniques including ‘process-tracing’, ‘the attributed 
influence method’ and ‘assessing the degree of preference attainment’ (Dür, 2008a) and 
there are also others that offer these techniques’ combined application (see: Arts & 
Verschuren, 1999). Yet, none of these suggestions have provided a fully equipped 
strategy to avoid all the above discussed measurement biases. Alert of these biases, we 
can still settle on a feasible strategy to assess lobbying success.  
The process-tracing strategy is principally applied by small-N studies (for such 
studies see, for instance: Cowles, 1995; Warleigh, 2000; Pedler, 2002; Dür, & De 
Bièvre, 2007; Michalowitz, 2007). It looks for causal mechanisms and intervening 
variables through which the final policy about a particular issue is produced and to this 
end it provides detailed examination of each case. The following is a schematic 
representation of a possible causal chain proposed by Andreas Dür (2008: 49): 
The preferences of the interest group  lobbying according to these preferences 
 access to decision makers  the responses that they receive from the decision 
makers  the extent to which the final policy reflect interest group preference  the 
extent to which the interest group is satisfied with the final policy.  
In the Turkish case, this causal chain involves some alternative links that some 
lobbying groups are able to utilize. As argued above, the EU enters into the picture as an 
extra channel of influence when one is dealing with an EU negotiating country. Some 
lobbying groups, which can utilize the opportunity structures created by access to EU 
institutions or through applications to ECHR, may increase their chances of realizing 
their interests. In their case, one should consider additional causal mechanisms such as 
lobbying in the EU and the EU’s communication of these lobbyists’ preferences back to 
domestic decision makers (see Figure 1.2).  
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In-depth analysis of these different aspects of the causal chain provides valuable 
information about the different faces of influence. Yet, process-tracing is an unfeasible 
method for large-N studies; since its in-depth analysis has to rely on small number of 
observations (both small number of policy issues and small number of interested 
parties). 
A rather straightforward strategy is to utilize ‘attributed influence’ method which 
draws on surveys and interest groups are asked about their self and peer-assessments of 
influence (see for instance: Edgell & Thomson, 1999; Pappi & Henning, 1999; Dür & 
De Bièvre, 2007). A major problem associated with this method is that, as Nelson 
Polsby (1960) argues, the results which rest on this strategy will be about lobbyists’ 
perceptions of influence rather than the actual influence. 
To measure lobbying success, some other studies witin the interest group 
literature concentrated solely on the degree to which an organization attained its 
preferences (Schneider & Baltz 2004; Mahoney, 2007; Dür, 2008b). Studies applying 
this method basically make inferences about influence by looking at the distance 
between the ideal point of the interest group and the final outcome. As in ‘attributed 
influence’ strategy, this method also relies on information derived from lobbyists’ 
perceptions of their influence, leaving scholars exposed to similar biases since the 
interviewed groups may have quite a few reasons to conceal their real assessments of 
self-influence over policy outcomes.   
Overall, the methodological choice is in mutual interaction with the scope and 
nature of observations and the variables that a research is planning to test; and 
ultimately impacts the inferences that a research is going to make. In the following part 
of this chapter on design of inquiry, the dissertation provides further elaboration on its 
choice from among these alternative methodologies.  
 
1.1.3. Alternative Determinants of Interest Group Influence  
 
The interest group literature proposes several alternative explanatory factors to 
account for differences in organized interests’ ability to exert political influence. These 
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factors can be classified under the broad categories of structural, interest group specific 
and issue specific characteristics.  
The structural context can be defined as the rules surrounding the policy making 
process and the degree of democratic accountability of a political system (Mahoney, 
2005; Mahoney 2007: 39). As far as the lobbying groups are concerned, these basically 
involve availability of participatory mechanisms, transparency of decision making, and 
responsiveness of the government (Michalowitz, 2007: 136). These institutional 
dynamics are generally deemed as constant in single country studies. If, however, the 
case under scrutiny is a democratizing country like Turkey and the time period, which 
corresponds to decision making process, is extensive; then during this process, the 
structural context may undergo transformations to alter chances of access to decision 
making. Moreover, such structures could be more available to certain groups whereas 
inaccessible for others. For instance, the lobbying on women’s human rights, one of the 
issue fields studied in this dissertation, enjoy more regularized access through 
mechanisms such as the Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women and 
its Advisory Board on the Status of Women which engages civil society advocates, 
academicians and representatives from all Turkish ministries in planning and 
implementation of the State policies on the status of women. Other than that, the 
creation of Women-Men Equal Opportunities Commission in March 2009 represents 
another step for further institutionalization of regularized access for the lobbying on 
gender mainstreaming. Thus, concerning the ability to partake within the law making 
processes; women organizations owe much to these advances in the institutional 
context. Such mechanisms of regularized access are not available in the case of other 
groups –for instance, Alevi organizations and journalist organizations- which have to 
rely on the government’s willingness to come to table and bargain with such groups of 
stakeholders.    
Secondly, scholars have long debated the impact of numerous interest group 
specific characteristics on interest group influence. Some address the ‘type of an 
organization’, for instance, that whether the organization represents diffused or 
concentrated interests (see: Olson, 1965; Pollack, 1997; Schneider & Baltz, 2004). 
Others study ‘legitimacy’ -operationalized through the age of an organization- (Keefe, 
1988); the resources spend on lobbying (McCarthy & Zald, 1978; Furlong, 1997; Dür, 
2005; Woll, 2007); membership size of an organization (Keefe, 1988; for the opposite 
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argument see: Olson, 1965); and the nature of lobbying coalitions (Hojnacki, 1997, 
Hula, 1999; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 2011b).  
Organizational resources mainly correspond to money and staff committed to 
establish contacts with decision makers, to provide information on constituency 
interests, to provide expertise on policy issues, and information on the opinions of other 
policy makers which may be provided to authorities in exchange for the realization of a 
group’s preferences. An organization may alternatively devote its resources to 
mobilization of the general public through media campaigns, through press conferences, 
press releases and dissemination of research as well as through boycotts and 
demonstrations to generate public opinion and then expect this societal consensus to 
become an element of pressure over the decision makers. The amount of resources 
employed in the service of these different strategies may impact an organization’s 
chances of influencing policy outcomes. Resources can be measured through estimating 
the sum of the budget and the professional staff dedicated to lobbying on a specific 
issue. Using the same measures, Scott Furlong (1997) suggests that their combination 
provides a good measure of a group’s commitment to rule making process and argues 
that as this commitment increase, so too should a group’s influence on the process; yet 
through empirical investigation of this hypothesis, he finds evidence to the contrary. 
Some other scholars (see for instance: Baumgartner et al., 2009) have also empirically 
demonstrated the weakness of resource endowment in terms of predicting lobbying 
success. Resource endowment may increase influence in the form of access to decision 
making, yet it may or may not result in lobbying success if this success is measured 
through preference realization in the policy outputs.     
With respect to some policy issues, the lobbyists may be supported or opposed by 
other policy advocates who have vested interests on the same issue. As Sefa Şimşek 
puts it, “...civil society is generally understood as a single, homogenous society”; yet 
“there are different civil societies or, more precisely, different groups in a civil society. 
These groups may have variegated interests and exhibit separate political attitudes” 
(2004: 47). It is necessary, therefore, to explore not only how different lobbyists relate 
to the political decision makers but also how they interact with their allies and 
adversaries within civil society. Organizations with similar preferences tend to rally 
around these preferences –that is, they form lobbying coalitions- and engage in 
collective efforts to pull the content of the final policies towards their ideal points. They 
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prefer to work through issue based coalitions given the reasonable conviction that 
compared to individual efforts; coalitions would have more potential in terms of 
influencing policy outcomes. In their analysis of interest group influence, recent interest 
group scholarship addresses that it is critical to consider and test the size of such 
lobbying coalitions as one of the key variables in determining lobbying success 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009). However, intensity of collective lobbying efforts may also 
account for the ability to influence decision making about a reform issue. The strength 
of a lobbying coalition therefore may not only depend on the size of its membership 
relative to the counter lobbying coalition, but also on the magnitude of collective efforts 
to impact policy making. Besides, the number of powerful actors within a coalition may 
also account for that coalition’s influence over the policy output. Yet, the difficulty 
associated with measuring concepts such as strength and power should have kept 
scholars away from investigating these aspects of lobbying coalitions and limited their 
analysis to size measured through the number of organizations that rally around a 
particular policy stance.  
Thirdly, some scholars also address issue characteristics as additional factors that 
would account for the variation in lobbying success. Those proposed in the literature are 
the scope, the salience, the issue conflict and complexity of policy issues, or the 
occurrence of a focusing event (see Dür & De Bièvre, 2008; Mahoney, 2007; Dür, 
2008c; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 2010). 
Issues can be classified according to their scope -that is, their impact over a broad 
spectrum of interests. If the scope of an issue is high, the decision makers will be 
pressured by multiple interests and as Mahoney (2007: 40) points out, decision makers 
“would not be well-advised to follow the lead of a single special interest” which then 
constitutes a challenge for the lobbying organizations in terms of realizing their goals. 
Additionally, issues vary according to their salience. Mahoney (2007: 43) measures 
issue salience through media coverage of issues in major newspapers and presents 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that as the salience of an issue increases, the 
lobbying success decreases. Although these issue characteristics (scope and salience) 
appear to be important factors to account for lobbying success, some other scholars 
claim that their impact can be moderated by the relative size of the lobbying coalitions 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009; Klüver, 2011: 488). For instance, if there is widespread 
concurrence among different groups on a salient or a large scope reform issue, then their 
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preferences are likely to be reflected in the final policy. Alternatively, there may be a 
severe conflict between two opposing groups on a less salient or small-scope issue 
which would hinder the likelihood of a group to fully realize its preferences. According 
to these accounts, the impact of scope and salience of an issue is expected to change 
depending on the configuration of coalitions.  
Another issue characteristic is the level of conflict over an issue. Interest groups 
sometimes lobby for preferences which may diametrically oppose the preferences of 
some other groups within civil society. A lobbying group may become unable to exert 
any influence over issues about which there are clear demarcations in society and 
accordingly about which there is no accord of viewpoints among the powerful actors of 
the decision making process. In other words, the level of conflict over an issue may 
negatively impact an organization’s chances of wielding influence on the final decision 
(Salisbury et. al., 1987; Mahoney, 2007). Conflict over an issue can be considered as 
‘high’ when there are strong countervailing forces that push for directly opposite ends; 
‘medium’ when there are multiple perspectives with slight differences of viewpoint; and 
‘non-existent’ when there is consensus on a policy issue. Other than that, a further 
distinction should be made that counter-interests arise not only among the interest 
groups but also between interest groups and decision makers. Lobbying success 
becomes much more difficult if the demands of the lobbying groups clearly violate the 
core interests of the decision makers (Michalowitz, 2007: 137). 
The following section details whether and how these alternative conditions of 
lobbying success can be analytically observed and methodologically approached in the 
empirical cases of the dissertation.  
 
1.2. Assessing Interest Group Influence in the Turkish Case 
 
1.2.1. The Challenge of Sampling Interest Groups in the Turkish Case 
 
According to most recent figures (as of January 21, 2013) provided by the 
Department of Associations, there are 93.777 registered associations that actively 
operate within the sphere of Turkish civil society. Small percentage of this crowd 
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actively lobbies the political structures and seeks to exert political influence and instead 
many groups within Turkish civil society rather operate at the local level and lack the 
purpose of playing any role with respect to decision making. It is extremely demanding 
to extract an exact list of influence seeking lobbyists out of this complex and ever 
changing population and not viable for a single study to cover the whole lobbying 
universe. One potential way out of this complexity is to first concentrate on certain 
critical issue fields within which the lobbying activities take place. Once a particular 
policy domain is specified, it becomes less complicated to discern the relevant players 
of that domain and this strategy also disentangles one from the challenge of coping with 
lobbyists with multiple concerns and goals who lobby on many issues across wide range 
of issue areas.  
 
1.2.2. Choice of Issue Areas 
 
The dissertation resorts to a modest workable strategy of driving information from 
lobbying under particular issue areas - gender mainstreaming, Alevi rights and media 
freedoms. Essentially, the selection of these three policy areas is purposive. All of them 
are critical for Turkey’s progress with respect to human rights improvement and 
democratization and thus became highly salient in the process of Turkey’s negotiations 
for the EU membership. The European Parliament (2011) highlights the situation of 
women, the lack of protection of national minorities, and the deterioration of press 
freedom, as the main remaining challenges in Turkey’s process of accession to the EU.  
Albeit a series of progressive reforms, the legislative framework regulating these 
issue areas remains largely unsettled. Over the last decade, there had been 
unprecedented improvements in the scope of human rights in Turkey through reform of 
the major laws such as the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Penal Code and the Press 
Code. Yet, today the policy making processes are filled with ongoing polemics about 
the need for revising their content. Besides, there has been some retrogression through 
legal arrangements such as the 2006 amendments to the Anti-Terror Law and the 
Internet Law of 2007 which introduced some strict restrictions on the exercise of 
freedom of expression. The political domain had also witnessed various reactions to and 
conflicts concerning certain demands from civil society such as some women 
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organizations’ requests for the establishment of a gender quota system in political 
representation and the removal of the ban on the Islamic headscarf; the Alevi 
organizations’ demand for removal of the compulsory religious instruction in schools 
and their demand for official recognition of their places of worship; and the journalists 
organizations’ lobbying for revisions to a pleathora of restrictive provisions of the Anti-
Terror Law and the Penal Code. 
There are also instances that groups lobbying for rights and freedoms under these 
three issue categories had shown success at least with respect to access to political 
decision making, contributed to content formulation processes and showed some 
success in pulling the content of certain laws towards their preferences. In general, there 
is progress and yet a considerable level of deadlock and even retreat in the freedoms 
pertaining to the issues of gender rights, Alevi rights and media freedoms in Turkey. 
This variation indicates that those, who lobby for these rights and freedoms, should also 
vary in terms of their ability to influence the related policy making processes. These 
variations are expected to serve the main purpose of this dissertation -that is to test the 
alternative determinants of lobbying success under these issue areas.  
 
1.2.2.1.  The Literature on Lobbying for Gender Mainstreaming 
 
In the sphere of gender mainstreaming, women organizations represent the main 
visible group of lobbyists that actively seek to participate within the related policy 
making processes. Throughout 2000s, they have not only tremendously increased in 
number, but also developed capacity to collaborate under platform structures (see Table 
2.1 in Chapter 2). Their lobbying activities directed at influencing decisional outcomes 
have also substantially increased during this period with several detailed policy 
suggestions and important contributions regarding the draft major laws such as the Civil 
Code and the Penal Code (Ayata & Tütüncü 2008: 381; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 563-
564) that concern women’s rights in Turkey; and compared to their advocacy efforts in 
the 1990s, they have shown substantial progress in terms of the ability to influence 
gender related policy outcomes. Part of the hitherto literature suggests that this progress 
should be a factor of the women organizations’ ability to utilize the opportunity 
structures provided by the conditionality of the EU membership (Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 
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2009; Korkut & Eslen-Ziya, 2011: 391; Ecevit, 2007: 200); emergence of shared 
feminist discourses among these women organizations (Coşar & Gencoğlu-Onbaşı, 
2008: 334-339); their strategy of intensifying advocacy efforts throughout this process 
(Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2009: 372; Ecevit, 2007: 200); and high level of institutionalization 
within the women’s movement (Coşar & Gencoğlu-Onbaşı, 2008: 334). 
However, there are still limits to this group of lobbyists’ role within decision 
making as their good relations with the government have been erratic during the AKP 
era. Observing these relations, a group of scholars have begun to question the 
sustainability of the AKP’s choice for cooperation with women organizations (Coşar & 
Gencoğlu-Onbaşı, 2008: 326; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 568) given the AKP’s 
“conservative approach to womanhood, shaped first and foremost in terms of the 
familial sphere on the basis of religious-nationalist understanding” (Coşar & 
Yeğenoğlu, 2011: 557) boosted by the persistence of “the challenges of the mainstream 
political culture which stems from the predominantly male-dominated politics where 
communications with civil society institutions are limited” (Esim & Cindoğlu, 1999: 
178). Thus, on the basis of these challenges, this group of scholars warns against 
exaggerating the leverage of women organizations in the formation of gender policies in 
Turkey.  
Taken as a whole, the existing literature on women organizations’ decision 
making participation patterns in Turkey already gives us some hints about the possible 
dynamics at play in leading to ups and downs in the route to gender equality. These 
dynamics bear resemblance to explanatory factors offered in interest group influence 
literature such as the institutional context, coalition formation and issue conflict. In 
Chapter 2, the dissertation evaluates the ‘relative’ impact of these dynamics along with 
a set of other possible factors and seeks to show how they interact with one another in 
explaining the variation in success/failure of lobbying across gender issues.  
 
1.2.2.2.  The Literature on Lobbying for Alevi Issues 
 
The Alevi organizations’ struggle for recognition have stirred increased academic 
attention in the post-2007 period mainly given their visible access to political decision 
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making through workshop series initiated in the summer of 2007. Although 
discontinuous, the workshops had filled a huge gap when taken into account the 
previous paucity of data, knowledge, interest and lobbying with respect to the Alevi 
issues. In the post-workshop period one can also observe considerable upsurge of 
demand making of parliamentarians with respect to certain Alevi issues, reflecting the 
avail of workshops in raising awareness also within the sphere of politics. Some 
scholars evaluated this process optimistically asserting that the workshops indeed 
created a forum for dialogue -with the State, as well as, with the representatives of 
Sunni majority- within which the Alevi organizations found chance to raise their 
demands: 
   The process of dialogue and deliberation will empower Alevi citizens. As a result of the 
‘Alevi opening’, Alevi and Sunni citizens will get to know each other better through 
exposure to one another’s culture, worldviews, and problems.” (Köse, 2010: 161) 
   These workshops are a historic beginning for the ‘rapprochement’ between the Alevis and 
the state as well as the Alevis and the Sunnis.” (Subaşı, 2010: 165) 
Other scholars even underline improvements in the pre-workshop period such as: 
rapid expansion of Alevi organizations (Çamuroğlu, 1997: 26),3 transformations in the 
State’s policy towards the Alevi community, and rising media attention towards the 
Alevi issues (Poyraz, 2005). Findings from a group of other studies have attached 
significance to the EU reform process as an opportunity structure –a catalyst for the 
Alevis’ ability to raise their demands (Poyraz, 2006; Steward, 2007; Grigoriadis, 2006: 
454; Ulusoy 2011: 414). However, these supportive conditions including networking 
among the community associations (Soner & Toktaş 2011: 431), media attention, and 
international support could not be fully utilized in the face of some unfavorable 
structural dynamics. Concentrating on these adverse dynamics, part of the literature on 
the Alevi movement also draws attention to internal divisions within the community 
(Dressler, 2008: 282), especially the clashes with respect to representation at the 
political level (Dressler, 2008: 290-291) and the Sunni State policies (Steward, 2007) 
which have negatively reflected over the ability of the Alevi organizations in demanding 
the Alevis’ human rights. Overall, similar to the women’s movement, the Alevi 
movement was reinvigorated in 2000s under this context of complex supportive and 
disruptive dynamics. Chapter 3 elaborates on the weight of these different dynamics in 
                                                            
3 Reha Çamuroğlu asserts that the motive behind this expansion was basically the instinct of Alevi groups to protect 
their identity against the revival of Islamic fundamentalism. 
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explaining success/failure of alternative lobbying positions emerged on a set of Alevi 
issues.  
Compared to other religious minority groups with official minority status such as 
Greeks, Armenians and Jews; the Alevi organizations lobby for a set of community 
interests which became subject to several legislative proposals that offer diversity with 
respect to satisfying the needs and demands of a particular community. The Alevi 
organizations also differ from the representatives of other religious minority groups 
given the multidimensionality of the Alevi issues and the representation of the Alevi 
community by highly organized alternative associations which together provide prolific 
data to utilize and compare with other lobbying experiences included in this 
dissertation.  
The Alevi organizations also diverge from other minority groups concerning the 
ways in which they relate to the political decision making structures. Hitherto, the 
negotiations with the representatives of the non-Muslim groups had rather been 
rhetorical which were not given any chance to play part in the formal decision making 
processes, thus these groups are not considered within the confines of the analysis. The 
dissertation also omits from its analysis the lobbying concerning demands of the 
Kurdish minority in Turkey, since it is extremely challenging to investigate this issue 
domain given a set of peculiar characteristics of the movement. The ethnic identity 
based expectations of the Kurdish movement represents one of the thorniest issues of 
Turkish politics, as -besides peaceful political activities for civil rights- it involves a 
separatist aspect which is tried to be achieved through violent armed rebellion in the 
southeast of Turkey. This dual character makes the movement distinct regarding the 
ways in which its representatives relate to the governing party and the State institutions 
including the military (as the guerilla warfare leads to an armed confrontation). Besides 
the above mentioned duality of the movement and the resultant problematic relations 
with the political authorities, another characteristic of the movement that tell it apart is 
that in the past two parliamentary periods, representatives of the movement (in the form 
of political parties) have been able to advocate the interests of the Kurdish community 
within the structures of the Parliament. Although we can easily identify the actors of the 
movement within the political domain; it is not that straightforward to uncover the 
Kurdish associations and it is expected that the political authorities will continue to 
deny these groups any legitimacy to partake within decision making processes, as long 
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as they fail to distance themselves from the separatist movement. Overall, the Kurdish 
lobby does not provide a good comparative fit as it has some special properties which 
seem to have a bearing on the lobbying success/failure of the movement. 
In Chapter 3, the dissertation thus solely concentrates on lobbying with respect to 
Alevi issues which provide prolific comparable empirical data with issues discussed and 
actors involved within the related policy making processes.  
 
1.2.2.3. The Literature on Lobbying for Freedom of the Press 
 
Contrary to the fertile academic literature on the lobbying within the sphere of 
gender mainstreaming and increasing academic interest about the lobbying concerning 
Alevi rights, there is scant academic interest and discussion as regards the lobbying on 
the freedom of the media and the press. Most of the academic studies on media sector in 
Turkey primarily concentrate on press freedom in the form of its independence from the 
political. To this end, some analyze the partisan coverage of the news media and 
demonstrate divisions within the media along political orientations (Bayram, 2010)  and 
especially the new tensions created through rapid development of the conservative/pro-
AKP government media committed to dissemination of the governing party’s 
viewpoints (see: Kaya & Çakmur, 2010) and responses/reactions from its opposite (see: 
Keyman, 2010). Others look at partisanship of the newspaper readers and evaluate the 
competitiveness of the media market through such indicators (see: Çarkoğlu & Yavuz, 
2010).  
The alignments between major media outlets and political orientations are not 
specific to Turkey and they prevent the media from truly performing its function of 
monitoring certain developments in the service of public interests. For instance, Ahmet 
Uysal (2009) demonstrated how a media environment dominated with ideological 
concerns, is reflected over the news coverage of social movements and thus the ability 
of these movements in conveying their viewpoints to the public.  
The issues of media pluralism, media-party parallelism and polarizations around 
ideological dichotomies such as secularism and religious conservatism are critical in 
understanding media independence. However, to be able to assess the complete picture 
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on press freedom it is also necessary to discuss the regulatory environment conducive to 
such political control and influence over the press and the broadcasts. In their elaborate 
study on media landscape in Turkey, Esra Elmas and Dilek Kurban (2010) provides 
detailed analysis of this environment reviewing not only the history of the State-media 
relations but also the media regulatory framework. Their report additionally provides 
some information about the actors involved in the formulation of this framework and 
concludes that there remains much to be accomplished and that sector specific 
associations lack capacity or will to partake in the development of this framework 
(2010: 429). In her overview of changes in the media related regulations throughout 
2000s in Turkey, Mine Gencel Bek (2010) also attributes limited role to civil societal 
actors and demonstrates how the State’s interests were prioritized in reform of the 
regulatory framework. 
This dissertation argues that it would be deterministic to attribute limited role to 
lobbyists without scrutinizing their access to the political level and delineating their 
demands and preference realization with respect to content formulation processes 
concerning each issue of interest. Chapter 4 traces the adjustments in the freedom of the 
press and the media related legislation throughout 2000s concentrating on alternative 
policy positions of different stakeholders and evaluates factors behind these competing 
actors’ bargaining capacity or lack thereof. The evidence derived from the debates in 
TBMM proceedings and content analysis of the media demonstrate that in effect there 
have been several suggestions raised by sector specific organizations concerning the 
content of several press and media related reforms and that at least some major 
organizations were able to get involved within the decision making processes. Besides, 
the journalist organizations are not the only stakeholders that have interest over the 
issue of freedom of the press. As Uysal’s (2009) study indicates social movements such 
as women’s movement and environmentalist movement have strong interest in press 
freedom, since the press represents the major medium of access to the public. Thus, 
press freedoms concerns not only sector specific groups such as journalist organizations, 
but also every other interest seeking group that struggle to raise their demands through 
the use of the media and the press. 
The previous claims in the literature on this sector thus need to be validated with 
thorough analysis of the participation patterns of the interested actors and differences in 
their framings of press freedom and consequent alternative proposals for reform. Once 
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empirically demonstrated, these different framings and proposals would give further 
insights about competing interests over the operations of the sector, as well as, its 
independence from political control.    
 
1.2.3. Potential Factors Determining Lobbying Success under these Issue Areas 
 
1.2.3.1.  Issue Conflict 
 
Contrary to the salience of these three policy areas in the EU reform process, the 
extension of some related freedoms and rights have been belated basically in the 
background of certain ideological polarizations which became excessively visible and 
irreconcilable under the changing context of Turkey’s socio-political space in the 2000s. 
Counter-approaches to reform of some policy issues have begun to take shape under this 
highly polarized climate. From among Turkey’s several intertwined socio-political 
cleavages what loom large are the tensions especially between the identity-citizenship 
based cleavages. The first one has emerged in the form of polarization between secular 
versus religious conservative identities and related norms and ideals, and on many 
policy issues, this polarization has led to alternative policy proposals and triggered 
tensions at the political level between the ruling AKP and the secular establishment –
mainly represented by CHP (the main opposition party in the Parliament), the military 
and the upper echelons of the judiciary. The EU requests for reform have in some cases 
contradicted religion, ideology and interest-driven policies of the AKP government and 
in others have disturbed the balance of power to the disadvantage of the secular 
establishment and the political opposition. Since AKP became the governing party in 
2002, with three successive election victories, it has reinforced its power within the 
sphere of politics, sought to build up a new understanding of Islam, developed policies 
compatible with this new understanding, and at the same time sought not to tarnish its 
pro-EU reformist image. The outcome was a hyphenated party identity as AKP, once in 
government, pledged for a synthesis in its agenda of change –the party jointly provided 
pro-European, reformist, democratic and besides some religiously conservative policies. 
According to Burhanettin Duran the term conservative democracy:  
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   gives an identity to the party without disturbing the international community and the 
secularist establishment in Turkey while at the same time assuring its Islamist electorate 
that Islam continues to play an important role in the party’s identity and policies. (2008: 86) 
This synthesis, however, has been exposed to fatigue and challenged given the ups 
and downs in the policy making processes with respect to human rights improvement in 
Turkey. The representatives of the opposition parties -most intensely the CHP 
representatives- have tried to exploit the assumption that the AKP government has 
hidden Islamic intentions and they have also generally referred to this assumption in 
formulating their policy positions. The clash between the AKP policies –attentive to 
Islamic sensitivities- and the policy proposals of the opposition parties have led to 
alternative articulations about what should be considered as a necessary democratic 
reform.  
Within this milieu of clashing secular versus religious conservative discourses, the 
reform of gender specific issues has emerged as one of the most visible domains of 
conflict capturing the attention of some scholars writing and theorizing about gender 
mainstreaming in Turkey (for these see, for instance: Arat, 2010; Coşar & Yeğenoğlu, 
2011; Çitak & Tür, 2008; Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2008). Besides some visible terrains of 
this controversy such as the ban on Islamic headscarf, the issues of abortion and 
adultery; there are several other issues -such as women’s political representation, 
economic empowerment and overall role within society and family- the reform of which 
in varying degrees had become subject to the impact of the ideological confrontation 
concerning gender roles embedded within the confrontation between secular versus 
religious conservative discourses.  
The settlement of the demands of the Alevi community represents yet another 
critical policy domain that worst hit with the conflicts between secular versus religious 
conservative and in addition to that Sunni versus Alevi sectarian policy positions. 
Especially the fact that AKP has Sunni-Islamist roots has given rise to reservations 
among scholars concerning the AKP government’s ability to embrace certain demands 
of the Alevi community (see: Öktem, 2008; Liaras, 2009; Soner & Toktaş, 2011; 
Çarkoğlu & Bilgili, 2011).  
Similarly, the current legal framework on the freedoms pertaining to the media 
and the press again became a subject of controversy between the two camps. With 
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respect to punishment of offenses committed through the media and the press, the 
opposition party representatives often associate the AKP government with the 
investigations by public prosecutors and the arrest warrants by judges against the 
journalists. They basically concentrate on the ways in which the new media-government 
relations would disturb the power balances and argue that the existing regulatory 
framework and the government’s economic sanctions would easily be misused for 
political ends such as propagating the ruling party ideology, establishing monopoly in 
media, and suppressing and penalizing the opposition:  
   We regrettably and anxiously see that the political power, which seem to advocate 
freedoms due to conjuncture; in the present situation, have started to make legal 
arrangements to put into effect a substructure of a repressive regime (see Atilla Kart in 
Appendix 2). 
   The partisan media, which involves the media that was forced to knee before the 
government’s economic sanctions, went beyond the truth and being the voice of the public 
and is in a position to become the bugle of the government, the ruling party and the 
community, and turned to be administered through directives (see Murat Bozlak in 
Appendix 2). 
These declarations and others presented in Chapter 4 reveal that the ideological 
polarizations in the political sphere were also exceedingly manifest in the polemics over 
the regulation of the media and the press. Accompanying the confrontation of secular-
religious conservative discourses, a much more divisive identity cleavage was triggered 
by increased politization of the Kurdish identity issues which further contributed to 
conflict-ridden nature of the reforms concerning press freedom. Moreover, the 
opposition attributes great importance to the media as a fourth power -along with the 
legislature and the judiciary- to check upon the government’s possible propensity to 
arbitrariness. The failure of this fourth pillar to provide criticisms and controls as 
regards the operations of the government would strengthen the government’s hand with 
respect to non-cooperative policy making which would also adversely affect the civil 
society’s access to the executive processes.  
Taken as a whole, the ongoing ideological and interest based acrimony between 
secularist versus religious conservative camps is a distinctive dynamic of Turkey which 
exceptionally manifests itself in the discussions about certain rights and freedoms 
pertaining to women, the Alevi minority and the press and the media. These three 
 31 
 
represent interesting case studies to uncover the weight of ideology and interest based 
acrimonies within the political sphere in determining the articulation and prospects of 
human rights reforms in the Turkish case.  
Under these broad issue categories there are both issues over which there are clear 
demarcations in society and accordingly about which there is no accord of viewpoints 
among the powerful actors of the decision making process; as well as, issues that did not 
become subject to this conflict to provide us with the opportunity to compare. Thus, the 
analysis may first outline alternative policy positions in each case; look at their level of 
conflict with the interests of other actors and also whether and the extent to which these 
interests violate the policy preferences of the government. The dissertation formulates 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The more the policy issues are subject to lobbying of directly 
opposing interests; it is less likely that a lobbying group realizes its preferences in the 
policy output.  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the conflict between the core policy preferences of the 
government and a lobbying group, it is less likely that this lobbying group realizes its 
preferences in the policy output. 
 
1.2.3.2.  Coalition Formation Dynamics 
 
Comparison of lobbying across the issues of gender mainstreaming, Alevi’s 
minority rights and the media and the press related freedoms is expected to provide 
valuable information concerning the linkage between coalition formation patterns and 
lobbying success.  
Over the last decade, women organizations had become increasingly successful in 
establishing issue based coalitions with broad based participation (see Table 2.1. in 
Chapter 2). This dissertation expects that the capacity to build coalitions around issues 
of common concern should have been positively reflected upon the lobbyists’ ability to 
alter major legislative acts that frame various gender issues. Yet, there are also specific 
symbolic issues such as the ban on Islamic headscarf that used to crosscut the 
movement and lead to alternative framings of women’s human rights by different 
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women organizations (Coşar & Onbaşı, 2008: 326). Thus, it needs to be examined how 
lobbyists are aligned with alternative policy positions along the policy space on such 
conflict-ridden issues. One needs to also account for other actors from outside the 
movement that have a stake over gender policies who are strong enough to constitute 
potential opposition and who offer alternative conceptions of gender rights.   
In comparison to the women’s movement, there is a higher level of divergence 
within the Alevi movement given the range of policy positions endorsed by different 
Alevi organizations. This group of lobbyists’ had been unable to overcome certain 
collective action problems in reaching a compromise concerning how the political 
decision makers should settle the issues of their common concern. The dissertation 
expects that this internal disunity should have added to this group of lobbyists’ 
weakness in attaining its policy preferences. Besides the rival claims of the Alevi 
organizations concerning the interests of the Alevi community, there is also a strong 
Sunni-counter lobbying whose faith based interests constitute impediment to certain 
Alevi expectations for reform. Thus, to demonstrate the linkage between lobbying 
success and coalition formation patterns under this issue category, one needs to take into 
account not only the constellations of coalitions by alternative representatives of the 
Alevi interests; but also the characteristics of the coalitions by the representatives of the 
Sunni counter-lobby and specify how each are located on the policy space on any given 
issue.  
The journalist organizations mostly unite with respect to their preferences on the 
issues of press related rights; yet in the past, they failed to warrant sufficient access to 
decision making processes which ultimately led them -since 2010- to resort to broad 
based coalition formation with around 90 organizations participating within the 
Platform for Freedom to Journalists. Whether journalists succeed more through change 
in their lobbying strategy is a critical question to ask. The nature of the lobbying 
coalitions that emerged around freedom of the press gives us the opportunity to compare 
the significance of coalitions not only time wise within this specific issue field, but also 
with other issue categories studied in this dissertation.  
Overall, the dissertation expects to observe variegated policy positions which 
sometimes coincide and at others clash with one another and in line with the 
constellations of these positions over the policy spectrum, it also expects divergences 
 33 
 
with respect to patterns of coalition formation. Following the recent literature on interest 
group influence (Klüver, 2011b; Baumgartner, 2009); the dissertation explores the 
capacity to build coalitions around specific issues under the issue fields of gender 
mainstreaming, Alevi rights, and media freedoms and probes on the relationship 
between the relative size of these coalitions and their lobbying success. The dissertation 
formulates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  The higher the relative size of a lobbying coalition on a policy 
issue; it is more likely that this lobbying coalition realizes its preferences in the policy 
output. 
 
1.2.3.3.  Europeanization: Rethinking Lobbying Success in an EU-Negotiating 
Country 
 
The research on the linkage between Europeanization and domestic change has 
flourished starting from the mid-1990s and so far the literature has been branched out 
leading Europeanization to become an encompassing concept. In its broadest sense, this 
relationship is defined as a process with multiple dimensions and it refers to EU-led 
transformations such as “processes of cultural change, new identities formation, policy 
change, administrative innovation, and even modernization” (Radaelli, 2000: 4). The 
underlying focus in all of these different understandings is on the changes that the EU 
integration and enlargement processes have entailed. Yet, there are various levels and 
multiple mechanisms of change, routes of influence and objects of Europeanization 
(regional integration, change in domestic structures, policies and actor identities). Thus, 
scholars came up with alternative explanations as to what is meant by Europeanization, 
depending on their focus on these different levels, mechanisms, routes and objects of 
change.  
The literature further matured when it became evident that the Europeanization 
experience is not specific to the EU Member States. As borders of the EU moved to 
south-eastwards with candidacy of Western Balkan countries and Turkey, the 
effectiveness of the EU’s transformative power had to be reconsidered; since 
mechanisms of EU conditionality and incentives operate in a distinct way under these 
alternative contexts of candidacy leading to differential impact of the EU. The 
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asymmetry of relations entrenched within the processes of candidacy -that is in order to 
qualify for membership, the candidates have to download the EU policies with little 
room to maneuver- differentiates candidates from the existing Member States. The 
impact of such asymmetry was extremely evident right after the start of Turkey’s EU 
candidacy with the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Scholars have thus begun to observe a 
rapid reform process and associate it with the EU’s transformative power through their 
analysis of the impact of the EU level developments, mechanisms of conditionality and 
incentives and the extent to which these were reflected over Turkey’s broader domestic 
transformations such as the democratic quality of the political regime (Aydın & 
Keyman, 2004; Müftüler-Bac, 2005) and the extent to which they have encouraged or 
enforced institutional level transformations, or altered legal and administrative 
structures (see the discussion in Bölükbaşı et. al. 2010). 
In their review of the literature on Turkey’s Europeanization, Thomas Diez et al. 
(2005: 1) criticize the early scholarly efforts for limiting themselves to the study of 
rather “...the ups and downs of this complex relationship, and on the analysis and 
assessment of existing as well as possible institutional linkages.” They warn that 
“...Europeanization during membership candidacy is by no means restricted to formal 
adaptation processes”  and drew attention to the loophole in the literature that although 
some of the earlier studies have addressed the impact of the EU on the development of 
civil society and citizenship rights in Turkey; their analysis were still primarily 
concerned with institutional transformations and fell short of explaining the ways in 
which the EU directly interacts with the civil society actors in order to elicit support for 
its agenda of democratization (Diez et. al., 2005: 3). Others (see: Tocci, 2005; Göksel & 
Güneş, 2005; and Rumelili, 2005) also agree that democratization in Turkey cannot be 
solely linked to the EU policies of conditionality and emphasize the need to study the 
mechanisms through which EU level factors interact with non-governmental actors who 
demand political change. In a similar vein, in their assessment of the decade old 
literature on the EU’s transformative impact on Turkey, Bölükbaşı et al. (2010) review a 
sample of articles in social science citation indexed journals which focus on 
Europeanization processes in Turkey. They criticize that scholars fail to identify the 
underlying causal mechanisms that would help better understand the ways in which the 
EU plays a causal role and they observe that “no unit in the sample employs horizontal 
Europeanization mechanisms as possible explanations of the ways in which the EU may 
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or may not lead to domestic change – mechanisms which could have been captured by a 
bottom-up research design” (Bölükbaşı et al., 2010: 474). They criticize the reviewed 
works for employing a top-down research design, for their lack of systematic search for 
other possible causes at the domestic level and for directly attributing the observed 
effects to the impact of the EU (Bölükbaşı et al., 2010: 467).  
Akin to the general literature on Turkey’s Europeanization, descriptive studies 
that adopt a top down research design dominate the literature on civil society 
participation into the EU reform process. Some earlier studies analyzed the limits and 
the success of the EU conditionality, the EU’s financial aid (Arkan, 2007) and the EU-
led reform process in terms of bringing about civil society empowerment in Turkey 
including aspects such as the legal status of and opportunity structures available to 
groups within civil society (see, for instance: Grigoriadis, 2009; Keyman & Öniş, 2007; 
Ulusoy, 2009; Ergun, 2010). A number of MA dissertations also focused on this 
specific relationship. Some analyzed the role of non-governmental organizations 
concerning Turkey’s integration process with the European Union (see, for instance 
Kocalar, 2006; Usta, 2006; Noyan, 2007) or these organizations’ perceptions about the 
process (see, for instance: Saygın, 2008) and others had sought to provide comparative 
account of differences between the approaches towards civil society in Turkey and in 
Europe (Tüzgiray, 2005). The main problem in these studies is the failure to establish 
causal linkages and lack of concern for systematic testing of hypotheses based on 
evidence form empirical data.  
Another grave methodological problem in the literature is related to the issue of 
case selection. Large-scope descriptive studies ignore this problem as they lack concern 
for systematic empirical data collection. Others either focus on particular civil society 
organizations (for such studies see: Göksel & Güneş, 2005; Türk, 2008; Yankaya, 2009) 
or group of organizations that are active in matters pertaining to a specific issue area 
(for such studies, see: Atan, 2004; Çelik, 2007; Alemdar, 2009) and there are as well 
studies that only concentrate on the organizations that are most vocal with respect to the 
EU related reforms (Ünalp-Çepel, 2006; Baykal, 2007). 
The literature is also limited given its scant attention to the differences in the 
expectations of several actors involved within the reform processes and to how the EU 
boosts or hampers their ability to realize these expectations. Paul Kubicek, for instance, 
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holds that “liberalization, regardless of how and by whom it occurs, would be 
welcomed, but one might wonder how well Turkish democracy can be consolidated if 
reforms are dependent upon actors ‘from above’ or external to the State itself” (2002: 
776). Especially after the start of accession negotiations, the EU became much more 
attentive to and started to put the emphasis rather on this longstanding problem. With 
respect to Turkey’s progress toward accession, the European Commission reported in 
2008 that: 
   As regards civil society organizations, governmental bodies regularly consult NGOs. 
However, there is no coherent legal framework organizing this cooperation. As a result, 
consultations are held on an ad hoc basis, with unclear selection criteria, and do not result 
in tangible policy outputs (European Commission, 2008: 18).  
In the post-2005 period, the EU became much more interested in integrating the 
Turkish civil society organizations into Turkey’s EU-led reform process and in helping 
and encouraging them to participate within the decision making processes. These 
transformations, however, first required a change in the hitherto legal status of civil 
society organizations and a change in the manner in which the State is accustomed to 
respond to the demands from the civil society realm.   
In their analysis of the hitherto chronic weakness of this realm, Turkish scholars 
primarily address the legacy of Turkey’s State tradition. Some historical studies within 
the literature (see: Mardin, 1969 and 1973; Heper, 1985, 1992 and 2000; Toprak, 1996) 
refer to early Republican and even Ottoman political traditions, and for continual 
marginalization of civil society into a narrow sphere of activity; they, before anything 
else, blame the legacy of State-civil society relations of these earlier traditions. 
According to Binnaz Toprak, the legacy of the strong State tradition in Turkey left 
“little room for individual initiative and collective pursuit of interests within 
autonomous domains, free from State interference” (1996: 91). Alternatively, Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu argues that “the actual strength of State is at best dubious” and that “a 
better way of defining State is as coercive and even arbitrary” (2002: 71). He identifies 
the Turkish State as interventionist and ‘distrustful’ towards civil society and relates the 
weakness of social activity and associability in Turkey to these unconstructive features 
of the State (Kalaycıoğlu, 2002: 68). Others, who observe State-civil society relations of 
the late 1980s in Turkey, refer to a legitimacy-crisis of this early State tradition 
(Keyman & İçduygu, 2003; Göymen, 2008). Moreover, during the same decade the 
 37 
 
Turkish civil society entered into a process of progress in both qualitative and 
quantitative terms (See: Keyman & İçduygu, 2003: 221). Before 2000s, the implications 
of that progress and the quality of its impact was yet to be seen given the continuing 
legal limits even over civil society’s autonomy from the State and scholars still question 
the potential for civil society’s contribution to democratization processes in Turkey. 
Although accepting that the EU policies have helped reinforce some pro-democratic 
forces within civil society; Sefa Şimşek, for instance, emphasizes that “the State cannot 
easily relinquish its centuries-old habit of manipulating civil society” (2004: 69) and he 
underlines also how some internal contradictions of the Turkish civil society especially 
its fragmented structure and quality of relations among the actors of this realm may still 
obscure the faith in this totality as a pro-democratic force.  
Such continuing reservations, however, do not necessarily reduce the importance 
of questions about civil society participation into decision making processes and 
alterations in the dynamics of this participation that Turkey’s Europeanization process 
has entailed. It becomes much more interesting to investigate how the tensions between 
this century-old legacy and transformations required by the EU negotiation process are 
reflected over lobbying success and thus the extent to which Europeanization can be 
appreciated for its potential to stipulate a change in the hitherto state of play concerning 
the State-civil society relations in Turkey. In explaining these transformations, a number 
of potential direct and indirect routes of EU impact can be delineated.  
 
1.2.3.3.1. The EU Negotiation Framework as a Political Opportunity 
Structure 
 
First, the EU negotiation framework leads to transformations in the structural 
dynamics of the bargaining between the State and groups within civil society, as the EU 
pushes for creation of some regularly operating domestic consultation mechanisms. 
Under these mechanisms, the EU demands from the candidate governments to seek 
collaboration with the stakeholders from civil society. It also sets a timetable for 
reforms and each time reform of a major law is carried to the agenda of the government, 
this provides lobbyists with the opportunity to step in and raise their demands pertaining 
to content formulation of these laws. Although these new political opportunity 
structures endow the lobbyists with the opportunity to participate (Diez et al. 2005; 
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Ulusoy, 2009), the success of lobbyists with respect to realizing their demands in the 
policy outcomes should depend more on the receptiveness of their government based on 
its policy preferences. The dissertation argues that the relationship between these 
structures and the success of domestic level lobbying is rather ‘spurious’ (see Figure 
1.2). 
Figure 1.2. Alternative routes of EU impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opportunity structures may facilitate greater access to decision making, yet the 
following chapters empirically demonstrate that the lobbyists’ success with respect 
policy outcomes is observed only at lower levels of conflict with the core policy 
preferences of the government.  
 
1.2.3.3.2. The EU’s Resource Endowment 
 
The EU endows lobbyists -especially, the projects on human rights, 
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advocates, who can generate projects concerning these issues, make the most of the EU 
financial support. However, it is uncertain whether and how the EU’s resource 
endowment strengthens the hand of lobbyists within decision making structures. 
Moreover, although the EU’s financial resource endowment might explain advance in 
the lobbyists’ capacity to participate, it requires us to establish additional links in 
demonstrating the causality between the EU’s resource endowment and lobbying 
success (see Figure 1.2). For instance, an organization might have access to excessive 
financial support of the EU, but it may only make a difference over its lobbying success 
if these resources are successfully committed to the rule-making processes. Besides, the 
interest group literature does not also provide any empirical support for the resource 
endowment hypothesis.   
 
1.2.3.3.3. The EU’s Adaptational Pressures and Feedbacks from the 
Domestic Level  
 
Above and beyond ‘resource endowment’ and ‘changes in the opportunity 
structures’, Europeanization impact can be better studied looking at the transformations 
created by the EU’s ‘adaptational pressures’. These pressures constitute a more direct 
and visible hard link (see Figure 1.2) between ‘Europeanization’ and ‘difference in the 
success patterns of alternative lobbying positions’. To legitimize their demands, a 
plethora of lobbyists make references to and push for convergence and harmonization 
with the EU prescribed policies. Yet, these EU level policies may not always concur 
with the policy objectives of the domestic level lobbyists. They may either not 
sufficiently satisfy the needs of lobbyists or in other instances they may even become 
counterproductive for lobbyists’ prospects of realizing their interests. For instance, 
despite protection of minorities is a foundational value of the EU, hitherto it’s standards 
did not sufficiently ameliorate the conditions of Alevis the same way as it does for the 
officially recognized minorities of Turkey.  
Furthermore, the EU’s approach to domestic level policy development may 
sometimes be superficial and advisory as there are policy issues concerning which the 
EU lacks concrete policy standards or a unified policy stance for the EU to be able to 
steer a particular policy outcome. In such cases where there is no clear EU template, the 
policy outcomes may take shape depending on the dynamics of the domestic level 
bargaining environment as it was, for instance, the case in the controversy in Turkey 
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concerning the ban on Islamic headscarf. Some lobbyists, who are unable to achieve 
success when left to the domestic level dynamics, may yet again resort to the European 
level supranational institutions such as the European Commission, the European 
Parliament or the European Court of Human Rights and try to influence these 
institutions policy perspectives and thus generate a policy position at the European level 
(see Figure 1.2). These institutions are then expected to pass on the lobbyists’ 
preferences back to domestic level and exert pressures for their realization. In the 
Turkish case, those lobbyists, which target and gain access to these extra-channels and 
if able to generate a policy position at the European level, are expected increase their 
chances of attaining their preferences. The dissertation probes whether these channels 
compensate for (lack of) direct access to domestic level decision makers.  
Taken as a whole, the impact of the EU’s adaptational pressures is expected to be 
differential across policy issues and may change over time on account of feedbacks 
from the domestic level (for similar accounts see, for instance Sedelmeier, 2006: 8). The 
dissertation explores whether and how these pressures empower certain policy positions 
yet at the same time obstruct the powers of others. It formulates the following 
hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: The more the EU’s policy requirements are compatible with the 
issue-based preferences of the domestic level lobbyists; it is more likely that these 
lobbyists realize their preferences in the policy outputs.  
Once the strengths and weaknesses of this hypothesized relationship are 
empirically demonstrated, it would also give us insights about the nature of the overall 
adjustment processes in Turkey (the downloading of the EU requirements). The Turkish 
transposition experience was once swift, yet never smooth and problem-free. Especially 
the delays and setbacks in the opening of new negotiation chapters had caused despair 
about the prospects of membership and consequently led to a slowdown in the pace of 
reforms. Besides this context sensitive nature of transposition; a rather recent strand of 
the literature on general EU transposition processes (see, for instance: Mastenbroek & 
Kaeding, 2006; Treib, 2003 and 2008) suggests that the linkage between the EU 
requirements and domestic adaptation is not necessarily automatic and depends on the 
policy-makers’ capability/incapability and willingness/unwillingness to transpose the 
EU requirements. The ability of the EU to yield positive domestic transformations can 
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also be mitigated by the nature of the political regime, constellations of major parties, 
and domestic political costs of compliance in the target countries (see: Schimmelfennig, 
Engert & Knobel: 2003; Schimmelfennig, 2005). These warnings about and growing 
emphasis on actor preferences from the domestic level and the domestic level dynamics 
of interaction among these actors -as essential components of transposition- is worthy of 
consideration.  
The dissertation’s theoretical model brings all this information together and 
probes how much of the policy outputs are externally induced administered through the 
mechanisms of conditionality; by the policy preferences of the decision makers; or by 
the amount of pressures exerted by stakeholder from the level of civil society. Thus, it is 
argued that in the Turkish case, indicators of lobbying success can be found at three 
different levels –the EU, the government and the grassroots. 
The research within the interest group literature- although provides alternative 
tests of several independent variables in explaining interest group influence, do not 
account for the above discussed first level -that is how the policy requirements from the 
supranational level may be reflected over the outcome. Naturally, these domestic-
international linkages were not subject to scrutiny in interest group literature, the bulk of 
which concentrates in influence seeking behavior at the supranational level. If a 
research focuses on decision making processes at the domestic level of an EU 
negotiating country, it additionally has to consider the potential of this extra channel of 
influence. To this end, the fourth hypothesis of the dissertation is expected to carry us a 
step forward in explaining the variation in lobbying success in Turkey. Emphasizing the 
uniqueness of the Turkish case (along with a number of other EU negotiating countries), 
the dissertation underlines the significance of alternative channels of influence provided 
by the EU negotiation framework -an aspect overlooked in the interest group literature. 
Within that literature, the issue conflict and the nature of coalitions have been widely 
accepted as the major determinants of lobbying success. However, these macro level 
observations fail to account for the additional impact of the EU’s adaptational pressures 
and their match with the policy preferences of actors from the domestic level, as well as 
lobbyists’ appeals to supranational EU-level and consequent externally imposed 
transposition processes in an EU negotiating country. The dissertation demonstrates 
how in alternative lobbying settings like Turkey, these processes may alter the lobbying 
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environment and lobbying success when they are added to the model as additional 
independent variables.  
 
1.3. The Design of Inquiry: Procedures of Data Collection and Analyzing 
 
In its empirical chapters, the dissertation covers Turkey’s decade-long reform 
process under the AKP government and concentrates on a list of critical issues and 
related law making processes under the issue categories of gender mainstreaming, Alevi 
rights and freedom of the media and the press. One cannot entirely know in advance 
whether the selected cases offer all the desired variations and similarities; and the above 
empirical validation for selecting our cases might not be fully unswerving and 
convincing. What has driven the choice of these issue areas was especially the fact that 
all in varying degrees became subject both to the EU reform processes and some deep-
rooted ideological -mainly the secularism versus religious conservatism debate- and 
interest based cleavages within Turkey’s socio-political space.  
To draw up its issue list and to trace the process within which these issues had 
become subject to law making, the dissertation primarily conducts content analysis of 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly proceedings, the news media, and the successive 
EU Commission reports on Turkey’s progress towards accession. This content analysis 
is expected to provide a priori knowledge about the policy positions of the actors 
involved within these law making processes. Once alternative lobbying positions are 
identified, the lobbyists are specified according to these positions. For instance, those 
women organizations along with their supporters within civil society and within the 
political domain, who collectively lobby for the implementation of national level gender 
quotas, are evaluated as a lobbying group and the dissertation assesses the success of 
this ‘pro-gender quota lobby’ instead of making inferences about the success of 
individual organizations. In a similar vein, the dissertation defines all the lobbying 
experiences according to their specific lobbying positions- i.e.: the pro-headscarf lobby, 
the lobbying for the recognition of the Alevi places of worship, the lobbying for the 
reform of the criminal procedures and legal sanctions in the Anti-Terror Law. 
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To check on and supplement the content analysis, some interviews are conducted 
with the representatives from organizations selected deliberately as proponents of such 
alternative lobbying positions (see in Appendix 3). These are actively lobbying 
stakeholders or coordinators of or the main actors in the largest coalitions which have a 
policy proposal for the selected issues. Founding members and/or executive committee 
members and -in cases where these first two group of respondents cannot be reached- 
active members who partake in the policy development processes are selected as 
interviewees. At times, these respondents happened to take active roles in more than one 
organization/or coalition. It should be noted that the observations rest on the policy 
preferences of the collective lobbying instead of individual policy preferences of the 
interviewees. Selected statements of some representatives from the targeted 
organizations (Appendix 1), of some political level actors (Appendix 2), and of the 
interviewees (Appendix 3) can be seen in the appendixes. The appendixes are all in 
Turkish and the dissertation also presents direct translations from their content in its 
related chapters. 
To further develop the issue list, the interviewees are asked about the issues they 
have been most recently working on. Thus, the sampling of both the key issues and key 
policy positions are processes that contribute to and identify one another. 
In the interviews, the interviewees are also asked about their policy proposals on 
each issue of concern; the size of coalitions emerged around these proposals; their 
considerations about the gap between these proposals and the policy positions of the 
government; if there are any counter lobbying on these issues; as well as, their 
considerations about how the EU’s adaptational pressures relates to the outcome and 
about the details of their contacts with the EU institutions (such as the European 
Commission and the European Parliament) or other European level institutions like 
ECHR; and finally whether the intermediation of these institutions help them realize 
their reform related preferences (for these and all the other semi-structured interview 
questions, see: Appendix 4). 
The data on policy positions provides a measure of conflict over an issue and 
given the constellations of these positions, the level of conflict can be coded as high, 
medium and non-existent. The size of the lobbying coalitions can be measured by 
counting the number of organizations belonging to a specific issue position. Some 
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groups in civil society manage to establish umbrella organizations on issues of common 
concern cooperating with other like-minded organizations. Yet, there are plenty of 
groups within civil society which work for similar causes although they do not come 
together in formal coalitions. As Mahoney puts it “these advocates need not be allied in 
an official ad hoc coalition, they may not even be communicating, but if all are pushing 
in the same direction, it should make a difference in whether they attain their goals in 
the final outcome” (2007: 54). In a similar vein, this dissertation asserts that the 
coalition size should be evaluated as the number of all the active groups within civil 
society as well as within the political domain and even includes reform anchors from the 
international level all of which holds the same position when working on a specific 
reform issue. In its empirical cases, the dissertation tries to account for coalitions that 
emerge around specific policy issues and demonstrates that one can hardly ever reach 
precise and reliable data about the size of the lobbying coalitions. The dissertation, 
nevertheless, acknowledges these shortcomings and points to requirement for deeper 
investigation of these coalitions. 
For the dependent variable, the interviewees are again consulted about their level 
of preference attainment on account of the reforms concerning each issue. They are 
asked about their preferences and the extent to which the final policy output is in line 
with these preferences: lack of any preference realization, partial preference realization 
and high level or total preference realization.  
Overall, the observations in the following empirical chapters rests on two 
alternative methods -process-tracing and preference attainment. Employing both 
strategies, the dissertation expects to compare the observations from content analysis 
with observations from the interviews.  
 
1.4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Interactions between interest groups and the actors of the political sphere, as well 
as the interest groups’ activities that aim at supporting or questioning decisional 
outcomes necessitate us to inquire on the value of interest group participation to politics. 
If the interest groups’ role in decision making continues to increase, then it has 
implications for political science research.  
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The issue of civil society’s role in Turkey’s Europeanization became a highly 
debated issue; but these discussions need to build more on reliable empirical evidence. 
Although empirical investigation of interest group influence is a tricky task, the issue of 
influence is too important to be neglected. Utilizing the previous empirical literature on 
interest group influence, the dissertation provides test of some previously proposed 
factors that may determine lobbying success in its case studies. 
The analysis of lobbying success in the Turkish case is expected to develop 
hypothesis field of action both in interest group influence literature and in the literature 
on Europeanization in Turkey. When searching for factors determining lobbying 
success, some additional contextual variables such as the EU’s adaptational pressures 
require further consideration in the Turkish case. The dissertation is expected to offer 
new insights to the interest group literature which does not account for such country 
specific factors.  
The studies that concentrate on Europeanization and civil society relations also 
overlook the ways in which the EU’s adaptational pressures interact with preferences of 
the actors at the domestic level. The dissertation argues that the EU’s civil society 
empowerment debate should rather revolve around the question of preference 
attainment of the actors involved. The EU’s impact shall not be understood as constant 
and is expected to vary across issues –both positive and negative impacts are expected. 
Cross-case comparison of lobbying experience in alternative issue categories should 
highlight this variation. By this method, the dissertation expects to demonstrate some 
internal characteristics of lobbying under each policy domain that may have led to 
variation in the outcome. Thus, results of empirical data from each policy domain are 
also compared with one another.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ISSUES OF GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND 
ALTERNATIVE LOBBYING POSITIONS 
 
 
Turkey’s gender policies have undergone substantial transformations following 
Turkey’s candidacy in the EU which conditions membership to introduction and 
implementation of a legal framework that would enhance gender equality. However, 
there are limits to the EU’s role in totally altering gender mainstreaming in the Turkish 
context which is also shaped by historical, social, economic, cultural as well as religious 
peculiarities of the country. These country specific factors diversely impact the ways in 
which Turkey’s domestic level actors -including politicians and lobbyists within civil 
society- articulate and address the issue of gender equality. Especially the weight of 
religion and culture emerges as a defining factor in the formulations of alternative 
gender norms and conceptions of women’s role in a predominantly Muslim society 
which has underwent processes of modernization from above. The duality of secular 
versus religious conservative norms represents one of the greatest barriers against 
Turkey’s upgrade to gender-neutral policies. This duality manifests itself in almost all 
issue areas related to women’s human rights and prevents emergence of a consensus on 
gender policies that revolve around issues such as equality before the law, affirmative 
action, violence against women and honor killings, as well as, economic empowerment 
of women through access to employment, equal pay, social benefits and education.  
Over the last decade, the lobbying on gender meainstreaming has been highly 
visible especially through collective efforts of the women organizations to impact the 
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content of the amendments to certain laws and regulations that frame various gender 
issues. Many of them coalesced under platform structures (see Table 2.1) to have their 
proposals incorporated into the content of the major laws such as the Constitution, the 
Civil Code, and the Penal Code. 
 
Table 2.1. Some major platforms established around gender issues 
Name of the Platform/ Date of 
Establishment 
Representative or Leading 
Organizations/ Number of Women 
Organizations Involved 
Constitution Women Platform/ 2007 
 
KADER/ 200 
Civil Code Women Platform  KADER/ 126 
 
Turkish Penal Code Women Platform/ 
2002 
WWHR/ 33 
 
European Women’s Lobby Turkey 
Coordination, AKL-TK/ 2004 
KADER/ 80 
Women’s Labor and Employment 
Initiative Platform (KEİG)/ 2006 
 
KAGİDER/ 29 
Women Initiative against Male 
Domination in Trade Unions/ 2010 
 
KEİG 
Women Platform Against Sexual 
Violence/ 2009 
 
Purple Roof Women’s Shelter 
Foundation/ 28 
We will Stop Killings of Women 
Platform/ 2010 
 
Purple Roof Women’s Shelter 
Foundation 
Women’s Coalition/ 2002 KADER/ 80 
Equality Mechanisms Platform KADER/ 80 
Rightful Women Platform  KADER/ 41  
 
 48 
 
Women organizations also collectively lobby on specific policy issues such as 
violence against women, women’s employment or establishment of institutional 
equality mechanism without giving a formal name to these collective lobbying efforts. 
For instance, in 2011 a total of 233 women organizations collectively proposed a Draft 
Law on the Elimination of All Kinds of Violence and Domestic Violence, and Fight 
against Violence. Besides these broad-based collective lobbying structures, there are 
also independent lobbying concerning some specific issues such as the issue of the ban 
on Islamic headscarf, the criminalization of adultery, as well as gender quotas that 
require special attention and further elaboration; since these issues are framed by 
alternative contentions both at the level of society and within the sphere of politics and 
some of them even generated sharp-cut controversies. 
This chapter utilizes the declerations by representatives of some major 
organizations that actively lobby for women’s human rights, coordinate major platforms 
and seek to contribute to the legal framings of different gender related issues. These are: 
 Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği [Association for the Support and 
training of Women Candidates, KADER] coordinates important platforms such as 
Anayasa Kadın Platformu [The Constitution Women Platform] and also Avrupa 
Kadın Lobisi Türkiye Koordinasyonu [The European Women’s Lobby Turkey 
Coordination, AKL-TK]. Moreover, KADER defines its establishment purpose as 
the removal of social, cultural and legal obstacles to women’s political 
participation.  
 Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği [Women for Women’s Human 
Rights, WWHR] which had assumed the coordination of TCK Kadın Platformu 
[The Turkish Penal Code Women Platform] 
 Türkiye Kadın Girişimciler Derneği [Turkey’s Women Entrepreneurs, 
KAGİDER] cooperates with other women organizations through Kadın Emeği ve 
İstihdamı Girişimi [The Women’s Labor and Employment Initiative Platform, 
KEİG] and specifically works on women’s employment and labor issues. 
 Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfı [The Purple Roof-Women’s Shelter Foundation] 
represents the Women Platform against Sexual Violence and primarily works to 
fight with violence against women.  
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 Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği [Association for Women’s Rights 
against Discrimination, AKDER] renowned due to its works and campaigns on 
the headscarf issue . 
These organizations reflect differences in activity domains as they center the 
majority of their lobbying efforts upon different issues such as political participation, 
violence, or employment. Except AKDER, they also represent the broader coalitions 
that they partake. In the following part, the chapter defines the lobbyists according to 
their lobbying focus. If there are other organizations located on the same side of 
lobbying space and lobby for a common policy objective, these organizations are 
regarded as a one lobbying team defined for instance as pro-gender quota lobby, pro-
headscarf lobby, or platform against sexual violence. The chapter evaluates the success 
of these lobbying teams instead of individual organizations.   
The major organizations, which lead these lobbying teams, developed in 
conjunction with the women’s movement of the 1990s.4 Şirin Tekeli for instance, talks 
about two distinct periods in the history of women’s movement in Turkey “being the 
first period between 1910 and 1920 and the second period from 1980s up to now with 
preparation phase of 40-45 years” (1998: 37). However, it is necessary to incorporate a 
third phase in this periodization and consider 2000s separately as events, political 
actors, the legal structure of the State-civil society relations, as well as, the density of 
gender policy related demands and pressures from the EU level have greatly changed 
during the post-1999 Turkey’s EU candidacy period.  
A major transformation in 2000s was the new opportunity context provided by the 
EU negotiation framework which has been pressuring for revisions to key laws that 
include provisions to regulate issues related to gender mainstreaming. Another equally 
important transformation was the restructuring of the Turkish parliament with coming to 
power of the conservative AKP and the reemergence of pro-secular CHP as the main 
opposition party with their ideology induced alternative visions concerning gender 
policies. In an attempt to adapt to these changing circumstances, the lobbying on gender 
equality has undergone substantial transformations in terms of its activities, demands, 
and patterns of coalition formation, as well as, contacts with the international level. 
                                                            
4 KADER was established in 1997, WWHR in 1993, KAGİDER in 2002, Purple Roof in 1990, and AKDER in 1998. 
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In the following part, this chapter proceeds in order of major gender related laws 
and details their content formulation processes. It discusses the alternative framings of 
and policy suggestions about the resolution of gender issues at the domestic level by 
Turkish parliamentarians from the political parties with groups in the TBMM, and at the 
European level by institutions such as the European Commission and the ECHR. The 
chapter traces parallelism/distinctions between the policy positions of all these actors 
and the demands of the lobbying on gender mainstreaming. It evaluates the degree of 
preference attainment by lobbyists and looks into factors that may account for 
differences in the levels of lobbying success. 
 
2.1.  Gender Equality in the Turkish Constitution 
 
The constitutional standards of equality among sexes are extremely important 
given their reflection over any other laws that frame gender equality. In this respect, 
there had been some vital reforms in the first half of 2000s. As part of the EU 
adjustment laws, on October 3, 2001 the Articles 41 and 66 of the Constitution were 
amended to bring about gender equality within the family. Again to further meet the EU 
criteria; in 2004 an important revision came with the amendment of the Article 10 of the 
Constitution which was putting the State under the obligation to ensure equality 
between men and women. These changes did not satisfy those who lobby for 
incorporation of affirmative action into the Constitution -a policy change also 
recommended by the European Commission.  
One such affirmative action policy is the establishment of a quota-instrument for 
electing and appointing staff to representative and administrative institutions of decision 
making. The increase in women’s political representation through affirmative action 
would open a window opportunity for women to have a say in the formulation of 
egalitarian laws that would eliminate gender gap in all other areas (O’Regan, 2000; 
Aldıkaçtı-Marshall, 2010). Based on this rationale, in a 2005 Report, which was 
submitted to the CEDAW Committee and which was also endorsed by the WWHR, it 
was proposed that: 
   In order to enable the elimination of gender discriminatory practices and expedite 
effective translation of gender equality before the law into gender equality in practice, 
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Turkey is need of a number of legislative changes establishing the grounds for temporary 
special measures including quotas. The recently adopted version of Article 10 of the 
Constitution, for instance, does not entail a provision in favor of affirmative action despite 
extensive lobbying of women’s organizations to this end. Furthermore, the lack of a gender 
quota system hinders women’s opportunity for political participation (WWHR, 2005). 
The same Report also underlined the need for revisions to the Article 10 to 
involve “special temporary measures to provide gender equality” and demand also that 
the Political Parties and Elections Acts should be amended to involve a minimum 30% 
gender quota system (Ibid).  
During the 2004 revisions to the Constitution, a group of CHP parliamentarians 
were also highly vocal to pressure the government to endorse positive discrimination 
policies. They proposed rearticulation of the Article 10 as “Women and men are equal. 
The State has the obligation to ensure the implementation of these rights. Temporary 
measures and regulations for this purpose should not be regarded as preferential 
treatment and privilege.”5 CHP parliamentarians especially underlined that the EU 
criteria cannot be satisfied unless the Article10 involves special temporary measures to 
effectuate gender equality (see Nevingaye Erbatur in Appendix 2). Another concern was 
that in the absence of constitutional guarantees, gender quotas might easily be 
considered as a privilege and thus become unconstitutional, and in that case application 
of quotas might even be annulled by the Constitutional Court (see Uğur Aksöz in 
Appendix 2).  
Despite these criticisms, back in 2004 the ‘no’ votes of the AKP parliamentarians 
had repudiated these demands. Nevertheless, the amendment of the Article 10 was once 
again brought to the agenda of the Parliament in 2010, this time as part of the AKP’s 
draft constitutional amendment package which foresaw amendments to 26 articles in the 
Constitution. The AKP’s draft offered the addition of the clause that “the measures 
taken on this behalf cannot be interpreted as contradicting the principle of equality” and 
the amendment was accepted through a referendum in September, 2010. With its new 
form, the Article 10 provides that gender quotas are constitutionally enforceable, yet 
fails to address quotas as required measures. In this respect, the Constitution Women 
Platform draws attention to the limits of the previous amendments and demands 
                                                            
5 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2004), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 86, 
May, 7.  
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compulsory positive discrimination measures to become constitutional (Constitution 
Women Platform, 2011). According to the the chair of KADER: 
   The measures such as not to take candidacy deposits from women candidates and the 
implementation of quotas in political representation and employment is of vital importance. 
Erdoğan has announced that the work on the new constitution will commence starting from 
2011. We expect him to as soon as possible get in contact with us about the new 
constitution and about how to design the article on positive discrimination (see Çiğdem 
Aydın in Appendix 1).  
Concerning the issue of gender quotas, there are two alternative policy positions 
adopted by political parties that currently have groups in the TBMM. The ruling AKP 
disapproves of compulsory quotas on the basis of the view that quotas contradict the 
principle of equality (see Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Appendix 2). This policy stance of 
AKP leads to heavy criticisms from the pro-gender quota lobby. For instance, in an 
attempt to underline the impact of quotas in increasing women’s representation, in 2007 
Hülya Gülbahar from KADER (see in Appendix 1) compared Turkey with Rwanda –a 
country which had been renowned due to its culture of patriarchal gender relations, yet 
politically applies gender quotas leading to high representation rates for women which 
is currently 56%. In response, the AKP government sustained its policy position and 
some party representatives developed arguments downplaying the pros of quotas and 
construed the issue rather as a debate about procedures. For instance, Nimet Çubukçu -
the former Minister of Family and Social Policies- provided examples from countries 
such as France which although applying quotas, have low level of women 
representation (12.1% in 2007 which was way below the 33% EU-set critical threshold) 
reflecting that quotas may in fact become unsuccessful projects (see Çubukçu in 
Appendix 2). Another political party with a group in the current Parliament, which is 
outspokenly against compulsory quotas, is MHP. According to Şennur Şenel -the head 
of the women branches of MHP-, quotas are not preferable not only because they 
contradict the principle of equality but also they are meaningless in the absence of 
demands from women for candidacy (see in Appendix 2). 
Contrary to this anti-quota stance of AKP and MHP, other main groups in the 
Turkish parliament –the main opposition party CHP and also BDP- joins the lobbying 
for compulsory gender quota policies. According to its new party bylaw of 2012, CHP 
adopted a minimum 33% gender quota in preparing candidate lists and in all its party 
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organs. Besides, BDP applies an even higher (40%) gender quota in its bylaws; the 
party is ruled by a system of co-chairmanship; and one of the leaders of the party has to 
be a women. On account of these party level affirmative action policies, BDP is 
notorious with the highest rate of women representation. The party also provided a draft 
law for the adoption of a 40% national level gender quota.  
Despite the law proposals by parties in the opposition and collective lobbying 
efforts of women organizations, the AKP government continues to reject national level 
gender quotas and parity laws. Through a decree in March 2012, the party presidency of 
AKP expected its local administrative bodies to apply 30% gender and youth quotas.  
However, the party does not apply quotas in the elections to the Parliament and it still 
prefers optional quotas and refrains from supporting any constitutionally binding 
measure.   
 
Table 2.2. Women’s representation in the TBMM, 1999-2011 
 Ratio of 
Female 
Deputies 
Number of 
Female 
Deputies 
Total Number 
of Deputies 
1999 4.2% 22 550 
2002 4.4% 24 550 
2007 9.1% 50 550 
2011 14.2% 78 550 
            
   * Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2012). Women in Statistics-2011.  
 
The application of party level gender quotas cannot guarantee high representation 
rates for women, since their impact will depend upon the vote rates of the political 
parties. For three successive political periods since 2002, AKP maintains considerably 
higher vote rates in comparison to other political groups in the Parliament. Thus, AKP’s 
rejection of mandatory national level gender quotas automatically stultifies the impact 
of voluntary party level quotas applied by other parties in electing women 
parliamentarians. Besides, the routine of party leaders to place women at the lower 
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ranks of the candidate lists prove symbolic and continue to constitute a glass ceiling for 
women’s political representation in Turkey (see Table 2.2).  
In the absence of legal measures to promote de facto equality, some women 
organizations resort to awareness raising campaigns during the pre-election periods. 
Throughout March-July 2007, KADER initiated such a campaign called ‘Mustached 
Campaign’ with the slogan that “Is it a must to be a man to enter the Parliament?” 
which has sought to generate a public discussion about Turkey’s need for quota 
systems. According to KADER, it was this campaign that led to a rise in the number of 
women parliamentarians from 24 in the previous parliamentary period to 50 in the 
aftermath of 2007 elections (KADER, 2009). To achieve further increase in women’s 
political representation, prior to national elections in June 2011, KADER initiated 
another campaign called ‘275 Women to the Parliament’. Following the elections, the 
women’s representation rate again remained below the levels expected by women 
organizations although there had been a sizeable increase from 9.1% in 2007 to 14.2% 
in 2011 (see Table 2.2) that is 28 more women were able to get into the Parliament.  
 
Table 2.3. Women’s representation in the local governments, 1999-2009 
 Ratio of 
Female 
Mayors 
Ratio of 
City 
Councilors
Ratio of the Members 
of Provincial 
Assembly 
1999 0.6% 1.6% 1.4% 
2004 0.6% 2.4% 1.8% 
2009 0.9% 4.2% 3.3% 
 
*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2012). Women in Statistics-2011. 
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In 2009, KADER also carried out a local election campaign called ‘the Three of 
Us Are of the Same Mind’6 to attract attention to women’s considerably low level of 
representation in the local administrative bodies (see Table 2.3). Yet, the campaign 
simply failed as there weren’t any sizeable rise in the number of women mayors which 
was 18 according to the results of the 2004 local elections and had risen only to 26 in 
2009.  
In order to more effectively push for affirmative action polices, KADER also 
cooperates with other women organizations through platform structures. It coordinates 
the Constitution Women Platform composed of more than 200 organizations rallied in 
reaction to AKP government’s 2007 initiative to draft a new civilian Constitution. The 
Platform supports KADER’s cause for making compulsory quotas constitutional and to 
this end keeps pressuring the political authorities. Another major collective supporting 
KADER in its demands to increase women’s political representation is ‘Women 
Coalition’. The Coalition was established prior to 2002 general elections and initiated 
campaigns primarily to increase women’s representation in every sphere of life. 
Finally, the EU also joins the pro-quota front in Turkey and continuously 
underlines its discontent with women’s underrepresentation within Turkey’s decision 
making structures. The EU does not have a particular policy about gender quotas and 
does not possess the tools to pressure neither its members nor candidates like Turkey to 
adopt such quotas. The EU has a number of directives and common guidelines 
concerning policies that relate to equality in the labor market, employment and the right 
to maternal leave (see Table 2.6), however it lacks such binding directives for equal 
representation of women within the sphere of politics. Moreover, legislated gender 
quotas for the elections of national parliaments is not a common practice in the EU, as 
there are, for instance, Member States such as Denmark and Ireland which lack such 
measures and in some other cases such as the UK, Sweden, and Germany, there are only 
party level voluntary quotas (see: European Commission’s Network to Promote Women 
in Decision-making in Politics and the Economy, 2011). Albeit these different practices 
in the EU Member States; the EU-27 average with respect to women’s political 
                                                            
6 In the pre-2009 local elections period, organizers of the campaign used posters in which the leaders of the largest 
three parties in the parliament depicted as standing shoulder to shoulder on the practice of rather nominating men as 
their candidates.   
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representation in the national parliaments is 25% which is 11 points above the current 
ratio of 14.2% in Turkey. 
As a development encouraging for the pro-gender quota lobby in Turkey, in its 
2010 recommendation to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe; the 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2010) demanded women’s increased 
representation in politics and advised that the Member States should consider this 
problem as a priority and accordingly revise their related policies. It suggested ideally 
40% gender quota as a minimum in countries that apply proportional representation list 
system for national elections and also expected the Committee of Ministers to promote 
the application of these policies in the Member States and demanded preparation of a 
draft protocol for the European Convention on Human Rights which would include 
positive discrimination measures for the under-represented sex (see Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly, 2010). These rather recent transformations suggest that a 
European level common policy, which would call for legal measures to guarantee equal 
participation of women and men into politics, is still on the making and the existing EU 
level decisions are only advisory. Turkey’s success in terms of compliance with these 
advisory decisions would improve the country’s deteriorating image concerning its 
ability to undertake the EU demanded reforms, yet these decisions are currently 
unbinding leading the Turkish government to have a free hand in rejecting the 
application of gender quota instruments at the national level.  
Although supported by allies at the domestic political level and at the EU level 
and notwithstanding the plurality of organizations belonging to pro-gender quota 
position through support of major mergers such as the Constitution Women Platform 
and the Women Coalition, the lobbying on gender quotas was not successful in 
procuring the adoption of national level gender quotas and in achieving any remarkable 
increase in women’s political representation. Civil society organizations also coalesced 
under the Rightful Women Platform prior to June 2011 elections and under this 
platform structure 41 powerful civil society organizations lobbied for women’s equal 
political representation with that of men. In an open letter sent to the Prime Minister, the 
Platform made the following observation: 
   While our country is ranked 16th in terms of economical magnitude in the world, it is 
ranked 126th in terms of women and men equality index. This is a huge problem we have to 
deal with in order to consolidate our democracy. Compared to the previous period, even if 
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the rate of women deputy has increased from 9% to 14% in the parliament, such a figure 
falls behind the target of ‘real democracy’ of either yours or your party’s.7 
Overall, the hitherto revisions to the Article 10 on equality only partially address 
concerns of the pro-gender quota lobby and do not provide guarantees for compulsory 
positive discrimination policies. Irrespective of the fact that a pleathora of groups and 
lobbying coalitions simultaneously and heavily pressure for these policies; there was no 
substantial transformation in the policy stance of the AKP government whose 
alternative understanding of equality among sexes have been detrimental on the party’s 
articulation of the need for such policies. The demands of the pro-gender quota lobby 
and the political interests of the governing party have been located at opposite remote 
ends of the policy continuum and this strong degree of conflict have immensely limited 
the success potential of the pro-gender quota lobby in Turkey.    
The Constitution related lobbying of women organizations is not confined to the 
issue of positive discrimination. Through cooperation under the Constitution Women 
Platform, they try to have several other demands considered in the future new 
Constitution. The Platform has been active for and successful at procuring acceptance of 
its Constitution related demands by other broad-based platform structures such as the 
Constitution Platform and Constitution Reconciliation Platform. In October 2007, the 
Constitution Women Platform published a bulletin on its suggestions about amendments 
to several constitutional articles on education, political representation, public service, 
labor rights to ensure equality between men and women and sent it to relevant decision 
making authorities (Constitution Women Platform, 2007). In this bulletin, the emphasis 
was primarily placed on the notion of equality. The signatory organizations primarily 
proposed further extension of the article 10 on equality (Ibid):  
 To involve sexual orientation, sexual identity, disability, marital status, ethnic 
origin and age, 
 To ban all kinds of (indirect or direct) gender discrimination, 
 To state that “women and man are entitled to equal rights. The State is obliged to 
effectuate this equality. It takes legal and institutional special and temporary 
measures including quotas to realize this de facto equality until reaching the target 
                                                            
7 See in the Platform’s official website. Available at: http://www.haklikadinplatformu.org/icerik/46-rightful-women-
platform. 
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of women’s access to practical and opportunity wise equality in every sphere of 
life. These measures cannot be considered as discrimination.” 
Currently, these demands of the Platform were partially addressed as the Article 
10 remains as it was amended in 2010. The other proposals of the Platform had to await 
reconsideration in the long anticipated new civilian constitution, the drafting process of 
which finally commenced in late 2011. The drafting process gained real momentum as 
the representatives from all the political groups within the Parliament have started to 
collaborate under the ad hoc Constitution Reconciliation Commission. The Commission 
is composed of eleven men representatives and one women representative from the 
political parties that have a group in the Parliament, and the only women representative 
is from BDP. The Commission received several proposals from civil society advocates 
and during this process; the Constitution Women Platform was also consulted and 
conveyed its proposals to the Commission.  
The Constitution Women Platform, first and above all, suggested the formation of 
a ‘constitution assembly’ which would settle on the draft contents of the new 
Constitution and which would consist of the political parties inside and outside the 
Parliament, the civil society advocates and women from all strata of society -with 50% 
representation (Constitution Women Platform, 2011). Yet, this proposal appears to have 
little chance to materialize as the Constitution Reconciliation Commission had already 
undertaken the responsibility to prepare a draft new constitution and finalized the 
preparatory phase throughout which the Commission consulted with civil society, 
gathered and evaluated data. During this preparatory phase, the demands of the 
Constitution Women Platform were given place in the TBMM website on the new 
Constitution. According to the document published in the website, the emphasis is again 
on the concept of equality (Ibid). The members of the Constitution Women Platform 
mainly demand equal representation in political, administrative and legal decision 
making bodies including the political party structures and suggest measures against 
discrimination and mobbing in the private sector, in workplace and in the State 
institutions (Ibid). Lately, the earlier discourse on equality and affirmative action 
policies had been replaced with the emphasis on the phrase ‘parity’ between men and 
women which stresses continuous full equality in both theory and practice (see Nuray 
Özbay in Appendix 3). 
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2.2. Gender Equality in the New Civil Code 
 
The Turkish Civil Code dates back to 1926 when it was first entered into force 
and since then revised for nine times, yet at the beginning of 2000s it was still carrying 
significant obstacles for gender equality. The main problems of the Code were the 
women’s status in comparison to men and the related dilemmas in the exercise of 
certain rights concerning marriage, divorce, parenting, inheritance, property and 
surname. A new Civil Code was adopted on November 22, 2001 in line with the short 
term priorities of Turkey’s National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis, NPAA. 
The new Civil Code was instrumental in terms of bringing about more gender equality 
through abrogation of the clause that husband is the head of family; guarantees to 
women’s right to property accumulated during marriage; increase in the legal marriage 
age to 18 for both sexes, which was formerly 15 for women, and 17 for men; and same 
hereditary rights to out of wedlock children with that of children of the legitimate birth.   
The 2000 Report of the European Commission (2000: 19) notes as an 
achievement that the women organizations had participated in the formulation of the 
draft Civil Code. 126 women organizations joined the Civil Code Women Platform to 
push for the realization of their collective demands and many of the Platform’s demands 
were incorporated to the new Code with a few exceptions. Above all, amendment of the 
marital property regime represents one of the key innovations. The amendment gave the 
women the right to property accumulated during marriage; however, the Civil Code 
Women Platform was not content with the law on the enforcement of this regime 
arguing that it deprives millions of married women from property rights in the new Civil 
Code.8 The enforcement law basically states that the couples married before the entering 
into force of the Civil Code are bound by the previously governing property regime. 
This case clearly illustrates how the incongruity of different laws would end up in 
violation of the supposedly recognized rights of the individuals. The enforcement law of 
the new property regime had also led to fierce polemics in the Turkish parliament and 
there had been several law proposals to revise this regime so that it would become 
                                                            
8 Minidev (2002), “Kadınların 8 Mart uyarısı: Medeni Kanun'un Yürürlük Yasası değişsin! Hemen şimdi! [Women’s 
8 March warning: Change the Enforcement Law of the Civil Code!]”, modified March, 7. Available at: 
http://www.minidev.com/stk/sivil_toplum8mart.asp. 
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retrospectively applicable (see Erdal Karademir from CHP in Appendix 2). 
Nevertheless, for those married before the entrance into force of the Civil Code, it 
became possible to avail of the new regime through forming contracts before a notary 
public which shall be completed before December 31, 2002. According to another CHP 
parliamentarian, given the patriarchal family structures, the impact of culture, religious 
customs, and women’s education levels in Turkey; it would be against the reality of life 
to expect women to be able to persuade their spouses into such contracts (see Ahmet 
Ersin from CHP in Appendix 2). Özlem Özkan from Purple Roof (see in Appendix 3) 
also criticizes this new property regime underlining similar concerns about the problem 
of retrospective applicability and argues therefore that it is a extremely unjust to leave 
100% of women outside the scope of the law at the time it was introduced. Despite 
these criticisms, neither currently the AKP government nor the preceding coalition 
government9 eased the conditions for retrospective applicability of the new property 
regime.  
There were also criticisms that disapprove of the new regime in its entirety with 
arguments that root in conservative policy positions. For instance, concerning the draft 
new Civil Code, a parliamentarian from conservative SP developed the following 
arguments: 
   This system has a frustrating impact on divorce decision of the wealthy spouse. In this 
respect, it would lead to continuation of the marriage as a nightmare. On the other hand, 
adultery is a reason for divorce. The adulterer would take half of the property, be sort of 
awarded and the other spouse would be punished twice (see Fahrettin Kukaracı in 
Appendix 2); 
   We consider the removal of the head of family concept as ill-advised. An arrangement 
that does not impose the husband to be the head of family would provide equality and 
would have been more suitable for Turkish societal structure which made it a tradition to 
adhere to a ruler or a headman even in the smallest community. Now, the family is left 
without a head. Concerning the choice of joint tenancy, education of children, participation 
to payment of family expenses, doing housework and similar issues, conflicts will arise (see 
Fahrettin Kukaracı in Appendix 2). 
During the content formulation process of the new Civil Code back in 2001, the 
coalition government turned down such proposals from SP, which were based on the 
                                                            
9 DSP, ANAP, and MHP coalition was in power during the amendment process of the Civil Code.  
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above mentioned and some other considerations of the party members. The issues of the 
head of family and the regime of participation in acquired property (except its 
enforcement law) were arranged in the new Code in line with the demands of the Civil 
Code Women Platform.  
Another disputed issue concerning the amendment of the Civil Code is the Article 
187 which regulates the changes to the post-marriage surnames of women. According to 
this Article, women can keep their maiden surname if they wish to; yet they also have to 
take their husbands’ surname. The ECHR judgement in the case of Ünal Tekeli v. 
Turkey opened the way for women to keep their maiden names alone (ECHR, 2004). 
Yet, women still have to file lawsuits to be able to keep the maiden name only, which 
also constitutes a profound discrimination. The necessity to revise the legal loopholes in 
the Article on surname became much more pronounced in TBMM due to the ECHR 
decision and demands of the women organizations. According to Nevingaye Erbatur 
from CHP: 
   Concerning the Article 187, on which the women’s organizations lay stress, there should 
be revisions including the change of title of the Article as family name, marriage name or 
last name; the freedom to spouses to choose their surname as they demand; and the children 
can take the surname of their mothers in the case of marriage. Besides, the surname concept 
also impacts the understandings of honor. We need a cognitive arrangement to revise the 
way of thinking that ‘You carry my surname, thus you are my honor’. These arrangements 
would help correction of the mentality that makes women look like the asset of first the 
father, and then the husband (see her speech in the Parliament in Appendix 2). 
As regards these demands, the Turkish Constitutional Court currently provided 
some unfavorable rulings. In October, 2011 it rejected the claim for women’s use of 
maiden surname alone; yet as a positive development, in December, 2011 it repealed the 
Article 4 of the Surname Act which states that the child, even if he/she is entrusted to 
mother, takes the surname that father chose or will choose in the cases of annulment of 
the marriage or divorce. Recently, a law proposal amending the Article 187 of the Civil 
Code on surname was submitted to the Justice Commission and to the Women Men 
Equal Opportunities Commission of the TBMM. The proposal envisages that the 
woman does not lose the right to use her maiden surname alone, yet in addition she can 
discretionally use her husband’s last name at the end of her maiden name.    
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Besides the Civil Code Women Platform and parties in the opposition, the EU had 
also put substantial amount of pressure on the Turkish government to revise the Civil 
Code and to harmonize it with the common EU policy. In the words of Yeşim Arat 
“internal and external pressures might have all interacted with one another to precipitate 
State action on this issue” (2010: 242). The legitimacy of this argument comes from the 
fact that the women organizations had been also active throughout the 1990s raising 
demands about the reform of the Civil Code which was delayed until the 2000s. As Arat 
argues:  
   Both those in government who voted for the amendment as well as those in the opposition 
seemed to agree on the need for a new code, not because they believed in the pressing need 
to expand women’s rights but rather because the amendment had become a condition for 
accession talks with the European Union (Ibid: 250). 
When the 2001 revisions are evaluated as a whole, it is observed that they brought 
substantial achievements with respect to gender equality. The concerns of the 
conservative opposition including the issues raised by SP and AKP representatives were 
repudiated, reflecting the ideological propinquity between the Civil Code Women 
Platform and the coalition which was in power during the process of Civil Code 
amendment. The following statements substantiate this argument: 
   The Ministry, as a result of the pressures from certain ideologically preponderant 
associations and institutions, imposes the regime of participation in acquired property to our 
parliament and society (see SP parliamentarian Fahrettin Kukaracı in Appendix 2); 
   With respect to property regime DSP and MHP have reached a compromise; what about 
the people, the opposition and other parties? These are not emphasized (see AKP 
parliamentarian Ismail Alptekin in Appendix 2); 
   The resistance of the religious conservatives and the nationalists in the parliament took 
place despite the EU accession process and could only be overcome by a major campaign 
initiated by women’s groups all over the country (Anıl et al., 2005: 7). 
These declarations also indicate ideological concerns behind the lack of consensus 
over the reform of some provisions of the Civil Code. However, the counter-lobbying of 
the conservative groups within the Parliament was not strong enough to challenge the 
collective lobbying of women organizations. Overall, the Civil Code Women Platform 
was able to draw the final content of the Code close to its gender equality related 
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preferences through the ability of a total of 126 organizations to put forward a unified 
position, specification of the Civil Code reform as a precondition for the opening of the 
EU accession talks, as well as, the concurrence between the issue preferences of the 
governing coalition and the Platform. 
Despite the achievements in the new Civil Code, in practice, women continue to 
suffer abuse of these legal rights. Especially the male dominant culture in Turkey 
prevents women’s access to certain rights such as the right to carry their maiden 
surnames alone and the right to acquired property which point toward the need for 
further legal measures and a change in mindset. The process tracing of the Civil Code 
reform process also demonstrated that lobbyists’ success with respect to policy 
formulation and consequent legal content might become meaningless unless this success 
reverberates to the implementation processes.  
 
2.3. Gender Equality in the Penal Code 
 
For progress on gender equality amendment of the Penal Code was exceptionally 
essential since the Code used to have unfavorable provisions that codify the penalties 
concerning various forms of violence against women including honor killings, rape, 
virginity tests and sexual assault. In this respect, the gender related provisions of the 
Code fell short of supplying satisfactory standards for women’s bodily, sexual and 
reproductive rights. These provisions remained as they were adopted from the Italian 
Penal Code in 1926 until the first revisions through the 6th Harmonization Package of 
July, 2003. The package brought some minor changes which for instance increased 
sentences for ‘honor killings’ in the Articles 462 and 453 of the Penal Code. Around the 
same time, the AKP government also engrossed a draft for the entire amendment of the 
Penal Code and submitted it to the Parliament on May 12, 2003. When the women 
organizations found out about the AKP’s draft, they intensified their lobbying efforts in 
order to influence the final content. The WWHR coordinated a campaign called ‘the 
TCK from Women Perspective’ and formed a working group to review the gender 
related provisions of the existing Penal Code. Later, the campaign has extended to 30 
organizations which formed the TCK Women Platform. The Platform argued in a report 
that the AKP’s draft was against international agreements such as CEDAW, as well as, 
the constitutional principle of equality between men and women (WWHR, 2003).  
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AKP’s initial draft did not include any of the demands of the TCK Women 
Platform. Through unrelenting lobbying efforts and commitment, the Platform was 
successful in terms of influencing the amendment process. The member organizations 
proposed for about 45 amendments to the Penal Code and according to Pınar İlkkaracan 
(2004: 255) the proposals were accepted with a few exceptions. In a booklet prepared 
on behalf of WWHR, Ela Anıl et al. (2005) also points to high level of preference 
attainment as a result of the Platform’s intensive lobby: 
   Due to the success of the campaign (2002-2004), the new Turkish Penal Code includes 
more than thirty amendments that constitute a major step towards gender equality and 
protection of women’s human rights, particularly sexual and bodily rights of women and 
girls in Turkey (2005:1); 
   The fact that the Platform was so well prepared in advance with the proposed 
amendments and employed diverse strategies, including using the media and establishing 
allies from the opposition party, as well as commission consultants, assisted us in having 
most of our demands accepted by the sub-Commision (2005: 12-13). 
With the 2004 revisions, there had been a paradigmatic shift in the Penal Code’s 
language on gender issues. The TCK Women Platform’s holistic approach when 
formulating the new articles on gender helped alter the overall philosophy of the Code. 
Especially important in this respect is that the sexual crimes were no longer considered 
as crimes against social order, family, or public morality; instead they are codified in the 
new Code as crimes against the individual. Other main achievements include increased 
sentences for these crimes; criminalization of the marital rape and sexual harassment at 
the workplace; elimination of provisions legitimizing rape and abduction in the cases 
which the perpetrator marries the victim; measures to prevent sentence reductions to 
perpetrators of honor killings; elimination of discrimination against non-virgin and 
unmarried women; revision of the article on ‘indecent behavior’ to only refer to sexual 
intercourse in public and exhibitionism; and more precise definition of sexual abuse and 
removal of the ‘consent of the child’ phrase. In this respect, Özlem Özkan from Purple 
Roof (see in Appendix 3) welcomes the changes in the gendered classifications of the 
offences in the previous law and changes in the gendered concepts; however she adds 
that in cases of sexual assault, there is this problem that the courts continue to base their 
decisions on the declerations of women exposed to sexual assault. In this respect, the 
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women continue to suffer from the problem of the obligation to provide evidence for the 
assault. 
The new Penal Code entered into force on April 1, 2005 and since then the TCK 
Women Platform has been continuing to lobby for its proposals that were initially left 
out of the Code’s final content. The left out proposals involve the following:10 
 All crimes committed in the name of honor, not just those committed for tradition 
and customs shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.  
 Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation shall be prohibited by law and 
defined as a crime.  
 The article, which foresees the punishment of juvenile sexual intercourse between 
the ages of 15 and 18, shall be repealed.  
 The virginity tests shall be openly prohibited by law and shall be defined as a 
crime under no circumstances.  
 The article on obscenity shall be rearranged as it threatens freedom of expression 
and legitimizes discrimination based on sexual orientation. 
 The legal term for abortion shall be extended to twelve weeks.  
Within the political sphere, opposition party representatives also bring up some of 
these left out proposals. They refer to recommendations of the CEDAW Committee in 
line with above proposals on honor crimes, virginity tests, and punishments about 
juvenile sexual intercourse (see Nevingaye Erbatur in Appendix 2). Concerning these 
left outs, one of the most heated debates revolves around the exclusion of honor crimes 
from the list of major crimes in the Article 82 of the Code which punishes the 
perpetrator with life imprisonment. The Article 82 still refers to the ‘motive of custom’ 
instead of the internationally accepted ‘motive of honor’. Besides this legal loophole, 
the opposition also blames AKP’s so-called paradigm of religious conservatism for the 
increase in honor-motivated crimes: 
   AKP’s muhafazakarlaşma (conversion to conservatism) paradigm, which the AKP tries 
to propagate and reign over society, has a huge impact on the increasing honor motivated 
crimes during the ruling AKP period. With this paradigm, the institution of family is treated 
with a sexist approach, the women is treated as an object identified with the institution of 
family, women’s place is within home perception is reinforced and most importantly the 
                                                            
10 WWHR (2011), “Remaining demands and further necessary amendments to the new Turkish Penal Code,” 
accessed December, 13. Available at: http://www.kadinininsanhaklari.org/tck_kampanyasi.php. 
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approach that women is not an individual with free will is developed (see Nursel Aydoğan 
from BDP in Appendix 2). 
During the bargaining process about the Penal Code amendment, another 
conflictual issue was the criminalization of adultery. Back in 1996, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court annulled the Penal Code Article 441 regulating adultery by men 
and later in 1998, the Article 440 regulating adultery by women. When the 2005 Penal 
Code amendment process was about to come to its conclusion, the AKP government 
announced the proposal to recriminalize adultery which reinstated fierce polemics 
between the secular and religious conservative circles. Some AKP representatives 
argued that the Anatolian women demand such an arrangement (see in Coşkun, 2004). 
Some women representatives from AKP also argued that the penalty inequalities 
constituted the basis of Constitutional Court decision to annul the articles on adultery; 
hence provided that these inequalities are eliminated and contingent upon complaint, it 
would be appropriate to recriminalize adultery to address the demands coming from 
society (see Güldal Akşit in Appendix 2). 
The EU, which had rather been gender blind with respect to the reform of the 
overall Penal Code, launched heavy criticisms about the government’s move to raise the 
issue of criminalization of adultery. The EU’s trump card of not to open accession 
negotiations with Turkey dissuaded the government from its proposal. Although the 
issue was settled in line with the EU demands, some opposition representatives argued 
that the conflict over criminalization of adultery basically resulted in a number of 
negative future repercussions. According to Onur Öymen from CHP (see in Appendix 
2), the conflict first led to serious suspicions about Turkey’s determination to protect 
secularism and that the EU authorities would no longer be confident about the 
government’s future proposals concerning compliance with the European norms and 
modernity. The issue also heavily contributed to reconfiguration of the European 
Commission’s report on Turkey’s progress towards accession to involve conditions that 
were not imposed in any other case of EU candidacy.  
In May 2012, the seeds of a potential dissension were sown afresh when the AKP 
government opened to discussion the rearrangement of legal terms for abortion which is 
currently ten weeks. Whereas there is an intensive lobbying for further extension of this 
period –the TCK Women Platform expects extension of this period to twelve weeks-, 
the AKP government came up with plans to reduce the existing legal terms and to 
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redefine the limits of ‘medical obligation’ which provides for abortion in risky 
pregnancies. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made declarations to deny the 
women’s right to bodily integrity; if the issue in question is the child’s right to live (see 
in Appendix 1). He argued that there is a strong campaign and laws against abortion in 
the US and in many other western socities and that they also struggle to that end (Ibid). 
There had been heavy criticisms against this current anti-abortion campaign of the AKP 
government. For instance, the Rightful Women Platform in an open letter to the Prime 
Minister persisted that:  
   We suggest you cease to do politics on woman and her body in every platform, whether 
relevant or not. If you want unwanted pregnancies be prevented in a way other than 
abortion, we suggest you work towards raising our citizens’ awareness on birth control and 
provide free service… Abortion has been regulated in the Penal Code during your term in 
government in 2005 and if, all of a sudden, you started seeing abortion as murder, we 
suggest you make notice of the fact that at least five women being murdered every day in 
Turkey and make preventative regulations.11 
In response to such criticisms, the former Minister of Health Recep Akdağ 
indicated that they may negotiate with the women organizations during the future 
amendment process, yet added however that these organizations do not represent the 
whole society (see in Appendix 2) signalling the AKP’s determination to legalize its 
anti-abortion policies.  
Regarding the overall Penal Code amendment process back in 2005, the 
representatives of the TCK Women Platform associate the success of their lobbying 
rather with the formation of a platform structure prior to the policy processes, their 
intensive lobbying efforts (see Pınar İlkkaracan in Appendix 3), and they criticize the 
EU’s indifference concerning the revisions to women’s human rights related articles 
except the issue of reduced sentences for perpetrators of honor killings and the conflict-
ridden issue of the criminalization of adultery. In the words of İlkkaracan: 
   The European Commission was concerned mainly with the abolition of the death penalty, 
pre-trial detention provisions, and the expansion of the scope of freedom of expression, and 
not with gender equality or articles concerning sexuality. Despite the lack of EU interest in 
these areas of reform, WWHR – NEW WAYS saw in the planned reform of the Turkish 
                                                            
11 See in the website of Rightful Women Platform. Available at: http://www.haklikadinplatformu.org/icerik/53-open-
letter-to-prime-minister-recep-tayyip-erdogan. 
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Penal Code an opportunity to push for reforms on gender equality and sexual rights. (2004: 
254-255) 
As in the case of Civil Code amendment, to push for their demands about the 
reform of the Penal Code, the collective lobbying of women organizations had 
successfully utilized the opportunity structures provided by the EU negotiation process. 
For the most part, the EU played a causal role at the level of agenda setting. Its 
standards was dictating the overall reform of the Code, but the EU had little influence 
over the substance of the provisions related to gender mainstreaming in the Penal Code 
except its decisive intervention to AKP’s move to recriminalize adultery. The success of 
the TCK Women Platform can rather be associated with its intensive lobbying. The left 
out demands of the Platform reflects the reservations of the AKP government rooted in 
religiously conservative values and compatible with its ideology of religious 
conservatism, the party endorses a counter stance on issues such as honor crimes, sexual 
orientation, juvenile sexual intercourse, virginity tests, obscenity and abortion. Overall, 
the conflict between religious conservative versus secular norms had been manifest 
during the reform of the provisions that set the standards about all these issues. The 
inability of the TCK Women Platform to have these divisive issues arranged in line with 
its demands corroborates the weight of issue conflict in determining lobbying success in 
the case of gender mainstreaming in Turkey.  
 
2.4.         Protection of Women/Family from Violence 
 
One of the most significant issues with regard to the fight against domestic 
violence entails the legal mechanisms through which the victims seek relief from such 
violence. The establishment and amendment of the legal framework involve: 
 The Law on the Protection of Family No. 4320 (1998) 
 The Law on the Establishment, Jurisdiction, and Adjudication of Family Courts 
(2003) 
 The Municipal Law No. 5393 (2005) 
 Amendment of the Law on the Protection of Family (2007) 
 Council of Europe Convention on the Violence against Women (2011) 
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 Adoption of the Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against Women No. 
6284 (2012), which replaced the Law No. 4320  
The legal actions to protect victims of violence date back to 1990s. The first 
domestic level legal instrument to specifically address the issue was the Law on the 
Protection of Family No. 4320 which had been among the most criticized women’s 
human rights related Law since its entry into force in 1998. The Law has been the main 
reference point for actions to be taken in the case of women’s exposure to domestic 
violence. It provided the victims including women and children to file court cases. 
However, the Law was rather incomprehensive and thus ineffective leading to 
unfavorable practices of the courts and the police. For instance, the Law did not include 
all members of the extended family and failed to provide protection for non-married 
women. Besides, Özlem Özkan from Purple Roof claims that the Law No. 4320 had 
promulgated some positive protective measures which were not properly implemented 
until 2004 (see in Appendix 3). İpek İlkkaracan-Ajas from WWHR also associates the 
past limits with the discourse uphold by the conservative SP –the senior partner of the 
then coalition government which was in power when the Law No. 4320 first came to the 
agenda of the Turkish parliament (see in Appendix 3). Back then, the women 
organizations have proposed measures to keep the perpetrators of violence away from 
the domicle. The conservative SP rejected this proposal on the basis of the argument 
that such measures cannot be adjusted to the Turkish culture. The WWHR, in response, 
had researched about the legal framework in other Muslim countries and found out that 
Malaysia applies such a protective measure, a Muslim country which was then set by 
the SP government as an economic role model for Turkey. In this respect, İlkkaracan 
Ajas finds it ironic and argues that Turkey should also learn from its role model 
Maleysia’s progress in gender based violence prevention (see in Appendix 3). She 
emphasizes also that, as a lobbying strategy, these contradictions have been successfully 
utilized by women organizations and demonstrated the delusiveness of the ‘such 
measures cannot be adjusted to our culture’ arguments of the conservative groups at the 
political level.   
With respect to the issue of implemetation, an important advance concerning 
mechanisms to protect women from domestic violence was the creation of Family 
Courts in 2003. There had been some criticisms during the content formulation process 
of this Law as the initial draft failed to incorporate suggestions such as:  
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 the reconciliation to rely on mutual agreement of the spouses,  
 assignment of jurists that specialize on domestic violence,  
 and the Law No 4320 to be listed among the jurisdiction of the Family Courts (see 
Nevingaye Erbatur in Appendix 2) 
These limitations remained intact apart from the 2007 amendment to the Law No. 
4320 with which the Family Courts became the sole competent court of jurisdiction.  
Another important pillar of protecting victims of domestic violence is the supply 
of shelters. The Municipalities Law No. 5393 was adopted a new in 2005 and addressed 
this issue of shelters through a provision which listed among the responsibilities of the 
metropolitan municipalities and the municipalities with a population larger than 50 000 
to establish shelters for women and children. This 2005 legal amendment was already in 
line with the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention of 11 May 2011 on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence which also 
made it obligatory to open shelters in municipalities with a population larger than 
50000. After all that time,  by 2012, around only 80 centers provide shelter services in 
Turkey reflecting the State’s limited capacity in protecting the victims of violence. 
Given Turkey’s population which is approaching to 75 million, it is not only that these 
centers should increasein number and evenly spread around the country, but also the 
existing ones requireextensive restructuring. As in the case of the Civil Code 
amendment, with this issue of shelters it became evident once again that the legal 
guarantees do not always automatically translate into policy implementation.    
The 2007 amendments to the Law No. 4320 were important in extending the Law 
to all individuals in the family including children and family members living separately. 
However, the scope of the Law was still narrow and was incapable of protecting women 
who lack particular marital status. Besides, the Law remained trivial in many respects 
including the definition of violence and in terms of addressing the problems 
encountered in access to legal remedy (see CHP parliamentarian Nevingaye Erbatur in 
Appendix 2).  
On the issue of not being able to prevent violence against women, Turkey is the 
only country to be found guilty by the ECHR. Concerning the Law on the Protection of 
the Family, the ECHR concluded in the case of Opuz vs. Turkey that:  
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   The alleged discrimination at issue was not based on the legislation per se but rather 
resulted from the general attitude of the local authorities, such as the manner in which the 
women were treated at police stations when they reported domestic violence and judicial 
passivity in providing effective protection to victims (ECHR, 2009). 
   Mor Çatı has identified serious problems with the implementation of Law no. 4320. In 
particular, it was observed that domestic violence is still treated with tolerance at police 
stations, and that some police officers try to act as arbitrators, or take the side of the male, 
or suggest that the woman drop her complaint (Ibid).  
The ECHR welcoming the reform of the existing Law in 2007 concluded, 
therefore, that in the Turkish case it is rather the implementation of the Law which is 
problematic and conducive to domestic violence. Besides, in making its judgement, the 
Court refers to observations of a domestic level women organization, Purple Roof; 
demonstrating the utilization of this alternative channel by domestic level lobbyists as 
an indirect route to render particular policy implementation. The steady increase in the 
slayings of women in Turkey also reflects the inability of the previous legal reforms to 
sufficiently deter violence against women. According to data provided by the Justice 
Ministry, there had been a 1400% increase in the slayings of women between 2002 and 
2009, and the number of murdered women was 66 in 2002 and had risen to 1126 in 
2009 (see in Esayan, 2011). More recent records of the police and gendermarie point to 
a further increase to 1550 in 2010 and observe also that in the first five months of 2011, 
770 women were murdered (see in Günay, 2011). This accelerating rate of violence 
against women has ultimately impelled the State to take action on the issue. In 2011, the 
Ministry of Family and Social Policies came up with ‘The Draft Law on the Protection 
of Women and Family Members from Violence’ which envisaged radical measures for 
the protection of women and also stipulated a change in the name of the law so as to 
protect women that the previous Law excludes by the reason of their marital status.  
A group of 233 women organizations participated in the formulation of an 
alternative draft which they named ‘The Draft Law No 4320 on the Elimination of All 
Kinds of Violence and Domestic Violence, and Fight against Violence.’ This group of 
lobbyists evaluated the draft of the ministry as progressive, yet still inadequate in certain 
respects and prone to problems with respect to implementation. They, therefore, 
demanded deliberation with women organizations in the process of determining the 
final content. Concerning the process of content formulation, the Ministry of Family and 
Social Policies argued that they sit on the table with all stakeholders and asked for the 
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opinion of the interested civil society organizations. To the contrary, Özlem Özkan from 
Purple Roof argues that reform process coincided with the adultery debate and the fact 
that the Ministry remained silent on this issue had led to disruption of the women 
organizations’ dialogue with the Ministry (see in Appendix 3). Özkan adds that many of 
their demands were not included in the Ministry’s draft despite which the Ministry 
continued to assert that they prepared the draft through deliberation with women 
organizations (see in Appendix 3). 
As Table 2.4 displays, the Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence against 
Women No. 6284 fails to address a number of demands pertaining to the name, scope, 
definitions, measures and punishments as collectively proposed in the draft of women 
organizations. 
 
Table 2.4. Comparison of ‘the 2012 Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence 
against women’ with ‘the draft of women organizations’ 
 
Name of the 
law 
The Law to Protect 
Family and Prevent 
Violence against 
Women No. 6284, 
which replaces Law 
No. 4320 (accepted 
on March 8, 2012) 
The Draft Law No. 
4320 on the 
Elimination of All 
Kinds of Violence and 
Domestic Violence, 
and Fight against 
Violence (proposals of 
a group of 233 women 
organizations) 
Scope of 
protection 
Women, children, 
family members, and 
victims of arbitrary 
persistent chase who 
are exposed to 
violence and who are 
in danger of being 
exposed to violence 
 
Additionally demands 
the Law to address all 
individuals and, if 
exists, relatives of 
victims, in accordance 
with international level 
agreements, and 
regardless of marital 
status, or the condition 
to live under the same 
roof, or mutual affinity 
or sexual orientation 
protection from ‘all’ 
kinds of violence. 
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Implementation 
of protection 
Based on 
internationally 
adopted agreements 
especially the Council 
of Europe Convention 
on preventing and 
combating violence 
against women and 
domestic violence. 
Additionally demands 
the Law to be based on 
the Council of Europe 
Convention on the 
Compensation of 
Victims of Violent 
Crimes which awaits 
approval in the Turkish 
Parliament. 
 
In the support 
and services 
provided to 
victims of 
violence 
The competent 
authorities should 
follow fair, effective 
and swift methods that 
are sensitive to 
equality between men 
and women. 
 
Additionally demands 
that the competent 
authorities shall not 
discriminate on the 
basis of sexual 
orientation and on the 
basis of several other 
reasons listed in the 
draft. 
 
Relevant 
instutitions 
Family and Social 
Policies Ministry, 
Family Court judge 
 
Women and Equality 
Ministry along with 
Family and Social 
Policies Ministry, 
Family Court judge 
along with Criminal 
Court judge  
 
Definitions of 
violence 
 
Includes violence, 
domestic violence, 
violence against 
women, victim of 
violence, violence 
prevention and 
monitoring centers, 
perpetrators of 
violence, and 
injuction.  
 
Additionally demands 
inclusion of definitions 
such as ‘gender 
mainstreaming’, 
‘discrimination against 
women’, and ‘violence 
against women based 
on gender’. 
Early and forced 
marriages, digital and 
electronic material that 
humiliate women to be 
considered as violence. 
The phrase ‘women’ to 
include girls under the 
age of 18.  
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Measures Protective: 
 
Appropriation of the 
domicile to the victim, 
debarment and 
physical/medical 
examination of the 
perpetrator, seizure of 
congeable weapons. 
In non-delayable 
cases, police officers 
to take these 
measures. 
Changes to personal 
identifying 
information of 
victims. 
Violence prevention 
and monitoring 
centers to be 
established within two 
years as a pilot 
scheme. 
 
Protective and 
preventive: 
 
 Additionally demands 
payment of 
compensation to the 
victim and her relatives, 
sexual violence crisis 
centers to be 
established witihin a 
year in every city, 
establishment of 
Violence Monitoring 
and Expert Action 
Commissions and free 
call centers, positive 
discrimination to be 
addressed in the Law, 
and allocation of a 
share from the State 
budget to protect 
victims of violence. 
 
Punishments  Obliging 
imprisonment of 
perpetrators of 
violence from 3 to 10 
days. In case of 
recurrence of 
violence, 
imprisonment from 15 
to 30 days not to 
exceed 6 months. 
In case of recurrence of 
violence, imprisonment 
from 6 months to 12 
months which cannot 
be suspended or 
converted to a fine. In 
penal proceedings, 
honor, customs and 
culture cannot be 
accepted as motives for 
violence. 
 
During the content formulation phase, the most heated debate was about the scope 
of the law. The initial compromise about the scope was violated when the AKP 
government made an unexpected move to limit the scope to those women who are 
married, divorced and engaged. The Prime Ministry also demanded to eliminate the 
clause ‘mutual affinity’ arguing that the clause is legally abstract (see in İnce, 2011). 
These interventions were heavily ciriticized and argued to reflect the conservative and 
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male-dominant mentality of AKP which have its own category of women to exclude 
those without a particular status:  
   This is the continuation of a mentality which tries not to protect women but family and 
which therefore eradicated the concept of ‘women’ from the name of the ministry and 
brought the concept of ‘family’. A woman is not an object that exists within family. A 
woman is an individual that you cannot confine to family (see Selin Çalışkan from ‘We will 
Stop the Killings of Women Platform’ in Appendix 1); 
   They see the solution from this angle: by treating men and without splitting the family 
they think that they should work out the problem this way. Those women, who are subject 
to violence, are not only the married women. Therefore, it is nonsense to talk about break 
up of family (see Özlem Özkan in Appendix 3). 
According to a report of ‘We will Stop Killings of Women Platform’, between 
January 2008 and December 2011 the women murdered by their lovers or ex-lovers is 
estimated to be 11.5% (see in İnce, 2011). In this respect, Canan Arın from the Purple 
Roof argues that: 
   Without looking for existence of the institution of ‘family’, the law should be extended to 
include all kinds of relationships and everyone that perpetrate violence or have the potential 
of perpetrating violence (see in Appendix 1). 
These efforts attracted attention to the hazards of an exclusionist definition of the 
victim and yielded adoption of a more comprehensive –yet, still limited- scope which 
was extended to include women, children, family members, and victims of arbitrary 
persistent chase who are exposed to violence and who are in danger of being exposed to 
violence (see Table 2.4 for comparison with the women organizations’ more demanding 
position with respect to scope). ‘We will Stop Killings of Women Platform’ also 
criticizes the Law as it does not specify the women organizations right to take part in the 
court cases on violence against women.12 Besides, Purple Roof underlines that the 
request for documentation or evidence for violence is the most problematic issue and 
also evaluates this procedure as a negation that it renders all the other positive measures 
of the new Law meaningless (Purple Roof, 2012). When compared with the draft of 
women organizations, the Law is also deficient with respect to effective protection 
given the reduced penal sanctions and problems of infrastructure such as the inadequate 
                                                            
12 Bianet (2012), “Kadın örgütleri müdahil olamadı [Women organizations could not get involved],” February, 28. 
Available at: http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-haklari/136532-kadin-orgutleri-mudahil-olamadi. 
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capacity of the existing shelters, uncertainties concerning the services and staff of the 
support mechanisms (see Table 2.4; see also Özlem Özkan in Appendix 3). For an 
effective campaign against sexual violence, another initiative called ‘the Women 
Platform against Sexual Violence’ has been actively lobbying since February, 2009 for 
a law on the establishment of sexual assault crisis centers.  
In terms of compliance with the internationally set standards, TBMM accepted the 
Council of Europe Convention on the Violence against Women on November 24, 2011 
making Turkey the first country to ratify this agreement.13 Being the first international 
level binding document concerning the issue of violence against women, the 
Convention obliges the acceding countries to collect statistical data on violence against 
women and to take the necessary legal measures to prevent violence against women. It 
also obliges the police forces to provide protection for victims of violence, and the 
courts not to acknowledge crimes committed in the name of honor as justifications of 
violence. The Convention urges the signatory states to develop treatment programs for 
those who commit violence, and legal and psychological support for the victims. The 
signatory States are also expected to create an official institutional structure to carry out 
the terms of the agreement. The Parliament’s ratification of this important initiative of 
the Council of Europe is a sign of an increasing political willpower to eliminate 
violence against women in Turkey. However, the delays in the adoption of ‘the Council 
of Europe Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes’ resulted in 
failure of the Law no. 6284 to rank compensation among the measures to support 
victims of violence. 
The EU also currently works on diversifying its policies to combat violence 
against women. For instance, the European Parliament demands from the Member 
States to automatically prosecute those who commit violence against women (European 
Parliament, 2009). In April 2011, the European Parliament announced to adopt a more 
comprehensive policy and published a new resolution on priorities and outline of a new 
EU policy framework to fight with violence against women. The measures enumerated 
in the resolution are very much corresponding to the list of measures in the above 
discussed Council of Europe Convention on the Violence against Women. An especially 
important development is that through this 2011 Resolution, the European Parliament 
                                                            
13 TBMM (2011), Kadınlara Yönelik Şiddet ve Aile İçi Şiddetin Önlenmesi ve Bunlarla Mücadeleye İlişkin Avrupa 
Konseyi Sözleşmesinin Onaylanmasının Uygun Bulunduğuna Dair Kanun No.6251. 
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proposes the adoption of a criminal-law instrument in the form of a directive against 
gender-based violence (European Parliament, 2011b). The creation of such a binding 
document at the EU-level would mean strengthening of the EU’s conditionality tool. 
Currently, however, such a common EU policy on the issue of violence is still 
undergoing its construction phase. Once incorporated within the body of the EU law, 
Turkey will become obliged to take more seriously the enhanced EU policy against 
gender based violence as a new element of its domestic reform endeavor.  
Overall, the accelerating murder rates of women, the ECHR decision of 2009, and 
collective lobbying on gender based violence prevention should have jointly 
precipitated further State action on the issue. The relevant laws were revised to 
incorporate more protective measures and ratification of certain international level 
documents provides for further preventive measures against violence. Besides, the 
Ministry of Family and Social Policies adopted a National Action Plan to combat 
Violence against Women (2012-2015) which focuses on the areas of enhancing the 
legislative framework, raising awareness, empowerment of women, cooperation with 
stakeholders from civil society and diversification of violence prevention services, as 
well as health care (European Commission, 2012: 26). Through their increased 
institutional access to decision making structures, women organizations were able to 
participate in the formulation of reforms about violence prevention. Institutions such as 
the Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women serve a prominent role in 
the formulation of draft laws and policies to enhance the status and conditions of 
women and to this end, these institutions provide coordination between the government 
and women organizations. The women organizations have effectively utilized these 
structures and actively partake into the law making processes depending on their area of 
expertise. For instance, a small group of women organizations including Purple Roof 
had been highly active during the discussions in the parliament and the consultation 
process concerning the Law No. 6284. Still, a pleathora of other women organizations, 
if not physically participate into these processes, gave their external support (See Nuray 
Özbay in Appendix 3) and expect the same kind of support for furthering women’s 
human rights in their own area of expertise. This strategy of division of labor is a very 
critical aspect of the women organizations lobby.  
Although the initial draft of the Law No. 6284 was prepared by contributions of 
women organizations; in the following process, certain specific arrangements were 
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sorted out by the government. The government’s policy rhetoric on the issue, which is 
purportedly rooted in religious conservative values, basically overemphasizes the 
importance of family and women’s role as mothers: 
   During the process of preparations for fight with violence against women, this is some 
people’s approach to the family… they are not pleased at all; they breathe fire most 
particularly to the terms mother, motherhood. They cannot stand it. When we say ‘mother’, 
they say we are against ‘mother’. Woman, woman, woman… What is mother? Isn’t it 
woman? We give prominence to women because of their important role within the family 
(see Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Appendix 2). 
This approach to women’s status within and outside the family clearly manifested 
itself in the government’s policy scheme concerning the case of violence prevention. 
Overall, the tracing of the content formulation process as regards the Law No. 6284 
reveals partial preference attainment on the part of collective lobbying on legal 
arrangements to protect women from domestic and other types of violence. 
Nevertheless, through their continuous efforts to address possible future hazards of the 
approach to women in the draft of the Ministry, this collective lobbying was able to 
achieve a legal framework that to a degree address its’ adherents’ most accentuated 
concerns. The success of this collective lobbying on gender-based violence prevention 
was, however, negatively impacted by the duality of secular versus religious 
conservative norms and the associated alternative approaches to concepts such as 
women’s marital status, the condition to live under the same roof, mutual affinity and 
sexual orientation. The analysis of the lobbying process discloses interplay of many 
factors in explaining the medium level lobbying success of the collective lobbying by a 
group of 233 women organizations. Still, the comments and expressions made by the 
interested policy advocates make it clear  that the ‘issue conflict’ looms large as a 
powerful determinant of the women organizations’ limited preference attainment with 
respect to policy formulation and especially with respect to policy implementation and 
that this variable also moderated the impact of the size of lobbying coalition. 
 
2.5.         Gender Equality in the Labor Market 
 
Sexist oppression and discrimination springs up in diverse forms and can be 
observed in every domain of life. In the Turkish case, the barriers to female labor force 
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participation represents yet another controversial issue. Beyond purely economic factors 
such as urbanization and consequential decline in agricultural participation, there are 
complex set of possible dynamics that may additionally increase barriers to women’s 
access to the labor market. These include cultural barriers such as social attitudes to 
working women, gap between working conditions and gender roles, the resultant low 
demand levels for female labor; imposed gender based roles which situates women 
within the confines of home as mothers and housewifes; and the existing structural and 
legal entry barriers such as, for instance, the insufficiency of childcare services and 
arrangements about paid maternity leave. Thus, the issues of preventing gender based 
discrimination in the labor market and reversing the women’s low level of participation 
to labor force have many aspects and require a holistic approach (for research on these 
barriers see: İlkkaracan, İ., 2010). 
2006 onwards, female labor force participation in Turkey portrays slightly an 
upward-moving trend reaching 28.8% in 2011, yet remains way below the OECD (61.2 
percent) and the EU (64.3 percent) averages (see Table 2.5). Turkey’s 9th Development 
Plan expects to increase this rate to 29.6 percent by 2013. This target is reachable but 
trivial considering the EU’s Lisbon target of 60 percent. 
 
Table 2.5. Female labor force participation (FLFP) in Turkey, 1988-2011; and 
comparison with the OECD and the EU averages of 2007 
 
DATE/ 
FLFP Rate 
1988/ 
34.3% 
2000/ 
26.6% 
2004/ 
23.3% 
2006/ 
23.6% 
2008/ 
24.5% 
DATE/ 
FLFP Rate 
2009/ 
26% 
2010/ 
27.6% 
2011/ 
28.8% 
OECD/ 
61.2% 
 
EU-19/ 
64.3% 
 
* Source: World Bank and State Planning Organization of Turkey14  
 
                                                            
14 World Bank and State Planning Organization of Turkey (2009), “Female Labor Force Participation in Turkey: 
Trends, Determinants and Policy Framework,” Joint Report. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/TURKEYEXTN/Resources/361711-1268839345767/Female_LFP-en.pdf. 
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Generally, low labor force participation of women is argued to be an indicator of 
poor employment opportunities (TÜSİAD, & KAGİDER, 2008). There is an inherent 
connection between women’s low labor force participation and the overall gender gap in 
a society. According to the Global Gender Gap Report of 2011, which utilizes economic 
participation and opportunity as a measure of gender gap, Turkey ranks 122 among 135 
countries (see Hausmann et al., 2011) and the ability to close this gap is dependent upon 
policies that would help avert women’s marginalization from the sphere of economy.  
Among various necessary measures, the reform of the relevant legal framework 
represents a fundamental step. The first positive development was recorded through 
May, 2003 revisions to the Labor Law which brought the principle of anti-
discrimination in employment. In January, 2004 the Prime Ministry issued a Decree to 
provide gender equality in the hirings of civil officials and later in 2008, the government 
prepared an ‘Employment Package’ amending the Labor Law to further promote 
women's employment.  
From a gender perspective, these revisions are still inadequate with respect to 
eradicating the past discriminatory practices that women encounter during the process 
of recruitment, throughout their career, and when seeking promotion. In 2006, 29 
women organizations established the Women’s Labor and Employment Initiative 
Platform (KEİG) to address the problems related to women’s labor and employment. In 
April 2009, KEİG came up with a report which provides a number of suggestions about 
the necessary legislative changes to promote women’s participation in work life. 
According to this report (KEİG, 2009): 
 The Labor Law should define the labor relation to include “recruitment process” 
so that eliminate possible discrimination against women during this process.  
 The principle of anti-discrimination should be expanded on the basis of sexual 
orientation. 
 The Labor Law should provide regulations not just to increase women’s 
employment but to improve women’s working conditions. The law should cover 
women working temporarily and with daily fee in house services. 
  The authorities should prepare an Agriculture-Labor Code with regulations to 
address the needs of the women working in the agricultural sector.  
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  The issue of maternity leave should be redefined as a parental leave, should be a 
paid leave at least for 6 months period, and it should also be guaranteed that 
women return to the same/or same value position after the maternity leave.  
Additionally, the Platform demands revision of the ‘Regulation no. 25522 on 
Work Conditions of Pregnant or Nursing Women and Nurseries In and Childcare 
Centers’ which brings the obligation to open nurseries to enterprises that have a 
workplace with between 100 and 150 female workers and to open childcare services to 
enterprises that have a workplace with 150 and more female workers (Ibid: 9). 
According to Canan Arıtman, in its existing form, the regulation provides for 
manipulation of the determined limits that is the employers would opt for keeping the 
number of women workers below 150 and thus easily become exempt from providing 
these services (see in Appendix 2). Moreover, with the regulation, majority of the 
enterprises with fewer women employees are freed from the obligation. Thus, KEİG 
suggests that the regulation should include a clause to rearrange the existing conditions 
according to the number of working women and men and the number of total workers 
“in order to diffuse responsibility between women and men equally, to prevent 
discrimination in engagement process, to extend the responsibility of crèches” (KEİG, 
2009: 19; see also Nuray Özbay from KAGİDER in Appendix 3). As part of its 
campaign to increase women’s employment, KAGİDER as a leading women’s 
organization working on women’s employment issues and which also participates in 
KEİG Platform, puts forward the following proposals (KAGİDER, 2010):  
 The flexible working model of the Labor Law should be extended.  
 Türkiye İş Kurumu [The Turkish Labor Institution] should be more active with 
helping women to find employment. 
 Childcare services should be extended for working women and day care centers 
should be opened in the workplace. 
 The government should carry out the strategic works of the Women’s Statute 
Directorate-General on increasing women’s employment. 
The responsible ministries took action with initiating a project called ‘My 
Mother’s Job is my Future’. With this Project creshes are planned to be opened in 
organized industry sites which are going to be available to 10025 women and their 6260 
children within the age group of 0-6 (see Nihat Ergün in Appendix 2). Although such 
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projects fail to address women organizations’ demands for binding legislative measures; 
in her evaluation of their overall lobbying experience on the issue of the extension of 
day care services, İpek İlkkaracan-Ajas nevertheless observes a substantial change since 
2005 in the discourse of the governing authorities concerning the linkage between these 
services and the advance in terms of equality among the sexes (see in Appendix 3). The 
following is a summary depiction of İlkkaracan’s narration about how WWHR had 
successfully utilized some international level channels such as the United Nations 
CEDAW Committee and also how it additionally lobbied other influencial groups 
within civil society so as to raise the government’s awareness on this issue (see in 
Appendix 3): 
In 2005, the United Nations CEDAW Committee expects a report about the 
situation in Turkey  The government sends its formal report  Civil society 
organizations also send a shadow report as an alternative to that of the government 
arguing that the limited day care services is one of the reason behind inequalities 
between women and men in the sphere of economy  In light of the shadow report, a 
CEDAW Committee representative asks to the government’s delegation about the pre-
school education rates and creshes in Turkey  During these negotiations in 2005, the 
delegation fails to link these services to women’s human rights  At the domestic 
level, WWHR also lobbies organizations such as KAGİDER and TUSİAD which in 
return gave their support to this cause, and KEİG Platform also embraces WWHR’s 
policy position  The issue is kept on the agenda and becomes often-heard  In early 
2013, the government starts to work together with the European Commission on the 
issue of parental leave and flexible working models and invites also women 
organizations and ask for their opinion on these models  And finally, the Minister of 
Labor currently declares that the responsibility to open creshes shall not be conditional 
solely upon the number of women workers in a particular enterprise; but shall become a 
responsibility on the basis of the number of total workers.   
The above observations indicate a variation in the importance that alternative 
lobbying groups attach to the different stages of the policy making. The WWHR 
representative, as their lobbying is predominantly directed at the stage of agenda setting, 
observes as regards this stage a substantial level of success notwithstanding the 
continuation of some legal loopholes (for a detailed examination of women 
organizations lobbying at the United Nations CEDAW processes see: İlkkaracan-Ajas, 
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2008: 14-15). These findings have implications for the inferences of this dissertation. 
The issue of day care services points to the necessity for thorough examination of the 
policy making processes; if one claims to assess the overall influence of a particular 
lobbying.  
Besides the issue of day care services, positive discrimination measures can also 
be utilized as effective mechanisms to promote women’s employment. In this respect, 
KEİG proposes temporary special measures in workplaces until equality in social life is 
reached (KEİG, 2009). In several instances, some opposition party representatives also 
proposed establishment of quotas to increase women’s labor force participation. A 
group of women organizations additionally lobby for quotas as regards representation of 
women in trade unions. They cooperate under ‘Women Initiative against Male 
Domination in Trade Unions’ and provide draft bylaws and programs that would 
involve the concerns of women workers. The Initiative is critical of the government’s 
conservative, neo-liberal labor policies and disapproves of the working model that this 
policy stance developed for women, which can be identified as part-time, temporary, 
and dependent upon the call of vendor, as well as flexible and lacks security (see 
Tahaoğlu, 2011). The initiative, if manages its objective of improving women’s 
unionization and enhancing women’s status within the existing unions, would secure a 
larger coalition for its agenda of promoting women workers’ rights.  
As a positive development, In May 2010, the Prime Ministry issued a circular on 
‘Increasing Women’s Employment and Enabling Equal Opportunities’ which provided 
for the formation of a Women’s Employment National Monitoring and Coordination 
Committee and this Committee would incorporate all the concerned parties including 
representatives from civil society. The circular also brought positive discrimination to 
female workers over the age of 18 through social security premium reductions to 
enterprises employing women. However, the circular represents an incentive regulation 
as it did not make quotas compulsory. It simply mirrors the overall government policy 
concerning gender quotas.  
The Ministry of Family and Social Policies also announced that they attach 
importance to flexible and part time work model and once managed the model would 
provide women with the opportunity to both take care of their children and work 
productively in their jobs: 
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   When you look at the EU rates on women’s employment, they say it is 60%. 40% of this 
works part time and 20% full time. Currently, we reached 30% in full time employment 
rates. Once we regulate the legal infrastructure of the part time with our Ministry of Labour, 
we are in a position to quickly reach the EU standards (see Fatma Şahin in Appendix 2). 
Although such flexible working models obviously contribute to an upward shift in 
women’s employment rates, they also relegate women to a secondary status in work life 
and reinforce the perception that women are substitute army of labor force (Filiz, 2011). 
As Nuray Özbay from KAGİDER maintain  “it would not be fair enough to suggest 
that ‘women’s employment is very low, let’s increase that, let all the women work part-
time” and she advocates therefore that although KAGİDER supports improvement of 
such flexible working models; these should be defined under a social security umbrella 
and should be established very carefully (see Appendix 3). 
Some international level legal documents also pressure the authorities in Turkey 
to restructure the women’s employment related domestic level legislation. Especially 
the EU negotiation process puts considerable pressure through its binding documents in 
the form of directives (see Table 2.6).  
 
Table 2.6. The EU directives on gender issues 
Name of the Directive/ Date of 
Acceptance 
Main Sanctions 
Equal Pay Directive/ 1975 Prohibits discrimination in relation to 
pay 
 
Equal Treatment Directive/ 1976 Prohibits discrimination as regards 
access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion, and working 
conditions  
 
Social Security Directive/ 1979 Prohibits discrimination in statutory 
schemes for protection against 
sickness, invalidity, old age, accidents 
at work and occupational diseases and 
unemployment. 
 
Occupational Social Security Directive/ 
1986 (amended 1996) 
Prohibits discrimination in 
occupational social security schemes.  
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Self-employment Directive/ 1986 Provides protection for self-employed 
women during pregnancy and 
motherhood. 
 
Pregnant Workers Directive/ 1992 Requires minimum measures to 
improve safety and health at work of 
pregnant women. 
 
Parental Leave Directive/ 1996 Provides at least 3 months’ parental 
leave and for individuals to take time 
off when a dependant is ill or injured. 
 
Burden of Proof Directive/ 1997 
 
Requires changes in Member States’ 
judicial systems so that the burden of 
proof is shared more fairly in cases 
where workers made complaints of sex 
discrimination against their employers. 
 
Equal Treatment in Employment 
Directive/ 2002 
 
 
Defines indirect discrimination, 
harassment and sexual harassment, 
requires equality bodies to promote, 
analyze, monitor and support equal 
treatment between women and men. 
 
Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 
December 2004 : Goods and Services 
Directive/ 2004 
 
Prohibits discrimination in access to 
goods and services available to the 
public. Extends gender equality 
legislation outside the employment 
field for the first time. 
 
Recast Directive Equal Treatment in 
Employment and Occupation/ 2006  
 
Puts the existing provisions on equal 
pay, occupational schemes and "the 
burden of proof" into a single text. 
 
 
 
Concerning the gender based discrimination during the process of recruitment; the 
EU has a 2006 Employment Directive on “the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
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occupation” which rules out all kinds of discrimination including the latent 
discrimination during the recruitment process. Discriminations of this kind are also 
prohibited by the ILO Convention concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation which was ratified by the Turkish government.15 
However, transposition remains incomplete as concerning the recruitment process the 
Turkish Labor Law does not sufficiently conform to these international level documents 
and needs revisions to eliminate existing discriminatory practices during this process.  
The 2006 Employment Directive also defines paternity leave and obliges the 
Member States to assure that at the end of such leave, men and women “are entitled to 
return to their jobs or to equivalent posts on terms and conditions which are no less 
favorable to them.” The EU also has a specific Directive on parental leave since 1996 
(European Council, 1996) and a Directive “concerning the implementation of measures 
to encourage improvements in the safety and health of pregnant workers, workers who 
have recently given birth and women who are breastfeeding” according to which the 
“maternity leave must be for an uninterrupted period of at least 14 weeks before and/or 
after delivery, two of which must occur before the delivery” (European Council, 1992). 
The provisions of the Turkish Labor Law on maternity leave are in line with the body of 
the EU law. However, the Labor Law does not sufficiently address the issue of job 
security in the period following the maternity leave. The length of the maternity leave is 
16 weeks and is extended to 18 weeks in multiple pregnancy cases both of which are 
even above the EU set standard. However, in response to some women organizations 
demand for further extension of this period to 6 months, the Minister of Labour Faruk 
Çelik stated that they are going to consider this demand in conjuction with its 
implications over women’s employment (see in Appendix 2). A representative from 
KAGİDER also raised similar concerns arguing that extension of this period would 
mean women’s estrangement from the work life and as the women, who are also 
mothers, unless supported with a sufficient day care system; would probably withdraw 
from the labor market (see Nuray Özbay in Appendix 3). These suggestions and 
concerns demonstrate the need for a holistic approach in the handling of women’s 
human rights issues. Maternity leave in Turkey is already above the EU level set 
                                                            
15 ILO (1960), “ILO Convention concerning discrimination in respect of employment and occupation,” June, 15. 
Available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C111. 
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minimum standards for reform, yet the domestic level decision makers are open to 
suggessions for reform of the existing period and negotiate demands from below.  
Alternatively, the concept of parental leave, which was embodied within the EU 
law back in 1996, clearly violates the governing party’s idealization of women’s status 
within the family. Besides, the concept is markedly radical for a paternalistic society 
where the father’s entitlement to childcare is principally considered as unthinkable. 
Under the circumstances, the Turkish Labor Law’s future amendment to incorporate the 
concept of parental leave is not expected to be a smooth process.  
Finally, with respect to women working in house services, the European 
Parliament in a 2007 resolution called on the Turkish government to “improve the 
situation of home workers, most of whom are women; in this connection,” urged 
“Turkey to sign and ratify … ILO Home Work Convention No 177 and to expand the 
Turkish Labour Code in order to cover home workers” (European Parliament, 2007).  
In general, there are still deficiencies and loopholes in the domestic legal outlook 
with respect to adjusting to the EU demands concerning women’s participation in work 
force. The measures set at the European level may partially pressure the authorities to 
adopt the changes demanded by the domestic level lobbying for gender equality in the 
labor market. However, in terms of compliance with the EU standards, structural and 
cultural barriers are far beyond problematic than the deficiencies of the labor legislation. 
Especially, the traditional division of gender roles in Turkey prevents further reform of 
the existing legislation and leads to problems in terms of implementation (Korkut & 
Eslen-Ziya, 2011). This division emphasizing women’s role as mothers and wifes; and 
men as breadwinner (Müftüler, 1999: 305) was further reinforced through coming to 
power of the AKP government in 2002 whose discourse of development is principly 
based on the protection and empowerment of the traditional family (İlkkaracan, İ., 2012: 
17) Accordingly, women have been rather encouraged to reproduce and raise children; 
instead of seeking employment. In several instances, the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan has urged the Turkish women to give birth to a minimum of three children. In a 
shadow report, women organizations evaluated these public statements as “a shocking 
expression of conservatism at the highest level of administration” (Executive 
Committee for NGO Forum on CEDAW and Women’s Platform on the Turkish Penal 
Code, 2011: 7). The shadow report added that:  
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   Following the Prime Minister’s call, several reports in the media have highlighted 
provincial mayors who announced material incentives to families upon birth of a third 
child. Despite protests from NGOs, the Prime Minister has made no retreat and sustained 
his position (Ibid). 
The government is therefore held responsible for its policies reinforcing women’s 
confinement to domicile. Its pro-family stance also estranges the government from 
giving weight to certain gender egalitarian policy suggestions such as subsidized 
childcare, compulsory quotas to increase women’s employment, or full time working 
models. Overall, the lobbying for women’s increased participation into the labor forceis 
confronted with barriers that arise from gender roles rooted in culture and that are 
fortified by the governing party’s approach and policy preferences concerning women’s 
role in work life.  
 
2.6.      Women’s Rights in the Social Security and General Health Insurance 
Amendment 
 
The reform process concerning Turkey’s social security system was a highly 
controversial issue that its transformation had been a prolonged one. In May 2006, the 
Parliament adopted the Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance, the 
implementation of which was suspended until October 2008 due to Constitutional 
Court’s decision to annul some provisions of the Law.  
The new social security scheme was designed in a way as to eliminate gender 
differential treatments. From a gender perspective, however, this policy transformation 
carries social security risks for two groups of women. The first one is the category of 
‘dependents’ incorporated into the system through their relations with men as wives, 
mothers and daughters, and their access to social security relies upon the continuation of 
these relations as well as their father’s and husband’s eligibility for social security 
benefits. The 2008 arrangements basically narrowed the scope of social security for this 
dependent group. For instance, with the arrangements, the dependent daughter’s 
privileged access to health insurance on the bases of their insured parents and the 
divorced women’s access to social security that they previously benefited through their 
husbands were eliminated; home injuries for women working in the house were left out 
the scope of social security, and the required days of premium payments were increased 
(Ibid). Upon reaching the age of eighteen, the women are therefore either forced to 
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accept unfavorable working conditions, marriage at an early age to benefit from 
husband’s insurance, or they remain without social security. Moreover, according to 
KEİG, the option of voluntary insurance “that was proposed as an alternative to 
housewives by the previous social security system and has been benefited from only by 
a limited number of women till now became inaccessible for this small group too, 
because of the high premiums” (KEİG, 2009). As Azer Kılıç puts it “the health reform 
treats women as independent earners before they have been integrated into the labor 
force, and thus it will actually worsen the situation for majority of women in the short 
run” (2008: 494). The new Social Security Law ideally seeks to counteract the 
understanding that women are dependent on the male-head of family; however in 
practice it debars women from some previously granted welfare benefits. As in the old 
social security system, the new one remained conditional upon the registered 
employment status of individuals. In this respect, the system excludes many women 
given not only women’s low labor force participation; but also the pervasive informal 
employment (İlkkaracan, İ., 2012: 15). The second endangered category is composed of 
temporary agricultural workers and wage worker women who need to be “included in 
the social security system until the informal/unregistered economy problem is 
eliminated” (see Executive Committee for NGO Forum on CEDAW and Women’s 
Platform on the Turkish Penal Code, 2011: 9) Finally, there is also the problem of 
access to social security by women in shelters without having to pay premiums. As 
KEİG report states: 
   It is crucial to give the right to health insurance and social monthly pay with no premium 
to women who are subjected to domestic violence to make those women able to leave the 
place of violence and to support them to start a new life on their own with free will (KEİG, 
2009). 
Overall, the issue of social security demonstrates the intertwined nature of 
women’s human rights issues. It represents yet another field where women need 
preferential treatment so as to be emacipated from their inferior status. However, the 
social security reform in 2008 had brought provisions to the contrary. Pınar İlkkaracan 
observes the situation as follows: 
   It is so ironic that the changes in the social security law were made in the name of gender 
equality. Some politicians ask why women should be given some privileges. This is a 
skewed way of understanding gender equality because we are talking about two groups that 
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do not have the same opportunities, and therefore measures are needed to ensure a 
narrowing of this gap. I predict that the unemployment rate of women will go even further 
down with this new social security law.16 
The new Social Security Law basically failed to transform the approach to women 
as dependents and ruled out many women working inside or outside home, and persons 
working flexible and part time (KEİG, 2009). It was also carried out through a process 
from which the women organizations were excluded and during the process of 
enactment of the draft law, their belated suggestions were not taken into consideration 
(AKDER, 2008). Besides, the women organizations collective efforts were rather ill-
timed as KEİG was only able to come up with a report when the Social Security Reform 
process was about to be finalized (see İpek İlkkaracan-Ajas in Appendix 3).  In March, 
2008, 87 women organizations collectively signed a manifesto on the government’s 
draft Law on Social Security and General Health Insurance. According to this manifesto 
they demanded:17 
 social security to women and men equally in cases of unemployment, accident, ill 
health, diability, old age, death, pregnancy and motherhood 
 women’s access to social rights independent of their husbands and fathers 
 in return for women’s domestic labor, women’s entitlement to rights such as early 
retirement, salary increase for gender based depreciation/de facto service. 
These demands of the women organizations were not yet materialize. The EU 
criteria also had an obstructive impact on the success of lobbying on women’s social 
security related rights. The EU criteria envisage equal treatment of men and women 
within the social security system. The EU guarantees equal rights to social security 
through a binding directive and prohibits discrimination on grounds of sex and by 
reference to marital status as concerns the conditions of access to social security 
schemes, and the obligation to contribute thereto, as well as concerning the entitlement 
to social security benefits (European Council, 1979). However, this EU advised formal 
equality needs to be accompanied by policies to resolve structural labor market 
problems such as informal employment, gender segregation in the labor market, and 
                                                            
16 See in: Yonca Poyraz Doğan (2010), “Rights activist İlkkaracan: Turkey needs urgent initiative on gender 
equality,” Today’s Zaman, March, 8. Available at: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=8973E7C804438D1D993B2B94C895965
E?newsId=203643. 
17 See in the website ‘Feminisite’. Available at: http://www.feminisite.net/news.php?act=details&nid=497. 
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limited opportunities for women’s employment; as well as the discriminations 
associated with women’s domestic labor. The new framework’s formal equality rather 
deepens women’s vulnerability through forcing them into dependency on their 
family/kin relations. According to Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder the current 
conservative governments approach on the issue of social security portrays a “liberal 
residualism, flavoured with social conservative values that are premised upon the 
centrality of the family and the significance of communal solidarity” (2006: 213). In 
pioneering a new social security system, the AKP government has provided an unusual 
combination of the rhetoric of compliance with the EU criteria -formal understanding of 
equality- and its ideology of conservatism underestimating the de facto inequalities that 
are embedded in women’s subordinate status in the Turkish labor market. Thus, 
compliance with the EU criteria on the equal treatment of women and men concerning 
access to social security becomes counterproductive for many women, unless it is 
accompanied with policies to increase employment opportunities for women and 
policies to eliminate gender discriminations in the labor market.  
 
2.7.       Liberalization of the Ban on Islamic Headscarf 
 
In Turkey, the struggle over women’s identity involves the regulation of their 
clothing in public institutions. Especially since the 1980s, with the proliferation of 
veiled university students and contradictory regulations to abolish or reinstate a ban on 
headscarf in higher education, the issue became a terrain of vehement controversy 
between secular versus religious conservative camps advocating their respective 
standpoints about whether the ban constitutes a human rights violation. In an attempt to 
provide a legal resolution, in the late 1980s the Parliament came up with two alternative 
formulations: 
 “It is acceptable to cover neck and head because of religious belief.”18 
 “Dress is not subject to any prohibition in higher education, provided that it is not 
forbidden by law.”19 
Both of these formulations were carried to the Constitutional Court which 
annulled the first on grounds that it contradicts the principle of secularism; yet the Court 
                                                            
18 Addition of Article 16 to Higher Education Law with the Law No: 3511 (December 10, 1988). 
19 Addition of Article 17 to Higher Education Law with the Law No: 3670 (October 25, 1990). 
 92 
 
did not take any legal action given the watchful tongue of the second which avoided 
reference to issues of veiling and religion. Throughout the 1990s, despite some 
universities’ decision to independently apply a ban on headscarf; most veiled students 
were able to enter university campuses thanks to the legal ambiguity and the weight of 
headscarf-friendly political parties within the political sphere. However, in 1997 the 
rising tide and visibility of religion in political and public domains was once again 
countered by the secular establishment when the military openly demaded resignation of 
Necmettin Erbakan – the leader of RP and coalition partner.  The ban was immediately 
reinstated in 1997 through a YÖK verdict prohibiting veiled students’ entry to 
university campuses and in 1998 YÖK reiterated its critical stance announcing that the 
university rectors who do not comply with the ban would risk dismissal (Cindoğlu & 
Zencirci, 2008: 799).  
The coming to power of another conservative government in 2002 did not provide 
for liberalization of the headscarf use for the following five years; since the AKP 
government preferred to leave aside the issue which would otherwise lead the party to 
share the same fate with its predecessors. In the face of continuing strong secular 
opposition, AKP strategically concentrated on building a moderate party image and in 
this respect vacillated with regard to bringing up the headscarf related demands of its 
constituency. In the aftermath of 2007 general elections, the proper conditions have 
begun to emerge with AKP’s another landslide victory, supportive MHP’s presence in 
the Parliament to provide for majority to pass necessary legislative amendments, and 
former AKP parliamentarian Abdullah Gül’s rise to presidency to surmount a potential 
veto point. Moreover, during the same period, a number of public opinion surveys 
indicated the rising societal support for liberalization of the headscarf use (Erdem, 2007; 
A&G Research Company, 2008). Relying upon this supportive conjuncture, in 
February, 2008, AKP proposed constitutional amendments to the Article 10 of the 
Constitution which sought to bring equality before the law in access to public services 
and amendment of the Article 42 to prevent ban on exercising right to higher education 
for a reason not specified in the law. During and after the amendment process, the pro-
headscarf coalition was once again countered by the opposing camp composed of CHP, 
universities, YÖK, the military, and the judiciary. Besides, during this period, the 
representatives of secular civil society organizations avoided any unequivocal 
declaration concerning the liberalization of the ban on headscarf: 
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   Yes, on the one side we have young girls who have difficulty in the process of education 
because they cover their heads. On the other side, there are those who in fifteen years of age 
forced to veil against their will and those who fear being obliged to cover their head a few 
years later along with the neighborhood pressure (see the former chair of TÜSİAD Arzuhan 
Doğan-Yalçındağ in Appendix 1); 
 
   We’re worried that our rights, which we worked so hard to earn, could be lost eventually. 
We’re worried that our lives would become more conservative,” “The discussion can be 
healthy. However we don’t want women to become polarized because of the headscarf 
issue (the former chair of KAGİDER Gülseren Onanç).20  
The anti-headscarf lobby once again achieved success when the Constitutional 
Court annulled the amendments given the reasoning that they were against the principle 
of secularism and carry the threat of society’s Islamization. In its criticism against the 
Court’s decision, AKDER –an NGO renowned for its campaigns to liberalize headscarf- 
asserts that the amended articles were no different than their earlier version and the 
amendments were urging the State to treat its citizens equally and were underlining that 
all the citizens have the right to education (AKDER, 2011). AKDER also criticizes that 
the Court’s reasoning fails to comply with domestic or international legal norms and is 
rather based on the speculative assumption that the removal of the ban would lead to 
pressuring of the unveiled women (AKDER, 2011). In making this claim, the 
organization refers to the constitutional articles that “no one can be debarred from the 
right to education” and “the fundamental rights and freedoms, without touching to their 
substance, can only be restricted by law and only in relation to the reasons specified in 
the relevant articles of the constitution” (AKDER, 2011b). In order to eliminate the de 
facto application of the ban, AKDER additionally proposes the following conditions to 
become constitutional (AKDER, 2011c):  
 “Noone can be debarred from the right to higher education on account of their 
attire.”  
 “The right to education and work cannot be restricted on account of one’s attire.”  
 “In providing services and in the enjoyment of these services, the State bodies and 
public authorities are obliged to act according to the principle of equality before 
the law.” 
                                                            
20 Today’s Zaman (2007), “KAGİDER chair calls for compromise,” September, 28. Available at: 
http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/newsDetail_getNewsById.action;jsessionid=C125720BBEE5966F1815E3A4
9D71B3D8?newsId=123355&columnistId=0. 
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In February, 2010, AKDER initiated a signature campaign called ‘Feb. 28 cannot 
last for a thousand years’ demanding the removal of the ban from all the spheres of 
public life and a total of 104 civil society organizations gave their support to the 
campaign. In late 2010, YÖK has prohibited the higher education student’s expulsion 
from the university courses on grounds that they do not abide by the disciplinary 
regulations. This verdict of YÖK can be considered as a development contributing to 
the success of the pro-headscarf lobby, or it at least provided an interim solution.  
Those who situate the issue within a human rights discourse may also claim that 
the lifting of the headscarf ban should be considered as part of the democratic reforms 
aimed at EU. Yet, there is no EU level policy as the EU Member States do not have a 
single unified stance on the issue. Besides, the ECHR ruled against the claim that the 
ban violates the right to religious freedom and education (ECHR, 2005). Neither the 
political approach in the EU nor the legal rulings of the ECHR are supportive of the 
advocates of the freedom to headscarf.  
The issue is therefore left to domestic level settlement which seems still exigent 
unless the ruling AKP comes up with a formula to persuade especially the main 
opposition party -CHP. Some of the representatives of CHP including its leader Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu issued statements in favor of the YÖK verdict which loosened the past 
restrictions on headscarf use. Moreover, there are statements of the party representatives 
that CHP may negotiate about removal of the ban and strategically utilize the issue as a 
bargaining chip to realize the demands of their party about a number of contentious 
issues such as the lowering of the 10 percent election threshold in Turkey, the lifting of 
parliamentary immunities, and the dissolution of YÖK (see: Cemal, 2010). If these 
demands of CHP are considered as a package, it was proposed by some party 
representatives that further liberalization of headscarf may also be considered within 
such package (Ibid). This signifies a change in the CHP’s outlook which was long 
supportive of the ban on headscarf. However, concerning the issue there are frictions 
within the party as its representatives still voice different opinions.  
The debates about the unjust treatment of women wearing headscarf cannot be 
confined to the issue of right to education. The issue also relates to lobbying on 
women’s participation within politics and work life. The lobbying on the liberalization 
of headscarf involves demands for access to public domains, representation in elected 
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bodies and access to employment in civil services. In a more recent campaign called 
‘Başörtülü Aday Yoksa Oy da Yok! [If No Veiled Candidate, No Vote!]’, AKDER raised 
these demands and continue to lobby for further freedoms referring to manifest societal 
consensus and quoting the statements of powerful political and civil societal actors 
(Arıkan, 2011). In her newspaper article, Arıkan quotes Gürsel Tekin from CHP, 
KADER’s election campaign and TÜSİAD’s Constitution Draft Report all of which 
support the liberalization of the headscarf ban (Ibid).  In a workshop on the new Civilian 
Constitution, the women branches of AKP also recommended ease of restrictions for 
recruitment to particular professions except teaching, magistracy and law enforcement 
officials (see in Başaran, 2012).  
In the past decade, the issue of headscarf noticeably divided the women 
organizations. AKDER and others, which in particular lobby for the liberalization of the 
headscarf use, were at odds with and detached from the mainstream women’s lobby. 
The past isolation of AKDER currently seem to become alleviated as the mainstream 
women organizations and coalitions have begun to uphold more liberal positions on the 
ease of the headscarf ban. For instance, the chair of KADER Çiğdem Aydın criticizes 
the discrimination towards veiled women as they are excluded from participation in 
politics (see in Appendix 1). Nuray Özbay form KAGİDER makes a distinction 
between public and private sectors as well as between those who provide public services 
and those getting these services. She states that their organization’s position is 
unequivocal on this issue; that KAGİDER approves the right to higher education of the 
veiled students; yet that those who provide public services shall not carry religious 
symbols; and also that KAGİDER does not also observe a religion-based discrimination 
in the private sector (see in Appendix 3). As observed from the statements of İpek 
İlkkaracan-Ajas, WWHR’s concerted position on this issue is completely the same with 
that of KAGİDER (see in Appendix 3). The bulk of the Constitution Women Platform 
also suggests that the issue of attrie shall not be regulated in the Constitution; the 
Platform demands freedom to headscarf in higher education and criticizes politization of 
the issue.21 This discursive shift among the women organizations demonstrates 
increasing support for the lobbying on the liberalization of the headscarf use not only in 
                                                            
21 Tarık Işık (2007), “Kazanımlardan ödün verilmesin [Gains shall not be compromised],” Radikal, December, 10. 
Available at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=241245. 
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higher education, but also in politics and work life. However, lack of consensus persists 
concerning the freedom to headscarf use by those who provide public services.  
The question remains as to how this complex issue is going to be framed within 
the awaiting civilian Constitution. It should be once again emphasized that the 
liberalization of the headscarf use has been extraneous to the EU’s human rights 
discourse as the EU Member States appraise the issue from alternative standpoints. 
Besides, the ECHR judgement in the case of Leyla Şahin V. Turkey had further 
solidified the EU’s indifference on the issue. Furthermore, in the face of strong anti-
headscarf lobby at the domestic level and additionally given the sustained pressures of 
the Turkish General Staff for the ban’s continuation; the government had so far 
refrained from taking big steps and instead attached priority to societal compromise. 
Overall, the issue of the headscarf ban demonstrates that lobbyists may become unable 
to exert influence over issues about which there is a strong counter lobby. Still, the anti-
headscarf lobby, which was once solid and strong enough to prevent compromise and 
challenge the success of the pro-headscarf lobby, has begun to ravel out with 
moderation of some of its constituents including both civil societal and political level 
actors. If continues, this transformation is expected to increase the likelihood of the pro-
headscarf lobby to realize its demands of legally protected access to education and 
participation in work life and politics. 
 
2.8. General Evaluation of the Lobbying on Gender Mainstreaming 
 
The emprical analysis in this chapter is set out to investigate the conditions 
shaping success patterns of lobbying on gender mainstreaming in Turkey. A number of 
different dynamics were elaborated including the EU’s adaptational pressures, the 
constellations of lobbying coalitions, and contacts and policy/preference congruence 
with allies from the political level. The analysis demonstrates that the effects of these 
factors are not constant and that their effect is indeed moderated by issue conflict. 
Especially, the secular versus religious conservative controversy and its linkage to 
policy proposals of the lobbying on gender mainstreaming decisively impacts the degree 
to which the lobbyists realize their objectives.  
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As for the EU impact, there are multiple mechanisms through which the EU has 
been instrumental in aiding the lobbying on gender equality. First, to achieve 
membership in the EU, there are EU set standarts which need to be fulfilled by the EU 
negotiating countries. This puts substantial pressure on the Turkish government to 
comply with the EU’s binding directives on gender mainstreaming. The downloading of 
the EU requirements enabled considerable progress on gender equality (Müftüler-Bac & 
Fisher Onar, 2011; Müftüler-Bac, 2012); however, the EU’s sanctioning power in the 
form of directives had been rather limited to the area of eliminating gender 
discriminations in the labor market. Besides, as demonstrated in the case of the Social 
Security Reform, the EU prescribed policy transformations do not always concur with 
policy objectives of the domestic level lobbying on gender mainstreaming. The formal 
understanding of equality in putting up a new social security framework had been 
counterproductive given women’s subordinate status in the Turkish labor market 
combined with the AKP government’s proclivity to conservative policies further 
solidifying women’s confinement to domicle. Despite certain improvements in the 
adoption of some legal supportive measures; implementation wise problems are also 
common given the patriarchal codes of conduct, belief in male superiority, and 
consequent acceptance of male domination and oppression which are sustained by the 
traditionally constructed gender roles within the Turkish culture.   
In addition to the binding directives, the EU institutions also came up with 
recommendations pertaining to other issue areas such as positive discrimination and 
violence prevention. Yet, the EU level decisions pertaining to these issues remain rather 
advisory. The European Commission currently increased its calls on the Turkish 
government for the implementation of these measures arguing that “the constitutional 
amendment providing for positive discrimination in favor of women has yet to produce 
results” (European Commission, 2011: 33).  To push for the necessary adjustments, it 
also utilizes the ECHR judgements. The Commission underlined in its final report that 
“as regards domestic violence, the ECHR judgment in the Opuz v. Turkey case has yet 
to be implemented” (European Commission, 2012: 27). 
A second route of the EU impact over the process of gender mainstreaming in 
Turkey is observed at the stage of agenda setting. Throughout the negotiation process, 
the EU demands reform of the major laws such as the Constitution, the Civil Code, and 
the Penal Code, and it also expects design of these major documents to offer more 
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democracy and respect for human rights. However, it normally does not get involved in 
the details of the content formulation processes. As the EU negotiation process carried 
these major laws to the agenda of the government, the lobbyists succeed in placing front 
proposals for rearrangement of gender issues in these laws. The requirements of the 
negotiation process provided an opportunity context to women organizations; especially 
concerning their lobbying on the Civil and the Penal Code amendments. However, the 
governments in power had been responsive to these proposals for reform; to the extent 
that they do not contradict the governing cadres’ ideology induced policy preferences. 
Whereas during the Civil Code amendment, the coalition government had repudiated 
the proposals from religiously conservative circles within the Parliament; during the 
Penal Code amendment, the AKP government turned down the proposals of women 
organizations touching sensitive issues such as abortion, juvenile sexual intercourse, 
sexual orientation, virginity tests and honor killings. These two cases clearly exhibit the 
leverage of secular versus religious conservative controversy in determining success of 
actors lobbying on gender meainstreaming in Turkey and how this issue conflict 
dampens the effect of other factors. The European Commission, relying on feedbacks 
from women organizations, also draws attention to the impact of this issue conflict 
conveying that “independent women's NGOs have reported that public institutions 
discriminate in favor of NGOs promoting conservative values” (European Commission, 
2011: 33).   
Third, it is possible to talk about another and a rather indirect route of EU 
influence which stipulated a change in structures of dialogue between the State and 
women organizations. The EU heavily pressured the authorities in Turkey for the 
formation of domestic level mechanisms of consultation to promote gender equality. 
The early institutionalization process dates back to 1990 with the formation of a 
Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women. The legal status of this 
institution was ambiguous until November 2004. Since then, the Directorate has been 
allocated with better functional means to perform the duty of eliminating discrimination 
against women. One such means was the establishment of an Advisory Board on the 
Status of Women which gives advice about the functioning of the Directorate and which 
engages civil society advocates, academicians and representatives from all the Turkish 
ministries for the planning and implementation of the State policies on the status of 
women. Another source of institutional empowerment is the EU’s allocation of 
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considerable funds to the Directorate. For instance, the EU provided 1.720.000 euros as 
part of its Gender Equality Development Project for the period 2007-2008 (see 
Directorate General for the Status and Problems of Women, 2007: 43).  
Another very critical institutional development was the establishment of ‘the State 
Ministry responsible for Women and Family’ in 2003. It was annulled in the aftermath 
of 2011 elections and replaced by the ‘Ministry of Family and Social Policies’ under the 
61st government. Since then, the women organizations intensively lobby for a change in 
the name of the ministry back to its old version. For instance, the European Women’s 
Lobby Coordination in Turkey argue that the current name is a backward step for 
women rights since it represents the mindset that associate women with family rather 
than as individuals (European Women’s Lobby, 2011). The Equality Mechanisms 
Platform also heavily criticized the new name of the Ministry, associated it with the 
government’s approach that women do not exist outside the family, and heavily 
protested against this arrangement.22 Besides the problem of the name of the Ministry, 
the nature of the Ministry’s dialogue with women organizations is of utmost 
importance. The European Commission reports to observe a more enhanced dialogue, 
since the appointment of the new Minister of Family and Social Policies (2011: 31). 
However, this dialogue, in the absence of institutional guarantees of access, would only 
temporarily solve the women organizations’ problem of being heard by the decision 
makers. 
Again, instigated by the EU reform process, the most recent institutional 
renovation was the creation of the Women-Men Equal Opportunities Commission in 
March, 2009. As Selma Acuner from KADER states: 
   The Commission is a great step forward, in opening up democratic spaces in Turkey and 
also for mainstreaming a gender equality perspective in policy formulations… 
Establishment of an entity at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the highest level of 
decision making mechanism in Turkey, is a proof of embracing an institutional approach 
for the equality concept or the struggle against inequality (see in: United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009). 
                                                            
22 Bianet (2011), “Kadınlar eşitlik mekanizmaları için mücadelede kararlı [Women are steadfast on their struggle for 
equality mechanisms],” June, 10. Available at: http://bianet.org/bianet/kadin/130644-kadinlar-esitlik-mekanizmalari-
icin-mucadelede-kararli. 
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The EU also demands formation of a specific committee on women's rights and 
gender equality in every Member State. In a 2007 resolution, the European Parliament 
underlined that it “strongly regrets that a standing committee on women's rights and 
gender equality has still not been established within the Turkish Parliament and 
emphasized “that the committee should be established as soon as possible” (European 
Parliament, 2007). In response to that resolution, the Directorate General for the Status 
of Women announced that within the framework of its Gender Mainstreaming National 
Action Plan 2008-2013, the works commenced on a draft plan for the establishment of 
such a committee (see the Directorate’s Action Plan, 2008). By and large, the women 
organizations’ access to decision making had been eased with sophisticated 
institutionalization of their dialogue with the decision makers. Moreover, via 
employment of some twinning projects, the EU’s pressures over gender reforms had 
been highly influencial. Pressuring the institutional structures such as the Directorate 
General for the Status of Women, the EU puts a timetable for reforms and the 
Directorate comes up with action plans to be completed in line with these timetables. 
Such mechanisms of regimented interaction with the domestic level of the negotiationg 
country clearly speeds up the harmonization processes.  
The empirical analysis observes multiple ways in which the European level 
pressures and incentives impact the domestic level bargaining on gender mainstreaming 
in Turkey. On the one hand, the EU pressures for and supports the introduction of an 
institutional framework for a standing dialogue between the State and women 
organizations and ultimately augments the women organizations’ prospects for 
increased access to decision making level. On the other hand, it conditions the 
continuation of accession talks to accomplishment of particular legal reforms and its 
negotiation framework creates window opportunities bringing certain issues to the 
agenda of the government. However, when the content of these reforms are analyzed in 
detail, in certain instances, the EU impact is observed to be inconsistent as the AKP 
government managed to promulgate certain conservative standards without 
contravening the EU’s entry requirements.  
As long as certain religious conservative values are not removed from the center 
stage of the ruling party, the women organizations located on the opposite side of the 
policy space have little chance of fully realizing their gender mainstreaming related 
objectives. 
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Although some women organizations had been highly successful with respect to 
networking among themselves, seem to gain the support from -or at least not confronted 
by- other groups and networks that operate within the realm of civil society and found 
allies at the political level which push for the same objectives; their relations with the 
government authorities had been contentious, fragile and one of distrust. The empirical 
analysis in this chapter exhibits some degree of relationship between the lobbying 
coalitions and the lobbying success. Concerning the receptiveness of political 
authorities, the women organizations owe much to their ability to form issue based 
coalitions with broad based participation so as to succeed in their efforts to put pressures 
over policy making processes. In certain instances, the women organizations’ intensive 
lobbying, resource commitment and the strategy of providing holistic reform proposal 
packages also contributed to the lobbying success. However, when the final contents of 
the past amendments and their implementation processes are analyzed, it is observed 
that whether lobbyists do or do not achieve their objectives is determined much more by 
issue conflict especially driven by secular versus religious conservative controversy. 
The reform proposal packages of the lobbying on gender mainstreaming were approved 
in so far as they do not involve provisions that go beyond the policy contours of the 
ruling party.  
In conclusion, the lobbyists both made gains and losses concerning the legislative 
processes on gender mainstreaming in Turkey. The results of the process tracing of a 
pleathora of gender issues reiterate the necessity to differentiate between the lobbying 
success of these actors with respect to policy formulation and their lobbying success 
pertaining to policy implementation. The bulk of the past legislative amendments have 
met the demands raised by the lobbying for gender rights; yet these legal reforms did 
not always automatically eventuate in smooth policy implementation. Therefore, the 
policy outcomes with respect to revision of major gender related laws shall not 
misguide one to overemphasize the success of this lobby. Also under this issue 
category, the EU’s effective transposition pressures had been mostly limited to the 
processes of legal adjustments, albeit that the EU additionally expects smooth 
implementation of these legal reforms. Besides, a number of controversies with respect 
to reform of the legal content also seem to remain unresolved and carried into 2010s. 
Especially, the secular versus religious conservative conflict has fueled these 
controversies and emerges as the most critical factor in procrastinating compromise.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ISSUES OF ALEVI RIGHTS AND 
ALTERNATIVE LOBBYING POSITIONS 
 
 
For cooperation with countries in the process of EU accession, the fair treatment 
of minorities is within the EU’s top list political criteria. In an effort to comply with this 
EU criterion and to reconcile the religious and cultural identity based grievances, the 
Turkish authorities carried out a number of legal reforms. Until 2007, these efforts did 
not involve any policies to address the demands of the Alevi community and the 
political parties had lacked in their party programs any concrete policies to address the 
Alevi expectations. In due course, there had been a gradual change in this old policy of 
denial and ignorance following the initial AKP attempts to engage with the 
representatives of the Alevi groups. In the summer of 2007, the AKP government 
sought to enhance communication with the Alevi community and initiated a new policy 
popularly referred to as Alevi Açılımı [Alevi Opening]. This initiative of the government 
had been highly debated in the major media -additionally creating public awareness. 
Ultimately, some other previously indifferent political parties had also joined the trend 
and announced their transformed Alevi policies. For instance, CHP did not integrate the 
Alevi demands within its party program until the revisions in December 2008. The 
leader of MHP also detailed the party’s new Alevi policy in June 2009 which signifies 
the party’s moderation concerning a number of Alevi issues. During the same period, 
the government designed a series of workshops as forums for dialogue with the 
representatives of the Alevi community. All of these developments were signalling 
increasing propensity to alter the treatment of the Alevi question. 
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The workshop process, which took place between June 2009 and January 2010, 
was the first time that the Alevi organizations were conferred about the reform content. 
It provided a platform for deliberation to more than 300 different stakeholders. The 
representatives of diverse interests within the Alevi community, academicians, and 
representatives from Diyanet, human rights organizations, journalists, and politicians 
were all invited to the workshops. Whereas the Alevi organizations were all present in 
the first of these workshop series, the second was dominated by academicians, the third 
by the representatives of the Diyanet and theologians, the fourth by representatives of 
the civil society organizations including trade unions, human rights organizations and 
some other NGOs, the fifth by the members of the media, and the sixth by politicians 
who had been active on Alevi issues. On January 28-30, 2010, the process was 
concluded in a final meeting which was designed as a platform for collective bargaining 
In an attempt to alleviate some remaining concerns surfaced during this initial process, 
the workshops were followed by a series of large-scale meetings with the Alevi spritual 
leaders and NGO representatives at the end of which the State Ministry came up with a 
report about the needs of the Alevi community (for a more detailed discussion on this 
workshop process see: State Ministry of the Turkish Republic: 2010). 
Alevi organizations’ exclusion from some of these workshop series and the way in 
which the overall process was conducted rendered these organizations highly critical. 
Several criticisms were waged against the policy suggestions in the workshop report 
that were argued to materialize through consensus; yet in fact, according to some 
representatives of the Alevi community, provide for the assimilation of Alevis. 
Nevertheless, the workshop process provided the Alevi organizations with the chance to 
express their alternative demands, communicate these demands to the general public, 
and directly bargain among themselves, with the State and also with other stakeholders. 
The analysis in this chapter elaborates on major Alevi issues and on the alternative 
policy positions and lobbying of different Alevi groups that organize as associations and 
foundations at the level of civil society. The analysis is primarily built on the experience 
of:  
 Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu [Alevi Bektashi Federation, ABF] which represents the 
Central Office of Alevi Kültür Dernekleri [Alevi Culture Associations] and its 102 
branch offices, Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği [Pir Sultan Abdal Culture 
Association, PSAKD] and its 61 branches and 29 other Alevi organizations. 
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 Alevi Vakıfları Federasyonu [Alevi Foundations Federation, AVF], which was 
established in 2005 and composed of 11 foundations including prominent ones 
such as Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı- CEM Vakfı [Republican 
Education and Culture Center Foundation, CEM Foundation] 
 Alevi Dernekleri Federasyonu [Alevi Associations Federation, ADF], which was 
established in 2008, involves 16 organizations including prominent dervish lodges 
of Alevis such as Şahkulu Sultan Vakfı Dergahı and Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği, 
as well as, organizations such as Erikli Baba. 
 Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı [World Ahlul Bayt Foundation] which was formed 
through an Ahlul-Bayt Meeting by 126 Alevi-Bektashi organizations. Currently, 
there are 256 member organizations in Turkey and around the world. 
Representatives from these leading Alevi umbrella organizations all participated 
in the workshop process (for the complete list see: State Ministry of the Turkish 
Republic: 2010). The chapter concentrates on the lobbying of these major umbrella 
organizations given their representative capacity and diverse policy proposals 
concerning the resolution of some Alevi issues. These before all else include  questions 
concerning the Alevi identity, the relevance of minority status, the compulsory Sunni 
religious instruction in schools,  the status of the Alevi places of worship,  the status and 
services of Diyanet, and finally the practice of designating religion in the identity cards. 
Unlike the lobbying on gender mainstreaming, the Alevi organizations were less 
successful in terms of presenting a united front with respect to the details of their 
lobbying positions. This problem is perhaps a product of the fact that this group of 
lobbyists had lacked proper contact prior to the workshop process. In effect, the Alevi-
based institutionalization process has started more than two decades ago and before the 
workshop process alternative federation structures have already surfaced (see interview 
with Doğan Bermek in Appendix 3). Yet, these groups were in disagreement with 
respect to proper representation and the workshop process had exacerbated this 
fragmented nature of the Alevi lobby. For setbacks in reforms to address the problems 
of the community, part of the blame was placed upon the Alevi organizations which had 
trouble in terms of finding the middle ground on some issues of interest. In essence, 
despite their differences in nuance, this group of lobbyists issued common complaints. 
Still, during the workshops they were unable to effectively emphasize this commonality 
and they were additionally countered by some other stakeholders including those 
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representing the interests of the Sunni majority. Moreover, coupled with the strong 
Sunni reflex23 within the Turkish society; the governing party’s proclivity to this reflex 
represents another possible impediment to peaceful settlement of the Alevi issues and 
together characterizes a decisive factor in setting the scenery of Alevis’ negotiations 
with the government. 
Within the political arena, the Sunni-Alevi demarcation soon crystallized as one 
of the major pillars of power struggle between the representatives of secular versus 
religious conservative controversy. With the initiative of the so-called opening to the 
Alevi community, the AKP government tried to prove that there is a possibility for 
change in its version of conservatism. Through this initiative, AKP was signaling that 
the party is ready to recognize the diversity within Islam. In response, the secular 
opposition has concentrated on the limits of this opening in terms of addressing the 
Alevi grievances criticizing that this process is lacking concrete legal steps. 
Notwithstanding its limits, there were also allegations that the government’s initiative’s 
underlying motive is to assimilate Alevis into the Sunni mainstream and that the 
prospects of the Opening were predetermined by the interests of the Sunni majority. 
Thus, the clash between the Sunni versus Alevi interests had begun to feed and further 
sharpen the existing secular vesus religious conservative rivalry in the Parliament as the 
poles of this rivalry had sought to appeal to these competing faith-based interests.  
This chapter proceeds in order of major Alevi issues. It capitalizes on the related 
debates in the Turkish Parliament and presents alternative demands raised by the major 
Alevi umbrella organizations. It also discusses the EU factor in the settlement of these 
issues and evaluates the process through which these various perspectives were 
translated into policy outcomes.  
 
3.1.  The Issue of Recognition 
 
Alevis represent the largest sub-national identity group in Turkey which, 
according to some estimates, constitutes around 10 and 20 percent of the population 
(Çarkoğlu, 2005). Along with other ethnic and linguistic sub-national groups, Alevis 
                                                            
23 With the phrase of ‘Sunni reflex’, the dissertation refers to the counter advocacy of the representatives from the 
Sunni community and the Sunni policy positions against the Alevis’ faith based interests. 
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have been excluded from the official minority discourse that remains unchanged since 
the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which restrictively uses the term minority to refer to 
non-Muslim populations of the country -only Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Apart from 
the persistence of this official minority discourse, there have been major transformations 
in rhetoric and practice signifying gradual endorsement of Alevism’s distinctiveness. In 
effect, the issue of recognition is far more complicated as there are a number of 
alternative understandings as to what differentiate the Alevis from the mainstream 
Turkish community. Alevism rather operates as an umbrella term for various sectarian 
groups and is composed of many axis of differentiation. Any constant definition to 
encapsulate Alevism with a single identity would be misleading as Alevis themselves 
are still in the process of contesting and constructing the elements of their 
distinctiveness. It should be underlined that the politics of recognition is beyond the 
single consideration about recognition of Alevism as a separate homogenous totality. 
The question is what makes Alevism distinct, as arguably there are different Alevism 
perceptions and an intra-group rivalry as to which particular clique stands for Alevism.  
The differing perceptions of the Alevi identity had impeded a more collaborative 
approach among the Alevi organizations (Dressler, 2008). It is critical to examine in 
detail these existent alternative Alevism perceptions, so as to avert the fallacy of 
associating the Alevi demands with a single Alevi discourse. Among many axes leading 
to development of alternative self-understandings, definition of Alevism in relation to 
Islam had been depicted as the most problematic issue to divide the Alevi community. 
Throughout September 3-19, 2009, Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü [the Institute of 
Strategic Thinking] had conducted a survey in 26 provinces of Turkey based on face to 
face interviews with 2217 respondents, 614 of which were Alevi citizens. According to 
the results of this survey, 48.6% of the Alevi respondents reported that they consider 
Alevism as a sect, 19.1% as a culture, and 12.3% as a religion (Institute of Strategic 
Thinking, 2009: 18). Besides, 57.1% of the non-Alevi respondents also preferred to 
define Alevism as a sect within Islam (Ibid). These survey results demonstrate that the 
predominant opinion within the Turkish society rather reflects on Alevism as within 
Islam. Still, one cannot ignore the fact that both within the Alevi and non-Alevi 
respondents there are those who give prominence to some other definitional elements.  
This elusiveness at the public opinion level is similarly observed among the major 
Alevi organizations (see Figure 3.1). For instance, the chair of AVF Doğan Bermek, the 
 107 
 
chair of CEM Foundation İzzettin Doğan, the chair of World Ahlul Bayt Foundation 
Fermani Altun, and the chair of ADF Hüsniye Takmaz all underline that they consider 
Alevism within Islam and assert also that the Alevi base do not question Alevism’s 
connection to Islam despite their differences in nuance (see in Appendix 3; see also 
Torun, 2009). They also point to different definitions of Alevism either as a sect, as a 
philosophy or as a humanist interpretation under the Islamic religion (see: Appendix 3; 
and Torun, 2009).  
 
Figure 3.1. Positions of some Alevi umbrella organizations on issues related to 
definition of Alevism24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
*The dashed circle portrays the definition provided in the Alevi workshop report.  
                                                            
24 The depictions of the policy advocates’ locations over the two-dimensional policy space reflect my personal 
estimations on the basis of my own evaluations about the statements of these organizations’ representatives. It should 
be emphasized that these depictions of the alternative policy positions are not based on any standardized indices and 
were not therefore measured on the basis of a clearly set criteria. Concerning all the figures of this chapter, the 
readers should rather pay attention to whether these policy advocates fall within a particular quadrant instead of these 
advocates’ handbuilt spacial positions. 
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There is yet another group which stresses the need for a more comprehensive 
definition and aim to free Alevism from its confinement to religious tenets. For instance, 
ABF and PSAKD counter the contemplation of Alevism solely in terms of its relation to 
Islam. Ali Yıldırım –a prominent community commentator from PSAKD- provides a 
detailed definition of Alevism as a philosophy, a life style, a culture and even a societal 
phenomenon which is rational and against dogmatism, democratic, secular and humanist 
(see in Appendix 1). This viewpoint both distances Alevism from its religious 
connotations and seeks to demonstrate its compatibility with the ground rules of 
modernity. Standing aloof from such an exhaustive definition, ABF also avoids defining 
Alevism as a religion or as a sect and defines it simply as a teaching to guide its 
followers.25  
There are also certain groups within the movement which go further to the 
extreme such as Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu [European Federation of Alevi 
Communities, AABK] that operate at the European level, lobby the structures such as 
the European Commission, and strive for the recognition of Alevism as a religion 
separate from Islam and additionally lobby for minority status. The representatives of 
the major umbrella organizations such as AVF and ADF assert that such radical 
accounts found little if any support from the Alevi community in Turkey (see in 
Appendix 1). Nevertheless, seemingly these counter discourses of some radical 
approaches on Alevism’s relation to Islam inadvertently beget the third parties confused 
about the Alevi identity.  
On the pretext that Alevis are incapable to specify the borders of Alevism, the 
State which was long ignorant of the distinctiveness of the Alevi identity became 
aspirant to put an end to these contentions. In the aftermath of Alevi Workshops, it 
opted for a rather narrow definition in the school textbooks, which would by no means 
please some of the Alevi organizations.  
The school curriculum was revised to incorporate Alevism in its relation to Islam. 
Alevis are defined as followers and lovers of Hz. Ali, who are on top of it Muslims, 
                                                            
25 ABF (2013), “Kitapta Alevilik tanımı yanlış [Wrong definition of Alevism in the book],” see in the Website of 
ABF, accessed February 16, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=763%3Akitapta-alevilik-tanm-
yanl&catid=1%3Ason-haberler&Itemid=2. 
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whose holy writ is Koran, thus that Alevis believe in the unity of God accepting Hz. 
Mohammed as the last prophet. In this respect, the State did not take heed of all the 
Alevi demands for self-definition and defined Alevism on behalf of Alevis without 
reference to some of the above stated definitions proposed by the representatives of the 
Alevi organizations. Commenting on the definition of Alevism in the school textbooks, 
Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik argues that: 
   They said: ‘Why we did not write it?’ Especially, some specific associations said: ‘Why 
we did not write it?’ And we said: While we write about Orthodoxy we did not have Greek 
Patriarch Bartholomew write it, or while writing on Shafii find a Shafii write it, and find a 
Hanafi for Hanafism. We have utilized the university teachers, who are specialists on the 
issue in Turkey, the reservoir of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the specialists of 
the Ministry of National Education (see in Appendix 2). 
This policy of denial has led to relegation of Alevism to affinity with a religious 
belief system under Islam whose analogies with the Islamic faith are emphasized instead 
of some differentiating aspects as highlighted by some of the Alevi organizations. In a 
similar vein and without referring to Alevism as a sect within Islam, Turkey’s previous 
Minister of Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu argues:  
   Discussing whether Alevis are Muslim or not is an insult against Islam. All Alevis are 
Muslim. Nobody should be deceived by the West and claim that Alevism is outside the fold 
of Islam.26  
The ambiguities about the status of Alevis and the associated problems also 
became subject to harsh criticisms in the Turkish Parliament: 
   In the workshops, the decision to regard Alevism as a sect was issued. Thereupon, is the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs, which does not see Alevism as a sect, suddenly going to 
see Alevism as a sect? (See Şevket Köse in Appendix 2);   
   On November 21, 2004 our Director of Religious Affairs gave a speech to the media 
stating that ‘Alevis are not minority, they are sub-belief group; we cannot bring services to 
every group; in that case what happens if Aczmendi’s make demands’. My dear friends, 
religious interpretations are inconsequential for the essence, sprit and aim of our religion. In 
any case, this situation is understandable from their activities and this perverted 
interpretation is rejected by our society. However, Alevi and Sunni interpretations are 
                                                            
26 See in: Emre Demir and Ahmet Ozay (2006), “For Minority Status, Alevis Bypass Turkey, Appeal to European 
Court,” Zaman, November, 18. Available at: http://wwrn.org/articles/23423/?&place=turkey&section=islam. 
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accepted by the majority of our society. If Alevism is a sub-belief group of Islam, so does 
Sunnism (see Ali Rıza Gülçiçek in Appendix 2). 
Others draw attention to lack of legal guarantees to protect Alevis’ right to belief 
if Alevis are defined solely as a belief under Islam. For instance, the Penal Code only 
refers to religion and sect, and excludes ‘religious belief’ from its definition of 
punishments. Referring to Article 216 of the Code, Muharrem Kılıç from CHP 
highlights that: 
   Pressures, defamations and insults against the Alevi belief are not within the scope of 
punishments. What is protected under the Penal Code is only religion and sect… in that 
case, the court is going to ask to the Directorate of Religious Affairs about whether 
Alevism is a sect or a religion or not; and as the Directorate is going to report that Alevism 
is not a separate religion as well that it does not fall under the conventional four sects, the 
court case is going to abate (see in Appendix 2). 
For continuation of these legal ambiguities, the Alevi organizations were kept 
responsible given their failure to provide a joint position on the distinctiveness of their 
community. The final report on the Alevi workshops articulates lack of coherence 
within the Alevi movement as follows: 
   The factionalism that feed on ideological tensions among themselves, the problems that 
feed on organizational interests and spheres of competition reflect certain weaknesses and 
contradictions of the Alevi politization. (State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 26) 
Moreover, the dissidence about how to position Alevism -either as a sect or 
merely as a culture within Islam or as a religion or a life style separate from Islam- has 
led to contradictory views about the necessary formulas to address several other Alevi 
grievances. For instance, those who consider Alevism as a sect within Islam are 
naturally expected to demand representation within Diyanet instead of claiming total 
abrogation of the institution; to demand inclusion of Alevism in the school curricula 
instead of claiming termination of compulsory nature of the religious instruction in 
schools; and demand salary to Alevi spritual leaders instead of claiming ‘that the State 
shall not have religious officials and put them on salary’ (see Balkız, 2002). The 
differences of nuance among the Alevi groups with respect to constructs of their identity 
had narrowed these groups ability to emphasize their shared aims about the reforms to 
address every other Alevi grievance.  
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The issue of how to position Alevism vis-à-vis Islam is not the one and only 
problem to complicate Alevis’ recognition. Alevi organizations also remain cautious of 
accepting the term ‘minority’ which is popularly associated with separatism and they 
refrain from making claims for access to this status as a tool in their struggle for 
recognition. All the Alevi organizations in Turkey take a dim view of the minority 
status offered by some circles as a formula to solve the problems of the community. 
These organizations, although not necessarily demanding minority status, look ahead to 
official recognition of their distinct identity and correction of the past policies of 
segregation. Doğan Bermek from AVF argues that the minority status is inconsequential 
as Turkey does not respect the officially granted minority status of the existing legal 
minorities (see in Appendix 3). The ABF also sent suggestion to the European 
Parliament for the removal of the phrase ‘non-Sunni Muslim minority’ from the 
European Parliament’s Foreign Commission Report. According to the former chair of 
ABF: 
   There is a distinct status and distinct legal system called minority. We are not in favor of 
such a system. 90% of us think that way… Minority carries a negative connotation in our 
society… (With reference to Alevi community) there is no large group or organization that 
accept being minority (see Atilla Erden in Appendix 1). 
In a similar vein, the former chair of the PSAKD reports that:  
   We even criticized the EU which portrays the Alevis as a minority. Alevis are the 
constitutive elements and founders of the Republic (see Kazım Genç in Appendix 1).  
The Alevi public opinion is also largely against proposals for identification with a 
minority status. As demonstrated in a 2009 poll, only 26.6% of the Alevi respondents 
have reported to consider themselves as a minority within the Turkish society (Institute 
of Strategic Thinking, 2009: 25).  
In line with these criticisms, the European Commission has gradually changed its 
terminology about the Alevis who were previously defined as ‘the non-Sunni Muslim 
minority’ of Turkey. In its 2006 report, the Commission eliminating the term ‘minority’, 
referred to Alevis as the ‘Muslim Alevi community’, and 2007 onwards the term 
‘Muslim’ was also eliminated from the following reports which from then on referred to 
Alevis simply by the name of their community. This evolution can be regarded as an 
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achievement on the part of the Alevi organizations which defy the term minority and 
also which object to Alevism’s outright association with Islam.  
At the domestic level the Alevi organizations’ inability to carve out a precise 
Alevi identity has led the government to justify the portraiture of Alevism in the school 
textbooks in line with its own preferences. Complementing this government policy, the 
final report on the Alevi workshops criticizes those Alevi groups which object to 
Alevism’s association with Islam: 
   Despite the attempts today to engulf it in inexricable elusiveness with definitions that rule out 
one another on several counts; Alevism is a belief, an interpretation and a lifestyle which took 
shape within the Islamic tradition. (State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 41-42) 
In the report, this elusiveness emerges as a factor legitimizing the State preference 
to intervene and arrange the Alevis’ sphere of belief. Nevertheless, the above definition 
provided in the workshop report is much more comprehensive than the past official 
rhetoric. The Figure 3.1 depicts the definition provided by the State Ministry with a 
large dashed circle which points to the area that fall in between different Alevi umbrella 
organizations’ alternative standpoints irrespective of the outlier AABK.  
Notwithstanding its professed moderation, one cannot deny the fact that AKP is a 
conservative party with Sunni Islam proclivity. In this respect, Alevi organizations 
suspect the current AKP government’s ability to recognize and propagate religious 
diversity which runs counter to its alleged policy of propagating Sunni Islam in public 
and private domains. In this respect, some Alevi groups also regard AKP’s Alevi 
Opening Initiative as disingenuous. Commenting on the initiative, Ali Yıldırım alleges 
AKP to play tricks on Alevis in an attempt to assimilate them into its own style of Islam 
(see in Appendix 1). The government is also alleged to execute this assimilation policy 
through creating its allies from among the Alevi organizations as well as accused of 
exacerbating the intra-communal splits: 
   It is apparent that the AKP government is going to engage in window dressing politics 
under the name of opening with intermediation of CEM Foundation which is considered as 
having an understanding of Alevism close to AKP yet which is not embraced by the Alevi 
community (see Fevzi Gümüş from PSAKD in Appendix 1).     
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In response to a public statement by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli about their 
preference for negotiation with only groups which consider Alevism within Islam, the 
former chair of ABF declared that:  
   We do not contest whether Alevism is within or outside Islam. We deliberate on the 
problems of Alevism… We do not by any means approve the attempts to define and split us 
from the middle (see Ali Balkız in Appendix 1). 
It is fair to deduce from these debates that the competing positions on the 
definition of Alevism simply obstruct further dialogue with some power centers within 
the political sphere including the AKP government and MHP. The Alevi groups, who 
although not necessarily contest that Alevism is within Islam but reject Alevism’s 
outright association within Islam, were relegated to apparent inferiority in terms of 
relations with these power centers. Thus, for integration into the political process, they 
either have turned to advocacy of the parties in the opposition, particularly of CHP and 
BDP, or they continue to engage rather in outside lobbying commonly in the form of 
public protests.  
 
3.2. The Right to Religious Education 
 
The Turkish State provides religious education both in public and private schools 
starting from the 4th grade in primary education until the university level. The content of 
this education with its emphasis on the Sunni faith have implications for right to 
religious conviction of non-Sunni believers like Alevis, since this State-controlled 
education is compulsory for every pupil other than those of officially recognized 
religious minorities. According to the Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, “Education 
and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under the State supervision and 
control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the 
curricula of primary and secondary schools.” Additionally, the Article 12 of the Basic 
Law on National Education states that “Secularism is the basis of the Turkish State 
education. Religious culture and ethics shall be among the compulsory subjects taught 
in primary and upper secondary schools and in schools of an equivalent level.”  
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Entrenched into these major laws, the State has considerable discretionary power 
over the religious education in Turkey. The idea behind this practice was to protect 
secularism –a fundamental principle of the Republic- which was articulated in the 
Turkish case not as separation of the State and religion but as preponderance of the 
former over the latter. This basically leads to the dilemma that the State’s system of 
religious education will serve protection of secularism as long as the State is represented 
by secular forces. Otherwise, it may be alternatively employed as an instrument serving 
the interests of a particular religious conservative ideology to expand its opportunity 
space. In this respect, the religiously conservative AKP government is expected to 
reiterate these constitutional principles as regards mandatory religious education 
without any need to plead an ideological discourse as to why this education shall 
continue.        
Although its title seems comprehensive, the Religious Culture and Knowledge of 
Ethics classes were used to provide information about the Sunni faith of Islam with little 
discussion on other religions and without any reference to the Alevi faith. Since the 
Alevi community lacks minority status, the children of the Alevi families have to attend 
these classes. 
Broadly speaking, there are three possible formulas offered to end this unfair 
treatment of Alevis by reason of the compulsory religious education in Turkey. These 
basically comprise: 
 Exemption from these classes,  
 Constitutional arrangements to end the compulsory nature of these classes,  
 Revisions to the contents of these classes for the State not to pioneer religious 
education that concentrate on the needs of a particular belief group, thus revisions 
to incorporate the Alevi faith.  
Hitherto, the domestic level Administrative Courts have declined the lawsuits for 
exemptions from the State provided religious instruction. In response, an Alevi family 
decided to carry their case to the ECHR. In its defense in the ECHR, the government 
claimed that religious culture and ethics classes provides information on various 
religions; that it is legitimate to grant “more time to the study of Islam than to other 
religions and philosophies of life”; that the syllabus “did not take into consideration the 
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vision of members of mezhep [a branch of Islam] or tarikat [a religious order] 
represented in the country”; that this education is “necessary to protect children from 
myths and erroneous information, which gave rise to fanaticism”; as well that its content 
complies with secularism (ECHR, 2007). These justifications of the government were 
challenged by the ECHR which in this case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey found 
deficiencies in the content of the religious instruction in Turkey. The ECHR ruled that 
“the exemption procedure is not an appropriate method and does not provide sufficient 
protection” since it requires citizens to lay open their belief which as well constitutes a 
human rights violation (ECHR, 2007). In due course, applications for exemptions from 
these religion courses were started to be approved both by the Council of State and also 
at the local level by the administrative courts in Antalya, Ankara, and Istanbul 
(European Commission, 2009: 21). The resolutions of these domestic courts did not 
provide a solution to eliminate the above stated ECHR reservations about the content of 
these courses. The ECHR alternatively emphasized the “inadequacy of the Turkish 
educational system, which, with regard to religious instruction, does not meet the 
requirements of objectivity and pluralism and provides no appropriate method for 
ensuring respect for parents’ convictions” (ECHR, 2007). The high Court based this 
argument on the fact that religious education, if objective, need not be compulsory only 
in the case of Muslim students and need not exempt the students belonging to officially 
recognized minority religious groups (Ibid).  
At the domestic level, the Alevi organizations also came up with different 
proposals concerning the issue of how to put an end to injustices that arise from 
mandatory religious education in Turkey. CEM Foundation offers revisions to the 
content of these classes so that these classes would respond to the needs of every belief 
including Alevism in an objective and critical manner.27  To this end, as early as 2004 
CEM Foundation was involved in a study group under the guidance of the Turkish 
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and this study group has sought to 
provide suggestions about changing the content of the Religious Culture and 
Knowledge of Ethics classes. CEM Foundation supports this proposal as an option, 
whereas in fact it adopts a critical position on the compulsory nature of these classes. 
                                                            
27 Cem Foundation (2013), “CEM Vakfı’nın devletten istedikleri [CEM Foundation’s demands from the State] in the 
official Website of CEM Foundation, accessed February 16, 2013. Available at http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr/about/. 
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The Alevi organizations especially express their opinion about the constitutional 
protection of these classes: 
   There cannot be a constitutional obligation for one course. This is not rational. I am not 
stating this for I am an Alevi, but also as a human as a citizen (see Doğan Bermek in 
Appendix 3); 
   You put several unrelated things into the Constitution. Be it compulsory religion classes, 
or be it Diyanet; you involve many provisions to prohibit the people’s belief concepts. 
These provisions were incorporated on September 12 (see Fermani Altun in Appendix 3). 
In a similar vein, ABF also disapproves of these classes arguing that they are in 
violation of the ECHR Convention and demands their complete removal through 
constitutional amendments.28 ABF and PSAKD also criticizes AKP’s final report on the 
Alevi workshops which envisions continuation of the Religious Culture and Knowledge 
of Ethics classes and seeks to put in place a new sphere defined as the optional religious 
training. The former chair of PSAKD argues that such a policy would augment the 
assimilation of the Alevi students (see Fevzi Gümüş in Appendix 1).  
Others suggest that if these classes are going to remain in place, further measures 
should be taken to meet the requirements of objectivity:  
   What you need to do is to completely abrogate the religion classes… If you have them in 
any case, then you should provide that not the teachers of religious culture and ethics, not 
the theologians, but historians and philosophy teachers teach these classes. Their objective 
viewpoint would partially eliminate the problem (Hüsniye Takmaz in Appendix 3). 
These suggestions simply went down the drain as the final report on the Alevi 
workshops underlined that correction of the school textbooks to include subjects on 
Alevism would be a more viable option since there is also a considerable demand for 
continuation of these classes and Sunni citizens’ demand for enrichment of the content 
and further instructions about how to practice religion (State Ministry of the Turkish 
Republic, 2010: 141-142). Concerning the revisions, the government officials also 
referred to the ECHR rulings arguing that they carried out the ECHR demanded reforms 
to render school curricula more inclusive (see Faruk Çelik in Appendix 2).  
                                                            
28 ABF (2013), “Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu’nun Temel Talepleri [The Fumdamental Demands of the Alevi Bektashi 
Federation],” see in the official website of ABF, accessed February 16, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=264. 
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The representatives of the Alevi organizations are not content with this current 
remedy of the government that is an Alevism defined in school textbooks which Alevis 
would refuse to take for granted.  
 
Figure 3.2. Positions of some Alevi umbrella organizations concerning the religious 
culture and ethics classes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The dashed circle portrays the contours of the formula developed in the Alevi workshop report.  
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organizations share similar rhetoric of dissatisfaction about the policy outcome. It is 
observed that reconciliatory stance of some Alevi organizations did not also breed any 
favorable results (see Figure 3.2).  
A group of parliamentarians also voiced concerns about the procedures of the 
religious instruction in Turkey. There were not only criticisms concerning the way in 
which the workshops were conducted that is the process through which the content of 
the religious education was determined (see, for instance, Şerafettin Halis and Şevket 
Köse in Appendix 2) but also concerning the policy outcome that is how Alevism had 
been treated in the school curricula (see Fatma Kurtulan in Appendix 2). Many 
politicians from the opposition parties reiterated the demands for ending the compulsory 
nature of these classes (see the speeches of BDP parliamentarians including Hasip 
Kaplan; Aysel Tuğluk; Şerafettin Halis; Mehmet Ufuk Uras; and of CHP 
parliamentarians including Vahdet Sinan Yerlikaya; Yaşar Ağyüz; and Şevket Köse in 
the Appendix 2). Some also referred to the ECHR decision on the issue and also the 
reports of the European Commission and argued that direct and indirect assimilation and 
restrictive policies against the Alevi belief and culture continue as the school textbooks 
were not cleaned from discriminatory definitions, phrases and images (Fatma Kurtulan 
in Appendix 2). Kurtulan also alleges that the government preferred to bring forward the 
religious components of the Alevi identity as part of the attempts to enlarge its sphere of 
influence (Ibid). Indicative of how BDP interacts with the Alevi organizations, she also 
spoke in the name of ABF and reiterated the ABF’s demand for termination of the 
compulsory religious instruction in Turkey (Ibid). Other Alevi organizations as well as 
various other organized groups within civil society also gave their support to this policy 
position. These include, for instance, trade unions such as Eğitim-Sen, Authors’ Union 
of Turkey, Emekli-Sen, as well as, Turkish Institution for Public Education and 
Spreading Kemalism, TÜSİAD, and the Constitution Women Platform. These multiple 
actors from the level of civil society, although do not participate in a formal coalition 
structure, push for the same policy outcome. There might be even other actors that gave 
their support to the same policy position, yet this dissertation might have been unable to 
clearly identify them due to the limitations of data collection. In this respect, the 
complex nature of the lobbying concerning termination of compulsory religious 
education once again demonstrates that it is tremendously challenging to estimate the 
real number of actors supporting a specific lobbying position and given this uncertainty; 
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the dissertation simply becomes unable to infer about the significance of the ‘coalition 
size’ variable. 
The 2009 survey of the Institute of Strategic Thinking observes a vacillating 
public opinion on the issue, according to which 39.6% of the Alevi respondents and 
41.5% of the non-Alevi respondents proclaimed their preference for optional religious 
education, whereas 49.2% of the Alevi respondents demanded termination of mandatory 
religious education and only 11.6% of the non-Alevi respondents gave their support to 
this viewpoint (Strategic Thinking Institute, 2009: 33).   
In its progress reports, the European Commission also emphasizes its concern 
about the compulsory nature of religion and ethics classes and the need for an open 
debate on such sensitive issues. It criticized that the initiative aimed at improving 
dialogue with the Alevi community has not been followed through, in particular as 
regards the solution of the problem of education (European Commission, 2008: 11). The 
State-provided religious education is also a common practice in the countries which are 
members of the Council of Europe. According to the final report on the Alevi 
workshops, 43 out of 47 member states provides religious education in public schools 
(State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 133). Still, students are provided with 
options such as exemption, freedom to take another course as a substitute, or freedom to 
choose whether to atend or not to attend these courses (Ibid: 133-134). 
In Turkey, Alevi students continue to be subject to a religious education which is 
by no means approved by the Alevi community. What the government had presented as 
a remedy in fact seems to mask the existing unfair treatment of the community in terms 
of access to religious education. The content wise revisions still cannot ensure religious 
education that is in conformity with the religious convictions of Alevis. Excessive 
emphasis on the Sunni faith of Islam is preserved and indicates resistance to comply 
with international human rights law criteria which stipulates pluralist, critical and 
objective religious education free of religious indoctrination (ECHR, 2007). 
The ECHR decision in 2007, although pushed for reforms, did not result in a 
policy outcome that would satisfy the Alevi community and did not serve the 
preferences of those who seek termination of the compulsory religious education. 
According to the final report on the Alevi workshops, all the representatives of the 
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Alevi community agree that the State shall not provide information on any religion or 
belief and that those who have demands about religious education should seek access to 
such education through institutional/organizational means of their own community 
(State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 140). On the contrary, the same Report 
proposed incorporation of Alevism into school curricula on condition that these 
revisions purge proclivity to certain belief group and be in line with international 
standards (Ibid: 139-140). Although declared as the ideal, in the short-run, the State 
Ministry’s report does not anticipate the possibility of terminating these classes and as 
an interim solution it suggests optional religious education through which the students 
can have access to information about their own belief and rituals (Ibid: 159). 
The lobbying to terminate these classes is snowballing with political level support 
from parties in the opposition and from other organized groups within civil society. Yet, 
there is also a strong Sunni reflex which favors continuation of these classes. The 
drafting process for a new civilian Constitution continues and given the above discussed 
course of events and the governing party’s hard-liner policy position on the issue, it is 
dubious as to whether this consultative process will bring about removal of compulsory 
religious education from the list of Constitutional principles.  
 
3.3. The Official Recognition of Alevi Institutions: the Status of Cem Houses 
and Alevi Spritual Leaders 
 
Another major grievance of the Alevi community concerns the legal status of their 
places of worship. Alevis are excluded from the minority regime in Turkey which 
through the Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty guarantees the right of the non-Muslim 
communities to independently administer their religious institutions. Cem Houses are 
not only outside this regime, but also lack official recognition as a place of worship 
given the State policy of denying Alevism’s distinctiveness from Islam and thus the 
rejection of the need for a sanctuary other than the mosque. Mosques are considered as 
the unique worship places of Muslims; yet, in practice the Alevi rituals are radically 
unusual to those of Sunnis, consequently their places for conducting these rituals called 
ayn-i cem [ritual prayer] with dede [the spiritual leader] supervising these rituals. For 
that reason, Alevis refuse to go to mosques where they cannot practice any 
particularities of their distinctive ritual. 
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Parallel to the increase in Alevi urbanization, there had been a growing demand 
for constructing new Cem Houses in urban areas. Yet these demands for the recognition 
of their traditional religious institutions were basically discarded on grounds that Alevis 
are Muslims, thus need not worship at places other than the mosques: 
   Through the speech of a senior official, the Directorate of Religious Affairs had expressed 
that the Cem Houses are places for revelry. In addition, it is a complete scandal that the 
Prime Minister neglected the places of the members of a particular belief through stating in 
his speech in Berlin that ‘the Cem Houses are not places of worship. The only sanctuary for 
Islam is the mosque’… In countries ruled by democratic secular system, nobody has or 
should have the right or authority to assert to others ‘you will pray in a mosque, not in a 
Cem House’ (see CHP Parliamentarian Ali Rıza Gülçiçek in Appendix 2). 
The first intervention to the legal loophole concerning the status of the places of 
worship came with the Sixth Harmonization Package of July, 2004 which foresaw 
amendments to the Act on Construction. As a positive development, the amendment 
replaced the word ‘mosque’ with the phrase ‘places of worship’. However, the new 
phrase was not clearly defined in the Act making it uncertain as to which sanctuaries are 
going to be considered as places of worship. Thus, the amendment was not only limited 
in terms of obviating the existing legal loophole, it also created further ambiguities. The 
local Courts came up with different interpretations of this revised Act on Construction 
and in some cases the applications for constructing Cem Houses were rejected on the 
basis that these Houses are cultural centers rather than places of worship. In others, the 
Courts decide that the Cem Houses should be considered as places of worship. For 
instance, in 2008, the Sixth Administrative Court in Ankara rejected the application of 
CEM Foundation for upgrade of Cem Houses to worship place status, whereas the 
Sixteenth Court of First Instance in Ankara overturned the decision to close Çankaya 
Cem House Construction Association on the basis that Cem Houses are places of 
worship and their approval as such is not in breach of the Constitution. Given these 
contradicting and arbitrary Court decisions and lack of an overall State policy 
concerning this issue, Alevis carried their case to the ECHR. (European Commission, 
2010: 24). The chair of CEM Foundation İzzettin Doğan officially petitioned to ECHR, 
stating that “this issue cannot be left to the opinion of the government. This is a basic 
human right; it is the right to freedom of religion” (see in: Blazer, 2012). This 
application remains the only one case in the ECHR about the status of Cem Houses, and 
the chair of AVF Doğan Bermek argues that “the Alevi problems will long persist as the 
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attitude remains as ‘eventually others will find remedy, I need not cope with these 
problems’” (Bermek, 2012). In this respect, Bermek criticizes other Alevi organizations 
for their lack of concern when it comes to lobbying these available European level 
mechanisms.  
In practice, Alevis can perform their rituals in the existing Cem Houses. However, 
as Bermek observes: 
   There are about 3000 Cem Houses in Turkey. All of them are unlawful. In one morning 
when you go to the gate of a Cem House two policemen would come and say that ‘we seal 
this place’. Our Cem Houses remains open on account of societal consensus. Only one of 
them has occupancy permit. Others are not accepted as Cem Houses in the land 
registrations; because the State fails to acknowledge Cem Houses (see in Appendix 1). 
Similarly, the chair of ADF Hüsniye Takmaz expresses that they lost faith in 
future possibility of legal changes to the current status of Cem Houses (see in Appendix 
3). Fermani Altun from World Ahlul Bayt Foundation also claims that it is a grave 
human rights violation to consider some of the sanctuaries as invalid in the laws on 
construction (see in Appendix 3). He adds that:  
   Cem Houses cannot be established as Cem Houses in Turkey. They can be established as 
cultural centers. Then, they are called Cem Houses which is in fact still forbidden by law. 
Let’s say, in the future, the government comes and states that I am closing these Houses 
according the Law on the Dervish Lodges. In this respect, although it is forbidden, it is 
overlooked and let alone (see in Appendix 3). 
The issue of non-recognition has some other implications including resistance to 
opening of new Houses, lack of access to the State funds, and segregation in exemptions 
from a number of taxes enjoyed by the other places of worship. Apart from these, 
Alevis also claim to suffer from the alleged attempts to destroy Cem Houses and the 
alleged State sponsored and operated mosque construction in their villages (see Ercan 
Geçmez in Appendix 1). Last but not least, the rejunevation and protection of the Alevi 
identity also involves the status of the Alevi spiritual leaders. In the words of Michael 
Stewart “it is difficult to believe that the imams of Alevi mosques, hired and paid for by 
the Turkish government, fully support the continuation of heterodox Alevi traditions” 
(2007: 56). According to this logic, enhancement of the status of Alevi’s spiritual 
leaders represents an important element of the Alevis’ institutional reconfiguration. To 
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this end, CEM Foundation and AVF demands similar State benefits as provided to 
imams including salary; social security benefits, etc. Some Alevi organization 
representatives also made proposals for education programs to invigorate the religious 
knowledge and competence of the Alevi spiritual leaders:  
   Whatever every other civilized person needs while doing a particular job; dede is no 
different. The man is going to get sick, send his children to school, and get dressed. Are we 
going to do these with donations? This is what we do now… We demand salary for every 
personnel who provide services (see Doğan Bermek in Appendix 3).   
The chair of World Ahlul Bayt Foundation Fermani Altun alternatively demands 
the State to financially support Alevi associations and organizations which would then, 
in his account, allocate these State funds in a more institutionalized fashion (see in 
Appendix 2). He also underlines that there is a connection between the current legal 
status and lack of State support to the Alevi places of worship (see in Appendix 3). 
Others counter these proposals on the basis of the interpretation that Alevism may 
thus be put under the command of the State and become more exposed to the danger of 
Sunnification. For instance, the chair of ADF Hüsniye Takmaz argues that through 
State-provided salaries dedes will become civil servants of the State and will have to put 
into practice a State-imposed belief system (see in Appendix 3). 
Alevis also controvert the funds allocated to Diyanet and reserved for the Sunni 
community arguing that this is leading to discrimination of Alevis who are tax payer 
citizens not unlike their Sunni counterparts. Thus, linked to the status problem of Cem 
Houses, an additional policy proposal is that the State shall not discriminate in terms of 
services provided to its citizens and has the responsibility to fund the electricity, water, 
personnel, maintenance, and repair expenses of Cem Houses: 
   In this country, there is an Alevi citizen mass numbered 15 million, 20 million? This 
Alevi citizen mass pay taxes... You accept to pay for the fuel expense of Armenian, Jewish 
places of worship, but since it is Cem House you do not want to pay for where the people 
with Alevi faith are praying (see Kamer Genç in Appendix 2); 
   The Cem House reality, which occupies an important place in the life of Alevi 
community, shall be accepted free of political concerns and without turning it into mosque-
Cem House antimony. The State shall assist the Cem Houses which are important elements 
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of our belief and cultural life; funds shall be allocated from the general budget (see Atila 
Kaya in Appendix 2); 
   As in the case of mosques, the expenses of Cem Houses such as electricity and water 
shall be covered by the State (see İhsan Özkes in Appendix 2);  
   Supposing that you (with reference to the AKP government) have some religious reasons 
for not considering the Cem Houses as places of worship; but also repudiated are all the 
proposals we as Republican People’s Party have given in every budget period for 
appropriation of funds from the budget for the support of the Cem Houses, the maintenance 
and repair of the Cem Houses (see Mustafa Özyürek in Appendix 2). 
The government officials provided contradictory responses to these demands 
voiced by the opposition party representatives. Whereas, back in 2008 the former 
Deputy Prime Minister Nazım Ekren repudiated such proposals as extreme and rejected 
the need for legal arrangements arguing that “in no period of Islamic history, there had 
been any sect or religious order within Islam which consider itself within Islam but 
establish a place of worship as an alternative to the mosque” (see in Appendix 2); in 
2010, another State Minister Faruk Çelik (see in Appendix 2) alternatively argued that it 
is meaningless to talk about the issue of support unless the Parliament reaches a 
compromise on the status of Cem Houses underlining the future possibility for 
recognition. Still, the issue of access to the State support may eventuate earlier than the 
issue of recognition.  
Currently, there have been some local level requests for Cem Houses’ access to 
municipal funds. In October 27, 2011, the chair of the Mersin branch office of the Alevi 
Culture Associations submitted a petition to the Special Provincial Administration to 
cover electricity, water, personnel, maintenance, and repair expenses of Cem Houses. 
On November 1, 2011, the petition was transformed into a proposal in the provincial 
assembly and accepted unanimously by the members of this assembly from each 
political party. Although the proposal was ultimately turned down by the city major in 
Mersin; it pioneered a local level action by some Alevi groups in other cities (Blazer, 
2012). Yet, any provincial level fund allocation would result in unevenness as it will 
depend upon the discretion of different provincial authorities. Permanent solution rather 
lies in the State level policies to address the Alevi grievances. During 2012 budgetary 
discussions, it was once again proposed in the TBMM Planning and Budget 
Commission that 200 million Turkish Liras can be reserved to Diyanet for allocations to 
 125 
 
maintenance and repair of Cem Houses. The Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek, 
turning down this proposal, stated that:  
   It is an important issue, I have no reservation. Yet, it cannot be resolved with an 
additional allocation to the Ministry of Finance. It would be more appropriate to work on it 
in the following period and bring it to a certain position within the structure of the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs and then allocate resources. It is not that we don’t take 
heed of this (see in Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 3.3. Positions of some Alevi umbrella organizations on issues related to the 
Alevi Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
*The dashed circle portrays the vacillating approach adopted in the Alevi workshop report. 
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other participants of the workshops mentioned their reservations that the demanded 
status would lead to new splits within Islam since every religion has a single place of 
worship and the supporters of this viewpoint demanded arrangements in the relevant 
legislation that, without an emphasis on the phrase ‘places of worship’, the Cem 
Houses’ existing status can be confirmed by the State and the shortages in the existing 
legislations can be eliminated through amendments to provide Cem Houses with the 
same means benefited by other places of worship.   
Underlining these reservations, the final report on the Alevi workshops also 
adopted a vacillating approach (see its depiction in Figure 3.3) towards the demands for 
a worship place status and underlined the reservation that the arguments in favor of 
these Alevi demands knowingly or not knowingly may imply a religion status for 
Alevism (State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 72). The report nevertheless 
suggests that Cem Houses should be officially granted a certain legal status and that 
their expenses should be covered by the State in line with the principle of equality.29  
More than a year after the announcement of the Alevi Workshop Report, the 
government did not take any concrete steps to address the issue. The CHP 
parliamentarians keep pressuring the government and in November 29, 2011 they 
submitted a law proposal on rearrangement of the clause on places of worship. In May 
15, 2012, CHP once again appealed to put this proposal immediately back on the 
Parliament’s agenda, yet the appeal was declined due to a lack of quorum. Overall, the 
AKP government is hard pressed to carry out the necessary reforms given the united 
stance of the Alevi organizations which cannot be blamed for political inaction; 
supportive conclusions of the Alevi Workshop Report which signifies compromise 
among the participating stakeholders at least concerning the need for a ‘certain’ legal 
status; as well as pressures of the parties in the opposition, of the European Commission 
and of the law suits pending before the ECHR. Moreover, there is no strong public 
reaction against Cem Houses’ access to a place of worship status. The survey of the 
Institute of Strategic Thinking (2009: 33) stresses that only 28.2% of the non-Alevi 
respondents voiced preference in favor of witholding such status. According to the same 
survey, majority of the Alevi respondents (74.9%) have claimed worship place status for 
Cem Houses signalling also the exigency of this issue in the eyes of the Alevi 
                                                            
29 Akşam (2011), “Alevi çalıştay raporu açıklandı [Alevi workshop report was announced],” March, 31. Available at: 
http://www.aksam.com.tr/alevi-calistay-raporu-aciklandi--30241h.html. 
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community (Ibid). Still, the government’s future interpretation of the demanded legal 
status is open for debate.  
 
3.4. The Future Status and Services of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 
 
Diyanet, since its foundation in March 3, 1924, serves the Turkish State in 
supervising and controlling the sphere of religion. It was created as an administrative 
unit under the authority of prime ministry and according to the Article 136 of the 
Turkish Constitution, “the Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general 
administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance 
with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and 
aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” This Constitutional principle, however, is at 
odds with the popular Western discourse on secularism according to which the public 
realm is something to be cleared from any reference to ultimate reality provided by the 
dogma of religion. Alternatively, in the Turkish case Diyanet -as a public institution and 
through its service of informing the public about religion- is perceived to play a 
significant role in protecting secularism. Its creation represents testament to reinvention 
of secularism in Turkey, which is legitimized on the basis of some structural 
peculiarities of Islam. Sharp-cut political versus religious or public versus private 
distinctions cannot be secured in societies where the majority adopts religious belief 
systems that have provisions to arrange the public life. This character of the Islamic 
faith exceptionally challenges the Turkish State in correcting the balance in co-
ordination of these ideally distinct spheres. Thus, the ideal ultimate distinction between 
these realms, which could have been possible in the case of Western societies and 
Christianity, was converted in the Turkish case into an ultimate need to manage both. In 
that sense, Diyanet was argued to become a legitimate institution as far as religion does 
not dominate or influence the State affairs (Bardakoğlu, 2009: 13). This legitimization, 
however, posits a dilemma given the issue of how different religious groups, which 
consider themselves as distinct from the mainstream, should be treated under such a 
system of State controlled religious activity.  
Through the new context of religious rights based advocacy movements in Turkey 
and especially with the emergent Alevi demands for recognition, the monopoly of 
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Diyanet over religious activity has became a highly contested issue as the institution 
visibly suffers from the domination of the Sunni faith of Islam. The services such as 
fatwa [informing the society on matters of religion], publications of Koran, management 
of mosques, coordination of hajj, and appointment of muftis indeed only fulfill the 
needs of the Sunni majority and in this respect fall short of fulfilling what can be 
defined as the collective need. For the Alevi community, the status and services of 
Diyanet leads to discrimination not only given the shortages to cover the needs of 
Alevism; but also the institution is deficient with respect to upholding an impartial 
position due to its adoption of Sunnism and its representatives’ past hostilities towards 
the Alevi community.  
To alleviate the problem of State impartiality as frustrated through the institution 
of Diyanet, stakeholders deliberate mainly over three possible remedies. There are those 
who favor leaving religious affairs totally to the initiative of religious communities, 
those who argue that different religious beliefs including the Alevi faith should also be 
represented within Diyanet, as well as those who suggest that Diyanet should cease to 
be a State institution and gain an autonomous position. Different Alevi organizations are 
located at different ends of this policy spectrum (see in Appendix 1 and Appendix 3).  
ABF and PSAKD demand the abolishment of Diyanet and termination of the 
State’s alleged religious assimilation policies arguing that the existence of this 
institution basically violates the principle of laicism and feeds political Islam.30 This 
policy position entails radical changes to the long established secularist model of 
Turkey according to which the State possesses the power to intervene into the sphere of 
religion. Diyanet’s total abolishment would mean the State’s renunciation from this 
undue control over religious affairs, but it would to a large extent eliminate the problem 
of State impartiality towards different religions.  
As an alternative to ABF and PSAKD’s demands for total abolishment of this 
isnstitution, the chair of AVF Doğan Bermek rather draws attention to the problems 
associated with Diyanet’s current constitutional status: 
                                                            
30 ABF (2013), “Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu’nun Temel Talepleri [The Fumdamental Demands of the Alevi Bektashi 
Federation],” accessed February 16, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=264. 
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   Similar to the religion classes, today if the government wishes it can close down the 
Directorate of Security Affairs; it can state that I am closing down the Ministry of Health; 
there is no need for the Ministry. It cannot close down Diyanet; because Diyanet is a 
Constitutional institution… What we demand is that this institution should cease to be 
Constitutional. We can then discuss whether it is necessary or not (See in Appendix 3).  
 
Figure 3.4. Positions of some Alevi umbrella organizations on the status and 
services of the Diyanet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
*The dashed circle portrays the vacillating position embraced in the Alevi workshop report.  
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registered mosques and gives scope for tax exemptions which are denied in the case of 
Alevis and non-Muslim religious groups. According to another proposal by Kazım Genç 
from PSAKD, “even if the Religious Affairs Directorate remains in place, we would 
like a share from the general budget, but the government should be able to inspect 
where the money goes” (see in Poyraz-Doğan, 2007). Organizations -such as CEM 
Foundation and World Ahlul Bayt Foundation-demand also institutional reconfiguration 
of Diyanet and integration of their belief system into this institution so that Alevis 
would enjoy access to religious services that the State provides for its Sunni Muslim 
population and accordingly part of the State budget would be allocated for electricity 
and water expenses of the Alevi places of worship (Köse: 2010). Hüsniye Takmaz from 
ADF alternatively repudiates all these claims arguing that: 
   There cannot be an institution called Directorate of Religious Affairs in a secular 
democratic constitutional State. Besides, it is no longer an institution but is something 
further than a ministry. I mean, you cannot define it as a Directorate since it is in possession 
of a budget of 3-4 ministries (see in Appendix 3). 
Although the representatives from different Alevi umbrella organizations are still 
unable to put forward a precise unified policy stance about the future status of Diyanet, 
the dominant Alevi discourse basically repudiates the legitimacy of this institution’s 
current constitutional status and calls for equal treatment of different belief systems (see 
Figure 3.4). 
Within the political sphere, there is a clear consensus on the relative impossibility 
of realizing demands for total abrogation of Diyanet. As also enunciated by the 
Constitutional Court, the main raison d'être for supporting Diyanet’s relevance is the 
challenge of how to otherwise forestall the threat of irtica [religious reactionism].  
   We favor the continuation of Diyanet as a State institution given the persistence of the 
risk of irtica; otherwise our ultimate target is Diyanet’s –that is, the services of religion- 
total relinquishment to communities; however to reach that end, irtica should no longer be a 
risk, in other words, the demand for religious government should be removed from the 
agenda (see Süleyman Yağız speaking on behalf of DSP group in Appendix 2). 
   Under the circumstances, if it is left to communities, we all know that anomalous, 
fallacious malpractices, which would regard its truth as truth of Islam, steps in over various 
domains (see Haluk Koç speaking on on behalf of CHP group in Appendix 2). 
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Given these reservations, the dominant discourse in the Parliament rather 
underlines the need for reconfiguration of Diyanet’s current status either through 
autonomy (see Mehmet Nezir Karabaş in Appendix 2) or at least through adjustment of 
its services to address the collective demand without excluding any sub-belief group 
within the Turkish society (see Haluk Koç and Mehmet Şandır in Appendix 2).  
Others question the impartiality of the institution, not only in terms of the ability 
to include every sub-belief group; but also arguing that the institution plays right into 
the hands of the conservative government which is alleged to reinvent the institutional 
dynamics of Diyanet, and in return receive support for its conservative policies: 
   In the election of Müftis, merely those who swear an oath of allegiance to AKP are 
preferred. Diyanet is not an institution, backyard, benefice of the government, and mosques 
are not its political bureau. Islam can never be diminished to be put under the flag of a 
political party (see İhsan Özkes in Appendix 2). 
In this respect, the secular opposition suffers from a formidable dilemma. On the 
one hand, its irtica-related concerns favor continuation of the State supervised and 
standardized religious activity. However, the same secular opposition, if continues to 
remain in opposition in the following parliamentary periods, is not expected to ever be 
at ease with the Diyanet’s current status. The opposition’s political interests are severely 
damaged due to the AKP government’s uninterrupted preeminence in politics and thus 
the gradual increase in its control over every institution of the political domain. Besides, 
it should be noted also that the claims for reconfiguration of the Diyanet’s existing 
status and services were not yet openly voiced as a party level policy and only some 
parliamentarians have raised the issue on the basis of their fervor for the betterment of 
sub-belief groups in Turkey.    
The European Commission had also given scant attention to the issue and its 
position seems rather to be irresolute. The problem was first mentioned in its 2003 
Progress Report. Referring to Alevis, the Commission stated that “concerns persist with 
regard to representation in the Directorate for Religious Affairs” (European 
Commission, 2003: 36). A year later, the Commission came up with the alternative 
suggestion that the State “should not directly support one particular religion (the Sunnis) 
as it currently does through the Diyanet” (Ibid, 2004: 45). Finally, the 2005 report once 
again brought up the issue that Alevis are not officially represented under the institution 
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of Diyanet (European Commission, 2005: 31). Since then, the successive reports of the 
European Commission ceased to propose the issue as a possible item to be included 
within the government’s reform agenda. Overall, the European Commission failed to 
offer at least a clear advisory opinion on the regulation of the status and services of 
Diyanet reflecting the domestic level turmoil over the issue. Lacking consistent 
feedbacks from the domestic level, the EU fails to come up with an overt position. 
Moreover, in the words of Doğan Bermek “every State has its own structure and that is 
why the Directorate of Religious Affairs does not yet concern the EU. It is our domestic 
issue… The Commission expresses opinion about the attitude of the institution and it 
cannot deliver an opinion about the legal status” (see in Appendix 3). Given different 
practices across the EU Member States and consequent lack of a cohesive EU position, 
the future resolution of the issue was left to power dynamics at Turkey’s domestic 
political arena.  
The Turkish State’s hitherto exigency to keep an eye on religious activity and its 
institutional legacy engendered incongruity in today’s conjuncture where sub-belief 
groups have intensified their criticisms against the injustices that arise from the State’s 
intrusion into the sphere of religion. Diyanet is situated at the center of these criticisms 
as there are demands for abrogation of the institution countered by a strong Sunni lobby 
which benefits from the State-provided religious services. Given this high level of 
conflict over the issue, some Alevi groups directed their lobbying towards demanding 
equal access to religious services rendered not under the auspices of Diyanet but 
through a new realm reserved for Alevis. Some Alevi groups came up with this demand 
because they do not have confidence in the comprehensiveness of the Diyanet’s 
religious discourse and disapprove that the institution rather gives weight to Islam’s 
Sunni interpretation (State Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 2010: 119) Besides, in a 
2009 survey, this also emerges as the dominant opinion within the Alevi public that is 
73.3% of the Alevi respondents, who participated in this survey, had expressed their 
preference for an independent high council to organize their religious affairs (Strategic 
Thinking Institute, 2009: 33). Such a civil autonomous restructuring of Diyanet would 
eliminate the criticisms not only about the State interference to the sphere of religion but 
also about the Sunni’s unbalanced access to the State provided religious services. In the 
near future, it would be extremely optimistic to expect the government to reciprocate 
these Alevi complaints that is because Diyanet, through its existing structure, both 
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serves the AKP government and its Sunni electorate. Moreover, according to the survey 
of the Institute of Strategic Thinking only 23.9% of the non-Alevi respondents seem to 
support the Alevi expectations about the establishment of an autonomous institution to 
take care of the Alevis’ religious affairs (Ibid). Besides, the nuisance of reactionary 
religious movements also dissuades the secular opposition from unconditional 
endorsement of these Alevi claims.  
With reference to all these discussion on the status and services of Diyanet, the 
final report on the Alevi workshops draws attention to the increased politization of the 
issue which problematizes its imperturbable handling. The report points to the need for 
legal remedies, yet adds that Diyanet is not an institution designed for faith groups such 
as Alevism. It also underlines the demands of the Alevi groups which reject connection 
to institutional network of Diyanet under any circumstances and that these groups’ 
independent institutionalization could only be accepted in line with the secular 
principles of the Turkish State.31  
 
3.5. Removal of the Religion Section from the Identity Cards 
 
The Turkish Constitution guarantees one’s right not to disclose his or her religious 
beliefs. In contradiction with this constitutional principle, until the New Population 
Services Law of April 25, 2006 it was obligatory to indicate religion in the identity 
cards of the Turkish citizens. The issue of designation of religion in the identity cards, 
therefore, became another contradiction of the secular Turkish State whose 
unconventional modified understanding of secularism promoted a particular religion as 
a means to unify and mobilize the collective consciousness; yet, the mechanisms 
employed in the service of this policy have become unfavorable for the members of the 
minority religions. Alevis, who disapprove of the claim that Alevism is a sect within 
Islam, represent the most visibly frustrated group under the existing practice.  
In order to draw attention to discriminations associated with the practice of 
designating religion in the identity cards in Turkey, the European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance came up with three reports -respectively in 1999, 2000 and 
                                                            
31  Akşam (2011), “Alevi Çalıştay raporu açıklandı [Alevi Workshop Report was announced],” March, 31. Available 
at: http://www.aksam.com.tr/alevi-calistay-raporu-aciklandi--30241h.html. 
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2004. In response to these criticisms and before AKP’s coming to power, the issue was 
carried to the agenda of the preceeding coalition government composed of DSP, ANP, 
and MHP. The junior partner MHP resisted to the EU-anchored proposal for the 
elimination of the obligation to designate religion in the identity cards. Lack of 
consensus within the coalition government had prevented the expected legal changes 
(Esen & Gönenç: 2007/2008: 585).  
In due course, the struggle for reform continued with the domestic level lawsuit 
by Sinan Işık (a member of the Alevi community in Turkey). The applicant demanded 
the removal of the obligation to indicate his religion in his identity card. Yet, the court 
rejected the application on the basis of a legal advice from Diyanet which argued that 
Alevi faith is a sect within Islam and thus the indication of ‘Islam’ in the identity cards 
is appropriate. This case clearly demonstrates the peculiar understanding of secularism 
prevalent in Turkey, according to which the State defines its official religion, manifests 
itself through Diyanet and utilizes this institutional mechanism to remain in control of 
the religious domain. Nevertheless, currently even representatives from Diyanet have 
transformed their policy position on the issue. For instance, the previous Minister of 
Religious Affairs Ali Bardakoğlu expressed his concern that indication of a particular 
religion or a sect in the identity cards indeed aggravates the cleavages within the 
Turkish society.32  
According to the Article 43 of the 1972 Population Register Law, citizens could 
already change the information in their identity cards’ religion section –however, only 
thorugh a court decision. The 2006 amendment to the Population Services Law has 
eased this procedure making it possible to change the information in this section simply 
through petitioning to the Directorate of Population. The new arrangement did not 
change the legal procedures about leaving this section blank or changing the designated 
religion. In this respect, it is not necessarily ground-breaking for the members of the 
minority religions as they will have to continue to disclose their religious beliefs and 
might therefore become exposed to latent discriminations. As Selin Esen and Levent 
Gönenç argue “although the state's policy itself (i.e., the inclusion of religious 
information on ID cards) is not directly the source of harm, even an indirect correlation 
between the harm of religious discrimination through social pressure and the action of 
                                                            
32 Radikal (2010), “Din hanesi kaldırılmalı [The religion section shall be removed],” October, 24. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1025232&CategoryID=98.  
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the State suffices to qualify this policy as non-neutral under the concept of neutrality of 
consequences” (2007/2008: 600-601). 
Considering such reservations, the ECHR ruled with respect to the case of Sinan 
Işık v. Turkey that the deletion of the religion box on the identity cards could be an 
appropriate form of reparation to put an end to the breach in question (ECHR, 2010). 
The current practice is still not in line with this final ECHR decision and also in breach 
of the Article 15 of the Turkish Constitution that “no one shall be forced to disclose his 
or her religion, conscience, belief and convictions.”  
Interestingly, according to the results of a 2009 poll, the public opinion in general 
appears to be against this ECHR demanded arrangement and also the Alevi public 
opinion, in particular, rather seems to be ambivalent. According to this poll, 76.9% of 
the non-Alevi citizens and 42.7% of the Alevi citizens argued that the religion section 
shall not be removed from the identity cards (Strategic Thinking Institute, 2009: 33). 
The representatives from Alevi umbrella organizations also voiced different opinions. 
ABF and AVF demand the sections’ complete removal from the identity cards:33  
   That religion section, if empty, then you are under neighborhood pressure… You are 
under neighborhood pressure if you write I am an Alevi, you are under neighborhood 
pressure if you write I am a Shafi. There is no need for religion section. What relationship 
is there between citizenship and religion (see Doğan Bermek in Appendix 3)? 
Yet, there are still others –for instance, Hüsniye Takmaz from ADF (see in 
Appendix 3) - who are unable to put forward an institutional position, as well as others -
for instance, Fermani Altun from the World Ahlul Bayt Foundation- who seems to be 
content with the current practice:  
   In reality it is not that right. You are going to pass your identity card to someone who is 
going to look whether you are Alevi, Sunni, or from which other religion. What kind of an 
attitude should be expected from those civil servants… What do we have to do with a 
religion section in the identity cards? Let the people’s religion sections remain empty (see 
Hüsniye Takmaz in Appendix 3); 
   Nobody intervenes with peoples’ religious practice preferences, their spirituality. In this 
respect, they either have their religion written or not (see Fermani Altun in Appendix 3).  
                                                            
33 ABF (2013), “Alevi Bektaşi Federasyonu’nun Temel Talepleri [The Fumdamental Demands of the Alevi Bektaşi 
Federation],” accessed February 16, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.alevifederasyonu.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=264.  
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Although all of these representatives from the major Alevi organizations adduce 
certain negative aspects of the religion sections’ existence, their declarations make it 
clear that there is no effective lobbying concerning this issue. 
The religion section in the identity cards is quite likely to soon cease to exist as 
the pressures from the European level are received favorably by the domestic political 
authorities. About the final ECHR decision on the issues, the Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan commented that: 
   The ECHR’s latest decision is an issue that shows parallelism with the step taken by our 
Constitutional Court. The existence or non-existence of a section on religion in the IDs 
would not make a big difference. In this respect, I do not consider the ECHR decision as 
abnormal (see in Appendix 2). 
This practice of designating religion in the identity cards is nonconforming from the 
vantage of the EU Member States. Only Greece used to have such a practice until 2000 
and the religion section was deleted from the Greek identity cards as part of the 
country’s EU-harmonization efforts. Once Greece got rid of this section, however, there 
was heavy lobbying by the religious authorities who demanded restoration of religion 
section at least as optional, similar to the current practice in Turkey. In the Turkish case, 
it is uncertain as to how those favoring the section’s existence would react if the issue of 
its deletion becomes a solid government proposal.  
 
3.6. General Evaluation of the Lobbying for the Alevi Issues 
 
The past official negligence concerning the demands of the Alevi community 
might be a product of what Çarkoğlu and Bilgili (2011: 351) refer to as the misleading 
interpretation of Turkey’s religious landscape as homogeneous and thus the denial of 
divisions among the Muslim sectarian groups. This misleading official interpretation 
had begun to collapse under the context of Turkey’s EU negotiations, for continuation 
of which the authorities were hard pressed to come to terms with religious as well as 
ethnic divisions within the country and consult with the relevant stakeholders from civil 
society who had begun to raise demands on the basis of these divisions. In the case of 
Alevi community, it was not before 2005 with the enabling of the EU laws that the 
Alevi associations and foundations could organize under larger federation structures and 
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prior to the workshop process these structures lacked proper contact with one another, 
as well as lacked any access to decision making. The AKP government’s EU-induced 
reconciliatory approach vis-à-vis the Alevi claims and its decision to introduce a series 
of workshops opened a new channel of communication. Still, the community 
organizations perceived them as very much limited in terms of producing favorable 
results.  
A 2009 survey also suggests that most of the Alevi population is dissatisfied with 
this process of opening to the Alevi community -49.2% expressed discontent with the 
Alevi Opening and only 14.9% reported to be content about the process (Institute of 
Strategic Thinking, 2009: 82). The same survey demonstrates mistrust in the 
government’s initiative as according to survey results 59.8% of the Alevi respondents 
consider the initiative as a policy of Sunnification (Ibid: 49).  
The workshop process was one time only and remained discontinuous as the Alevi 
organizations lack proper institutionalized dialogue with the decision making structures. 
The empirical analysis of this process reveals lack of legal progress in the resolution of 
the Alevi’s human rights based demands. The politics of Opening was stuck in the 
discussions about ‘policy development’ concluded with a final report on the Alevi 
workshops and did not yet proceed to the next step of ‘policy execution’. One can, 
therefore, only partially evaluate the Alevi groups’ lobbying success through assessing 
the results of the policy development process (the workshop process) which was 
finalized with an official report published by the State Ministry. During the workshops, 
the Alevi organizations were expected to speak with one voice. However, this group of 
lobbyists came up with alternative policy suggestions concerning the underlying 
problems of their community even including the issue of how to define Alevism. 
Hitherto, the interpretation of Alevism had been very much litigious with different 
Alevi groups acknowledging alternative definitions and some even disapprove of the 
need for a fixed definition of Alevism. The analysis of the course of events proves the 
opposite and reveals that this discursive multiplicity and associated intra group rivalry 
challenged and complicated the Alevi organizations’ ability to address their common 
grievances. This competitive character of the Alevi lobby has also been utilized to 
allege as a pretext for the government’s irresolute position on the Alevi issues.  
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Despite differences in strategies, willingness to cooperate with the government, 
and solutions offered; as a matter of fact, the Alevi organizations are all of one mind 
about the main problems suffered by their community. First, all these problems are 
connected with the recognition of Alevism’s distinctiveness and all the Alevi 
organizations are especially at odds with the attempts to define Alevism on behalf of 
Alevis. Second, in line with this demand, another common grievance of the community 
organizations is the content of the religious education pertaining to their belief system, 
since the government made clear its obstinacy about not to terminate the compulsory 
nature of this education. Thirdly, the Alevi groups also complain about the State’s 
idiocratic understanding of secularism and the Diyanet’s limited representative capacity 
and services. In this respect, the State is required to find remedy to discriminations 
associated with this institutional tradition. Fourth, Alevis suffer from problems related 
to recognition of their religious institutions. The Alevi organizations are united in their 
demands for a legal worship place status and concerning this demand they also receive 
the support of some political level actors as well as the support of several other groups 
within civil society. Still, this growing support has so far failed to render the Alevi 
organizations successful in attaining their demands for a legal worship place status. 
This united position on the common Alevi grievances did not remain 
unchallenged. During the workshop process, academicians from university departments 
of religious studies, representatives from Diyanet, as well as some politicians and civil 
society organizations had voiced the reservations of the Sunni majority. This counter 
lobby and its interests decisively impacted the policy options offered in the final report 
on the Alevi workshops. Especially, on three issues central to the Alevi community -
compulsory religious education, the status of Cem Houses, and the status of Diyanet- 
the Sunni religious interests had visibly run counter to the Alevi expectations for reform 
further dragging the process into a deadlock.   
The Alevi organizations gave different reactions to this Sunni reflex and 
employed different lobbying strategies. For instance, CEM Foundation, AVF and World 
Ahlul Bayt Foundation rather preferred to follow a policy of reconciliation with the 
government hoping to produce negotiable policies that would not contravene the policy 
contours of the Sunni interests. Others such as ABF and PSAKD considered these 
concessions as betrayal, distanced themselves from the government, and concentrated 
on outside lobbying in the form of public protests. This latter groups’ cautious stance 
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and criticisms about the opening politics of the government heightened tensions not 
only with the government but also within the community organizations. Finally, ADF 
claims to uphold a bridging function between these alternative positions. According to 
its chair Hüsniye Takmaz, AVF is a little bit more close to the State and ABF is just the 
opposite as it is less concerned with experiencing Alevism intensely and she claims 
therefore that ADF stands in the middle and represents an important step in the merger 
of other Alevi umbrella organizations such as AVF and ABF (see in Appendix 3). 
Having realized the disadvantages of the failure to effectively present their common 
grounds, these major federations have begun to provide more integrity in the post-
workshop period. Yet, this strategy of increased communication among alternative 
federations and emphasis on common demands did not yield any favorable results as the 
workshop process remains discontinuous. 
The EU authorities also evaluated the government’s initiative of Opening to the 
Alevi community as incomplete. In July 2011, the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle criticized that:  
   The dialogue with the Alevis and the non-Muslim religious communities launched by the 
Turkish authorities has yet to produce tangible results. The Commission keeps raising 
issues regarding freedom of religion with the Turkish authorities.34  
The protection of minorities is a foundational value of the EU which, however, 
fails to provide any solid standards on the issue of minority rights. Nevertheless, the EU 
has a number of adaptation pressures in the case of candidate countries through its 
demand for compliance with other international and regional level law instruments as 
developed, for instance, by the Council of Europe, Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), etc. Still, these pressures do not sufficiently ameliorate 
Alevis’ conditions the same way as it does in the case of officially protected minorities. 
The fact that the most Alevi groups rebuff entitlement to a minority category further 
complicates the picture as Alevi’s become unable to utilize these international level 
minority rights instruments.   
The EU also lacks any consistent feedbacks from the Alevi organizations 
operating at the domestic level of Turkey. Alevi organizations are also self-critical 
                                                            
34 Štefan Füle (2011), “Answer given by Mr Füle on behalf of the Commission,” see in the website of European 
Parliament, July, 13. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2011-
005498&language=RO. 
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arguing that they showed low level of mobilization with respect to the EU reform 
process. For instance, according to Erdoğan Aydın (2004) from PSAKD, the European 
Union Progress Reports had been limited with reference to the Alevi issues and this is 
very much connected with the Alevis’ inability to express the systematic human rights 
abuses, the failure to disclose these before the EU, and the inefficacy to mold public 
opinion concerning their problems. Doğan Bermek from AVF similarly points to 
continuation of this lack of concern about lobbying the EU structures. Although he 
states that they organize routine meetings with the EU delegation in Turkey and engage 
in contacts with several representatives from the EU institutions; he adds that these 
relations with the EU remains very much limited and criticizes other Alevi groups for 
not efficiently lobbying the available EU mechanisms (see in Appendix 3). Hüsniye 
Takmaz from ADF alternatively argues that the EU rather gave prominence to the 
problems of the Kurdish community as a result of which the Alevi organizations 
became of secondary importance and thus estranged from the EU process which 
eventuated in rupture between the Alevis and the EU (see in Appendix 3).   
Alternatively, the ECHR had been a source of help and the Alevi citizens were 
able to make the most of this channel of influence. In a number of instances, the 
decisions of the Court had been instrumental in pressuring for the readjustment of 
Turkey’s domestic jurisprudence. Moreover, the ECHR decisions are detrimental over 
setting the agenda of other European level institutions. For instance, the case of religion 
section on identity cards was never mentioned by the European Commission in its 
progress reports until the 2010 ECHR decision. The same year, right after and with 
reference to the ECHR decision, the Commission for the first time drew attention to this 
issue stating that “personal documents, such as identity cards, include information on 
religion, leaving potential for discriminatory practices.” (European Commission, 2010: 
24). Thus, through their search for remedy in the ECHR, Alevis were able to raise 
awareness of the European Commission concerning specific human rights abuses. In 
turn, the European Commission embarks upon pressuring for the elimination of these 
abuses.   
A major conclusion of this chapter is that the pressures from the European level 
institutions had been limited, still decisive, in steering the agenda of reforms concerning 
the rights of the Alevi community. Most importantly, the workshop process, initiated in 
response to these pressures, laid bare the sensitive spots of the Sunni-Alevi cleavage and 
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demonstrated the weight of this cleavage in determining the frontiers of future reform 
endeavor. The design of this workshop process created a competitive lobbying 
environment within which the Alevi organizations were unable to present a united front 
and their policy proposals were countered by several other interested parties, especially 
those representing the Sunni interests.  
The ‘opening process’-related preferences of the Sunni interests seems to visibly 
concur with the preferences of AKP which single-handedly holds the executive power 
and also commands the majority in the Parliament. Beyond doubt, this political structure 
affects who attain their preferences and who don’t. Hüsniye Takmaz from ADF draws 
attention to the issue with underlining the government’s repudiation of hundreds of law 
proposals by CHP which were addressing the Alevi demands (see in Appendix 3). Some 
other Alevi organizations’ representatives are less content with the support that they 
have received from CHP. They argue that those issuing these proposals are individual 
parliamentarians and criticize CHP for not being able to come up with a tangible party 
level policy (see Doğan Bermek in Appendix 3) and for lack of concrete policies to 
address their demands (see Fermani Altun in Appendix 3).  
In the face of domestic-level structural constraints specifically the Sunni reflex 
within the Turkish society and the Alevi organizations’ lack of institutionalized access 
to the political level, the Alevi groups first need to overcome their collective action 
problems and would increase their lobbying success through concentrating on lobbying 
the European level institutions which so far proved to be the only effectual mechanism 
challenging the policy intransigence on the issues of Alevi rights in Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ISSUES OF FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA AND THE PRESS 
AND ALTERNATIVE LOBBYING POSITIONS 
 
 
The freedom of the media and the press indicates openness of a political system 
thus represents an essential aspect of democracy. In a democratic country where these 
freedoms are legally protected and where the instruments of the press are able to operate 
independent of political control; the public have more chances of access to accurate and 
unbiassed news and information about politics. Especially concerning this critical role 
of the press in shaping political choices of citizens, the governments are naturally alert 
about the information disseminated through the press and develop interest in controlling 
it either through attempts to monopolize ownership of its instruments; or by means of 
legal limitations over the practice. These limitations and the degree to which the 
governments bring them into play have ramifications over the democraticness of a 
political structure. 
In the Turkish case, this conventional situation of imbalance between freedom of 
the press and security interests of the government became distinctly apparent by reason 
of two major developments throughout 2000s. Especially, coming to power of the AKP 
government in 2002 and subsequent resurgence of Islam has given rise to ideological 
confrontation along secular versus religious conservative lines. This confrontation had 
taken a new form in 2007 with investigations into a clandestine ultra-secularist 
nationalist network called Ergenekon which had been allegedly engaging in activities to 
overthrow the elected AKP government through use of force. Since then, several 
military officers, acedemicians and journalists were taken into custody on charges of 
 143 
 
membership within this network. In addition to the unearth of this criminal case of 
Ergenekon, increased politization of the Kurdish identity came to the fore as another 
major axis of political power struggle in Turkey. The separatist demands within the 
Kurdish identity politics has become a major threat risk for Turkey’s national unity and 
those affiliated with the movement including journalists became a target on the pretext 
that they utilize journalism as a cover to promote illegal separatist activities. Since 
arrests in relation to these domestic threats were extended to those engaging in 
journalistic activity, the AKP government has been exposed to mounting criticisms that 
its fight against these domestic challenges is curtailing press freedom and that showing 
these challenges as reasons for arrests; the government might be seeking to turn the 
crisis into an opportunity to silence opposite political views. For instance, Doğan Tılıç -
the spokesperson for G-9 Journalist Organizations Platform and the former chair of 
ÇGD- states that “we have concerns that during this endless investigation there are 
attempts to eliminate all opposition, everyone who thinks differently” and that “the 
more the AKP consolidates its power, the more intolerant it becomes. I see a direct link 
between the AKP's consolidation of its power and press freedom.”35 As Freedom House 
observes “with heightened polarization regarding issues of secularism, nationalism, and 
separatism, reform efforts toward enhanced freedom of expression stalled in 2007” 
(Freedom House, 2008). Since then, the media and the press have rapidly turned into 
spheres for manifestation of these power relations and have begun to shape the 
ideological polarizations that fuel them. 
This state of affairs has deteriorated Turkey’s image about press freedom and 
there have been a steady decline from 2008 onwards in Turkey’s rankings within the 
worldwide freedom of the press indexes provided by organizations such as Reporters 
without Borders and the Freedom House. 
In the indexes of Reporters without Borders, Turkey had fallen down from its 
position of 102nd in 2008 to 148th in 2011-2012 (see Table 4.1). Similarly, the Freedom 
House reported a sharp decline in Turkey’s freedom of the press score in 2010 on 
account of the persecution of journalists based on certain provisions of the Penal Code 
and the Anti-Terror Law (Karlekar, 2011). In the Freedom House indexes, Turkey 
                                                            
35 The G-9 Journalist Organizations Platform is composed of 11 major journalist organizations in Turkey all of which 
are also members of the Freedom for Journalists Platform, see below. For Doğan Tılıç’s statement, see: Ivan Watson 
and Yeşim Cömert (2011), “Turkey arrests 3 opposition journalists,” CNN, February, 18. Available at: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/02/18/turkey.media.arrests/index.html. 
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ranked 116th in 2011 and relegated to 121th in 2012 and was placed at the bottom of the 
Western European list in both of these indexes (Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1. Turkey’s rankings within freedom of the press indexes, 2008-2012 
  
Freedom 
House 
Index (196 
countries) 
 
Freedom House 
Index-Western 
European List (25 
countries) 
 
Reporters 
without 
Borders Index 
(178 countries) 
 
2008 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
102 
2009 N/A N/A 122 
2010 N/A N/A 138 
2011 116 25 148 
2012 121 25 148 
 
*N/A: Not Available. 
Source: Freedom House and Reporters without Borders. 
 
Another problem that critics may consider as an indicator of Turkey’s 
deteriorating conditions about freedom of the press is the increase in the appeals filed to 
the ECHR and the fact that, compared to other countries, Turkey had receieved the 
highest number of ECHR decisions (exceeding 200 decisions) for violations of press 
freedom and freedom of expression.36 In its 2012 report, the European Commission also 
underlined this upsurge in the applications to the ECHR and waged several criticisms 
against the situation in Turkey. As major problems, the European Commission (2012: 
21-22) especially pointed to abuses caused by the interpretation of the legal famework 
as regards organized crime and terrorism, consequent court cases against journalists; 
consequent wide-spread self-censorship, as well as concentration of the media in 
industrial conglomerates. 
Whereas these international level anchors demand unconditional freedom of the 
press and have been pressuring for revisions to Turkey’s legal framework, the Turkish 
                                                            
36 Bianet (2011), “Turkey takes lead in violations of freedom of expression,” November, 30. Available at: 
http://www.bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/134404-turkey-takes-lead-in-violations-of-freedom-of-
expression. 
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government has been naturally half-hearted about some of these demanded revisions; 
since in its existent form the legal framework can be utilized as shield against the 
challenge of aforementioned domestic criminal and terrorist threats and as a mechanism 
to assist the government in realizing its policy preferences. The question then lies, how 
much the government can unleash the press in legal terms whilst looking after these 
interests? The dilemma of the Turkish government in constructing the balance between 
press freedom and its security and policy interests gives an idea about the ups and 
downs in the reform process initiated as part of the country’s EU bid.  
This chapter is set to provide a general idea about the debates in relation 
construction of this balance. In doing so, it looks into the legal framework on press 
freedom which involves not only sector-specific laws such as the Press Law, the 
Broadcasting Law, and the Law on the Internet; but also the Turkish Penal Code and the 
Anti-Terror Law which are broad and vaguely worded to enable charges against 
newsgathering and publication of critical and opposing political views. These major 
laws involve several provisions which are highly problematic for freedom of the press. 
In bringing cases against the journalists, the courts and the prosecutors primarily 
provoke the provisions of these major laws that stipulate numerous reasons to restrain 
the profession. The 1982 Constitution of Turkey also addresses freedom of the press. It 
states that “the press is free, and shall not be censored.” Yet, the Constitution itself, in 
its Article 26, itemises the conditions under which this freedom might be restricted and 
it is also accompanied with multiple incompatible laws and regulations. As part of the 
EU harmonization efforts, there had been revisions to certain provisions of these laws 
and there were some additional measures such as the Law No. 6352 on the suspension 
of prosecutions and convictions for press-related crimes which aimed at changing the 
system that adjudicates anti-State and terrorism cases. Despite these reform efforts, the 
regulatory framework is still marked by flows and its implementation is highly 
problematic. The analysis in this chapter details the content formulation processes of 
these major legal documents and elaborates on the related lobbying experience of some 
major journalist organizations including:  
 Türkiye Basın Konseyi [The Turkish Press Council]  
 Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti [The Journalists Association of Turkey, TGC] 
 Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği [The Progressive Journalists Association, ÇGD] 
 Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası [The Union of Journalists in Turkey, TGS] 
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 Türkiye Gazeteciler Federasyonu [The Federation of Journalists of Turkey, TGF] 
These organizations’ history of institutionalization at the civil society level dates 
back to 1940s. Established back in 1946, TGC is the oldest of these organizations and 
since then works on the ethics of the profession and on matters of freedom of the press 
and freedom of expression. Soon after TGC, TGS was established in 1952 and received 
its current name in 1963 and rapidly turned into a nationwide organization with the 
joining of unions at the local level. ÇGD’s establishment in 1978 further contributed to 
institutionalization of the sector as since then ÇGD works on matters of freedom of the 
press and freedom of expression, on the right to receive information, on the rights and 
the unionization of journalists. The association is also a member organization of the 
International Federation of Journalists and has several representation offices throughout 
the country. TGF is yet another important organization within the sector. It was 
established in 1998 as an upper structure for 71 professional organizations. Recently, a 
group of member organizations, which oppose the current leadership of TGF, were 
discharged and other 40 of these organizations established Türkiye Gazeteciler 
Platformu [Turkish Journalists Platform] to criticize these alledgedly anti-democratic 
discharges and enrollment of new organizations without consultation with the existing 
members. Given these developments, the latest general assembly of the Federation and 
its election results became a cause for concern. Finally, the Press Council was formed in 
1988 as a mechanism of self-control pertaining to matters of press freedom and to set 
the ethics and principles of the profession. There were, however, some reservations 
about the formation of such structures of self-control rooted in the understanding that 
plans to place restrictions on the profession would worsen press freedom in an 
environment where the political power is already inclined to exercise excessive control 
over the press. On the basis of these threats, organizations such as ÇGD and TGS have 
adopted a critical stance and decided not to take part within the Press Council. The 
Council proved otherwise and concentrated on matters about press freedom and 
engaged in activities to revise some restrictive press related provisions.  
Since 2010, all these organizations, as well as, around 90 other sector specific 
organizations cooperate under anew upper structure named Gazetecilere Özgürlük 
Platformu [the Platform for Freedom to Journalists, GÖP] through which they have 
been seeking to communicate their collective demands concerning freedom of the press. 
In addition to GÖP, there is another platform structure called G-9 Journalist 
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Organizations Platform established by 11 major journalist organizations, all of which 
are also GÖP participants. The chapter details the functioning of this cooperation and 
additionally looks into how these domestic level advocates relate to some prominent 
international and European level journalist organizations and unions working on press 
freedom worldwide such as the Reporters without Borders, the International Press 
Institute (IPI), and the Association of European Journalists (AEJ).  
The chapter is not solely confined to the lobbying experience of the journalist 
organizations. It adopts a holistic approach to the study of the related law making 
processes and presents also alternative framings of law proposals by domestic level 
politicians as well as by the EU institutions. In general, the chapter explores and 
evaluates the success of alternative lobbying positions endorsed by these different actors 
and expects to demonstrate the factors that would account for differences in the levels of 
their preference attainment. 
 
4.1.  Freedom of the Press in the Turkish Constitution 
 
The language of the 1982 Constitution is prima facie a vigorous champion of the 
press freedom. In its Article 28, the Constitution states that “the press is free, and shall 
not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall not be subject to prior 
permission or the deposit of a financial guarantee. The State shall take the necessary 
measures to ensure freedom of the press and freedom of information.” However, there 
are numerous exceptions to the use of this right, as enumerated in the Article 26, 
including “national security, public order and public safety, the basic characteristics of 
the Republic and safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and 
nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders, withholding information duly classified 
as a State secret, protecting the reputation and rights and private and family life of 
others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed by law, or ensuring the proper 
functioning of the judiciary.”  
In the summer of 2012, reframing of the constitutional articles on press freedom 
was opened to debate in the Constitution Reconciliation Commission. As positive 
developments, in its draft Constitution, the Commission reframed the first clause of the 
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Article 28 as “the press is free and is one of the essential elements of democracy and 
cannot be censored under any circumstances,” as well as, revised the second clause as 
“the State shall take the necessary measures to ensure freedom of the press and freedom 
of information, to secure emergence of public opinion and to provide pluralism in the 
media” (Sazak, 2012). With these additions highlighted in italics, the draft Constitution 
addresses two major problems. It not only aims to discourage censorship of any kind, 
but also renders the State responsible about the problem of monopolization in the media. 
Once adopted, these revisions would render the Turkish Constitution’s language more 
ardent in terms of guaranteeing the freedom of the press. Still, the language-wise 
adjustments may remain cosmetic, if the future civilian Constitution maintains and 
extends the existing list of reasons to restrict freedom of the press.     
The draft of the Constitution Reconciliation Commission excluded many such 
reasons specified in the 1982 Constitution; yet included some of those proposed by the 
AKP government such as “protection of public order and public morals, others’ rights, 
and to prevent warmongering and the propogation of every sort of discrimination, 
hostility or rancor and hatred” (see Ibid; see also: Yılmaz, 2012). The AKP 
representatives in the Constitution Reconciliation Commission additionally proposed 
reasons such as “to avert crimes, to protect national security, to provide judicial 
independence and impartiality,” as well as, new clauses stipulating that “no publications 
intended to violate the presumption of innocence can be issued” and that “the State 
takes measures to protect minors from publications that involve child abuse, sexuality 
and violence” (ibid). These additional AKP proposals were not included in the new 
draft; yet the draft’s content was still not good enough for the opposition parties. As 
CHP and BDP representatives objected to the phrases of ‘public order’ and ‘public 
morals’ and lodged a statement of opposition, MHP insisted on incorporation of 
‘national security’ to the list and also lodged a statement of opposition (Sazak, 2012).  
Another conflictual issue during these discussions was the potential limits that 
would generate from provisions concerning authorization and seizure of the instruments 
of the press. The AKP proposal was highly supportive of the limits over these 
instruments as it put forward measures to give the authorities the power to seize them, if 
considered as tools of crimes listed in the Constitution (Yılmaz, 2012) which would 
mean that the government becomes able to utilize these measures whenever it deems 
necessary. Besides, the AKP proposal had sought to remove the guarantee on 
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establishing printing houses without prior permission or financial assurances (Ibid). The 
draft of the Constitution Reconciliation Commission did not embrace these AKP 
proposals, yet it stipulated a permission system for broadcasters including radio, 
television and cinema (Sazak, 2012). The Constitution Reconciliation Commission also 
eliminated punishments such as closure and suspension of the instruments of the press 
and instead its draft brought new provisions to confiscate and prevent distribution, 
however, tied these to judicial decision (Ibid).  
These tensions in the Constitution Reconciliation Commission over the wording 
of the constitutional articles regulating press freedom demonstrate ideology induced 
framings of different political parties. The AKP’s perseverance on the issues of ‘public 
order’ and ‘public morals’, and its proposal about prohibition of publications that 
involve child abuse, sexuality, and violence gives an idea about the party’s adherence to 
religious conservative values. Alternatively, MHP is attached to a firm position on 
national security, which plainly reflects this party’s nationalist orientation. Contrary to 
these positions, what stands out in the CHP’s proposed list of reasons to restrict press 
freedom is “to forcibly change the democratic secular constitutional order based on 
human rights” (Pişkin, 2012). This proposal of CHP and its opposition to the AKP’s 
proposed reasons mirrors CHP’s policy stance along the secular versus religious 
conservative divide.  
Besides this ideology induced clash at the political level, journalist organizations 
gave various reactions to reform of the constitutional articles on press freedom. For 
instance, Atilla Sertel -the chair of TGF- proclaimed his total agreement with the AKP’s 
proposal that “no publications intended to violate the presumption of innocence can be 
issued” (see in Appendix 1). Sertel deviates from the AKP position in the sense that he 
considers it extremely dangerous to place limitations with broad concepts such as 
sexuality, public order, national security, the limits of which would vary from person to 
person (see in Appendix 1). Ahmet Abakay -the chair of ÇGD- compared the AKP 
proposal with the martial law and argues that provisions such as public morals and 
private life are the same as provisions that prohibit strikes (see in Appendix 1). Abakay 
adds that while they expected elimination of the limitations in the 1982 Constitution, 
additional sanctions were tried to be imposed by the new proposal of the AKP 
government (Ibid). Similarly, IPI and its affiliate, the SEEMO urged the Constitution 
Reconciliation Commission to reject the proposals of AKP which they deem to 
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“severely weaken the current language protecting media freedom in Turkey” (see in 
Ellis, 2012).  
The journalist organizations are not only critical of the content of the draft new 
Constitution, but also of the fact that they were not consulted about their concerns and 
simply excluded from the decision making process. This exclusion had resulted in 
indifference of some journalist organizations with respect to preparing a proposal for 
content revisions. For instance, Zafer Atay from TGC deems unlikely that their 
proposals would be considered given the malfunctioning of the Constitution 
Reconciliation Commission (Appendix 3). Kaan Karcılıoğlu from the Press Council 
similarly reports that there is lack of dialogue between their organization and the 
Constitution Reconciliation Commission (Appendix 3). He additionally states that they 
did not also feel the need to bring forward a proposal for revisions to the constitutional 
articles given their compatibility with the provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Appendix 3).   
Overall, content formulation of the draft new Constitution’s articles on press 
freedom is still on the table as political parties lodged statements of opposition into 
some of the drafted articles. When these draft articles are evaluated in their current 
language, it is observed that they are not satisfying for some sector specific 
organizations given these organizations’ content related preferences. Still, there are 
other groups which remain indifferent concerning the reform of the constitutional 
articles on press freedom. Concerning this issue, there seems to be no solid cooperation 
among the sector specific organizations and therefore these organizations fail to agree 
on a particular policy stance.  
Although the draft Constitution adopted a liberal approach as regards the 
conditions for authorization and seizure of the instruments of the press; the content of 
the provisions on the reasons to limit press freedom remains unsettled. Especially, the 
conflict between secular versus religious conservative norms had been manifest in 
reform of these limitations. It is obvious that, among other things, especially this 
conflict will render difficult the emergence of a political level compromise on these 
standards. On the surface, AKP proposals do not violate the limitations aforementioned 
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in the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.37 Still, the same article 
involves a preventive measure as it also states that “this right shall be practiced without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” Such preventive measures 
were neither incorporated into the Turkish Constitution nor into its draft amended 
version. These omissions, therefore, raise serious doubts about the ability of these basic 
laws in framing an effective language to protect press freedom in Turkey. 
 
4.2.  Freedom of the Press in the Press Law 
 
Until its total abolishment in 2004, the former Turkish Press Law No. 5680 had 
been valid since July 15, 1950 for fifty three years. It was not only archaic in terms of 
its language; but also problematic in many aspects including strict limits and controls on 
free operations of the press as well as the inbalance between crimes and punishments.  
As part of the efforts to bring up to date this former Press Law, until 2004 there had 
been some minor revisions through successive EU harmonization packages. For 
instance, with the fourth reform package the Article 15 of the Press Law was amended 
to protect the owners of periodicals, editors and writers from revealing their sources 
(European Commission, 2003: 30). Prior to initiation of the Press Law’s amendment 
process, the European Commission had recommended a holistic approach in the 
execution of reforms including not only the laws which are specifically designed to 
regulate the realm; but also the provisions of the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law 
(2003: 31) which are even more shattering in terms of their implications over press 
freedom. 
These requests of the Commission for entire revision of the relevant legislations 
were not catered. The following year, the Parliament put on its agenda only the 
amendment of the Press Law, leaving aside the Penal Code and Anti-Terror Law 
Articles that severely restrict press freedom in the Turkish case. A draft Press Law was 
carried to the Parliament’s Justice Commission in April 2, 2004 and adopted within two 
                                                            
37 The Article reads as: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be 
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary.” 
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months in June 9, 2004. The new law can be considered as an achievement as it 
reframed or repealed many archaic provisions of the previous 53 years old Press Law. 
With the new Law:38 
 It was underlined that press freedom involves the right to receive, disseminate, 
criticize, interpret information and the right to compose. 
 The right of journalists not to disclose their sources was strengthened.  
 The right to reply and correction was reinforced. 
 Prison sentences were largely replaced by fines.  
 Sanctions such as the closure of publications, halting distribution and confiscating 
printing machines were removed. 
 The possibility to confiscate printed materials, such as books and periodicals, was 
reduced.  
 Foreigners will now be able to edit or own Turkish publications. 
 However, in line with the 1982 Constitution, the Article 19 states that those who 
publish information concerning the ongoing court proceedings shall be punished 
with a heavy fine. 
Representatives from the Press Council, TGC, Parlamento Muhabirleri Derneği 
[the Association of Parliamentary Reporters], and TGS were present during the 
negotiations in the subcommittee which was then responsible for drafting the Press 
Law.  
In an effort to contribute to the formulation of reform content, the Press Council 
sent a report to the Justice Commission presenting its opinions about the draft law. The 
Council reported to contribute to the passage of the new Press Law as follows: 
   The Council had always advocated the making of a new Press Law and getting involved 
in the workings of the Parliaments’ Commission, made efforts for arrangements to widen 
the freedom of expression. As a result, the Parliament adopted a Press Law which can be 
considered as highly positive with respect to this freedom (see in Kazan, 2006).  
Others have also reported to regard the draft as a positive one with the exception 
of a number of its provisions. First and foremost, they criticized the remnant fuzzy 
definitions in the draft such as ‘disclosure of the State secret’ and ‘national security’ 
                                                            
38 TBMM (2004), Basın Kanunu No: 5187. 
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(Uçansoy, 2004). The Press Council underlined the need for replacement of the phrase 
‘freedom of the press’ with the phrase ‘freedom of communication’ and concerning 
punishments, the Council criticized that the fines in the draft are still against the 
principle of proportionality (Kazan, 2006). According to Orhan Erinç -the chair of 
TGC- the reasons for restrictions on press freedom as listed in the Press Law are in line 
with the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore they are 
not specific to Turkey (see in Appendix 1). In his account, the problem is whether these 
restrictions are going to be applied through a contemporary democratic approach or 
through ceberrut devlet [despotic State] approach (see Appendix 1). Therefore, 
language-wise, he proposes that the Article 3 of the Press Law on reasons to restrict 
press freedom should involve the statement that “without the intervention of public 
authorities” (see in: Önderoğlu, 2009). During the amendment process, TGC also 
expressed to the Justice Commission that when determining the pecuniary penalties, 
there should be a regard for the distinction among widespread, regional and local 
newspapers (TGC, 2007: 28). Deniz Zeyrek from ÇGD criticized some other vague 
legal definitions in the law, as well as, foreigners’ right to own publications and 
American media monopolies’ free access to the Turkish market (see in Appendix 1). 
Behzat Erkoç from TGS raised similar concerns stating that foreigners will become able 
to publish freely in Turkey whereas the Turkish laws will remain impotent with respect 
to judging these cases (see in Appendix 1).  
Albeit all the aforementioned reservations, these journalist organizations 
evaluated the overall amendment process as an achievement (Uçansoy, 2004). Yet, the 
reform of the Press Law alone has been so far insufficient to protect press freedom in 
Turkey as demonstrated by increasing political pressures over the press and journalist 
arrests. 
The discussions about amendment of the Press Law and remaining problems as 
addressed by sector specific organizations mirror the discussions in the current 
amendment process of the Turkish Constitution. These range from the reasons to restrict 
press freedom, the issue of censorship, and proportionality of punishments including 
heavy fines and seizure of publications. Thus, for Turkey to reach the EU standards on 
press freedom, comprehensive approach to elimination of legal limitations in multiple 
legislations is required.  
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The necessity of such an approach yet again came to the fore in May, 2011 when 
the Constitutional Court decided that the Article 26 of the Press Law is in contravention 
of the Article 36 of the Constitution on fair trial. The Court found an inbalance between 
individuals’ right to legal remedies and freedom of the press and therefore “approved 
the removal of Article 26 from Turkey’s press law, which had restricted the amount of 
time prosecutors had to file a complaint against publications or journalists to 2 months 
in the case of dailies and up to four months for other publications” (Freedom House, 
2012b). The Court found evidence that victims of crimes committed through the press 
are unable to file their complaints within the existing time limits leading the perpetrators 
to escape punishment. Still, some commentators argue that the time limits should not 
only protect the victims of crimes committed through the press but should also seek the 
balance between right to legal remedy and freedom of the press (İlkiz, 2011; Ongun, 
2010).  
Today, amendment of the Press Law is still on the agenda and some opposition 
party representatives issued a number of law proposals which await consideration in the 
relevant Commissions of the Parliament. One such proposal was issued by Pervin 
Buldan from BDP who demanded revision of the Article 3 of the Press Law on 
limitations concerning the use of press freedom. According to the proposal “the use of 
press freedom can be restricted with regards to democratic principles, and if this 
freedom contravenes the provisions of the international/supranational agreements on 
hate crimes and those against racist and ethnic discrimination to which Turkey 
accedes.”39 Another was issued by Adil Kurt from BDP who demanded removal of the 
2nd, 3rd and 4th clauses of the Article 25 of the Press Law which enables confiscation, 
and prohibition of distribution and disposition of publications by reason of crimes listed 
in the Law on Crimes against Atatürk, the laws on Turkish Reforms, some clauses of 
the Penal Code and 2nd and 5th clauses of the Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law.40 Finally, 
Sedef Küçük from CHP proposed amendment of the Press Law to punish those who 
                                                            
39 TBMM (2011), Türk Ceza Kanununda ve Basın Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Teklifi No: 2/222, 
Term 24, Year of Legislature: 2, Date of arrival at presidency: December, 19. Available at: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=98536. 
40 Akşam (2011), “BDP'li Kurt'tan Basın Kanunu'nda değişiklik teklifi [Adil Kurt’s proposal for changes to the Press 
Law],” November, 21. Available at: http://www.aksam.com.tr/bdpli-kurttan-basin-kanununda-degisiklik-teklifi--
80212h.html. 
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report news, publish articles or photos insulting women or those that cause gender 
discrimination.41  
Overall, the amendment process of the Press Law has been congested with 
variegated policy proposals concerning articulation of the limits over press freedom. If 
we are to make an assesement on the basis of differences between the political level 
discussions and demands of the lobbying organizations, it is evident that the political 
parties are rather eager to secure certain limits in line with their ideological or interest 
based preferences. On the other hand, the journalist associations are not only concerned 
with these politically controversial restrictions on freedom of the press; but also they are 
much more concerned about the possibility of arbitrary implementation of these 
restrictions. To them, the measures to prevent such arbitrariness are more critical than 
the scope of the restrictions. This is also a central aspect of the Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which although provides ample scope for 
restrictions on press freedom, states also that this right shall be practiced without 
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontiers. There are still others who 
argue that problems about press freedom do not arise from the Press Law itself, but 
from other laws such as the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law (see Kaan Karcılıoğlu 
in Appendix 3). As these organizations concentrate their lobbying efforts on the 
amendment of the laws that they deem as most problematic; currently, the issues of 
press freedom in the Press Law and in the Constitution seem to take a backseat in their 
agenda. 
 
4.3. Freedom of the Media in the Broadcasting Law 
 
With its two decades old history, the regulatory framework on broadcasting sector 
continues to narrow the frontiers of media freedom. It dates back to April, 1994 with 
coming to effect of the Law No. 3984 on the Establishment of Radio and Television 
Enterprises and their Broadcasts. With this Law, Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu [Radio 
and Television Supreme Council, RTÜK] was established as an independent regulatory 
                                                            
41 TBMM (2011), 5187 Sayılı Basın Kanununda Değişiklik Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Teklifi, Term: 24, Year of 
Legislature: 2, Date of arrival at presidency: December, 5. Available at: 
http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tasari_teklif_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=98181. 
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agency and endowed with extensive regulatory, monitoring and sanctioning powers 
over the broadcasting sector.  
According to the Law No. 3984, RTÜK was given the power to warn private 
broadcasters which violate the law. In the case of recurrence, it could also decide to 
temporarily (up to a yearlong) suspend the transmission of the programme, which 
contains violation. The broadcast of such programmes, despite RTÜK’s decision to 
cancel their release, would result in heavy fines or even penalty of imprisonment and 
the instruments of these broadcasters could be confiscated depending on the gravity of 
the violation.42  
The Law No. 3984 also states that “the Radio and Television Supreme Council is 
established as an autonomous and impartial public legal person in order to regulate 
radio and television broadcasting services.” Yet, RTÜK’s hitherto decisions about 
sanctions are indicative of the intent to prioritize the State’s security interests. For 
instance, as Cengiz Özdiker (2002) observes, 94 percent of all the penalties during 
1994-2002 period were imposed over irticacı [Turkish word for ‘radical Islamist’] and 
separatist broadcasts. During that period, irtica and seperatism were the main domestic 
challenges threatening the State’s security interests and concentration of penalties over 
implicated broadcasters represents the previous range of the State’s official ideology 
(Gencel Bek, 2010: 184).  
In addition to the Law’s main intent of promoting the State’s security interests and 
its official ideology, the Law was also favoring big media companies (İrvan, 1999: 264-
265) as it lacked provisions to prevent unfair competition (Gencel-Bek, 2010: 184). This 
situation was worsened when a new RTÜK Law No. 4676 was accepted in the 
Parliament in June 7, 2001. This new Law was not only vetoed by the then president 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer; but was also heavily criticized by a group of interested actors 
from the sector. Even the RTÜK’s former chair Nuri Kayış had become critical arguing 
that with the new law: 
   Big media bosses would own hundreds of radio and television. The local media will 
disappear. There will be severe losses with respect to public’s right to receive information. 
The big media companies would comfortably bid for the State tenders (see in Appendix 2).  
                                                            
42 See the Law No. 3984 of April 20, 1994 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their 
Broadcasts.  
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In a similar vein, Barış Yarkadaş from ÇGD evaluated the law as problematic that 
it overlooked domination of the media sector by big companies; yet what is more 
challenging in his account is that the Law may completely disable the profession of 
journalism not only by taking the smallest criticism into scope of crime; but also by 
increasing penalties which especially constitutes a burden over the small Anatolian 
media (see in Appendix 1). The Press Council and TGS voiced similar criticisms. Oktay 
Ekşi from the Press Council argued that heavy fines would silence especially the 
regional and local media and that the fines are not only deterrent but would also have a 
lethal impact (see in Appendix 1).  In a joint statement from TGS, it was argued that the 
new law would legalize monopolization in the media and consequently institutionalize 
the interest based relations between media owners and political authorities, which imply 
renunciation of the press freedom in exchange for the ability to bid for the State 
tenders.43  
All these critics have tried to draw attention to the problem of monopolization and 
especially its repercussions over the press freedom. Yet, the new Law was prepared 
without consultation with these stakeholders and it was no different than the previous 
Law in prioritizing the State’s and big media owners’ interests over civil society 
lobbying for the freedom of the press. The aforementioned reactions from civil society 
and the President’s veto did not prevent the Parliament from approving the law the 
second time. It was then sent to the Constitutional Court which annulled some of its 
clauses including the composition of RTÜK and thus leading to the appointment of a 
new Supreme Council (Gencel-Bek, 2010). 
The amendment of the RTÜK Law was once again carried to the agenda of the 
Parliament in 2002 and this time the proposals for the amendment can be considered as 
steps towards promoting media independence. The amendments were designed to 
reduce the extensive competences of RTÜK such as the authority to shut down an 
operator in its entirety. With the amendments, RTÜK’s sanctioning powers was limited 
to blackout of only the unlawful programs.44 Yet, the vague grounds for blackout 
                                                            
43 TGS (2001), “RTÜK Yasa tasarısına TGS’den tepki [Reaction from TGS to the proposal for the RTÜK Law],” see 
in the website TGS, May, 23. Available at: 
http://www.tgs.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=32&Itemid=16. 
44 Adalet Bakanlığı [The Ministry of Justice] (2002), Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayınları Hakkında 
Kanun, Basın Kanunu, Gelir Vergisi Kanunu ile Kurumlar Vergisi Kanununda Değişilik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun, 
No: 4756; Başbakanlık [The Prime Ministry] (2002), Çeşitli Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun, No: 
4771. 
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remained including violations such as the broadcasts against the independence of the 
Republic, the indivisible unity of the State, Atatürk’s reforms and principles, national 
and moral values, common ethics, and protection of the family.  
With AKP’s coming to power and especially since 2008 there had been a gradual 
shift in movitivations for penalties and sanctions imposed over the broadcasters. In its 
latest report, the European Commission observes that RTÜK “issued warnings to 
television stations and imposed fines on them, in particular for representing 
superstitious beliefs, denigrating morals and national values and the protection of the 
family, representing obscenity and praising terrorism” (European Commission, 2012: 
22). When compared with the RTÜK’s previous rationales for sanctions, this shift is in 
line with and indicative of the range of the new government’s political ideology. 
Although the issues of separatism and threats to national security are still on the target 
of RTÜK, especially the upsurge in sanctions due to broadcasts violating national and 
moral values of the community, the Turkish family structure, and development of 
children, youth and morality leads to doubts about the RTÜK’s independence from the 
governing authorities. The government justifies this shift addressing the declaratives 
that RTÜK has been receiving from the citizens. For instance, according to the deputy 
Prime Minister Bülent Arınç, for the nine month period of the year 2012, the complaints 
from the audience mostly points to the incongruity of broadcasts with the principle of 
protection of family and public morals and that citizens demand banning of the 
criticized programmes (see in Appendix 2). For the government to avert the accusations 
about its domination over the RTÜK, Kaan Karcılıoğlu (see in Appendix 3) 
recommends structural changes to the RTÜK’s composition that a balanced distribution 
of the RTÜK’s seats to political parties is inadequate for democratic legitimacy and that 
its composition should be rearranged to involve representatives from the level of civil 
society. Orhan Erinç –the chair of TGC- also argued that the current composition of 
RTÜK is undemocratic and is going to constitute a problem in the EU screening process 
(TGC, 2007: 94-95). In this respect, Erinç stated that “we accept the EU demands about 
any economic regulation without discussion and regardless of whether these regulations 
are appropriate for us. When it comes to justice, we leave aside the EU criteria and 
produce solutions that opt in favor of politics -not justice” (Ibid: 95). 
Apart from the issues about RTÜK’s independence and impartiality, some 
scholars have also elaborated on the expansion of pro-government private broadcasts in 
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the second half of 2000s (see Jeffrey Haynes, 2009: 105-106) and others on the 
governing party’s pressures over the anti-government media for political subservience 
(see for instance Kaya & Çakmur, 2010: 533) and these scholars underline the 
consolidation of the shift in the balance of power favoring the AKP government. 
Haynes (2009: 105-6) observes gradual consolidation of the government’s potency over 
the Turkish media with the 2007 sale of the large media firm ATV-Sabah to Çalık 
Holdings owned by Ahmet Çalık -an associate of the Prime Minister; the sale of daily 
Star which was previously critical of the government; the sale of another fiercely 
critical television channel KanalTürk to Akın İpek -another associate of Prime Minister; 
and growth of the religious media with mass circulation dailies such as Zaman. This 
shift was meant a decline in the share of the so-called mainstream secular media –as 
primarily represented by Doğan Group- which was previously controlling around 75 
percent of the total circulation in Turkey. According to the statistics published by the 
media monitoring organization Dördüncü Kuvvet [The Fourth Estate], whereas Doğan 
Groups’s share had fallen to around 50 percent; the pro-government circulation had 
risen to around 40 percent (Jenkins, 2008; Haynes, 2009). In response, Doğan Group’s 
news outlets have begun to voice criticisms about these alterations in power dynamics. 
They particularly concentrated on a court case opened in Germany which was about 
secret fund transfers to the pro-government media in Turkey. Writing on this case -also, 
popularly known as the Lighthouse case-, Doğan Media has tried to demonstrate the 
linkages between these fund transfers and alterations in power dynamics and kept the 
issue on the agenda of the Turkish public opinion. These criticisms have exacerbated the 
tensions with the government and the fierce reaction of the Prime Minister was to 
instruct heavy tax fines to Doğan Group for its involvement in tax irregularities. Doğan 
Group was additionally banned from bidding for the State tenders for a year period; 
prison sentences were demanded for Aydın Doğan and also for some other company 
executives.  
Doğan Group became overwhelmed under these pressures and it was looking 
forward to the government’s plans for easy tax dept payment schemes. Under this 
context, Oktay Ekşi –the former chair of the Press Council and also the former chief 
columnist in Doğan Media-owned daily Hürriyet– had written a scandalous and 
controversial article in October, 2010 which was criticizing the ruling AKP for 
hydroelectric dam constructions in İkizdere Valley in Turkey and for its environmental 
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failings. Ekşi finalized his column as “we, now, see the achievements of the mindset 
that sell everything.”45  These final words, which were insulting the authorties, had led 
the Prime Minister to file a claim for compensation. Although the court evaluated Ekşi’s 
criticisms within the scope of press freedom, he had to resign from Hürriyet as Doğan 
Group was no longer willing to annoy the government and risk its access to easy tax 
dept payment schemes. This course of events points to the complex nature of limits over 
the press freedom in Turkey that do not only emanate from de jure procedures, but also 
from de facto relations among the interested actors. This situation in Turkey, which is 
practically conducive to auto-censorship, has also led to the reactions of some 
international level actors pressuring for the elimination of the existing limits over the 
press freedom:  
   Such pressure from the head of the Turkish government raises serious doubts about his 
commitment to an independent media, free to report on matters of public interest. IPI calls 
on Erdogan to publicly retract his ultimatum to the Dogan Media Group immediately, and 
to cease all attempts to pressure the Turkish media (David Dodge, the director of IPI);46 
   The high fines imposed by the revenue authority potentially undermine the economic 
viability of the Group and therefore affect freedom of the press in practice. There is a need 
to uphold the principles of proportionality and of fairness in these tax-related procedures 
(European Commission, 2009: 18). 
Reform of the regulatory framework was once again carried to the agenda of the 
Parliament in June, 2010; this time as part of the efforts to address the technological 
transformations in broadcast technology, to eliminate the technical problems in the 
previous broadcasting legislation, and for compliance with the EU law. According to a 
statement from RTÜK, the draft was prepared through a process of consultations with 
civil society; and RTÜK underlined this consultative process as: 
   Concerning the arrangements about the sector, several joint meetings were conducted 
with radio and television enterprises and public institutional players. After the draft was 
completed, it was broached to radio and television enterprises and public institutional 
players, to universities and civil society organizations. The draft was reevaluated according 
                                                            
45 Oktay Ekşi (2010), “Az demişiz [We said little],” Hürriyet, October, 28. Available at: 
http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=16151109&tarih=2010-10-28. 
46 IPI (2008), “IPI calls on Turkish Prime Minister to retract ultimatum against Dogan Media Group,” see in the 
official website of IPI, September, 12. Available at: http://www.freemedia.at/archives/singleview/article/ipi-calls-on-
turkish-prime-minister-to-retract-ultimatum-against-dogan-media-group.html. 
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to opinions expressed and was placed to the RTÜK’s website. The draft was given its final 
shape after assessment of opinions that were received for a one month period.47  
The new Broadcasting Law No. 6112 came into effect in February, 2011 and 
repealed the Law No. 3984 of 1994. It brought several revisions and novelties with a 
specific focus on the commercial broadcasting. The most important revisions can be 
enumerated as follows:48 
 The Law provides for private and public broadcasters to be subject to the same 
rules and regulations; thus the supervision of Turkey’s only public broadcast 
Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (Turkish Radio and television Institution, 
TRT) was also put under the regulation of RTÜK.  
 The Law provides for increase in the ratio of foreign shareholdings in a private 
radio and television broadcast (from 25 to 50 percent) and also states that foreign 
real or legal entities’ shareholding is limited to two media service provider 
enterprises.  
 So as to prevent monopolization in the media, the Law states that the media 
service provider enterprises cannot receive more than 30 percent of all the 
commercial communication revenues in the market and they will have to transfer 
3 percent of these revenues (it was 5 percent in the previous Law) to RTÜK.  
 The Law also puts the rating system under the control of RTÜK and those 
companies who are to make rating estimations will have to ask for RTÜK’s 
permission and RTÜK will supervise these estimates.  
 Additionally, the new Law rearranges ‘the right to contravert and rebut’ in line 
with the Press Law and provides for possibility to ask for this right before the 
interested party files a lawsuit.  
 So as to comply with the body of the EU law, it brings the obligation to include 
national programmes and European productions.  
 The Law also introduces ‘audience representation practice’ according to which 
there should be an experienced audience representative in all broadcasting 
enterprises who is going to receive citizen complaints.   
                                                            
47 RTÜK (2010), “Basın Bildirisi (A.01.1.RTÜ.0.01.00-621.02/3183) [Press Release],” see in the official website of 
RTÜK, April 5. Available at: http://www.rtuk.org.tr/sayfalar/IcerikGoster.aspx?icerik_id=e0c3b8a1-6619-49c1-919f-
3831505f72d7.  
48 TBMM (2011), Radyo ve Televizyonların Kuruluş ve Yayın Hizmetleri Hakkında Kanun, No: 6112.  
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 Finally, the Law also sought to prevent racism and discrimination through the 
clause that the broadcasts cannot provoke the society to hatred and hostility by 
pursuing differences on the basis of race, religion, language, gender, class and 
sect. 
Given their policy preferences about the regulation of commercial broadcasting, 
some organizations from the broadcasting sector such as Televizyon Yayıncıları Derneği 
[Television Broadcasters Association, TVYD] and Radyo Televizyon Yayıncıları Meslek 
Birliği [Professional Union of Broadcasting Organizations, RATEM] have evaluated the 
new RTÜK Law as progressive. In their account, the Law was prepared with a 
collaborative approach and most of their opinions were taken into account (see in 
Çolakoğlu, 2010). Yet, according to the TESEV’s Report, some academicians and civil 
society organizations continue to criticize the revisions that their views were not taken 
into consideration and that the revisions were limited to regulation of commercial 
broadcasting instead of revising clauses restricting the freedom of the media (Sözeri & 
Güney, 2012: 20).  
The Law No. 6112 maintained and literally extended the punitive powers of 
RTÜK. Especially, the procedure with which this institution carries its powers into 
practice continues to be a cause for concern. These include, for instance, RTÜK’s 
discretionary power to determine whether an operator broadcasts against some vague 
standards including national and moral values. With the new law, RTÜK was also given 
the authority to cancel the broadcast license of an operator, if it detects recurrence of the 
unlawful broadcast. However, later in October 2012, the Constitutional Court called for 
repeal of the clause that “the Supreme Board decides to cancel the broadcast license of 
the media service provider, if it doesn’t make a payment in two months period.”49 The 
Court argued that there was an inbalance between the actions subject to sanction and the 
sanction itself and thus the clause is in contravention of the principle of proportionality 
and the rule of law.50   
Although the political authorities have argued to prepare the new RTÜK Law by 
giving consideration to all aspects of the EU on Audiovisual Media Services and 
                                                            
49 Hürriyet (2012), “RTÜK Kanunu’na kısmi iptal yürürlükte [Partial annulment of the RTÜK Law is in effect],” 
October, 14. Available at: 
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/21692310.asp. 
50 Ibid. 
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through consultation with all the stakeholders (see Arınç in Appendix 2), some 
international anchors have contested this claim. For instance, Thomas Hammerberg -the 
Council of Europe Commissioner- highlighted in his report that some blocking 
decisions of RTÜK were found unjust by the ECHR (see ECHR, 2010c) and expressed 
that: 
   The act provides the RTÜK with a great degree of latitude in interpreting relevant 
principles and monitoring their respect by broadcasters. These principles contain references 
to notions subject to subjective interpretation, such as “public morality”, “family values”, 
“trivialisation of violence”, etc. (Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of 
Europe, 2011). 
The European Commission makes a similar criticism: 
   The new Law on the establishment and broadcasting principles of radio and TV stations 
brings only partial improvement as regards the interpretation of certain rules on 
broadcasting bans and sanctions imposed on broadcasters (European Commission, 2011: 
26).  
The Freedom House likewise points to this ensuing problem of vague grounds for 
penalizing the broadcasters in Turkey:  
   In January 2011, a new amendment to the media law was passed, allowing for television 
broadcasts to be suspended and stations to be fined or closed by Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan or other designated ministers in cases of emergency or threats to national 
security Freedom House, 2012b). 
Interestingly, these deficiencies do not seem to be a lobbying priority for some of 
the journalist organizations working on freedom of the press. These organizations have 
sought the need to concentrate their lobbying efforts on issues that they consider as 
comparatively more problematic for freedom of the press such as the Penal Code and 
the Anti-Terror Law. In respect thereof, Kaan Karcılıoğlu from the Press Council (see in 
Appendix 3) comes up with the explanation that RTÜK would be among priority issues, 
if they did not have to struggle with the problem of arrested journalists. He also 
differentiates between ‘freedom of expression in general’ and ‘freedom of expression 
that falls within the definition of freedom of the press’, and evaluates that as RTÜK’s 
sanctioning decisions are generally against serials and magazinish programmes; these 
sanctions cannot be considered as an issue related to freedom of the press (see in 
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Appendix 1). It might be due to these specified reasons that the journalist organizations 
did not engage in any visible independent or collective lobbying during the 2011 
amendment process of the RTÜK Law.  
Taken as a whole, the amendments have sought harmonization with the EU 
directives only with reference to developments in the broadcast technology. It did not 
provide for independence of RTÜK, elimination of arbitrary broadcast bans by this 
regulatory agency and by the governing authorities as demonstrated by recent sanctions 
imposed over the broadcasters. Moreover, some government representatives proposed 
additional regulatory agencies such as ‘the Parental Monitoring Board’ envisioned as a 
supplementary shield against the threat of broadcasts that would erode conservative 
family structures and sentimental values. Finally, the new Law does not prevent big 
media companies from participation in public tenders; thus leaves unresolved the 
problem of utilization of the media as a mechanism to pursue economic and political 
interests. These media conglomerates are also dragged into chronic self-censorship as 
they fear jeopardizing these interests. Yet, it seems that these problems were rather 
addressed by international anchors such as the EU, the IPI and the Freedom House. 
Concerning the issue, domestic level journalist organizations did not engage in any 
discernable lobbying activity. Finally, it is observed that there is a high level of conflict 
between the interests of the international anchors who demand a change in the system 
with which sanctions are imposed over the broadcasters versus the governing AKP 
which benefits from this system’s functioning in line with its policy preferences. It is 
also obvious that ideological conflicts will also continue to fuel the rift between 
secular/mainstream versus conservative/pro-government media and render difficult 
legal arrangements to yield free operations of the broadcasting sector.    
 
4.4. Freedom of the Press in the Turkish Penal Code 
 
As part of the EU reform process, the Penal Code was adopted anew on 
September 26, 2004. The new Law No. 5237 replaced the old Penal Code No. 765 of 
May 1926, and was considered as an achievement; since it widely modernized and 
liberalized the country’s justice system and as it involves several new provisions to 
penalize various human rights abuses –i.e.: especially, issues concerning the abuse of 
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women’s human rights. However, this positive picture was spoiled by some provisions 
of the 2004 Penal Code curtailing the freedom of expression and the freedom of the 
press.  
Some highly disputed provisions are clustered under the headings ‘offences 
against the public peace’, ‘offences against political organs of the State’, and ‘offences 
against natinal defence’. These include:51  
 provoking commission of offense, Article 214;  
 praising the offence or the offender, Article 215 (former Article 312);  
 provoking people to be rancorous and hostile, Article 216 (former Article 312);  
 provoking people not to obey the laws, Article 217;  
 engaging in propaganda by praising the organized criminal group and its object, 
Article 220; 
 insulting the President, Article 299;  
 insulting Turkishness, the State of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, the Government of the Republic of Turkey or the judicial 
organs of the State, the military and security forces, Article 301 (former Article 
159); 
 encouraging military personnel to disobedience with the law, Article 319; 
 and discouraging the people from the military service, Article 318 (former Article 
153). 
Besides, some articles under the headings ‘the offences against the judicial bodies 
or court’, ‘the offences against honor’, ‘the offences against general ethics’, and ‘the 
offences against privacy and secrecy of life’ also became a lobbying target of the 
journalist organizations. These include:  
 attempts to influence a trial, Article 288;  
 violation of confidentiality of an investigation, Article 285;  
 defamation in the press in order to enable commencement of investigation and 
prosecution against a person, Article 267;  
 allowing a child to watch indecent scene or a product, or to or hear shameful 
words, Article 226;  
                                                            
51 See: TBMM (2004), Türk Ceza Kanunu, No: 5237; see also: TBMM (1926), Türk Ceza Kanunu (Mülga), No: 765. 
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 acts with the intention to harm the honor, reputation or dignity of another person, 
Article 125;  
 violation of communicational secrecy, Article 132; 
 tapping and recording of conversations between the individuals, Article 133; 
 violation of privacy, Article 134; 
 and affecting prices, Article 237.52 
This list can be further extended, yet more or less these are the main challenges 
against the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press as brought into question 
by sector organizations. The new Penal Code’s maybe the most problematic aspect 
concerning press freedom is that it stipulates an automatic increase (by one third or up 
to half) in punishments for some of these offences, if they are committed through the 
press or broadcast (Articles 218 and 318).  
In comparative perspective, similar provisions exist in the Penal Codes of many 
other countries’; however, in the Turkish case the ways in which these provisions are 
comprehended and interpreted by the judicial bodies and consequent flood of lawsuits 
against the journalists has led to unrelenting lobbying by sector organizations for 
revisions to the provisions under discussion. The Press Council had been highly active 
during the process of the Penal Code amendments in 2004. It sent reports to the Prime 
Minister, worked with the relevant authorities; however it failed to work off the draft 
provisions curtailing the freedom of expression (Press Council, 2005). As Kaan 
Karcılıoğlu –the general secretary of the Press Council argues, “what is called a 
‘chilling effect’ in the conclusions of the ECHR, that is even the existence of these 
articles or existence of persistent implementations of negative nature, further limits the 
use of the freedom to make news which is already a very troublesome activity” (see in 
Appendix 3). Similarly, TGC was also very active in the 2004 content formulation 
process of the new Penal Code and attended to a number of meetings with the Ministry 
of Justice to discuss the content of the Draft Penal Code. At the outset of the 
negotiations for content formulation, TGC’s proposals were not taken into 
consideration. TGC continued to press the issue, maintained negotiations with the 
Ministry of Justice, insisted on the proposed revisions to 26 articles in the Penal Code 
and yielded revision of 13 articles in line with their preferences (TGC, 2007: 26-27). 
                                                            
52 The Article reads as follows “Any person who spreads deceitful information or news or involves in fraudulent acts 
in such a way to cause decrease or increase of wages or prices of foodstuff or goods.” 
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TGC’s current chair Orhan Erinç argues that the Penal Code amendment was hurried 
and their proposals were ignored because the authorities worried that they would exceed 
the time limits set by the EU and would be unable to receive a negotiation date (Ibid: 
115). It seems that in the case of Penal Code revisions, the EU pressures for timely 
reforms became counterproductive for those who lobby for the freedom of the press. 
Interestingly, the contested provisions, which the EU will ultimately find objectionable, 
were passed for the sake of progression of the EU negotiations. Moreover, Turkey is 
signatory to the European Council’s documents that repudiate prison sentences against 
the offences of defamation and insult. The Turkish Penal Code is also incompatible with 
these documents as well as with the jurisprudence of the ECHR. Besides, there are 
contradictions among the domestic level laws that regulate press freedom. The TGC 
draws attention to a major contradiction that some offences which are punished with 
fines under the Press Law are transformed into prison sentences in the Penal Code (Ibid: 
116).   
In a similar vein, the chair of TGS Ercan İpekçi argues that the offences related to 
the press shall not be equated with disgraceful offences and he stated that they also 
carried the issue to the international platforms (Ibid: 110). İpekçi basically abridge their 
demands into two criteria. First, they propose elimination of the provisions that foresee 
automatic increase (by one third or up to half) in the punishments for offences 
committed through the press, and second they ask for the establishment of a balance 
between the crimes and the punishments (Ibid: 113).  
Taken as a whole, these journalist organizations, although consulted and 
participated in the 2004 Penal Code amendment process, were unable to attain their 
preferences of top priority. As their independent efforts proved ineffective, and since the 
journalist organizations concur concerning the necessary revisions to the Penal Code 
(see Kaan Karcılıoğlu in Appendix 3), they decided to join their forces under a platform 
structure and continued their lobbying in a more organized fashion. Starting from 2010, 
around 90 organizations gave their support to the Freedom for Journalists Platform with 
which lobbying activities were distributed to a ‘Protest Commission’ -established under 
the Platform and responsible for organizing protests against the threats to freedom of 
communication-; and to a ‘Law Commission’ -again established under the platform and 
given the responsibility to investigate the restrictive legal framework and to propose 
solutions. Since then, the Platform works for draft laws and lobbies for revisions to all 
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the Penal Code articles that limit freedom of the media and the press, especially the 
articles on ‘violation of secrecy’, ‘attempts to influence a fair trial’ and ‘keeping 
documents and information on account of journalistic activities’ (see GÖP, 2011). In a 
public statement on behalf of the Platform, the government was blamed for the 
intolerable levels of pressures over the journalists combined with the infrastructure 
established in 2005 with the amendments to the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal 
Procedures; and in 2006 with the changes to the Anti-Terror Law.53 
 
4.5. Freedom of the Press and the Anti-Terror Law 
 
The 1991 Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 represents another punitive law to curtail the 
freedom of the media and the press. It was primarily formulated in response to the 
Kurdish insurgence movement which was there for years and has begun to gain vigor in 
the second half of 1980s. In late 2000s, the Anti-Terror Law has begun to be applied in 
other cases such as Ergenekon in bringing lawsuits against the suspects accused of 
linkages to this clandestine criminal organization. The Law defines terrorism and 
terorrist acts and involves criminal procedures and penal sanctions. It allows for the 
suspension of periodicals and with reference to this law many lawsuits are brought 
against the journalists and the media owners. As amended in June 2006, the Anti-Terror 
Law’s one of the most criticized aspect is maybe its wide definition of terrorism (see 
Kaan Karcılıoğlu in Appendix 3) making it wide open to arbitrary implementation and 
lack of proportionality in the interpretation and application of its provisions that 
introduce restrictions on the freedom of the media and the press -mainly the Article 6 
and 7 (see Zafer Atay in Appendix 3), and its causal relation to self-censorship 
(European Commission, 2011: 22-25).  
According to a joint press statement from TGC, TGS and four other sector 
organizations, another highly problematic aspect of the Anti-Terror Law is that it 
replicates more than fifty crimes listed in the Penal Code, yet imposes heavier sentences 
if they are committed with the ‘motivation of terror’ –a phrase which lacks a solid 
definition (TGC, 2007: 158). Moreover, this group of lobbyists argues that the Article 6 
                                                            
53 See in: Serap Girgin Baykal (2011), “Gazetecilere Özgürlük Platformu basın açıklaması yaptı [the Platform for 
Freedom to Journalist issued a press statement],” AB vizyonu, March, 7. Available at 
http://www.abvizyonu.com/basindan/gazetecilere-ozgurluk-platformu-basin-aciklamasi-yapti.html. 
 169 
 
of the Anti-Terror Law is of particular concern for the press freedom. The Article states 
that “if any of the offences defined within this Article are committed by periodicals, 
their publishers shall be punished additionally by the imposition of fines”. The Article, 
therefore, jeopardizes editorial freedom as the owners of the media organs and editors in 
charge, who might not be aware of the content of the newspapers or journals before 
their publication, are kept responsible from the content in violation of the Article 6 
(Ibid: 158-159). The sector organizations also criticize upsurge in the penalties 
stipulated for the press in the Article 7 on terrorist propaganda; the bans on future 
publications; the elimination of the phrase of ‘süreli yayın [periodicals]’; and 
consequent penalisation of not only the press but also televisions, radios and the 
websites (Ibid: 159).  
The Anti-Terror Law provision on the ban on future publications was sent to the 
Constitutional Court by the former president Ahmet Necdet Sezer. In its June, 2009 
decision, the Constitutional Court repudiated the President’s request for repeal of the 
Article 6 (5) and ruled that the fight against terror is in public interests and relevant for 
continuation of the orderly and democratic society and that the Article does not 
contravene the Constitution (Elmas & Kurban, 2011: 49). The issue was also brought to 
trial before the ECHR. In the Ürper and others v. Turkey case, the ECHR concluded 
that “the practice of banning the future publication of entire periodicals went beyond 
any necessary restraint and amounted to censorship” and also found violation of the 
Article 10 of the ECHR Convention that the suspension of the publications based on 6 
(5) of the Anti-Terror Law constitutes an unjustified interference with the freedom of 
expression (ECHR, 2009b). The court also did not depart from this jurisprudence in the 
case of Turgay and others v. Turkey and once again ruled in June 2010 that the future 
suspension of a periodical is in violation of the Article 10 of the ECHR Convention 
(ECHR, 2010b).   
The journalist organizations have currently intensified their collective efforts 
concerning their demands for revisions to the Anti-Terror Law. The Platform for 
Freedom to Journalists works on a draft law and especially demands revisions to the 
provisions on ‘terrorist organization propaganda’ and on ‘targeting of those that fight 
against terrorism’ which allow for the monitoring of all kinds of communication, for the 
banning of websites, and for the blocking of access to social network services (GÖP, 
2011). Some representatives from the Platform for Freedom to Journalists (see Sibel 
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Güneş and Turgay Olcayto in Appendix 1) report that they attended to a meeting with 
the State Minister Bülent Arınç and during this meeting their collective lobbying about 
their demands for revisions to the Articles 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terror Law did not breed 
any positive results. These Platform representitives harshly criticize the authorities’ 
attitude of ignorance and their obstinate position as regards unwillingness to consider 
the demanded revisions on the pretext that there are some other groups within the 
Platform which prefer these articles to remain as they are (Ibid).  
The governing authorities’ reluctance with respect to reform of the Anti-Terror 
Law is not surprising. Every State prioritizes the protection of its national security -
especially those like Turkey which has to fight with excessive levels of terrorist threats. 
This situation obstructs the ability of the authorities in terms of constructing the balance 
between the parameters of this fight and the freedom of the press that Turkey has 
promised to protect as a signatory to international level legal documents. Besides, as 
Volkan Aytar from TESEV observes, during the 2006 amendment process of the Anti-
Terror Law, CHP was also incapable of presenting an effective campaign for the press 
freedom.54 It became evident that its position is sensitive to security concerns and thus 
largely deviates from the policy position of the journalist organizations. In this respect, 
CHP’s opposition was solely limited to blame the government that it lacks an effective 
plan to fight irtica, as well as, to fight the PKK’s separatist terrorism.55 In light of these 
observations, it could be suggested that the decision-making authorities’ legitimate 
concern for national security has rendered the amendment of the Anti-Terror Law very 
controversial.  
The Platform for Freedom to Journalists could not realize its preferences with 
respect to reform of the Anti-Terror Law; although their policy position has been 
backed by international level journalist platforms, by the European Commission, and by 
other domestic level human rights groups and NGOs.56 Despite this consensus at the 
level of civil society and despite international level pressures; the government have been 
reluctant to make concessions from national security. Taken as a whole, the process 
tracing of the bargaining between the sector specific organizations and the government 
                                                            
54 Volkan Aytar (2013), “Daha karanlık bir geleceğe doğru mu? Terörle Mücadele Kanunu’nda yapılan değişiklikler 
[To a darker future? Changes to the Anti-Terror Law],” TESEV Report, accessed January 16, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/Upload/Publication/52b9b38c-f36b-4093-b3ef-57537fe5eeca/TESEVTMKRaporu-
VolkanAytar.pdf. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
 171 
 
supports the second hypothesis of the dissertation that the higher the conflict between 
core policy preferences of the government and a lobbying group, it is less likely that this 
lobbying group realizes its preferences in the policy output. This conflict also rendered 
the coalition size meaningless in explaining lobbying success. If the collective pressures 
continue to increase, the government might have to consider certain revisions; though 
its current attitude against these pressures indicates that the government is geared up to 
withstand them to the best of its ability.   
 
4.6. The Problem of Arrested Journalists and the Third Reform Package as a 
Remedy 
 
The issue of journalist arrests on the basis of the Penal Code, the Code of 
Criminal Procedures and the Anti-Terror Law has led to fierce polemics between the 
governing authorities and organizations lobbying for the press freedom. These actors 
came up with contradictory figures about the number of imprisoned journalists and the 
reasons for their imprisonment.  
The European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) launched an international campaign 
to set free all the imprisoned journalists in Turkey and according to its estimates as of 
December 2012; there are 71 professional journalists that remain in prison.57 According 
to another estimate by the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) there are 76 
journalists behind the bars as of October, 2012 and at least 61 of them received 
imprisonment for their journalistic activity (CPJ, 2012). In response to such figures 
about the imprisoned journalists in Turkey, the Turkish Ministry of Justice issued a 
detailed report. In its report, the Ministry first and foremost criticized that there were 
only 8 persons in the CPJ’s 2011 report and all of a sudden that this number had risen to 
76 in the Committee’s 2012 figures; despite the fact that many of those included in the 
2012 list -70 persons- were already being tried back in 2011 (Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
The Ministry details also that only 8 out of 61 persons in the CPJ list, who were alleged 
to be in prison due to their direct activities of journalism, were convicted and 
prosecutions are still pending for other persons (Ibid). Moreover, the convicted are not 
in prison due to their journalistic activity; but because of ‘various offences’ including 
                                                            
57 See in the website of the European Federation of Journalists. Available at: http://europe.ifj.org/en/pages/turkey-
campaign-set-journalists-free. 
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membership in a terrorist organization, organising trainings on the terrorist 
organization’s instructions and doctrines, possessing dangerous substances such as 
molotov bomb and fireworks, and using them against the security forces, kidnapping 
people, using fake police identification, etc. (Ibid). 7 out of 15 persons in the second list 
of CPJ, all of whom have ambiguous relationship with journalism, are again convicted 
with various offences (Ibid). In this sense, the governing authorities’ question the 
reliability of the data provided by CPJ and this organization’s criteria to consider these 
persons as journalists, and claim that the arrests should be evaluated not only solely 
looking at the numbers; but also by detailed examination of the reasons for arrests. As 
Bülent Arınç argues:  
   Some of them are behind bars due to simple offences. Some of them are being accused 
[for reasons related to] their journalistic activities. There are only one or two people who 
are on trial because of what they have written. Those who complain about Turkey abroad, 
as though hundreds of journalists are in prison, have ideological aims. Their primary 
objective is to weaken the government.58  
 When the reasons for sentences against persons in these lists are considered, the 
governing authorities construe that the arrests and imprisonment sentences cannot be 
interpreted as a violation of the press freedom (see also İdris Naim Şahin in Appendix 
2).  Nevertheless, some journalist organizations find this claim objectionable and argue 
that the arrests and even the lawsuits brought against the journalists are similarly and 
even more problematic than the prison sentences (see Kaan Karcılıoğlu in Appendix 3). 
Others also criticize the fact that those journalists without the press card are simply 
rejected to be part of the profession (see Zafer Atay in Appendix 3). 
Apart from these debates about the number arrested journalists and reasons for 
their arrest; the fundamental problem is that together with these debates, the opaque 
justice system of Turkey and the possibility for its arbitrary implementation might 
simply serve as a mechanism to intimidate the journalists and oppress any opposition. 
Especially, the length of the legal proceedings represents a deterrent factor. Regarding 
the issue, there were several applications to the ECHR and according to ECHR Judge 
Işıl Karakaş around 24 percent of the pending cases against Turkey are related to the 
                                                            
58 Hürriyet Daily News (2012), “The Turkish media is free enough, Arınç,” August, 24. Available at: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/the-turkish-media-is-free-enough-arinc.aspx?pageID=238&nid=28491. 
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complaints about the duration of legal proceedings in Turkey.59 It could be that these 
applications to ECHR and the ECHR’s unfavorable judgements about Turkey, as well 
as, mounting criticisms about Turkey’s deteriorating image concerning press freedom 
should have been the impulses behind adoption of a few liberating reforms in the 
summer of 2012.  
These include reduction of the penalties for certain offenses such as “attempting 
to influence a fair trial,” “limitations on censorship of periodicals accused of producing 
propaganda”, and “changes in the system that adjudicates serious anti-State and 
terrorism cases” (CPJ, 2012). As part of the third reform package, in July 2012, the 
Turkish Parliament adopted the Law No. 6352 on suspension of prosecutions and 
convictions for the press-related crimes. This new regulation makes possible three year 
suspension of all prosecutions and convictions for the press and opinion related crimes 
but only for those committed before the end of 2011 and those that received maximum 
five year sentence in prison. Furthermore, during this period the persons concerned shall 
not be involved in an offense of the same kind.60 Other than the issue of suspension of 
prosecutions, the new regulation also sought to prevent the security forces from 
systematic detention of suspects and provides for the placement of suspects under 
judicial control (Reporters without Borders, 2012b).  
Despite these constructive provisions, the new regulation did not satisfy the sector 
organizations. Principally, they draw attention to the following implications which 
would render these reform efforts partial: 
   As we had feared, ’terrorism’ charges are being used as a pretext for not applying the 
reform to many cases and new prosecutions are being brought against people for the 
opinions they express because Law 6352 is limited to ’offences’ committed before 31 
December 2011(Ibid); 
   Authorities similarly introduced probation laws when the number of intellectuals and 
journalists in prison had escalated back in the 1990s. These regulations may bring about 
probation, yet all the prohibitions are essentially protected. The freedom of the press cannot 
be secured without repeal of the Article 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terror Law (see Ercan İpekçi in 
Appendix 1); 
                                                            
59 Hürriyet Daily News (2012), “Euro judge warns Turkey on long jail terms,” February, 20. Available at: 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/euro-judge-warns-turkey-on-long-jail-
terms.aspx?pageID=238&nID=14135&NewsCatID=339. 
60 TBMM (2012), Yargı Hizmetlerinin Etkinleştirilmesi Amacıyla Bazı Kanunlarda Değişiklik Yapılması ve Basın 
Yayın Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlara İlişkin Dava ve Cezaların Ertelenmesi Hakkında Kanun, No: 6352, July, 2.  
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   There are 99 journalists kept as detainees in prisons. Books are collected. I consider the 
latest regulations as ineffective in practice. The government, which does not apply the 
existing laws, brings about new laws. We look at practice. I consider these regulations as 
propaganda and as steps to appease the society’s conscience (see Ahmet Abakay in 
Appendix 1); 
   Although the period for suspension of the prosecution is three years this leads to a great 
pressure over the journalist. Second, the freedom of expression and the press should be very 
strongly defined in the new Constitution. The third point is that the Penal Code should be 
reviewed in line with the axis of freedom of expression and freedom of the press and thus 
should be made more democratic. The fourth and maybe the most important is that: even if 
the best laws are enacted, it does not have a meaning if they are not applied in a democratic 
fashion (see Deniz Ergürel from the Media Association in Appendix 1); 
   What is a lot said about the 3rd Reform Package, and in a way that I cannot understand 
what is observed to be a positive development abroad briefly says ‘if you continue to 
engage in journalistic activity in this fashion, I am going to retry you (see Kaan Karcılıoğlu 
in Appendix 3). 
Overall, these representatives of the major sector organizations consider the Law 
No. 6352 not only as limited but also as defective in the sense that it may simply lead to 
self-censorship. These organizations demand a holistic approach in reform of the 
freedom of the press related legislations; however the decision-making authorities show 
reluctance to adopt such an approach and instead opt for responding to such cyclical 
pressures with partial regulatory acts. As aforementioned, this tendency of the 
governing authorities can be explained with the criminal and terrorist threats against 
national security, and also with the unwillingness to relinquish the legal mechanisms at 
their disposal.  
It can be argued that the conflict with the Kurdish separatist movement represents 
the most formidable challenge against minimization of the limits against the press 
freedom. Besides, another major political level cleavage between secularists versus 
religious conservative circles will continue to orientate both sides in pursuit of policies 
that favor the associated ideologies against greater freedom of the press. These two 
conflicts are together significant in explaining the partial nature of reforms and their 
faulty implementation. Under the strains of these conflicts, the collective lobbying 
efforts of the journalist organizations and the international support to this domestic level 
lobbying have accomplished little as regards their demands for reform.   
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4.7. The Law No. 5651 on the Internet and Filters on the Internet Usage 
 
The printed press and the broadcasting sector are not the sole entities subject to 
legal restrictions that violate the freedom of communication. At the end of the 20th 
century, new mediums of communications have emerged with advances in information 
technology. The Internet developed into a major mechanism of freedom of speech 
which soon resulted in the creation of international and national level documents to 
arrange the rights concerning access to this exponential domain.  
To guarantee freedom of access, the language of the international level documents 
was designed to keep restrictions at the lowest level. For instance, the Council of 
Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime only counts child pornography and infringements 
of copyrights among the criminal offenses. In the Turkish context, the scope of crimes is 
far more extensive; as, besides provoking the controversial Law on the Internet, the 
blocking authorities may also provoke the provisions of the Penal Code, the Anti-Terror 
Law, as well as, the Law No. 5816 on Crimes Committed against Atatürk when 
ordering the blocking of the websites of political nature. Given this excessive legal 
interventionism, Turkey displayed a deteriorating picture with respect to cyber rights. 
For instance, 2010 onwards, ‘Enemies of the Internet Report’ of the Reporters without 
Borders listed Turkey as a country under surveillance along with other authoritarian 
regimes who are considered as the worst violators of freedom of speech such as China, 
Egypt, Tunisia, Vietnam and Saudi Arabia.  
This process of relapse was partly instituted with the initiation of the Law No. 
5651 on the Internet which came into force in November 2007 and complicated the 
already mixed legal framework on freedom of expression and communication in 
Turkey. It brought several restrictions on the Internet content and detailed the conditions 
under which the competent authorities including the judges, the courts, the prosecutors, 
the Ministry of Communications, and Telekominikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı [the 
Telecommunications Communication Presidency, TİB] can order blocking of the 
convicted websites. According to the blocking statistics of TİB, “as of 11 May, 2009, 
2601 websites were blocked from Turkey under the provisions of Law No. 5651” 
(Akdeniz, 2010). TİB did not disseminate any statistics since then and according to the 
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most recent figures of the engelliweb.com,61 there are 22719 websites blocked in 
Turkey.62 The practice of indefinitely banning a websites is no different in terms of its 
implications over the press freedom when compared with the Anti-Terror Law provision 
which makes it possible to ban the future publication of an entire periodical. 
This surfeit of website bans in Turkey did not escape the attention of some 
international level organizations and rendered them critical of Turkey’s regulatory 
framework on the Internet. In this respect, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) demands the Turkish government to “bring Law No. 5651 
in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards on freedom of 
expression, independence and pluralism of the media, and the free flow of information” 
(Akdeniz, 2010). Similarly, the European Commission (2011: 27) demands revision of 
the current legal framework on the Internet arguing that it both limits freedom of 
expression and citizens’ right to access to information. The Commission also criticized 
TİB for not supplying any statistics on the banned websites since May, 2009 (Ibid).  
Along with these reactions from the international level, the professional 
organizations also went up against the procedures on the regulation of the Internet. For 
instance, Oktay Ekşi -the former chair of the Press Council- heavily criticized the 
authorization of TİB for censorship of the Internet content (see in Appendix 1). 
Currently, cooperating under the Freedom for Journalists Platform, the participant 
associations collectively lobby for the abrogation of the Law No. 5651.63 As a search for 
remedy at the international level, Internet Teknolojileri Derneği [the Internet 
Technology Association, INEDT] also carried the issue of the censoring of youtube.com 
to the ECHR criticizing the Law on the Internet that it allows censoring of an entire 
website on the basis of particular objectionable content. The ban was imposed on the 
basis of the Articles 9 and 10 of the Law No. 5651 and had been intact since May, 2008 
and was removed in October, 2010. 
                                                            
61 The statistics provided in the website is cited by many academic works and by prominent broadcasters and 
newspapers operating at the national and international level such as Hürriyet, Radikal, NTVMSNBC, İHA, CNN, 
BBC, and the Associated Press. 
62 It was also stated under engelliweb.com that there are 1290 other blocked websites which were not included in the 
first list due to uncertainty about their blocking date. See the statistics under the website of Engelliweb. Available at: 
http://engelliweb.com/istatistikler/. 
63 TGS (2011), “Gazetecilerden ayağa kalk eylemi [On your feet protest of the journalists],” November, 4. Available 
at: http://www.tgs.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=529&Itemid=51. 
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Lately, the president of the Internet Board –an institution tied to the Ministry of 
Transport, Maritime Affairs and Communications; and composed of public bodies such 
as the related ministries and universities, the Internet utility providers, and civil society 
organizations- came up with a document entitled ‘the Amendment Work on the Law 
No. 5651’ and expected the members of the Board to give their opinions on the 
document until October, 2011. Through the Internet Board, the stakeholders from the 
information technology sector such as the Turkish Informatics Foundation have gained 
access to processes of policy formulation. Still, some other sector organizations such as 
INETD criticize the arbitrary procedure with which some interested parties from the 
level of civil society have been excluded from these consultation processes (INETD, 
2011).         
Another debate concerning the freedom of access to the Internet revolves around 
the introduction of mandatory filters on the Internet usage. Initial criticisms about the 
mandatory nature of filters led to postponement and modification of the proposed 
system. Protestors organized via social media and there were marches through Istanbul 
in May, 2011. In response to the pressures of these public protests, Bilgi Teknolojileri ve 
İletişim Kurumu [the Information Technologies and Communication Board, BTK] 
opened the proposed system into discussion and instantaneously organized a meeting 
with the representatives from civil society and from the Internet sector. According to 
Reporters without Borders, around 50 representatives from civil society and 
stakeholders from internet sector, as well as, officials from TİB took part in the meeting 
which failed to produce consensus as the opposing parties stuck to their initial positions 
(Reporters without Borders, 2011). 
The plans to introduce filters were not abandoned and TİB alternatively 
introduced what is called an ‘Internet Safety Sheme’ also referred to as optional filters 
to protect minors from the objectionable contents. Concerning this new sheme, the 
European Commission suggests that “the revised version, which was adopted in August 
2011, responds to a number of concerns” and adds that “implementation in line with 
European standards will be essential” (2011: 27).  Under this new system, the contents 
of the filtered Internet packages were decided arbitrarily and without any transparency. 
The demonstrations might have rendered the system voluntary; however, they did not 
prevent the government from determining the filtering criteria. Yaman Akdeniz 
exemplifies the problem by the fact that many websites such as the evolutionary 
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biologist Richard Dawkins’ website, Yaşam Radyo (Radio Life) -a radio station 
broadcasting cultural programs for minorities-, as well as Facebook and YouTube are 
all excluded from the child package (see in Reporters without Borders 2011b). 
It can be argued that such legal arrangements to regulate the Internet environment 
sustain the State interventionism. Unlike in the past, through institutions such as the 
Internet Board, particular lobbying groups from the level of civil society could gain 
institutionalized access to the processes of policy formulation. However, ambiguities 
remain with respect to the boundaries of this access and concerning the question of 
whom and according to which criteria become the chosen participants of the decision 
making process. The journalist organizations seem to be rather interested with the 
problems in the regulation of the Internet based journalism and according to Orhan 
Erinç from TGC (see in Appendix 1), the technological differences necessitates the 
Internet based journalism’s regulation with a separate law; in preference to the current 
plans to allocate it under the body of the Press Law.  
By and large, the issue of online freedom of communication is very intricate for 
every country as the Internet represents an unconventional sphere of communication 
which also breaks the routines of the profession of journalism and broadcast. With the 
sharp rise of the Internet, communications became increasingly global and the 
governments have become confused about how to get through the blurring of 
boundaries and security threats associated with the point arrived at Internet technology. 
In the Turkish case, the introduction of a filtering system and the highly restrictive Law 
No. 5651 are examples to the Turkish government’s attempts to cope with the 
challenges against its core policy preferences as well as those threats against the 
national security. The EU, also, did not yet develop a common binding policy on the 
regulation of the Internet sector. In these respects and given the fact that this realm is in 
constant state of flux, the future of its regulation is maybe the most unpredictable 
domain under the issue of freedom of the press.    
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4.8. General Evaluation of the Lobbying for Freedom of the Media and the 
Press 
 
The findings put forward in this chapter demonstrate that Turkey’s 
communication vehicles including media, press, and the electronic media are regulated 
through a highly complex legal structure which is both limited and open to arbitrary 
interpretation by the government, the judicial bodies and the regulatory agencies. The 
decision making authorities in Turkey had hitherto been reluctant to revise the bulk of 
this complex structure. They even introduced new restrictive provisions through 
amendment of the Anti-Terror Law and launched same safety schemes to further control 
the content in the new areas of communication such as the Internet. Some positive 
reforms –especially, the initiation of a New Press Law in 2004 and the third reform 
package of July, 2012- became almost meaningless in the face of punitive laws that also 
have provisions to regulate the realm. Consequently, sector specific organizations have 
routinely expressed the urgent need to remodel this composite freedom of the press-
related legal structure in its entirety, they proposed several revisions to these laws; 
however, so far they achieved limited success in realizing their proposals.  
This chapter aimed toward a detailed examination of the processes through which 
the sector organizations have lobbied the political structures and reasons behind their 
level of lobbying success including their particularly distinct lobbying context. The 
lobbying experience of the targeted organizations suggests that their individual lobbying 
did not leave any notable trace over the formulation of legal contents. Some 
representatives from these organizations reported to be regularly invited to policy 
making processes and consulted for their policy opinions (see Zafer Atay and Turgay 
Olcayto from TGC in Appendix 3), and others argue to the contrary (see Kaan 
Karcılıoğlu in Appendix 3) underlining the problem of the sustainability of this access 
since it lacks an institutional basis and is only available depending on the discretion of 
the governing cadres. Lacking institutionalized access and having realized the 
ineffectiveness of individual efforts, since 2010 journalist organizations cooperate under 
the Platform for Freedom to Journalists. Lobbying through such a coalition structure did 
not lead to a substantial change in lobbying success. Only, there had been some minor 
reforms initiated with the third reform package of July 2012 which only partially 
addresses the Platform’s policy preferences. Besides, the journalist organizations’ 
lobbying breed higher levels of success during the reform of the Press Law back in 2004 
 180 
 
when compared to success levels with respect to reform of the Penal Code and the Anti-
Terror Law. From 2010 onwards, the Platform for Freedom to Journalists has 
particularly concentrated on revisions to these latter two issues which are considered as 
the main sources of the journalist arrests. Moreover, many international level policy 
advocates support the policy position of this domestic level collective lobbying 
concerning the Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law. Despite the ever growing size of 
this coalition; the governing cadres stand firm on these freedom of the press related 
issues and remain irresponsive to these increasing demands and criticisms. However, 
one shall not jump at the conclusion that the size of lobbying coalitions is good-for-
nothing. It might be that lobbying through coalitions is a brand-new experience for the 
journalist organizations which is so far inconsequential when considered the Platform’s 
lobbying record. Given its short history, the members of the Platform still struggle with 
the inability to act in unison on certain issues of concern. Although they all point to the 
importance of collective lobbying, they also underline the hardship of accomplishing it; 
unless they resolve their problems about internal solidarity (see Zafer Atay in Appendix 
3 and Turgay Olcayto in Appendix 1). Thus, the Platform might have been technically 
there, but the de facto degree of the cohesiveness of its constituents is also critical; if we 
are to suggest that the journalist organizations are engaging in collective lobbying.  
Given the worsening picture within the Turkish context, by March 2011 the 
European Parliament concluded that the worrying deterioration of the press freedom, 
including self-censorship of the national media and Internet sites is among the main 
remaining challenges ahead of Turkey’s reform process (European Parliament, 2011c). 
This specification of press freedom as a priority area -along with women’s rights and 
minority rights- has also led the European Commission to recently increase its pressures 
for reform. However, concerning the issue of the press freedom, the EU’s common 
regulatory standards have rather been limited. That is why the European Commission 
generally refers to the ECHR rulings on freedom of expression, and it demands Turkey 
to comply with these rulings. Moreover, reform of some major laws such as the Penal 
Code were hurried to catch up with timetables set under the EU entry negotiations 
leading to a fait accompli method in the adoption of these reforms. In this respect, it can 
be argued that pressures of the EU negotiation framework do not always lead to flawless 
law content and it may even lead to a contrariwise impact as also pronounced by the 
journalist organizations. Nevertheless, the European Commission currently continues to 
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pressure for revisions to certain Penal Code articles and it additionally expresses that 
problems related to freedom of expression result from the interpretation of these articles 
by the governing authorities: 
   High-level government and state officials and the military repeatedly turn publicly against 
the press and launch court cases. On a number of occasions journalists have been fired after 
signing articles openly critical of the government. (European Commission, 2012: 21-22) 
While highly critical of the situation in Turkey, the EU also fails to internally free 
itself from the problems about the press freedom. The EU hosts 18 of the first 20 
countries in the press freedom rankings; still, there are also some Member States 
tarnishing the EU’s positive image and reputation: such as Italy with its partisan press, 
Hungary with its new restrictive Press Law, and Bulgaria with its sharp decline in 
freedom of the press rankings -from 70th to 80th in 2011-2012. Unable to address these 
problems in its Member States, the EU struggles to come up with new measures as 
future accession criteria. One such measure is the European Charter on Press Freedom 
which was launched back in June 2009. Although currently unbinding, it is planned to 
be made a condition for future EU accession. Thus, one of the major conclusions of this 
chapter is that the EU impact over freedom of the press had been so far limited and 
inconsistent.  
Besides problems with respect to collective lobbying and lack of a stong EU 
drive, it is quite obvious that the extension of guarantees for freedom of the press clearly 
challenges a number of State interests and interests of the governing authorities. In the 
face of sensitive issues such as the Kurdish separatism, insults against Turkishness, and 
the critique of the founder of the Republic Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; the current 
governing cadres are cautious to lose their existing legitimate power to control the 
vehicles of communication that commit these offences. Besides, censorship is no longer 
limited to such taboo issues as the legal arrangements provide the authorities with 
considerable level of discretionary power to censor and suppress any opposing and 
unwelcomed viewpoints. In this respect, the unwillingness to revise these existing 
restrictive arrangements leads to the negative impression that the government is 
pursuing its core policy objectives shaped by its position within the secular versus 
religious conservative divide. These powers are hard to renounce, which the 
government would easily utilize to render the media subservient to its political 
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objectives. Yet, it is not only the current government, but also any other ideological 
viewpoint that had been repserented at the Turkish political scenery that had fallen into 
similar unwillingness given their ideology induced policy preferences. In the words of 
Kaan Karcılıoğlu “all the parties of the political process have idiyosyncratic sentimental 
values and all sorts of things against these values are considered as a decleration that 
should be limited” (see in Appendix 3). The conflict between these values emerges as a 
highly challenging factor in the path towards reaching the levels of freedom of the press 
desired by the journalist organizations.  
There is also no consolidated opinion about the situation of press freedom in 
Turkey. Although the official reports of the international anchors and those of domestic 
level policy advocates converge in their evaluation of the situation and altogether point 
to a swiftly worsening picture; the Justice Ministry’s report and the government 
officials’ statements refute that there is a serious problem and that the issue is distorted 
by the critiques of the government.  
The major conclusion of this chapter is that the issue conflict between the 
preferences of the lobbyists and the core policy preferences of the government looms 
large in explaining the level of lobbying success with respect to reform of the press 
freedom related legislations. This conclusion has also been reached in the previous 
chapters. Among other determinants of lobbying success, issue conflict deserves extra 
attention as it appears to be extremely critical in determining the level of lobbying 
success as demonstrated in each of our empirical case studies. Alternative arguments 
can be made. In the case of journalist organizations’ lobbying, the positive impact of 
coalition formation dynamics and those of the EU policy requirements were also 
ambiguous. Still, one cannot deny that in every specific reform issue under this specific 
policy domain, the government’s ideology induced policy preferences became a reason 
for disagreement with the advocates of the press freedom. Moreover, the government’s 
legitimate fight against the Kurdish separatism had resulted in further limits over the 
practice of the profession. It could be argued that this additional axis of controversy 
renders the journalists’ lobbying much more controversial. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation was to contribute to the advance in 
understanding the determinants of lobbying success, so that alternative lobbying 
experiences under country specific contexts -such as Turkey’s EU accession negotiation 
context- could be explained more accurately. In explaining lobbying success/failure, 
earlier studies within the interest group influence literature above all emphasize the 
weight of two independent factors –the size of lobbying coalitions and the conflict over 
policy issues. The dissertation provided a detailed exploration of these factors in the 
Turkish case and additionally scrutinized the impact of the EU’s adaptational pressures. 
Through empirical evidence from pleathora of policy issues that became subject to 
Turkey’s reform processes, the dissertation demonstrated that not every lobbying group 
have equally benefited from the EU’s pressures for reform and that the impact of these 
pressures had rather been uneven across policy issues. In some of the earlier studies of 
Europeanization, there is an overt emphasis on the EU’s assisting impact over the 
empowerment of civil society. In effect, the study of this empowerment is a massive 
project with several components including the study of civil society’s development in 
terms of quality and quantity, progress in its organizations’ capabilities to mold and 
represent public opinion, changes in the structures of their interactions with the political 
sphere, the consequent rise in their decision making participation levels, and finally the 
rise in their ability to realize their policy preferences. Finding evidence for strong EU 
impact can be associated with the choice of the ‘dependent variable’ from among these 
different components of civil society empowerment. The EU’s assisting impact can be 
observed at all these different levels; yet once the dependent variable is specified solely 
as ‘the ability to realize policy preferences in the policy outputs’/‘lobbying success’, the 
EU’s impact across different policy issues have begun to vary. Even if those issues are 
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subject to the reform processes that attach priority to human rights improvement, the EU 
has its own human rights framework which does not always correspond to domestic 
level demands in Turkey. It cannot be denied that the EU reform process have 
immensely contributed to Turkey’s progress with respect to human rights improvement. 
Still, the dissertation observed several scenarios as a result of which the EU’s positive 
impact over lobbying success might be questioned. The empirical findings demonstrated 
that 
 The EU may simply fell short of/or refrain from presenting a policy position, thus 
become totally external to domestic level bargaining on a specific policy issue. 
 Even if the EU adopts a policy position; if not binding, this policy position may/or 
may not lead to a policy change at the domestic level.  
 Even if the EU pushes for domestic level policy change through its binding 
directives, these directives may/or may not sufficiently address the demands of 
some policy advocates from the domestic level. 
 Even if the EU pushes for domestic level policy change through its binding 
directives, these binding EU policies may contradict some of the domestic level 
demands for policy change.  
Besides this variation in the outcome of the EU’s adaptational pressures; the EU’s 
impact with respect to facilitating structures of regular decision making participation 
has not been the same in the case of every lobbying group that seek such regularized 
access. When some of the empirical cases under discussion are considered, one can 
hardly draw an optimistic picture of access to the political level. The machinery of this 
access, if regularized as it is to a great extent in the case of women organizations’ 
lobbying; fundamentally affects the ability to communicate policy preferences to the 
political level. Still, these structures cannot be systematically associated with lobbying 
success and other factors step in with implications over the responsiveness of the 
political actors. 
Although several requisites of lobbying success have been identified within the 
interest group influence literature, most recent studies emphasize the importance of 
issue specific factors and among these primarily the degree of conflict among 
alternative interests involved within policy making. In this respect, two types of conflict 
have been identified for their possible implications over lobbying success. The first one 
 185 
 
is the conflict that could emerge among the opposing interests that simultaneously lobby 
the decision making structures. The second is the possibility of conflict between the 
core policy preferences of the government and a particular lobbying group. Both types 
of conflict were observed in most of the policy issues discussed in this dissertation and 
these issues were especially observed to become subject to alternative articulations 
under the competitive discourses of secularism versus religious conservatism. This 
political level conflict has led to development of competing conceptions of a necessary 
democratic reform in response to the EU’s pressing requirements for accession. Thus, 
despite these EU pressures, the polarization between secularism versus religious 
conservatism has continued to be divisive in its effects when translated into solid 
policies and led to dissents in the understandings and implementations of reform 
content. Although, over the last decade, this discoursive conflict has dominated the 
Turkish political scene; it is one among many other polarizations that have complicated 
the prospects of human rights reforms in the Turkish case. The polarization regarding 
Turkish nationalism and Kurdish separatism has been similarly detrimental in its 
divisive effects and eventuated in alternative framings of reforms, and as regards the 
cases of this dissertation; it had implications particularly over the reform of the 
regulatory framework on freedom of the media and the press. In general, the initial 
expectations about the conflict hypotheses were confirmed under each issue field 
studied in this dissertation. The lobbying in the field of Alevi issues essentially 
exemplifies both types of conflict. The Alevi organizations, although united about the 
major needs of the Alevi community, came up with alternative policy proposals for 
reform miscalculating that they would thereby alter the government’s responsiveness. 
Besides the intra-group differences of opinion about the most efficient lobbying 
strategy; the Alevi organizations were further countered by a strong counter-Sunni 
policy positions that correspond to the policy interests of the ruling party. In this 
respect, the dissertation observed a strong pattern within the lobbying on Alevi issues 
that provide support for both of the conflict hypotheses. Unlike the Alevi lobby; the 
lobbying in the field of gender mainstreaming and in the field of freedom of the media 
and the press were not subject to similar levels of first type conflict (conflict within civil 
society). Still, significance attributed to second type conflict (conflict with the core 
policy preferences of the government), is once more certified under these issue areas. 
The dissertation also observed that some politicians have tried to utilize the first type 
conflict as a pretext for their policy intransigence. In the case of lobbying on Alevi 
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issues, the Alevi organizations were blamed for their internal disunity and the Sunni 
interests were claimed to further frustrate peaceful resolution of the Alevi issues. In the 
case of journalist organizations’ lobbying, again as an excuse for rejection of their 
demands for reform, the journalist organizations had been exposed to similar criticisms 
from the political level that on certain policy issues these organizations failed to offer a 
unified position. This state of affairs indicates the importance that these lobbying groups 
should attach to ‘lobbying through coalitions’.  
The empirical findings of the dissertation neither refute nor sufficiently support the 
assumption that lobbying through coalitions, the lobbyists would increase their potential 
to influence policy outcomes. Nevertheless, when the lobbying experiences studied in 
this dissertation are evaluated in comparative perspective, especially the women 
organizations’ success with respect to influencing policy outcomes can be linked to their 
routine of collective lobbying. The targeted women organizations are not organized 
around Turkey or they do not gather under permanent umbrella structures such as 
federations or confederations. What differentiates this group of lobbyists’ is that they 
establish national level issue-based coalitions on almost every issue of concern, 
assemble under these ad hoc structures, accord their differences of opinion, and 
establish unified policy positions in advance. Subsequently, particular organizations 
from among the women’s lobby, which are specialized on a particular issue field –i.e.: 
violence prevention or women’s labor force participation-, lay the groundwork for the 
details of women organizations’ collective demands, then join in the decision making 
processes and speak for the rest of the women organizations who externally support 
their cause. This division of labor with respect to laying the groundwork and 
representation of coalitions should have contributed to women organizations success 
without the need for each and every group to equally put all of their efforts in a specific 
issue. The dissertation could not, however, offer systematic analysis of the relationship 
between ‘the relative size of these coalitions’ and ‘lobbying success’ due to a number of 
reasons. First, it is not always possible to specify the number of all the lobbying actors 
that belong to a particular policy position. In the case of lobbying for gender 
mainstreaming, women organizations have been very much visible with their ability to 
constitute a lobbying front cooperating under platform structures. In making inferences 
about the coalition size and its relation to lobbying success, one could take into account 
the membership size of such formally established platforms as an indicator. However, 
 187 
 
this would lead to a major bias, as it means ignorance of other lobbying groups which 
are external to such platform structures, yet simultaneously lobby for the same/or 
opposite cause. It is, therefore, extremely demanding to be accurate about the size of the 
lobbying coalitions and difficult to draw general conclusions about the impact of this 
variable. Second, in some of the cases studied in this dissertation, coalitions around 
policy issues have not been confined to the domestic level. Both the women 
organizations and the journalist organizations have been supported with some 
international level allies who have been lobbying for the same cause. However, the 
analysis in this dissertation provided contradictory evidence with respect to assisting 
impact of cooperation with these international level policy advocates. Overall, although 
the dissertation could not give a clear picture of the relative size of the lobbying 
coalitions and their impact; it can at least suggest that coalitions are observed to 
generate some difference, yet not as much as they had been expected to. There is some 
evidence that verify the assisting impact of lobbying through coalitions; however, in 
light of its general findings, the dissertation concludes that their size should not be 
overstated. The dissertation also acknowledges the possibility for bias with respect to 
these conclusions; because it relied upon evidence from large scope and highly salient 
issues. When considered the impact of these issues over a broad spectrum of interests, it 
should be acknowledged that it becomes extremely challenging to claim accuracy about 
constellations of all the coalitions that emerge around these salient and large scope 
issues. 
Cross-case comparison is one of the main contributions of this dissertation. By 
this method, the dissertation demonstrated similarities and differences of lobbying 
experience under some alternative issue categories. Its findings also have implications 
over the literatures that specifically concentrate on these particular issue areas.  
Observing the transformations in the last decade the bulk of the literature, which 
concentrate on gender mainstreaming in the Turkish case, discovers substantial progress 
in terms of the women organizations ability to influence gender related policy outcomes 
and address several possible factors in furthering this ability including the EU’s 
opportunity structures and adaptational pressures, emergence of shared discourses 
among the women organizations, employment of particular strategies, and the 
movements’ high level of institutionalization. Part of this literature have been cautious 
with respect to exaggerating this ability and draw attention to negative impact of the 
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conservative reflex within the Turkish society as well as congruent conservative 
approach of the AKP government as regards the reform of gender issues. This literature, 
although sophisticated with research on these different dynamics at play, lacked any 
combined analysis of how these dynamics were in fact interacting with one another in 
explaining the variation in success/failure of lobbying across gender issues. The 
literature also required verification with comprehensive approach to the study of all the 
major gender issues that became subject to the EU reform processes. When these major 
gender issues were analyzed in detail, the dissertation found variation in women 
organizations’ ability to realize their preferences in the policy outcomes and 
demonstrated this variations’ linkage to the political level conflict between secular 
versus religious conservative policy positions. The findings of the qualitative analysis 
across several gender issues also exhibited how this conflict indeed moderated the 
positive impact of other variables -coalition formation dynamics and the EU’s 
adaptational pressures.  
The lobbying for the Alevi issues has stirred some academic attention in the 
aftermath of Alevi groups’ one time only workshop-based access to the political level. 
With respect to this literature, the dissertations’ findings are first and foremost skeptical 
about the previous claims which stress the differences among the Alevi organizations. 
Although these differences were brought to the forefront throughout the workshop 
process; the Alevi organizations became aware of their negative implications and they 
have begun to lay emphasis on their common grievances in the post-workshop period. 
In comparison to the lobbying on women’s human rights issues, the lobbying on Alevi’s 
human rights was less able to effectively communicate a discursive unity and utilize the 
supportive conditions for lobbying success. Additionally, the EU process indisputably 
boosted the Alevi organizations’ ability to raise their demands as it was the strongest 
catalyst behind the government’s opening policy; yet, this process had been 
inconsequential as regards preference realization of the Alevi organizations. The 
disruptive impact of secular versus religious conservative polarization was most felt 
under this issue category and it was also accompanied with yet another polarization 
between Sunni versus Alevi faiths of Islam.  
Another policy area explored in this dissertation was the freedom of the media and 
the press. This policy area had become subject to some academic discussions, yet 
empirical analysis of the sector specific organizations’ lobbying for these freedoms and 
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the dynamics of their contacts with the political level had so far escaped the notice of 
the literature. The analysis of the lobbying under this issue field also supports the 
general findings of the dissertation. The secular versus religious conservative 
controversy again emerges as a major reason behind the prospects of reforms. Distinct 
from other issue areas –gender mainstreaming and Alevi’s human rights issues-; the 
policy outputs concerning press freedoms also took shape under the disruptive impact of 
yet another major conflict that emanated from separatist demands within the Kurdish 
identity politics. The analysis of lobbying on freedom of the press demonstrated also 
that supportive conditions such as the EU’s adaptational pressures, lobbying through 
coalitions, and the support of other international level policy advocates failed to produce 
any significant fostering impact on lobbying success of the sector organizations. The 
positive impact expected from these supportive conditions could not be observed in 
most of the issues studied under this issue category and their process tracing once again 
certified the space that issue conflict occupies in explaining lobbying success.  
When all these finding are brought together, a general conclusion would be that 
different combinations of the factors studied in this dissertation resulted in alternative 
levels of lobbying success. Within this interplay of several factors, ideological and 
interest based polarizations and their translation into conflicting policy positions both at 
the societal and political levels emerges as a powerful determinant in setting the 
contours of the lobbyists’ ability to attain their policy preferences. Lobbying 
success/failure, however, cannot always be explained as a consequence of this single 
specific factor. Under such limited circumstances, one could still observe a variation in 
the lobbying success and this variation can be attributed to a set of other dynamics. The 
dissertation additionally observed that the lobbying organizations did not lobby on all 
the policy issues with equal efforts and their concentration on some policy issues and 
their neglect of others should also account for the anomalies in these lobbying groups’ 
preference realization.  
From an historical perspective, the interest groups in Turkey have begun to 
discover that they have to adjust to and press for integration into the transforming policy 
making context of the last decade and while doing that they have to reconsider their 
interactions both with the political level and among themselves. Whereas some groups 
gained plenty of experience with respect to these processes, others are still new in the 
game and try to puzzle out the best strategy to attain their preferences under the explicit 
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policy contours of the governing authorities. Exploiting Turkey’s EU negotiation 
context and lobbying the EU structures, some lobbying groups have also demonstrated 
that these existing polarizations are not totally insurmountable.  
Following all this debate about the dissertation’s empirical cases and somewhat 
pessimistic outlook of the time-wise trends in lobbying success, one avenue for future 
research is of course the analysis of further transformations in the next decade so that 
one can make more explicit comments on the rigidity of Turkey’s ideological 
polarizations, monitor further changes in the context of decision making, monitor also 
the changes in the pressures of the Turkey-EU negotiation context, and thus reevaluate 
lobbying success in these following processes. Either modeling on the methodological 
guidance in this dissertation or through employment of more quantitative techniques in 
cases where available, a much more desirable research agenda is the study of lobbying 
experiences under other policy areas which would further supply our understanding of 
lobbying success in the Turkish case with methodological and empirical sophistication 
and thus contribute to the progress in hypothesis field of action. A good starting point 
would be to utilize the methodological innovations offered in the interest group 
influence literature which already came up with some ground-breaking techniques to 
overcome problems about measurement, sampling and process related complexities. 
With respect to sampling, the choice of lobbying positions as units of analysis would to 
a great extent disentangle researchers from the most pronounced challenge in interest 
group studies -that is the problem of sampling from among the ever changing 
population of interest groups. The future research should also look for ways to 
overcome the complexities of studying the entire policy making cycles with concern for 
these cycles’ multiple stages. For instance, the process tracing strategy, as adopted in 
this dissertation, lays bare the potential gaps between de jure and de facto developments 
that is success in policy formulation were not always followed by success in policy 
implementation; or the other way around that some issues, which de facto cease to 
constitute a problem for the policy advocates –i.e: the liberalization of the headscarf use 
in the universities and the operability of Cem Houses as Alevi places of worship, may 
still be considered as in jeopardy if lack legal guarantees for the sustainability of what 
goes on in practice.  
In depth interviews had been useful to surface the lobbying groups’ perceptions of 
influence with respect to these different policy processes. The dissertation relied upon 
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limited number of interviews and also the public statements of the representatives from 
the target organizations. This ‘attributed influence’ method has its own weaknesses as 
these representatives sometimes failed to speak in the name of their organizations, and 
even if they did; it is uncertain as to how much these declarations correspond to the 
demands of their base. This dissertation has tried to ameliorate these initially projected 
weaknesses with simultaneous application of alternative methods. 
Another important direction for future research is to compare the results of the 
past research built on evidence from different countries. In engaging into such research 
agenda, one can restrict attention to across country comparison of lobbying under a 
particular issue field. Besides, it would also be very interesting to explore the EU 
negotiation frameworks’ impact over lobbying experiences in the domestic levels of 
different negotiating countries. Such comparative designs would help better understand 
if and how some complex set of variables distinctly interact under alternative lobbying 
settings. 
One last possible discussion could be on the implications of the dissertation’s 
findings on the assessment of Turkey’s experience with democratic consolidation. 
Turkey’s design of decision making had been severely criticized for lack of democratic 
legitimacy as this realm was used to be a black box for groups operating within civil 
society. Over the last decade, there were various initiatives as well as other signs of 
increasing dialogue between these realms to counteract the criticisms about the quality 
of the existing democratic regime in Turkey. The rise in the political participation of 
groups from civil society breeds some optimism; yet to be able to talk about democratic 
consolidation, this participation should be continuous and should not be biased towards 
particular privileged interests. Besides, the lobbying success of competing policy 
positions should also give an idea about the democraticness of the policy making 
processes. Observing these processes, the dissertation concludes that most of the policy 
outputs studied in this dissertation, although had been subject to deliberative decision 
making processes; do not always reflect compatibility between alternative interests that 
have emerged within the Turkish society. Still, another critical question to ask is 
whether the citizens’ interests genuinely correspond to those advocated by the formally 
organized lobbying groups. This is, thus, another assignment for future academic 
endeavor to explore the democratic potential of the interest groups through systematic 
study of their relations with their societal base and in this respect better comment on 
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whether these groups bridge the gap between citizens and the decision making 
authorities. Nevertheless, the civil societal groups should be considered as essential for 
democracy; if they vocalize the interests which lack proper representation at the 
political level. The policy advocates studied in this dissertation were all of this nature, 
as the political parties did not always have party level policies to fully support these 
advocates’ policy proposals.  
These outsider groups’ relative access to and role within the policy making 
processes are also indicative of the political system’s bias in favor of particularistic 
interests. A concluding remark might be that, in the Turkish case, this kind of favoritism 
is hard to overcome given the ideological polarizations which continue to represent one 
of the central aspects of the Turkish political scenery. The rigidity of these polarizations 
surfaces in the reform of several policy issues and constitutes a formidable barrier 
against the construction and implementation of a legal framework of particular liberties 
as idealized for gradation to the category of liberal democracies. One can nevertheless 
argue that some positive steps have been taken as regards the rules of the political game 
that is how competing interests are compromised under the decision making apparatus. 
These structures have become much more accessible owing to the EU negotiation 
framework. However, as the credibility of the EU accession declines; so does the ability 
of the human rights advocates in terms of utilizing these EU opportunity structures. The 
vulnerability of the EU process carries some risks for the Turkish democracy. Turkey’s 
democratic consolidation requires further institutional guarantees to accompany some 
minimal requirements of democracy such as free and fair elections. These institutional 
structures, once consolidated, render irreversible the decision making participation of 
groups from civil society. 
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APPENDIX 1 
SELECTED STATEMENTS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES FROM 
TARGET ORGANIZATIONS 
(IN ALPHABETIC ORDER, IN TURKISH) 
 
 
Abakay, Ahmet (the chair of ÇGD): 
 “Medya çalışanları için bu öneri sıkıyönetim genelgesidir. Anayasanın çok 
ötesinde, ‘genel ahlak, özel yaşam’ gibi hükümler bilindiği gibi grevleri yasaklayan 
hükümlerin aynısıdır. Bu, temel hak ve özgürlükleri yok edici pek çok hüküm içeriyor. 
Bu çağda böyle hükümlerin getirilmesi Sudan’da olabilir, kabile devletlerinde olabilir. 
12 Eylül’ün getirdiği sınırlamaların kaldırılmasını beklerken, yeni yaptırımlar 
getiriliyor.”64 “Cezaevlerinde 99 gazeteci tutuklu bulunuyor. Kitaplar toplatılıyor. Son 
yapılan düzenlemeleri pratikte geçersiz görüyorum. Var olan yasaları uygulamayan bir 
iktidar yeni yasalar getiriyor. Bizse pratiğe bakıyoruz. Bu düzenlemeleri propaganda ve 
toplumu rahatlatmak adına atılmış adımlar olarak görüyorum.”65 
Altun, Fermani (the chair of World Ahlul Bayt Foundation): 
“Eğer devlet ‘dedelere maaş bağlayacağım’ derse 5 milyon insan ‘maaş 
alacağım’ diye kapısına yığılır… Para bize verilir biz de cem evlerinde görevlendirilen 
dedelere maaşlarını veririz.”66 “Devlet bütün inançlara ve etnik kökenlere eşit 
mesafede ve tarafsız olmalıdır. Anayasada ideolojiyi besleyen ve nesillerimizi heder 
eden ırkçılığa ve mezhepçiliğe dayanan sloganlaşmalar yer almamalıdır. Laikliğe aykırı 
olan Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, devlet bünyesinden çıkarılarak özerkleştirilmelidir.”67 
                                                            
64 Radikal (2012), “Basın özgürlüğüne darbe geliyor [A blow is coming to freedom of the press],” July, 13. Available 
at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1094057&CategoryID=77. 
65 Radikal (2012), “Yargı reformu basın özgürlüğü getirir mi [Would legal reform bring about freedom of the press],” 
January, 21. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&CategoryID=77&ArticleID=1076308. 
66 Zaman (2008), “Dedelere maaş verilirse, 5 milyon insan devletin kapısına yığılır [If salaries are given to dedes, 5 
million people will be heaped up at the State’s door],” December, 2. Available at: 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_dedelere-maas-verilirse-5-milyon-insan-devletin-kapisina-yigilir_766560.html. 
67 Ayşe Tosun (2011), “Alevilerin anayasa önerisi: Devlet, bütün inançlara eşit mesafede olmalı [Alevis’ Constitution 
proposal: the State shall be in equal distance to all beliefs],” Zaman, December, 17. Available at: 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/politika_alevilerin-anayasa-onerisi-devlet-butun-inanclara-esit-mesafede-
olmali_1216045.html. 
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Arın, Canan (Purple Roof): 
“Yasa, ‘aile’ kurumunun varlığı aranmaksızın, her türlü ilişki biçimini; şiddet 
uygulayan ya da uygulama ihtimali olan herkesi kapsayacak bir şekilde 
genişletilmeli.”68 
Aydın, Çiğdem (the chair of KADER): 
“Siyasi temsilde ve istihdamda kota uygulaması ve kadın adaylardan adaylık 
parası alınmaması gibi tedbirler büyük önem taşıyor. Erdoğan, 2011’den itbaren yeni 
anayasa çalışmalarının başlayacağını açıkladı. Hem yeni anayasa, hem de pozitif 
ayrımcılık maddesinin içinin nasıl doldurulacağı konusunda bizimle bir an once temasa 
geçmesini bekliyoruz.”69 “Kampanyamızda başörtülü bir bayan arkadaşımıza da yer 
verdik. Amacımız başörtülü adayların da gösterilmesini tartışmaya açmaktı. Bunu da 
başardık, bu açıdan da mutluyuz.”70 
Balkız, Ali (the former chair of ABF): 
“Biz, Aleviliğin İslam içinde mi, dışında mı olduğunu değil sorunlarını 
tartışıyoruz. Hükümet yetkilileri de benzer deyimler kullandı. Aleviliği İslamiyetin 
içinde görenler ve görmeyenler... Görenler makul, akıllı, hoş, cennetlik Aleviler... 
Görmeyenler, cennetten mahrum kalacak Aleviler gibi bir kategoriyi kabul etmiyoruz. 
Tarif, Alevilere bırakılmalı. Bizi tanımlama, ortadan yarma girişimlerini asla doğru 
bulmuyoruz.”71 “Aleviliği kullanarak Sünni değerlerinin propagandasını 
sürdürecekler.”72 
 
 
                                                            
68 Burçin Belge (2011), “Ailenin Korunması Kanunu'nda değişiklik olumlu ama eksik [The amendment of the Law 
on the Protection of Family is positive, but deficient],” Bianet, January, 3. Available at: http://bianet.org/bianet/insan-
haklari/126975-ailenin-korunmasi-kanununda-degisiklik-olumlu-ama-eksik. 
69 Sevgim Denizaltı (2010), “Pozitif ayrımcılık talebi sürüyor [The demand for positive discrimination continues],” 
Birgün, September, 9. Available at: http://www.ka-der.org.tr/tr/basin.php?act=sayfa&id00=103&id01=98&menu=. 
70 Mürsel Karadeniz (2011), “Başörtülü vekil bir kadın meselesidir [Veiled parliamentarian is a women issue],” Yeni 
Şafak, March, 25. Available at: http://yenisafak.com.tr/gundem/?t=25.03.2011&i=310137. 
71  Milliyet (2008), “Siyasiler bizi tanımlamaktan vazgeçsin [Politicians should give up defining us],” December, 8. 
Available at: http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-siyasiler-bizi-tanimlamaktan-vazgecsin-
/siyaset/siyasetdetay/08.12.2008/1025965/default.htm. 
72 Berivan Tapan (2010), “Alevilik okutulsa dahi din dersi zorunlu olamaz [Even if Alevism is tought, the religion 
classes cannot be compulsory],” Bianet, December, 14. Available at: http://bianet.org/bianet/azinliklar/126607-
alevilik-okutulsa-dahi-din-dersi-zorunlu-olamaz. 
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Çalışkan, Selin (We will stop the Killings of Women Platform):  
“Bu, kadını değil aile yapısını korumaya çalışan, bakanlığın adından ‘kadın’ı 
çıkartıp ‘aile’yi getiren zihniyetin devamı. Kadın, ailenin içinde varolan bir nesne 
değildir. Kadın bir bireydir, onu ailenin içine hapsedemezsiniz.”73 
Doğan, İzzettin (the chair of CEM Foundation): 
“Alevilerin muharrem ayında düzenlenmiş olan bir iftar yemeğinde yaptığı 
konuşmada Sayın Başbakan, 'Hocam eğer bizim koyduğumuz bilgiler sizi tatmin 
etmezse, siz yazın ben Başbakan olarak Mili Eğitim Bakanlığına gerekli talimatı 
vereceğim ve koyduracağım' demişti. Görüyorum ki ya vakti olmadı ya da o bilgi 
ulaştırılmadı. Ama ders kitaplarında alevilikle ilgili olarak konulduğu söylenen bilgiler 
de fevkalade cılız ve yetersizdir. Onun için Alevi çalıştayları sebebiyle büyük bir başarı 
gibi kamuoyuna takdim edilen bu hususun da gerçekle bir ilgisi olmadığını siz değerli 
basın mensuplarına ifade etmek istiyorum.”74 
Doğan Yalçındağ, Arzuhan (the former chair of TÜSİAD, also founder of 
KAGİDER): 
“Ortada bir sıkıntı olduğu muhakkak. Ama bu sıkıntı bugün tartışılandan daha 
geniş boyutlara sahip. Evet, bir yanda başını örttüğü için eğitim sürecinde zorluk çeken 
genç kızlarımız var. Diğer yanda, 15 yaşında istemediği halde zorla kapatılanlar da, 
birkaç yıl sonra çevre baskısıyla başını örtmek zorunda kalmaktan korkanlar da var.”75 
Ekşi, Oktay (the former chair of the Press Council): 
“Tasarıdaki para cezaları, bugünkü şekliyle yasalaşacak olursa, yerel ve bölgesel 
yayın yapılan yerlerde radyo ve televizyonların değil kuşların bile sesini duyamayız. 
Çok sesli bir Türkiye'nin yerini, üstüne kabristan hüznü ve sessizliği çökmüş bir Türkiye 
alır. Çünkü bu cezalar caydırıcı değil öldürücüdür. Radyo ve televizyonlarla ilgili 
tasarıda bulunan para cezalarını bu haliyle savunmak mümkün değildir. Demokratik bir 
                                                            
73  Elif İnce (2011), “Yasaya nikah gölgesi [Marriage shadow over the Law],” Radikal, December, 29. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1073872&CategoryID=78. 
74  Yön Haber (2011), “İzzettin Doğan'dan Alevi çalıştayı raporu'na tepki [İzzettin Doğan’s response to Alevi 
workshop report],” April, 5. Available at: 
http://www.yonradyo.com.tr/index.php/yazi/izzettin-dogandan-alevi-calistayi-raporuna-tepki-. 
75 Yeni Şafak (2008), “Eğitim için zorluk çeken genç kızlarımız var [We have young doughters who suffer for 
education], January, 25. Available at: http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?t=25.01.2008&i=95470. 
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toplumda bunlar savunulamaz.”76“İnternet'e sansür getirilmesini protesto ediyoruz” 
…“Kanun koyucunun veya öteki kurum ve kişilerin, iletişim özgürlüğünü 
kısıtlamalarına, her zaman ve her yerde karşı çıkacağımıza kendi özgür irademizle söz 
veriyoruz.”77 
Erden, Atilla (the former chair of ABF): 
“Biz AB’den yetkililer geldiği zaman dedik ki, ‘bize Müslüman olmayan azınlık 
falan demeyin, biz azınlık değiliz. Biz buranın yüzyıllardır vatandaşıyız’. Azınlık diye 
ayrı bir statü ve ayrı bir hukuk sistemi var. Biz öyle ayrı bir sistemden yana değiliz. 
Yüzde 90’ımız böyle  düşünüyor. Azınlık demek, bir iktidarın dışındaki azınlık demektir. 
Federasyonda da böyle  tartışmalar oldu, genç arkadaşlar ‘biz azınlığız’ falan dediler. 
Bizim toplumumuzda azınlık  lafı zaten olumsuz bir anlam taşıyor. Hukuk sistemleri, 
Lozan, Sevr, anlaşmayla  getirilebilecek  şeyler, bütün bu tehlikelerin bilincindeyiz. 
Azınlık olmayı kabul eden öyle  büyük bir grup ya da örgüt yok. Birkaç kişi sadece.”78 
Ergürel, Deniz (Media Association): 
“Tasarı genel anlamda olumlu. 5 bine yakın soruşturmadan davaya dönüşenlerin 
birçoğunun erteleneceğini, daha sonra da düşeceğini umut ediyoruz. Yine de bu yeterli 
bir düzenleme değil. Davanın erteleme süresi üç yıl da olsa bu gazeteci üzerinde büyük 
bir baskı oluşturuyor. İkincisi, yeni anayasada basın ve ifade özgürlüğü temel hak 
olarak çok güçlü bir biçimde belirtilmeli. Üçüncü nokta, TCK’nın basın ve ifade 
özgürlüğü ekseninde gözden geçirilip daha demokratik hale getirilmesi gerekiyor. 
Dördüncü ve belki de en önemli noktaysa şu: En iyi yasalar yapılsa bile, demokratik 
biçimde uygulanmıyorsa bir anlam ifade etmez.”79 
Erinç, Orhan (the chair of TGC): 
“Tasarının daha önce eleştirilen basın özgürlüğü ile ilgili maddesi yeni tasarıda 
olumlu yönde değiştirilmiş. Hatta bu madde Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'nin 
                                                            
76  Akşam (2001), “Basın Konseyin’den RTÜK yasasına eleştiri [Criticism about the RTÜK Law from the Press 
Council],” June, 4. Available at: http://arsiv.aksam.com.tr/arsiv/aksam/2001/06/04/guncel/guncelprn7.html. 
77  Bianet (2007), “Konsey İçin ‘İnternet Yasası’ Sansürün Habercisi [For the Council the Internet Law is Prolog to 
Censorship],” December, 4. Available at: http://bianet.org/bianet/ifade-ozgurlugu/103323-konsey-icin-internet-
yasasi-sansurun-habercisi. 
78 See the interview with Attila Erden from ABF in the Website of Civil Society Development Center. Available at: 
http://www.stgm.org.tr/tr/icerik/detay/attila-erden-alevi-bektasi-kuruluslari-birligi-federasyonu. 
79 Radikal (2012), “Yargı reformu basın özgürlüğü getirir mi [Would legal reform bring about press freedom],” 
January, 21. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&CategoryID=77&ArticleID=1076308. 
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10'uncu maddesinden aynen alınmış. Maddedeki sınırlamalar yalnız Türkiye'ye özgü 
değil genel kabul gören sınırlamalar. Ancak önemli olan bu sınırlamaları ceberrut bir 
devlet anlayışıyla mı çağdaş demokratik bir devlet anlayışıyla mı uygulayacağınız. 
Buradan yasanın Türkiye'deki basın özgürlüğünün önündeki tüm engelleri ortadan 
kaldırdığı kanaati çıkmasın. Zira başta Anayasa olmak üzere, TCK, Bankalar Kanunu, 
Terörle Mücadele Kanunu gibi yürürlükteki pek çok yasada basın özgürlüğünü 
sınırlayan çok önemli yasal engeller var. Bu nedenle bu yasanın çıkmasıyla Türkiye'deki 
basın özgürlüğünün AB standartlarına geleceği sanılmasın."80 “Bir internet gazeteciliği 
yasası çıkarılması zorunluluğu karşısında kimi çevreler basın yasası kapsamında bir 
internetle ilgili düzenleme yapmaya niyetleniyorlar. Ancak basın iletişim araçları ile 
elektronik iletişim araçları arasındaki teknolojik farklılık öyle bir düzenlemenin yapılsa 
bile uygulama alanını zor olduğunu gösteriyor. Nitekim daha önceki 5680 sayılı basın 
yasasında geçici 9. Madde olarak internet yayıncılığı düzenlenmeye çalışılmış ama 
hukuk farklılıkları teknoloji farklılıkları nedeniyle uygulanamamıştır. Bu açıdan 
baktığımızda biz tgc olarak internet gazeteciliğinin ayrı bir yasa ile düzenlenmesi 
gerektiği kanısında olduğumuzu her fırsatta açıklıyoruz. İnternet haber sitelerinde 
çalışan meslektaşlarımızın da fiilen gazetecilik yapıyor olmalarına karşın hukuken 
gazeteci sayılmamaları onların büyük ölçüde kimlik ve ekonomik sosyal haklardan 
mahrum kalması sonucunu yaratıyor bu da öncelikle giderilmesi gereken sorunlarımız 
arasında.”81 
Erkoç, Behzat (the former chair of TGS): 
“Örneğin basın kuruluşunun sahipliği noktasında Türk vatandaşı olma 
zorunluluğunun bulunmaması olumsuz. Düşünün ki herhangi bir ülkeden beş parası 
olmayan birisi Türkiye'de bir yayın kuruluşunun sahibi olabilir, sorumlu müdürü 
olabilir. Böylece istediğiniz türden yayın yapabilirsiniz. Zira TC kanunları o kişiyi 
yargılamada etkisiz kalır. Şu anda tasarı komisyonda. Sanırım bizlerden yeniden görüş 
isteyecekler. Biz de eleştirilerimizi ve önerilerimizi ileteceğiz. Son olarak tasarının 
                                                            
80  Sabah (2004), “AB standartlarına daha zaman var [There is a time for EU standards],” April, 12. Available at: 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/04/12/gnd103.html. 
81 TGC and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung (2012), “Gelişen Teknoloji Karşısında Gazeteciliğin ve Gazetecinin Konumu 
[The position of journalism and journalist in relation to advancing technololgy],” seminar jointly organized by the 
Journalist Association of Turkey and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, December, 22. 
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Meclis'teki görüşmeleri sırasında devreye girerek gerekli değişikliklerin yapılmasına 
çalışacağız."82 
Geçmez, Ercan (the chair of HBV): 
“Çok sayıda Alevi köyüne cami yapıldı ama tekbir cemaati yok. İlk etapta 
Kayseri’ye bağlı Sarıoğlan, Çorum’a bağlı Turgut, Çukurören, Büyükcamili, Adana’ya 
bağlı Kuyumcular, Karahan, Yozgat’a bağlı Elmaağacı, Büyükmahal, Mersin’in Tarsus 
ilçesinde Tekeliköy’ü sayabiliriz. Hatta Sarıoğlan’a ikinci caminin temeli de atıldı. Ama 
şu anda Türkiye genelinde kaç Alevi köyünde kaç tane camii var, bunu kimse bilmiyor. 
Bu nedenle Çorum’dan bir çalışma başlattık. Çorum’a ait rakamları yakında 
açıklayacağız. Daha sonra da diğer köylerle ilgili araştırmayı sürdüreceğiz”83 
Genç, Kazım (the chair of PSAKD): 
“Alevileri azınlık gibi gösteren AB'yi bile kınadık. Aleviler cumhuriyetin temel 
unsuru ve kurucusudur.”84 
Gülbahar, Hülya (the former chair of KADER): 
“Başbakan Erdoğanla bu meseleyi tartıştığımızda Ruanda, dünyada kadın temsili 
açısından birinci sıradaydı. Kadınlarla gençlere yüzde 30 kota koyarak kadın 
temsilinde yüzde 48'lik bir başarı yakalamıştı. Başbakan'a bu örneği, 'Kadınların eşitsiz 
temsil tablosu ancak anayasal ve yasal kotalar konularak değiştirilebilir' diye 
vermiştim. Tartışmamızın ardından yeni seçimler yapıldı, Ruanda bir ilki daha başardı: 
Yüzde 56'lık bir oranla parlamentoda kadınların temsili erkekleri geçti.”85 
Gümüş, Fevzi (the former chair of PSAKD): 
“Belli ki AKP hükümeti kendine yakın Alevilik anlayışına sahip olduğunu 
düşündüğü ve Alevi toplumu tarafından da benimsenmeyen Cem Vakfı aracılığıyla 
                                                            
82  Sabah (2004), “Gazete sahipliği sorun yaratır [Newspaper ownership will lead to a problem],” April, 12. Available 
at: http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/04/12/gnd104.html. 
83 Radikal (2010), “Alevi köyünde yalnız bir imam [A lonenly imam in an Alevi village],” October, 17. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&Date=17%20Ekim%202010&ArticleID=1024083. 
84 Milliyet (2006), “Din Dersi Tartışması Alevileri Böldü [Alevis Split over the Religion Class Debate],” November, 
19. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/11/19/siyaset/siy03.html. 
85 Burçin Belge (2010), “Gülbahar: Ruanda Başbakana ve Dünyaya Mesaj Veriyor,” Bianet, January, 21. Available 
at: http://www.bianet.org/kadin/siyaset/119578-gulbahar-ruanda-basbakana-ve-dunyaya-mesaj-veriyor. 
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açılım adı altında bir göz boyama siyaseti yapacak”86 “Hükümet sünni kesimi kamu 
olanaklarıyla finanse etme uygulamasını güya alevileri de sisteme dahil ederek 
güvenceye almak istemiştir. Zorunlu din dersleriyle ilgili sunulan öneriler de mevcut 
uygulamanın sonuçlarını daha da ağırlaştıracak niteliktedir. Raporda mevcut durumda 
halen uygulamalı din eğitimi olan ‘Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi’ öğretimine devam 
edilmesi istenmekte, bu derse ilave olarak ‘yeni bir alanın’ devreye sokulabileceği 
belirtilerek bu yeni alan ‘isteğe bağlı din eğitiminin verilmesi’ şeklinde 
tanımlanmaktadır. Yani hükümet, Alevi çocukları için asimilasyon aracı ve sistematik 
işkenceye dönüşmüş olan uygulamayı artırarak iki din dersi önermektedir, ki bu asla 
kabul edilemez.”87 
Güneş, Sibel (the secretary general of TGC): 
 “Gazetecilere Özgürlük Platformu olarak biz Başbakan yardımcısı Bülent 
Arınç’ın başkanlık yaptığı Ankara’da bir toplantıya katıldık. Özellikle güneydoğudaki 
gazetecilerin çok tutuklanmasına neden olan terörle mücadele yasasının 6. Ve 7. 
Maddesi konusu orada gündeme geldi. Arınç dedi ki içinizde dedi bunun dedi 
kaldırılmasını dedi nasıl dedi kabul ediyorsunuz. Bizim dedi bunu böyle bir karar 
almamız mümkün değil. Ben dedi eminim içinizden buna karşı çıkanlar da vardır. Böyle 
cümle sarf etti. Biz hepimiz biz kaldırılmasını istiyoruz dedik. Bir meslektaşımız Turgay 
ağabeyin verdiği hani siyasete yakın duran ve bu konuda çabaları olan bir meslek 
örgütü yöneticimize bir söz attı. Anlaşılan daha farklı görüşmeleri var muhalif 
durmasına rağmen. O bile şunu söyledi. Dedi ki aslı ispat edilene kadar gazeteci 
terörist değildir dedi. Ve biz orada Arınç’a çok altını çizerek biz bu 6. Ve 7. Maddenin 
kaldırılmasını istiyoruz dedik. Sendika var, cemiyet var, bütün meslek örgütleri var. 
Sonra komik olan şudur. Toplantı bitti. İstanbul’dan gelenler İstanbul’a döndü 
Ankara’dakiler yerlerine gittiler. Arınç bir açıklama yaptı dedi ki: gazetecilerle ve 
meslek örgütleriyle ben görüştüm. Biri dışında hepsi 6. 7. Maddenin kalmasını istiyor, 
beni destekliyorlar” 88 
                                                            
86 Confederation of the French Alevi Communities (2009), “AKP-CEM Vakfı elele [AKP and CEM foundation is 
hand in hand],” May, 14. Available at: http://www.alevi-fuaf.com/haber/1/2706/akp-cem-vakfi-el-ele/. 
87 Muhalif Gazete (2011), “Alevilerden sert tepki: Hükümet Vatikan değildir [Strong reaction from Alevis: The 
government is not Vatikan],” April, 1. Available at: http://www.muhalifgazete.com/8984-Alevilerden-sert-tepki-
Hukumet-Vatikan-degildir.htm. 
88  TGC and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung (2012), “Gelişen Teknoloji Karşısında Gazeteciliğin ve Gazetecinin Konumu 
[The position of Journalism and Journalist in relation to advancing technololgy],” seminar jointly organized by the 
Journalist Association of Turkey and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, December, 22. 
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İpekçi, Ercan (the chair of TGS): 
“1990’larda da cezaevlerindeki gazeteci, aydın sayısı arttığında şartlı tahliye 
kanunları çıkarılmıştı. Bu düzenlemeler geçici tahliyeler getirebilir fakat, özünde bütün 
yasaklar korunuyor. Terörle Mücadele Kanunu’nun 6 ve 7. maddesi kaldırılmadan 
basın özgürlüğü sağlanamaz.”89 
Olcayto, Turgay (the deputy chair of TGC): 
“Sayın Arınç’la o görüşmemizde gayet net vurgulayarak dedi ki ‘ben Terörle 
Mücadele Yasası’nın kaldırılmasına karşıyım arkadaş’ dedi ve ‘bunu kaldırtmam’ dedi. 
Geçen gün milliyette okuyorum. Bülent Arınç Terörle Mücadele Yasası’nda 
iyileştirmeler yapılabilir diyor. Aradan onca yıl geçmiş, bu kadar şey olmuş, içeride 
olan gazeteciler sırf o yasa yüzünden… Ama şu anda ya dışarıdaki baskı nedeniyle 
böyle konuşacak. Yani politikacı konuşması.” “İşte diyorsunuz ki hükümetle 
ilişkileriniz? Onlarla bir bağlantı kuruyor musunuz? Tabi kuruyoruz. O bakımdan 
haklarını yemek istemem. Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti ne zaman başvursa hükümet 
bizimle ilgili olumlu karar alır. Bizi kabul eder. Görüşür. Ama büyük bir 
anlaşmazlığımız var. Bir kere iktidar -yani bugünkü iktidar- on yıldan bu yana görünür 
yazılı ve görsel basının ben yüzde yetmiş diyorum belki daha fazlasına egemen. 
Dolayısıyla, çok da diğer dernekleri ya da derneklerin getireceği önerileri kaale alacak 
değil. Mesela kendi derneğini kurdurdu iktidar. Bugün Medya Derneği diye bir dernek 
var. Medya Derneği’nin içinde ancak bakanın izin vermesiyle yönetim kurulunda yer 
alabilmesi gereken TRT’nin genel müdürü var, Anadolu Ajansı’nın genel müdürü var. 
Siz şimdi o Anadolu Ajansı’ndan, o TRT’den tarafsızlık bekleyebilir misiniz? Ya da 
onlarla bir diyalog geliştirmemiz mümkün olabilir mi? Ben kendi adımıza bunu 
söylerken cemiyetle ilişkileri iyi diyorum. Biz ne zaman başvursak, Orhan Bey’i alırlar 
sayın bakan yanına oturtur. Aman Orhan Bey şöyle böyle der, ama uygulamada hiç bir 
şey çıkmaz. İkincisi de cemiyete bu ilgiyi gösterirken, sendikayı hiçbir toplantılarına 
çağırmazlar. Bu da Türkiye’de garip bir tecellidir. Böyle bakınca çok da kolay değil. Bu 
dayanışma kendiliğinden yok olmuyor. Dolayısıyla bir takım güçlerin çok bilinçli bir 
şekilde yok etmeye çalıştığı bir toparlanma var mesela işte Gazetecilere Özgürlük 
Platformu.” “Peki diyorlar: siz gazeteciler olarak bir dayanışma içinde misiniz? O 
                                                            
89 Radikal (2012), “Yargı reformu basın özgürlüğü getirir mi [Would legal reform bring about freedom of the press],” 
January, 21. Available at: 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&CategoryID=77&ArticleID=1076308. 
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zaman da biz duruyoruz. Ona hiçbir yanıt veremiyoruz. Çünkü biz cezaevindeki 
gazetecileri ziyaret ederken bile hep aynı yüzleri görüyoruz. Hep birbirimizi görüyoruz. 
40-50 kişi ayrı yerde. Ama onun dışında dayanışma dediğimiz zaman örgütler arasında 
dayanışma dediğimiz zaman adamlara karşı çok mahcup oluyoruz. Yok diyoruz. Yani 
gerçekten de bugün bölünme var. Korkunç bir bölünme var örgütlenme arasında.” 
“Gazetecilere Özgürlük Platformunu kurduk. Birbiriyle hiç bağdaşmayan örgütler bir 
araya geldi. Ama bir süre sonra bazı toplantılarda çok üzücü şeyler oldu. Sendikayla 
öbür diğer örgütlerin gazete çalışanları için söylediği bir takım, savunduğu bir takım 
haklar konusunda bakanla konuşurken bakıyorsunuz bir meslek örgütünün lideri çıkıyor 
mesela Terörle Mücadele Yasası’nı savunabiliyor. Şaşırıyorsunuz birdenbire. Ve bakan 
da çok rahat diyor ki ‘bak arkadaşlarınız var… Savunuyorlar’ diyor Terörle Mücadele 
Yasası’nı. Oysa biz 6. ve 7. Maddesinin Güneydoğu’da Doğu’da gazetecilik yapmaya en 
büyük engel olduğunu anlatmaya çalışıyoruz. Böyle durumlar da yaşanıyor. Onun için 
bence örgütlenme konusu çok önemli.” 90 
Sertel, Atilla (the chair of TGF): 
“Masumiyet karinesi esastır. Ama sadece masumiyet karinesini basın açısından 
ele almamaları gerekir. Masumiyet karinesini hakimler de göz önüne almalıdır. 3,5-4 
yıl süren çok uzun tutukluluk sürelerinin sonucunda özellikle gazeteci arkadaşlarımızın 
beraat etme şansları da yitirtilmektedir. Çünkü ‘bu kadar süre tuttuk, bunlara bir ceza 
verelim’ gibi bir kaygıyla hareket edebilirler ki, en büyük tehlike de odur.” 
“İncelendiğinde zaten görülecek ki, basın hürriyeti milli güvenliğin, kamu düzeni ve 
genel ahlakın korunması gibi çok geniş ve kişiye göre sübjektif değerlendirilebilecek bir 
ortam olduğunda elbette ki, basın özgürlüğüne değil darbe, basın özgürlüğü gibi bir 
konunun artık tamamen gündemden kalktığını getirir ki, bu çok tehlikeli bir durumdur. 
Çünkü hem milli güvenliğin korunması hem de kamu düzeni ve genel ahlakın korunması 
gibi herkese, her dünya düşüncesine göre değişen bir kavramda bir sınırlama 
getirdiğiniz zaman, zaten Türkiye’deki basının özgürlükler konusunda Avrupa’da çok 
büyük ağır yaptırımlara uğradığı bir dönem yaşandığı ülkemizde çok da ağır sonuçlara 
yol açacak bir tablo olarak duruyor bu,” “Kadına, çocuğa şiddetin böyle sayfa sayfa 
yayınlanarak, adeta teşvik eder gibi noktaya getirilmesine kişisel olarak ben de 
                                                            
90 TGC and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung (2012), “Gelişen Teknoloji Karşısında Gazeteciliğin ve Gazetecinin Konumu 
[The position of Journalism and Journalist in relation to advancing technololgy],” seminar jointly organized by the 
Journalist Association of Turkey and Konrad Adenaur Stiftung, December, 22. 
 202 
 
karşıyım, o ayrı. Ama yine cinsellik gibi neyin cinsellik olduğunun çok tartışılır noktada 
olunan dünyada, sizin etek boyunuza yönelik bir habercilik anlayışına kadar giderse bu, 
bu da çok tehlikelidir.”91 
Yarkadaş, Barış (ÇGD): 
“RTÜK Yasa Tasarısı’nda ele alınması ve tartışılması gereken temel nokta, 
gazeteciliğin işlevsiz kılınacağıdır. Yasa, en küçük bir eleştiriyi bile “suç” kapsamına 
sokmaktadır. Bu da hiçbir gazetecinin, resmi kurumları eleştirememesi anlamına 
gelmektedir. Özellikle yerel televizyonlara getirilen ağır cezalar, Anadolu basınının 
nefes borusunu tıkayacaktır. Çünkü en küçük cezalar bile 250 milyar liradan 
başlamaktadır. Yerel bir televizyon için getirilen bu ceza çok ağırdır. Böyle bir cezayı 
alan televizyon, bir daha ayağa kalkamaz. Bu da Anadolu’da da yeni bir işsizlik 
dalgasını beraberinde getirecektir.”92 
Yıldırım, Ali (PSAKD): 
“Alevilerin taleplerini pazarlık edilecek, uzlaşılacak konular olarak görmek, 
topluma böyle lanse etmek Alevi açılımı değil Alevilere atılmış bir çalımdır. Aleviler 
AKP’nin arka bahçesi olmayacak, AKP’nin gölgesine teslim olmayacaklardır. Hükümet 
Alevilere çalım atmak yerine onların haklarını hukuklarını derhal teslim etmelidir.”93 
“AKP çevreleri Alevileri öteki olarak görmektedir. Alevilerin de diğer inanç sahipleri 
gibi onlarla eşit olarak hak/hukuk sahibi olmasını asla kabul etmemekte tam tersine 
Alevileri asimile edecek, Alevileri alevi olmaktan çıkaracak açık ve üstü kapalı 
faaliyetler içerisinde bulunmaktadırlar.”94 “Alevilik; insanı merkezine koyan (insanı 
merkez alan) Anadolu’ya özgü eşi benzeri olmayan bir felsefe, bir inanç, bir yaşam 
biçimi, bir kültür, bir öğreti ve hatta bunların tümünü de aşan bir toplumsal olgudur… 
Alevilik dünyada yaşayan tüm insanlık ailesini/tüm insanları dost ve kardeş bilir… 
Aleviler ve Alevi öğretisi demokrasiye bağlıdır… Alevilik rasyoneldir… Alevlik donmuş, 
kalıplaşmış bir öğreti/inanç değildir. Tüm tarihi boyunca sürekli bir gelişim, değişim ve 
                                                            
91 TGF (2012), “Sertel: Basın özgürlüğü tehlikede [Sertel: freedom of the press is in danger],” see in the website of 
the Federation of Journalists of Turkey, July, 20. Available at: 
http://www.tgf.com.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=706:sertel-basn-oezguerlueue-
tehlikede&catid=44:haberler&Itemid=92. 
92 Neslihan Demir (2002), “Muhatapları RTÜK’ü tartışıyor [ıts addressees discuss RTÜK],” Evrensel, May, 11. 
Available at:  http://www.evrensel.net/v1/02/05/11/politika.html. 
93 Milliyet (2009), “Yıldırım: AKP’nin yaptığı Alevi açılımı değil Alevi çalımı [Yıldırım: What the AKP is doing is 
not an ‘Alevi opening,’ but a trick against Alevis],” June, 1. Available at: http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/yildirim--akp-
nin-yaptigi-alevi-acilimi-degil-alevi-calimi/siyaset/siyasetdetay/01.06.2009/1101520/default.htm. 
94 Ibid. 
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ilerleme içerisinde olmuştur… Alevi toplumu yaşadığı her toplumda kamusal ve 
toplumsal hayatın laiklik ilkesine uygun olarak yapılandırılması gereğini savunurlar.”95 
Zeyrek, Deniz (the former deputy chair of ÇGD): 
“Bu tasarının maddeleri çok fazla yoruma açık. Biz yoruma açık olmasın 
istiyoruz" "Mesela sansür kavramını geçerli kılacak güncel tutacak maddeler var. Milli 
güvenlik, devlet sırrı gibi konularda çok net hukuki tanımlar yapılmadığı halde bunlar 
hala tasarıda var. Örneğin milli güvenliği herkes kendisine göre yorumlayabilir. Bu 
maddenin yorumlanmasıyla bile basın özgürlüğünün ciddi biçimde sınırlanabileceğine 
inanıyoruz. Türk vatandaşı olmayanların gazete sahibi olması, sorumlu müdür olarak 
görev yapabilmeleri de aynen korunuyor. Mesela Amerikalı medya tekelleri istedikleri 
gibi Türkiye'ye gelebilirler. Bu girişimlerimizden olumlu sonuç alamadık.”96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
95 Ali Yıldırım (2006), “Alevilik nedir? Günümüz Aleviliğinin Evrensel Değerleri [What is Alevism? Universal 
morals of today’s Alevism],” see in the website of PSAKD. Available at: http://www.psakd.org/alevilik_nedir.html. 
96 Sabah (2004), “Tasarı çok fazla yoruma açık [The draft is highly open to interpretation],” April, 12. Available at: 
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/04/12/gnd105.html. 
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APPENDIX 2 
SELECTED STATEMENTS OF SOME POLITICAL LEVEL ACTORS 
(IN ALPHABETIC ORDER, IN TURKISH) 
 
 
Ağyüz, Yaşar (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Alevi köylerine kendi istem ve önerileri olmadan, Diyanet işleri Başkanlığı ve 
bazı il müftülüklerince yönlendirilen cami yapma, yaptırma baskıları devam edecek 
mi?”97 
Alptekin, Ismail (parliamentarian, AKP): 
“Ne deniliyor: Aile yapısında devrim, koca artık evin reisi olmayacak, mal 
rejiminde DSP ile MHP anlaştı; ya millet ya muhalefet ya diğer partiler, bunlar 
üzerinde durulmuyor.”98 
Akdağ, Recep (the former Minister of Health, AKP): 
'Kürtajın bir cinayet olduğu' tanımına bir Türk hekimi olarak öğrenciliğimden bu 
yana katılıyorum,” "Bu kadın örgütleri, bütün kadınları temsil etmez. Yani biz sonuçta 
yüzde 50'nin üstünde oy alan, üstelik kadın oyumuz da erkek oyumuzdan daha fazla olan 
bir partiyiz.”99 
Aksöz, Uğur (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Bir kadın için herhangi bir yasada veya herhangi bir tüzükte bir kota tanıdık 
diyelim. Birisi Anayasa Mahkemesine gider, der ki: "Efendim, siz kadına böyle bir 
ayrıcalık tanıdınız; ama, Anayasanın 10 uncu maddesi açık. Anayasa diyor ki: Hiçbir 
kişiye, zümreye imtiyaz tanıyamazsın." Anayasa Mahkemesi bunu iptal eder. Etmez 
diyen var mı; hangi hukukçu var?! O bakımdan, burada Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi 
                                                            
97 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2008), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 121, 
June, 24. 
98 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2001), Term: 21, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 15, 
November, 1. 
99 Sabah (2012), “Kürtaj tamamen yasaklanabilir [Abortion may become totally outlawed],” May, 30. Available at: 
http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2012/05/30/bakan-akdag-kurtaj-tamamen-yasaklanabilir. 
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Grubunun önergesini çok dikkatle dinlemenizi istiyorum. Değerli arkadaşlar, orada 
diyoruz ki: Kadın ve erkek eşittir; ama, kadın lehine yapılacak olumlu ayrıcalıklar 
eşitliğe aykırı sayılmaz. İşte, bu, Anayasa Mahkemesini bağlar. Aksi halde, siz 
istediğiniz kadar yasa çıkarın; bu, ihtiyaca kâfi değildir.”100 
Akşit, Güldal (the former head of Women-Men Equal Opportunities Commission 
of TBMM, AKP): 
“Toplumdan gelen talepler ve zinanın hala bir boşanma sebebi olduğu 
düşünülürse, kadınerkek eşitliğini sağlamak kaydıyla ve şikayete bağlı olmak üzere 
zinanın tekrar TCK'nın içinde yer alması uygundur. Meclis grupları arasında da 
mutabakat oluşmuştur.” “Toplum düzeninin sağlanması, Türk örf, adet ve gelenekleri 
göz önüne alındığında yapılan Anayasa Mahkemesi kararıyla boşalan bir suçu 
doldurmaktır. Yeni bir uygulama ve geriye gidiş söz konusu değildir.”101 
Arınç, Bülent (the deputy Prime Minister, AKP): 
“İzleyicilerin yayınlarla ilgili şikâyetlerinde en fazla belirttikleri sebep, yayınların 
genel ahlaka ve ailenin korunması ilkesine aykırılığıdır. Vatandaşlardan gelen 
bildirimlerde, çoğunlukla bu yayınlara neden izin verildiği şikâyet edilmekte ve 
eleştirilen programların yayından kaldırılması talep edilmektedir.”102 “Arkadaşlarımız 
yasanın tümü üzerindeki görüşlerini dile getirecekler. Biz de not alacağız. Buna karşılık 
bildiklerimizi ifade edeceğiz. Bütün basın kuruluşları, Radyo Televizyon Yayıncıları 
Derneği, bu sektörle ilgili tüm kurum ve kuruluşlara önce taslak göndermiş. Görüş 
alanların görüşleri tekrar tartışılmış, bu görüşler sonunda yenilenen maddeler tekrar 
onlarla bir araya gelinmiştir. Burada zaten pek çok arkadaşımız bulunuyor. Yeri 
geldiğinde onların görüşüne de müracaat edersiniz.”103 
 
 
                                                            
100 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2004), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 83, 
May, 4. 
101 Sabah (2004), “Kadın Bakan Akşit: Zina suçu uygundur [Woman Minister Akşit: Criminalization of adultery is 
appropriate],” September, 2. Available at: http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/09/02/siy110.html. 
102  MeclisHaber (2012), “Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Basın Açıklamaları [Turkish Grand National Assembly 
Press Releases],” November, 12. Available at: 
http://www.meclishaber.gov.tr/develop/owa/haber_portal.aciklama?p1=123294. 
103 Zaman (2010), “Arınç: RTÜK Yasa tasarısını AB yönergesine göre hazırladık [Arınç: We prepared the RTÜK 
Law according to the EU directive],” June, 9. Available at: 
http://www.zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=993551&title=arinc-rtuk-yasa-tasarisini-ab-yonergesine-gore-hazirladik. 
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Arıtman, Canan (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“İşveren, maliyet artışlarına neden olduğundan, bir emzirme odası açmamak için 
100'üncü kadın işçiyi, bir yurt açmamak için de 150'nci kadın işçiyi işe almamaktadır. 
Kadın zaten iş yaşamında her zaman, en son işe alınan ve en önce işten çıkarılan 
konumdadır. Kadınlar sadece cinsiyetleri nedeniyle iş yaşamında büyük bir ayrımcılığa, 
eşitsizliğe ve hak ihlallerine maruz kalmaktadırlar.”104 
Aydoğan, Nursel (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“AKP iktidarı döneminde artan namus gerekçeli kadın katliamlarında AKP'nin 
topluma yayıp egemen kılmaya çalıştığı muhafazakârlaşma paradigmasının etkisi 
büyüktür. Bu paradigmayla aile kurumu cinsiyetçi bir yaklaşımla ele alınmakta, kadın 
aile kurumuyla özdeşleşen bir nesne olarak değerlendirilmekte, kadının yeri evidir 
algısı güçlendirilmekte ve en önemlisi de kadını özgür iradesi olan bir birey olarak 
görmeme yaklaşımı geliştirilmektedir.”105 
Bozlak, Murat (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“Hükûmetin elindeki ekonomik yaptırımlarla diz çökerttiği medyanın da içinde 
yer aldığı yandaş medya, gerçeğin ve halkın sesi olmanın ötesine geçip Hükûmetin, 
iktidar partisinin ve cemaatin borazanı hâline gelmiş durumdadır, talimatla idare edilir 
duruma dönüşmüştür.”106 
Çelik, Faruk (the State Minister and the former Minister of Labor, AKP): 
“Olmayan bir şeye diyorsunuz ki inşaat yapalım. Biz diyoruz ki cemevine statüyü 
verelim.” “Statüyü kazandıralım, sonra bunu konuşalım diyorum.” 107 “Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Mahkemesinin din dersleriyle ilgili kararı elimizdedir. Kesinlikle din dersleri 
zorunlu olmaktan çıksın demiyor karar. Net bir şekilde söylüyor, diyor ki: "Bu müfredat 
yeterli değil. Bu müfredat kuşatıcı değil. Bu müfredat 73 milyonu kuşatmıyor, bu 
müfredatı değiştirin." Söylediği bu. Biz de ne yaptık? Millî Eğitim Bakanlığımız 2008'de 
                                                            
104 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2008), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 
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105 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2011), Term: 24, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 22, 
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December, 16. 
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bir değişiklik yaptı, şimdi yeterli bulmadık… Oturduk, konuştuk, değerlendirdik ve çıkan 
müfredata dönük konuları Alevi eğitimciler yazdılar. Bir satırını ellemedik biz, bir 
kelimesini değiştirmedik, aynen o şekilde müfredata yansıttık ve dedik ki Alevilerin 
yazmış olduğu bu müfredat aynıyla din kültürü, ahlak bilgisi kitaplarında yer alacak ve 
Nusayrilerin yazdığı, Caferilerin yazdığı da aynı şekilde kitaba yansıtılacak ve daha 
kuşatıcı istenen din kültürü, ahlak bilgisinin bütün vatandaşlarımızı, bütün evlatlarımızı 
kuşatacak şekilde dizaynı konusundaki AİHM kararına uygun, hatta vatandaşımızın 
talebine uygun bir şekilde bir düzenleme yapmış bulunuyoruz.”108 “Bildiğiniz gibi 
doğum izinleri doğum öncesi ve sonrası 2’şer aydı. Şimdi talep 3 ay doğum öncesi, 3 ay 
doğum sonrası şeklinde. Bununla ilgili bakanlıklarla değerlendirmelerde bulunuyoruz 
ama tekrar ediyorum, bu kadın istihdamına olumsuz yansımamalı. Eğer olumsuz 
yansıyacaksa kadınlarında bu izin süre artışını düşünmemesi gerekir ama eğer olumlu 
yansıması olacaksa, bizler de çalışmalarımızı sürdürüyoruz.”109  
Çelik, Hüseyin (the former Minister of Education, AKP):  
“Şimdi, şöyle bir itiraz geldi, dediler ki: "Bunu biz niye yazmadık?" Özellikle 
spesifik bazı dernekler "Bunu biz niye yazmadık?" dediler. Biz de dedik ki: Biz diyelim 
ki Ortodoksluğu yazarken Rum Patriği Sayın Bartholomeos'ya yazdırmadık ki bunu 
veya Şafiilik bölümünü yazacak bir Şafii bulalım, Hanefilik için bir Hanefi bulalım 
demedik. Türkiye'de bu işin uzmanı olan, üniversitelerdeki hocalardan yararlandık, 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının birikiminden yararlandık, Millî Eğitim Bakanlığının 
uzmanlarından yararlandık.”110 
Çubukçu, Nimet (the former Minister of Family and Social Policies, AKP): 
“‘Kotacı Ülkeler’ başlığı altında verilen Fransa'nın yüzde 33 AB kritik eşiğinin 
altında kalan bir temsile sahip olması; sadece yüzde 12.1 ile kadın temsili olması nasıl 
açıklanabilir? Buna rağmen kota uygulamasına yer vermeyen İsveç'in yüzde 47 gibi 
yüksek bir temsil oranı ile parlamentosunda kadın vekile yer veriyor olması nasıl izah 
edilebilir?” “Sayın Başbakan'ın verdiği Fransa örneği, bu açıdan önemlidir. Fransa'da 
kota uygulanmasına rağmen, yüzde 12'lik bir temsil olması kotanın başarılı bir proje 
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olmadığını göstermektedir. Anayasasında kotaya yer vermeyen İsveç ise Avrupa'nın en 
yüksek kadın parlamenterine sahip ülkesidir. Kısaca, kota sistemi her zaman eşit bir 
temsile ulaşılmasını sağlamamaktadır.”111 
Ekren, Nazım (the former Deputy Prime Minister, AKP): 
“İslam tarihinin hiçbir döneminde kendisini İslam içinde görüp de camiye 
alternatif başka bir ibadethane kuran mezhep ve tarikat olmamıştır.”112 
Erbatur, Nevingaye (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Üyesi olma yolunda önemli aşama kaydettiğimiz Avrupa Birliği de kotayı gerekli 
ve şart görmektedir. Avrupa Birliğinin 1999'da yürürlüğe koyduğu Amsterdam 
Anlaşması hem AB'nin kendisini hem de üye ülkeleri bağlamaktadır. Anlaşmanın 
141'inci maddesine göre, eşitliğin sağlanması için kadınlara özel avantajlar sağlanması 
gereklidir ve bu bir ayrımcılık değildir. Avrupa ülkelerinde kota uygulamaları yaygın 
olarak hayata geçirilmektedir.”113 “Bu konuda kadın kuruluşlarının önemle üzerinde 
durduğu 187 inci maddenin başlığının, aile adı, evlilik adı veya son ad olarak 
değiştirilmesi, eşlerin istedikleri soyadını seçme özgürlüğünün olması, evlilik 
durumunda çocukların soyadlarının anneden de gelebilmesi gibi değişikliklerin 
yapılması gerekmektedir. Bunun yanı sıra, soyadı kavramı namus anlayışını da 
etkilemektedir. "Benim soyadımı taşıyorsun, öyleyse benim namusumsun" anlayışını 
değiştirecek bir zihinsel düzenlemeye de ihtiyacımız vardır. Bu düzenlemeler, kadını 
önce babanın, sonra eşinin malıymış gibi gösteren zihniyetin değişmesini sağlamada 
yardımcı olacaktır.”114 “Birleşmiş Milletler Kadına Karşı Her Türlü Ayrımcılığın 
Ortadan Kaldırılması Sözleşmesini, Türkiye, 1985 yılında imzalamıştır. Sözleşmeyi 
imzalayan her ülke, periyodik olarak, Birleşmiş Milletlere rapor sunmakta, raporu 
değerlendiren CEDAW da, o ülkeye, hazırlanan raporlar doğrultusunda sorular 
yöneltmekte, hükümete sözleşmenin gereklerini yerine getirmesi için tavsiyelerde 
bulunmaktadır.” “Komite, yeni Türk Ceza Kanununda, hâlâ, kadınlara ve kızlara 
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ayırımcılık yapan maddelerin olduğunu, özellikle de bekâret testlerinin kadınların rızası 
olmadan yapılamayacağı hususunun belirtilmesini istiyor. Komite, namus cinayetleri 
suçlarının nitelikli insan öldürme suçu olarak kabul edilmesini istiyor. Ayrıca, Komite, 
yeni Türk Ceza Kanunundaki 15 ile 18 yaş arası gençlerin kendi rızalarıyla girdikleri 
cinsel ilişkilere getirilen yasakların, özellikle kız çocuklarını olumsuz yönde 
etkileyeceğini ve bu yasakların kaldırılması gerektiğini belirtmektedir.”115 “İsterdik ki, 
tasarıda, kadın kuruluşları başta olmak üzere, sivil toplum kuruluşlarının görüşleri yer 
alsın, mahkemede görev alacak uzmanlar arasında aile ve aile içi şiddet konularında 
uzmanlaşmış hukukçular bulunsun, uzlaşma veya uzlaştırma iki tarafın mutabakatına 
dayansın ve 4320 sayılı Ailenin Korunmasına Dair Kanunun uygulanması aile 
mahkemelerinin görevleri arasında yer alsın.”116 
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip (the Prime Minister, AKP): 
“AİHM’nin verdiği son karar, Anayasa Mahkememizin de bu noktadaki attığı 
adımla paralellik arz eden bir konu. Nüfus kağıtlarında din ile ilgili sütunun olup 
olmaması çok şeyi değiştirmez. Burada AİHM’nin vermiş olduğu kararı ben anormal 
bir karar olarak görmüyorum. Yani bu oradan kaldırılabilir çok da önemli değil.”117 
“Biz kota gibi zoraki yollarla arzu edilen sonuçlara ulaşılamayacağını ve kota 
uygulamasının kadına saygısızlık olduğunu kabul ediyoruz. Kota uygulaması kadını 
erkeğin inayesine mahkum etmektir, yani erkek lütfedecek ondan sonra da kadınlar da 
parlamentoya girecek, böyle şey olmaz. Olması gereken ne? Önünü açmak, yarışa gayet 
güzel bir zeminde girmesini sağlamak, kaliteli olan, bayanlara bu yolu açmaktır.”118 
“Bazıları çıkıyor diyor ki, ‘Kürtaj yaptırmak bir haktır’ diyor. ‘Kadın’ diyor ‘isterse 
kürtajı yaptırır’. ‘O onun kendi hakkıdır. Siz onun vücudunda müdahalede 
bulunamazsınız, tasarrufta bulunamazsınız’. Bırak intihar edene de müsaade et. Niye 
köprüden atlarken müdahale ediyorsun adama? Hakkını kullansın. Böyle saçmalık olur 
mu? Bu bir cinayettir. Aynı şeyi söylüyorum. Şu anda Amerika’da kürtaja karşı korkunç 
bir mücadele var. Yasalar var. Batı’nın birçok toplumunda aynı şekilde. Biz de bunu 
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çalışıyoruz.”119 “Kadına şiddetle ilgili şu hazırlık safhasında, bazılarından aileye 
yaklaşımı, hiç hoşlanmıyorlar. Anne, ana ifadesine ateş köpürüyorlar. Dayanamıyorlar. 
Biz anne dediğimiz zaman, biz anaya karşıyız diyor, kadın, kadın kadın. Yahu anne 
dediğimiz kim? Kadın değil mi? Biz sizi bir dişiyle bir erkekten yarattık, dişi kadındır, 
erkekte babadır. Biri annedir, biri babadır. Bunların aile diye bir kavramı dünyada yok. 
Bu olmadığı gibi, bunların anlayışında yüreğinde millet diye de bir anlayışta yok. Ben 
de diyorum ki. Biz analığı yüceliği bir makam olarak değerlerimizden aldık. Anneye 
saygıyı bu değerlerimizde bulduk. Cenneti de annelerin ayakları altında bulduk. Bak 
babanın ayağı altında değil, annenin ayaklarının altında. Ben hep ayağının altını 
öptüm, Allah rahmet eylesin. Çünkü orada cennetin kokusu var. Orada başka bir dünya 
var. İşte bizi biz kılan, bizi güçlü kılan zaten bu değil mi? Ama o mantık bizim 
anlayışımız değil. Ak Parti iktidarını ister beğenirsiniz, ister beğenmezsiniz. Biz kadına, 
aile içindeki önemli rolü nedeniyle ayrı bir değer veriyoruz."120 
Ergün, Nihat (the Minister of Science, Industry and Technology, AKP): 
“Organize sanayi bölgelerinde 10 bin 25 kadının, 0-6 yaş grubundaki 6 bin 260 
çocuğu bu hizmetten yararlanma imkanına sahip olacak.'' 121 
Ersin, Ahmet (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Medeni Kanunun yürürlüğe girmesinden önceki tarihte evlenmiş olan eşler, bu 
kanunun, Medeni Kanunun yürürlüğe girmesinden itibaren bir yıl içinde noterden 
düzenleme ya da onaylama biçiminde bir sözleşme yaparlarsa, bu sözleşme geçmişe de 
geçerli oluyor. Şimdi, değerli milletvekilleri, bir defa şunu kabul etmek lazım, Türk 
toplumunda aileler erkek egemen olma özelliğini taşır. Bunun dışında, aileler üzerinde, 
gelenekler, töre, dinî alışkanlıklar, dinî kurallar ve çevre etkisi son derecede etkilidir. 
Dolayısıyla, bu koşullar içinde bir kadının -üstelik de Türkiye'deki kadınların eğitimsiz 
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oldukları da düşünülürse- eşini alıp, notere götürüp orada sözleşme yapması, hayatın 
gerçeğine aykırıdır.”122 
Genç, Kamer (parliamentarian, formerly independent, currently CHP): 
“Bu memlekette de sayısı 15 milyon mu, 20 milyon mu, bir Alevi vatandaş kitlesi 
var. Bu Alevi vatandaş kitlesi vergi veriyor ve bu vergi… Yani siz Yahudi'nin, 
Ermeni'nin ibadet yerine onun yakıt parasını vermeyi kabul ediyorsunuz ama cemevi 
diye Alevi inançlı insanların ibadet ettiği yere vermek istemiyorsunuz.”123 
Gülçiçek, Ali Rıza (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“21 Kasım 2004 tarihinde Diyanet İşleri Başkanımız "Aleviler azınlık değil, 
İslamın alt inanç grubudur; her gruba hizmet götüremeyiz; böyle olursa, Aczmendiler 
talepte bulundukları zaman ne olur" diye basına bir demeç vermiştir. Değerli 
arkadaşlarım, dinci yorumların, dinimizin özüyle, ruhuyla, amacıyla ilgisi yoktur. 
Zaten, bunların eylemlerinden bu durum anlaşılmaktadır ve bu sapık yorum, 
toplumumuz tarafından reddedilmektedir. Oysa, Alevi ve Sünnî yorumu, toplumumuzun 
çoğu tarafından kabul edilmektedir. Alevilik İslamın alt inanç grubuysa, Sünnîlik de alt 
inanç grubudur.”124 “Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, bu yıl da Başkan Yardımcılığı yapan 
bir üst düzey yetkilisinin ağzından, cemevlerinin cümbüş yeri olduğunu ifade etmiştir. 
Ayrıca, Sayın Başbakanın, Berlin'de yaptığı konuşmada "cemevleri ibadet yeri değildir, 
İslam için tek mabet camidir" diyerek bir inancın mensuplarının mekânlarını yok 
sayması ise tam bir skandal olmuştur, Alevî yurttaşlarımızın büyük üzüntülerine neden 
olmuştur. Demokratik, laik sistemle yönetilen ülkelerde hiç kimsenin bir başkasına 
"cemevinde değil, camide ibadet edeceksin; şöyle değil, şöyle inanacaksın" demeye 
hakkı ve yetkisi yoktur, olmamalıdır.”125 
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Halis, Şerafettin (parliamentarian, DTP): 
“Alevi inanç ve kurum önderleriyle görüşülerek ortak bir çabayla çözüm 
aranmalıdır. Çözüm aranırken oy kaygısı yerine demokratik toplumsal kaygı ön plana 
çıkarılmalıdır. Ancak anlaşılan o ki, AKP'nin yeniden ele aldığı açılım toplumsal 
demokrasi kaygısını taşımaktan uzaktır.”126 “Hani 12 Eylüle karşıydınız? 12 Eylül 
ürünü zorunlu din derslerini niye savunuyorsunuz? Dün, Sayın Faruk Çelik, Yeni 
Müfredat Bilgilendirme Toplantısında, "Çözüme bu kadar yaklaşmamıştık. Alevilerin 
müfredat konusundaki kaygıları da giderilecek." diyor. Ama bakın ne var burada: 40'a 
yakın Alevi -sözüm ona, Alevi- derneği çağrılmış, bunun içinde yalnız 3 tanesi Alevilerin 
hakları için mücadele eden dernek, geriye kalan, açılımlar sürecinde AKP'nin 
arpalıklarından faydalanmaya çalışan çıkarcı Aleviler, bir başka deyimle, yeşilbaş 
Aleviler. Şimdi, toplanmışlar, karar ne? 4'üncü sınıftan 12'nci sınıfa kadar din 
derslerinde Alevilik okutulacak ama nasıl? 7'nci sınıfta bir ünite, bir hafta, bilemediniz 
bir buçuk hafta. 12'nci sınıfta yine bir ünite Alevilik var. Gerisi nedir? Geri yıllarda da 
Hazreti Ali'nin ve Hacı Bektaş Veli'nin sözlerinin içinde yer aldığı programlar, dersler, 
konular.”127 
Kaplan, Hasip (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“Bilimsel ve teknolojik gelişmeye fikrî zenginlik katma yerine, felsefe derslerini 
müfredattan çıkarmak, ülkemizin farklı inançta yurttaşlarını yok saymak, zorunlu din 
derslerini koymak, ezberci eğitim sistemini ayakta tutmak, tarihi padişahların sayı ve 
anlaşmalarına indirgemek, çağ dışı YÖK anlayışına 21'nci yüzyılda kendi dinî, 
muhafazakar anlayışını ekleyerek bilimsel özgürlüğe müdahale, aynı zamanda ar-ge 
çalışmalarını yürüten bilimsel araştırmalara destek sağlayan öğrenci ve öğretim 
üyelerini bu yöne sevk etmeye çalışan az sayıda ve önemli kuruluşun bilimsel 
özerkliğine darbe vuruluyor.”128 
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Karabaş, Mehmet Nezir (parliamentarian, BDP):  
“Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının, başkanlıktan tutun en alt birimine kadar 
özerkleşmesi gerekiyor. Bu konuda tüm kesimlerin, tüm mezheplerin ve başta da 
milyonlarca, inancı taşıyan Alevilerin de güçlü bir şekilde temsil edildiği, hiçbir 
mezhebin, hiçbir inancın dışında tutulmadığı bir yapıya kavuşturulması gerekiyor.”129 
Karademir, Erdal (parliamentarian, CHP):  
“Medenî Yasanın bütün hükümleri devam eden evliliklere uygulanırken, sadece 
yasal mal rejiminin istisna tutulması, kanunun amacına ve ruhuna aykırıdır. 
Yürürlükteki düzenleme, Türk toplumunu çağdaş uygarlık düzeyine ulaştırma amacına, 
adalet anlayışı içinde, insan haklarına saygılı, demokratik, laik ve sosyal bir hukuk 
devleti anlayışına, herkesin kanun önünde eşit olduğu ve ailenin eşler arasında eşitliğe 
dayandığını vurgulayan Anayasanın 2 nci, 10 uncu ve 41 inci maddelerine aykırılılık 
içermektedir. Mevcut düzenleme, İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyannamesi ve Kadınlara 
Karşı Her Türlü Ayırımcılığın Önlenmesi Sözleşmesine de aykırılık içermektedir.”130 
Kart, Atilla (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Basın suçlarında kural olan para cezasıdır, kural olan tiraj sınırlamasıdır, kural 
olan iptal cezasıdır, yayın durdurma cezasıdır veya benzeri cezalardır, tazminat 
niteliğindeki cezalardır. Hapis cezalarını son derece sınırlı bir şekilde uygulamak 
gerekiyor. Getirilen uygulamada ise, istisnaî ve sınırlı olan düzenlemeyi yine çoğulcu 
bir hale getiriyoruz, sıkça uygulanan bir hale getiriyoruz ve kural haline getiriyoruz; 
yanlış olan bu değerli arkadaşlarım. Konjonktürel olarak özgürlükleri savunuyor 
görünen siyasî iktidarın, gelinen aşamada baskıcı bir rejimin altyapısını uygulamak 
amacıyla yeni yasal düzenlemeler yapmaya başladığını üzülerek ve endişeyle görüyoruz 
değerli arkadaşlarım.”131 
 
 
                                                            
129 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2010), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 
124, June, 25. 
130 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2006), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 77, 
March, 21. 
131 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2005), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 3, Session: 
103, May, 26. 
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Kaya, Atila (parliamentarian, MHP):  
“Alevi toplumunun hayatında çok önemli yeri olan cemevi gerçeği, siyasi 
kaygılardan uzak, cami-cemevi karşıtlığına dönüştürülmeden kabul edilmelidir. İnanç 
ve kültür hayatımızın bir unsuru olan cemevlerine devlet yardım etmeli, genel bütçeden 
ödenek tahsis edilmelidir.”132 
Kayış, Nuri (the former chair of RTÜK): 
“Kanun, bize göre pek çok açıdan sakıncalı. Medya-ticaret-siyaset ilişkilerini 
yoğunlaştıracak ve legal hale getirecektir. Bugün zaten medyada bir tekelleşme söz 
konusu. Bu, yasayla daha da yoğunlaşacak. Büyük medya patronları yüzlerce Radyo ve 
Televizyona sahip olabilecekler. Yerel medya yok olacak. Halkın haber alma özgürlüğü 
adına büyük kayıplar olacak. Büyük medya holdingleri, devlet ihalelerine rahatça 
girecekler.”133  
Kılıç, Muharrem (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Türk Ceza Kanununun bu düzenlemesinde vatandaşlarımızın önemli bir 
bölümünü oluşturan Alevîlerin inançlarına yapılacak bir inanç zorlaması, hakaret ve 
aşağılama, ceza kapsamı içinde değildir. Türk Ceza Kanununda koruma altına alınan, 
sadece din ve mezheptir. 1987 yılında Türk Ceza Kanununda yapılan değişiklikten önce 
olduğu gibi, böyle bir durumda, mahkeme, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığından, Alevîliğin din 
veya mezhep olup olmadığını soracak; Diyanet de, Alevîliğin ayrı bir din olmadığını, 
kabul edilen dört mezhepten birine de girmediğini bildireceğinden, dava 
düşürülecektir.”134 
Koç, Haluk (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Bu koşullar etrafında orada iş cemaatlere bırakılır ise kural dışı, safsataya 
dayalı, kendi doğrusunu İslam'ın doğrusu olarak kabul edecek yanlış uygulamaların 
çeşitli alanlarda devreye girdiğini hepimiz biliyoruz” “Tüm yurttaşlarımızın, geniş, en 
geniş kesimlerin olurunu alacak yeni bir Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı yapılandırmasının 
                                                            
132 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2009), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 33, 
December, 16. 
133 Neslihan Demir (2002), “Muhatapları RTÜK’ü tartışıyor [Its addressees are discussing RTÜK],” Evrensel, May, 
11. Available at: http://www.evrensel.net/v1/02/05/11/politika.html. 
134 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2006), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 93, 
April, 25. 
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artık Türkiye'nin bugünkü koşulları çerçevesinde tüm toplumsal gerçeklerimizi görerek, 
tüm toplumsal taleplerimizi görerek ve kavrayarak, hiçbir kesimi dışlamadan herkesi 
kavrayarak bu hizmetlerin yeni bir merkezî yapı içerisinde verilmesinden yana 
olduğumuzu ifade ediyorum.”135 
Köse, Şevket (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Bu çalıştayların sonucunda ortaya çıkan öneriler nasıl değerlendirilecek? Bu 
sonuçlarla ilgili hukuki bir düzenleme yapacak mısınız? Örneğin, çalıştaylardan 
Aleviliğin mezhep sayılması kararı çıktı. Bunun üzerine Aleviliği mezhep olarak 
görmeyen Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Aleviliği bir gecede mezhep olarak görecek mi?”136 
Kukaracı, Fahrettin (parliamentarian, SP): 
“Bakanlık, ideolojik ağırlığı bulunan birkısım dernek ve teşekküllerin baskıları 
sonucunda, sunulan sistem yerine, edinilmiş mallara katılma rejimini Meclisimize ve 
milletimize dayatmaktadır.” “Bu sistem, varlıklı eş için boşanmayı zorlaştıran bir etkiye 
sahiptir. Bu şekilde, evliliğin bir kâbus olarak devamına sebep olacaktır. Öbür taraftan, 
zina, boşanma nedenidir. Zina nedeniyle boşanan eş, malların yarısını da alarak, diğer 
eşi ikinci defa cezalandırmış, kendisi ise bir nevi ödüllenmiş olacaktır.”“Aile reisliğinin 
kaldırılmış olmasının mahzurlu olduğunu düşünüyoruz. Kocanın reisliğini dayatmayan 
bir düzenleme, hem eşitliği sağlayacak hem de en küçük toplulukta bile bir yönetici veya 
bir başa bağlanmayı gelenek haline getirmiş olan Türk toplum yapısına daha uygun 
olacaktı. Şimdi, aile, başsız bırakılmıştır. Müşterek konutun seçiminde, çocukların 
eğitiminde, aile giderlerine katılmada, ev işlerini yerine getirmede ve buna benzer 
konularda anlaşmazlıklar artacak, aile sık sık mahkeme kapılarına taşınacak, hâkimin 
müdahalesi vakai adiyeden sayılacak.”137 
Kurtulan, Fatma (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“Din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersleri ilk ve orta dereceli okullarda hâlen 
zorunludur. Bu hususta AİHM 2007 yılında, söz konusu derslerde dinlere genel bir 
bakış sağlanmaktan öte kültürel haklar da dâhil olmak üzere İslam inancının temel 
                                                            
135 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2007), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 5, Session: 
117, May, 30. 
136 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2009), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 33, 
December, 16. 
137 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2001), Term: 21, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 14, 
October, 31. 
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ilkelerinin öğretildiğine karar vermiş ve Mahkeme Türkiye'den, müfredatını ve 
mevzuatını Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi'nin birinci protokolünün 2'nci maddesiyle 
uyumlu hâle getirmesini istemiştir. Ancak Avrupa Birliği müzakerelerinde de üzerinde 
durulduğu ve 2009 Türkiye İlerleme Raporu'nda da belirtildiği gibi, Alevi inancı ve 
kültürü üzerindeki doğrudan ya da dolaylı asimilasyon ve kısıtlayıcı uygulamalar 
devam etmekte, ders kitaplarındaki ayrımcı tanım, ibare ve imgeler hâlâ ayıklanmış 
değil. Alevi yurttaşlarımızın inançlarını ve kültürlerini özgürce yaşayacakları yasal 
düzenlemeleri bir an önce hayata geçirmek yerine, Hükûmetin bu düzenlemeler 
içerisinde Aleviliği kendi etkisi altına alacağı hususları ön plana çıkarması ise daha 
derin bir çelişkiyi ifade etmektedir.”138 
Öymen, Onur (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Zina konusunda bu görüşmeler sırasında yapılan tartışmalar, maalesef, 
Avrupa'da, Türkiye'nin, laikliği koruma konusundaki kararlılığıyla ilgili çok ciddî 
kuşkular uyandırmıştır. Bunu, huzurunuzda açıkyüreklilikle söylemek istiyorum. Bu 
tartışmalar, karşımızda olanları güçlendirmiş, dostlarımızı güç durumda bırakmıştır. 
Çok değerli Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi milletvekili arkadaşlarımızla, Türkiye'de ve 
birkaç gün önce yurtdışında yaptığımız temaslarda yabancı millevtekilleri bize açıkça 
şunu söylemişlerdir: "Bu mesele halledilse bile, bir itimat sorunu, bir itimat eksikliği 
yarattınız; yarın öbür gün, hükümetinizin, başka bir konuda, laiklikle, çağdaşlıkla, 
Avrupa değerleriyle bağdaşmayan başka bir öneriyle gündeme gelmeyeceğini biz 
nereden bilebiliriz." İki gün önce Roma'da yaptığımız toplantıda, İtalyan milletvekilleri, 
bize bu konudaki kuşkularını çok ciddî bir endişeyle ifade ettiler.”139 
Özkes, İhsan (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Camilerde olduğu gibi, cemevlerinin de elektrik, su gibi giderleri devlet 
tarafından karşılanmalıdır.” “Müftü seçiminde âdeta AKP'ye bağlılık andı içenler 
tercih ediliyor. Diyanet, iktidarın bir kurumu, arka bahçesi, arpalığı, camiler de siyasi 
                                                            
138 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2009), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 14, 
November, 5. 
139 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2004), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 
124, September, 26. 
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bürosu değildir. İslam bir partinin flaması altına girecek kadar küçüklükte asla 
olamaz.”140  
Özyürek, Mustafa (parliamentarian, CHP):  
 “Diyelim ki, cemevlerini ibadethane saymakta kendinize göre bazı dinî 
gerekçeleriniz var ama cemevlerine yardım yapılması konusunda, cemevlerinin bakımı, 
tamiri konusunda bütçeden ödenek ayrılması için Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi olarak her 
bütçe döneminde verdiğimiz önergeler de kesinlikler reddedilmiştir.”141 
Şahin, Fatma (the Minister of Family and Social Policies, AKP): 
“Yarı zamanlı çalışmanın sosyal güvenlik ayağını da çalışma bakanlığı ile 
çalışıyoruz. Onu da başardığımız zaman kadının hem kapasitesini kullanıp işinde 
verimli çalışacağı, hem de çocuğunu evinde bakacağı bir sistemi hayata geçireceğiz. 
Avrupa Birliği (AB) oranlarına baktığınız zaman yüzde 60 istihdamda kadın oranı 
diyorlar. Bunun yüzde 40’ı yarı zamanla çalışıyor yüzde 20 tam zamanlı. Şimdi biz 
yüzde 30’u tam zamanlı çalışma oranlarında yakaladık. Yarı zamanlının alt yapısını 
hukuki alt yapısın çalışma bakanlığımızla düzenlediğimiz zaman hızlı şeklide AB 
standartları rakamlarına ulaşacak durumdayız”142 
Şahin, İdris Naim (the former Minister of Interior, AKP): 
“Darbeye zemin hazırlamak düşünce özgürlüğü kapsamında değildir. Hükûmeti 
yıpratmak maksadıyla yazılanlar, çizilenler elbette ki suç olamaz. Basın özgürlüğü 
çerçevesinde herkes istediğini istediği şekilde ifade eder, ediyor da. Sabahtan akşama 
kadar hükûmet aleyhine acımasızca eleştirilerin yapıldığı televizyon yayınları devam 
ediyor. Gazeteler, dergiler yayınlarına devam ediyor. Ancak yargının devam ettirdiği 
soruşturmalara baktığımızda soruşturulan olayların basın özgürlüğüyle hiçbir ilgi ve 
alakası olmadığını görüyoruz.”143  
                                                            
140 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2011), Term: 24, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 33, 
December, 10. 
141 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2011), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 5, Session: 67, 
February, 16. 
142 The Ministry of Family and Social Policies (2013), “Organize Sanayi Bölgelerine Kreş [Creshes to organized 
industrial sites],” see in the website of the Ministry of Family and Social Policies, January, 21. Available at: 
http://www.aile.gov.tr/tr/haberler/s/690. 
143 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2012), Term: 24, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 
January, 10. 
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Şandır, Mehmet (parliamentarian, MHP): 
“Alevi inancına, Alevi İslam inancına bağlı kardeşlerimizin taleplerini de mutlaka 
Diyanet gibi, yani inancın hukukunu, inanç hizmetlerinin hukukunu belirleyen bir 
yapıda yerini buldurmamız lazım.”144 
Şenel, Şennur (the head of women branches, MHP): 
"Kotayı tasvip etmememizin sebebi kadın erkek eşitliğine aykırı olarak 
değerlendiriyoruz. Kadın adaylara karşı değiliz. Memlekete hizmet etmek isteyen 
kadınlarımızın 'adayım' diye çıkmalarını bekliyoruz. Bu arz talep dengesidir. Sadece 
kadın aday göstermekle olmaz.” 145 
Şimşek, Mehmet (the Minister of Finance, AKP): 
“Önemli bir konu, tereddüdüm yok. Ama Maliye Bakanlığı'na bir ek ödenekle 
çözülmez. Önümüzdeki dönem çalışılır, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı bünyesinde belli 
noktalara getirilip kaynak ayrılırsa daha doğru olur. Yoksa bunu önemsemiyoruz 
değil.”146 
Tuğluk, Aysel (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“Madem inançlara bu kadar saygılısınız, başta Alevi yurttaşlarımız olmak üzere, 
farklı inanç ve kültürlere sahip insanlarımızın sorunlarını çözün, zorunlu din dersini 
kaldırın ki samimiyetiniz tescil edilsin.”147 
Uras, Mehmet Ufuk (parliamentarian, BDP): 
“AKP Hükûmeti Alevi açılımı diye bilinen çalıştaylar düzenledi, Alevi kuruluşları 
bu çalışmalara katıldı, ortaklaştırdıkları talepleri sundular. Nedir bunlar? Cemevleri 
yasal statüye kavuşturulsun, zorunlu din derslerine son verilsin, Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı lağvedilsin, Alevi köylerine cami yaptırma politikasından vazgeçilsin, 
                                                            
144 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2010), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 
124, June, 25. 
145 Nagihan Akarsel (2011), “Siyasette kota yok kadının adı yok [There is no quota in politics, the women has no 
name],” Özgür Gündem, February, 2. Available at: http://www.ozgur-
gundem.com/index.php?haberID=4103&haberBaslik=Siyasette%20kota%20yok%20kad%C4%B1n%C4%B1n%20a
d%C4%B1%20yok&action=haber_detay&module=nuce. 
146 Cumhuriyet (2011), “Cemevi isteğini reddetti [Rebuffed the demand for Cem House],” November, 26. Available 
at: http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=295952. 
147 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2008), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 59, 
February, 6. 
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Madımak müze olsun, başta Hacı Bektaş Dergâhı olmak üzere bu türdeki değerler ve 
mekânlar Alevi yurttaşların örgütlerine iade edilsin; kamuda çalışan Alevilerin 
kimliklerinin saklanmasına neden olan dışlama, iş vermeme, emekliliğe zorlama, 
görevde yükseltmeme, belli görevlere atamama, belli kadrolarayükseltmeme, 
soruşturmalarla yıldırma, görevden uzaklaştırma ve sürgün, istisnai kadrolarda 
istihdam etmeme gibi durumlara Hükûmet hemen son versin.”148 
Yağız, Süleyman (parliamentarian, DSP): 
“Biz, irtica riskinin, belli ölçelerde de olsa, sürmesi nedeniyle, Diyanetin devlet 
kurumu olarak devam etmesinden yanayız; yoksa, bizim de nihaî hedefimiz, Diyanetin -
yani, din hizmetlerinin- bütünüyle cemaatlere bırakılmasıdır; ancak, bu noktaya 
varabilmemiz için, irticaın bir risk olmaktan çıkarılması, bir başka deyişle, dinsel devlet 
yönetimi talebinin gündemden düşürülmesi gerekir.”149 
Yerlikaya, Vahdet Sinan (parliamentarian, CHP): 
“Aleviler, sorunların ülke içinde çözülmesini, devleti yönetenlerin de duyarsız 
kalmamasını istemektedirler. İsteklerine baktığımızda bunlar çok masumane ve kabul 
edilir isteklerdir. Bunların içinde önemlileri şunlardır: Cemevleri yasal statüye 
kavuşturulmalıdır, diğer inanç kurumlarına tanınan imkânlar bunlara da tanınmalıdır. 
Zorunlu din dersleri tercih hâline getirilmelidir. Aleviler hakkındaki ön yargıların 
değişmesi için, Alevilerce önemli olan günler, başta TRT Radyo ve Televizyonu olmak 
üzere diğer medyada bazı yayınlara yer verilmelidir. Aleviliğin ne olduğu din dersleri 
kitaplarında göstermelik olarak değil, esastan yer almalı ve öğretilmelidir. Diyanet 
İşleri Başkanlığı Alevilerin sesini duymalı ve Alevilere ait bir birim kurularak bu 
eşitsizlik mutlaka giderilmelidir.”150 
 
 
 
                                                            
148 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2009), Term: 23, Year of Legislature: 4, Session: 16, 
November, 11. 
149 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (1999), Term: 21, Year of Legislature: 2, Session: 43, 
December, 25. 
150 Turkish Grand National Assembly General Council Record (2007), Term: 22, Year of Legislature: 5, Session: 58, 
February, 1. 
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APPENDIX 3 
SELECTED STATEMENTS FROM IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
(IN ALPHABETIC ORDER, IN TURKISH) 
 
 
Altun, Fermani (the chair of World Ahlul Bayt Foundation, December 19, 2012): 
 
“Biz ilk defa Alevi inanç kimliğini Türkiye’de hem Alevilere hem diğer inanç 
kesimlerine doğru şekilde ortaya koyduk. Bazı kuruluşlar Aleviliği ideoloji ile 
karıştırıyorlar, siyasi tercihlerle karıştırıyorlar veyahut da bir kültürü yaşam biçimiyle 
karıştırıyorlar. Ama biz Aleviliğin asıl temel değerinin, hatta bütün Müslümanların 
ortak değeri olan Ehl-i Beyt olgusu ve İslam içinde tasavvuf yorumu olduğunu, bunu, 
detaylarıyla öğrettik.” “Birçok hiç alakası olmayan şeyleri Anayasa’ya koymuşsunuz. 
Mecburi din dersi olsun, Diyanet olsun, insanların inanç kavramlarını yasaklayan 
birçok maddeler koyuyorsunuz. Bunlar 12 Eylül’de konmuş. 1921, 1924 Anayasası’nda 
yok. 60’ta bile dinle ilgili ifadeler yoktu.” “İmar yasalarında devlet kalkıyor 
ibadethanelerin bir kısmı geçerli, bir kısmı geçersiz. Bu bir insan hakkına tecavüzdür.” 
“Cem evleri direkt olarak cem evi olarak kurulamıyor. Kültür merkezi olarak 
kuruluyor. Üzerine işte cem evi deniliyor. Aslında yasada halen yasak. İleride diyelim ki 
bir şey gelse, bir hükümet gelse ben kapatıyorum Tekke ve Zaviyeler Kanunu’na göre 
yasak. Onun için yasak olduğu halde idare ediliyor. Yani, dokunulmuyor, göz 
yumuluyor. Onun için de istediği zaman da resmi ibadethane değildir deniliyor. Yer 
tahsis edecek, resmi ibadethane değildir deniliyor.” “Yahut da ibadethanelerde elektrik 
su birçok giderler doğalgaz alınmıyor mesela. Bunu devlet karşılıyor. Ama siz müracaat 
ettiğiniz zaman ibadethane olarak havra olsanız verir, kilise olsanız verir, cami olsanız 
verir, ama cem evi olunca vermiyor.” “İnsanların ibadet tercihlerine maneviyatına 
kimse karışmaz… O bakımdan ister yazdırır, ister yazdırmaz. Siz dünyayı geziyorsunuz 
orada belki konumunuz gereği orada inancınızın, dininizin yazılmasını istemiyorsunuz. 
Yahut da daha sizin için iyi olacağını düşünüyorsunuz. Bu da bir tercihtir. İsteyen 
yazdırır, isteyen yazdırmaz.” “Alevilerin oy verdiği Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi bugüne 
kadar hiçbir şey yapmamış. Kalkıyor partinin genel başkanı Tekke ve Zaviyeler 
Kanunu’nun şimdi sırası mı diyor. Türk Hava Yollarının grevi var, onu konuşalım 
diyor. Şimdi anayasa taslağı görüşülüyor. Şimdi sırası değil de ne zaman sırası? 
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Aleviler siyasette de dışlanmışlardır, ekonomide de dışlanmışlardır. Yani Alevilerin 
varlığı kabul edilmiyor. Türkiye’nin üçte bir nüfusu olan bu kesim Türkiye’de belki en 
ezilen kesimdir.”  
Atay, Zafer (the deputy secretary general of TGC, December 20, 2012): 
“Anayasa komisyonu çok muntazam çalışan her şeyin çok seri olarak yürütüldüğü 
bir yer değil. Bir dosya gönderilmiş olsa ne olacak.” “Bu dertlerimiz öyle çok karmaşık 
her gün değişen falan değil. Terörle Mücadele Kanunu’nun 6. 7. maddelerinin 
değişmesi lazım diyoruz. Çünkü bu fikir özgürlüğünü, gazetecilerin haber yazma 
özgürlüğünü kısıtlıyor diyoruz.” “Basın kartları yok diyorlar. Tabi olmaz. Şimdi ben 
gazete yönetimlerini suçluyorum. Yanlarında çalıştırdıkları arkadaşlarla adam gibi 
sözleşme yapmadıkları için bu arkadaşlarım basın kartı alamıyorlar. Tabi hukuken de 
onlar gazeteci değil. Sözleşmeleri yok, basın kartları yok suçlamasıyla karşı karşıya 
kalıyorlar. Bunun günahı kimin bunun günahı yöneticilerin. Bunun günahı sendikayı 
ortadan kaldıranların.” “Başbakanlarla buluştuk. Biz Tayyip beyle de buluştuk… 
Haklısınız diyorlar. Merak etmeyin diyorlar bize. Bizi çok iyi dinliyorlar. Şunlara bir el 
atalım dendiği zaman da maalesef el atılamıyor. Meclis komisyonlarına çağırıldık. Alt 
komisyonlara başkanımız katıldı. Görüşlerimizi açıkladık. Siz nereden çıktınız denmedi 
bize. Onlar çağırdılar. Alt komisyonda bulunmak önemli bir şey. Fakat, sonra bizim 
istediğimiz gibi çıkmadı. İstediğimiz gibi dediğimiz yüzde yüz bizim sözümüzü 
dinlesinler anlamında değil. Burada hata var noksan var bu problem olacak dediğimiz 
şeyler kaldı. Bu karşılıklı diyalog evet vardı. Her Ankara’ya gidişimizde bir dosya 
verdik Adalet Bakanlığı’na, İçişleri Bakanlığı’na, Başbakana, Cumhurbaşkanına.” 
“Platform önemlidir. Platformun içinden acayip acayip sesler çıkıyor. Birileri öne 
fırlamaya çalışıyor. Yapsınlar. Ziyanı yok. Platform iktidarın karşısındaki en büyük 
şeydir. Bana diyebilirler ki -Sen kimsin kardeşim? -Cemiyet. -Bana ne? Ama doksan 
cemiyet bir araya gelince, IPI bir araya gelince, bu hükümetin en çok çekindiği 
şeylerden biri dışarıdaki tepkidir.” 
Bermek, Doğan (the chair of AVF, one of the founders of CEM Foundation, 
December 13, 2012): 
 
“Etki alanı olarak bakarsanız bizim etki alanımız çok geniştir. Alevi taban üst 
yapıyı tanımaz. Derneklerin, kurumların ne yaptığıyla çok fazla uğraşmaz. Alevi taban 
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inanmak istiyor… Bizim onursal başkanımız Prof. Dr. İzzettin Doğan’dır. İzzettin Bey 
zaten Alevi hareketinde en öndeki simalardan birisidir. Türkiye’de dolayısıyla toplumun 
İzzettin Bey’le de duygusal bir ilişkisi de vardır. Aradaki kurumlar olsun olmasın o 
ilişki sürer. Rehber ve toplumsal ilişki sürmektedir.” “Alevi Dernekleri Federasyonu 
gerek ilke olarak gerek inanç sistemi olarak gerek tavır ve uygulama olarak bizimle 
yüzde yüz paraleldir. Onlarla biz ayrı isimleriz çünkü hukuksal yapılarımız farklı. Yoksa 
biz onlarla kendimizi aynı görüyoruz... Dernekler ve Vakıflar Federasyonu’nun zaten 
Türkiye’deki büyük bir tabanı yani yüzde doksanlık kısmını temsil ettiğini 
düşünüyoruz.” “Bir de ABF diye bir Federasyon var Ankara’da, Alevi Bektaşi 
Federasyonu. O bizlerden eski bir federasyondur. Biraz daha eskidir. Onların 
söylemleri bizlerden biraz daha radikaldir. Biraz daha siyasaldır söylemlerinde. 
Bizimkiler daha inanca dönüktür ABF ve AVF.” “Aleviliği devlet tanımlamıyor. Madem 
siz Müslümansınız, gelin camiye gibi bir tanımlama var. Tabi bizim bu tanımlamayla 
bağdaşmamız mümkün değil. Son on yıl demişsiniz ama bizim geçmişimiz biraz daha 
eski tabi. Kurumsallaşmanın tarihi 20-25 yıldır.”“Türkiye de eğer bütçeden inançlara 
kaynak ayrılacaksa, bu kaynaktan Türkiye’deki bütün inanç grupları yararlanmalı. 
Türkiye’de bütçede inançlara ayrılan kaynak tek bir inanç grubuna tahsis edilmiş. 
Sünni olup Hanefi olmayanla, mesela Şafi Sünniler hiç destek almıyor. Aleviler, 
Caferiler hiçbir destek almıyoruz. Vergi ödediğimiz halde, Yahudiler de bir kuruş 
almıyor. Belki Türkiye’nin vergisinde çok önemli payları vardır Yahudilerin, Yahudilere 
ait kuruluşların. Herkesin var. Ama herkese dağılmalı bu para, eğer kullanılacaksa. 
Birinci talebimiz buydu.” “İkincisi eğitimdi. 600 tane imam hatip’in olduğu bir ülkede 
Süryani’nin niye papaz okulu olmasın, Yahudi’nin niye haham okulu olmasın. Eğitim 
eşitliği eğitimde eşit haklar istedik.” “Üçüncüsü inanç merkezinde hizmet verenlerin 
sosyal güvenliğe kavuşması gerekir. Nasıl imamlar müezzinler devlet memuruysa 
güvenlikleri varsa papazların da –papazın da bir güvencesi yok, adam hayrına papazlık 
yapıyor orda, sigortası yok bir şeyi yok, adam topluma hizmet ediyor orda-, bizim de 
dede için aynı şey geçerli.” “Türkiye açısından tek taraflı olarak Lozan’a uyulmamıştır. 
Böyle bir azınlık statüsünün kimseye getireceği bir şey yok. Azınlık statüsü diye bir şey 
de yok. Olan statüye Türkiye zaten saygı duymuyor.” “İslam’ın Tasavvufi ve Hümanist 
bir yorumu diye bakmak lazım. Bu tarife de bugün Türkiye’deki Alevilerin yüzde doksan 
sekizi doksan dokuzu herhalde evet der. Alevilik İslam dışında farklı bir mezheptir falan 
diye bir oryantalist görüş var. Bu oryantalist görüşün savunucuları da var. Ama o 
savunucuların hiçbirisinin bu tabanla ilişkisi olamaz. 20-25 yıldır böyle iddiaları 
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durmadan sürerler pazara ama alıcısı yok.” “Şu anda Türkiye’deki üç büyük 
federasyon yani ABF, AVF ve ADF’nin Alevilikle ilgili tek bir görüşü var. Alevilik 
İslam’ın bir yorumudur. Mezhep değildir. Mezhep Sünni inancın kendi içindeki 
hiziplerden gelir. Hizip demektir mezhep zaten. Aleviliği bir mezhep diye tarif 
edemezsiniz. Sünni inancın bir anlayışıdır. Şii gibi, Sünni gibi, Alevi gibi anlaşılabilir. 
Sünni gibi anlayanların mezhepleri vardır. İşte Şafi, Hanefi, Hanbeli, Maliki, Vahabi 
falan gibi. Şii gibi anlayanların da içinde mezhepler vardır. Alevi gibi anlayanların da 
kendi içlerinde tarikatları vardır. Bizde yol, yani farklı yollardan gitmek.” “Anayasal 
bir zorunluluk olamaz bir tek ders için. Bu rasyonel de değil. Sadece Alevi olduğum için 
söylemiyorum bunu, insan olarak vatandaş olarak da. Bir tek din dersi zorunlu. Başka 
dersler zorunlu değil.” “Din dersi zorunlu olmaktan çıkarılmalı. Müfredatta zorunlu 
olmak zaten Milli Eğitim’in kararı. Yani Milli Eğitim matematiği kaldırabilir, şimdi 
canı isterse, ama din dersini kaldıramaz. Bizde din dersini anayasal bir koruma altına 
aldığı için, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı’nın din dersleriyle ilgili bölümü adeta bakandan 
daha fazla yetkili bir bölüme dönüşüyor.” “Ben Avrupa Parlamento’su başkanlarıyla 
görüştüm iki veya üç kere. Avrupa’daki bazı büyük bürokratlarla, bazen de kamu 
temsilcileriyle görüşüyoruz. Avrupa Konseyi’yle görüşüyoruz. Zaten delegasyonun 
Türkiye’deki siyasi danışmanıyız. Onlarla rutin toplantılar yapıyoruz. O toplantılarda 
işte sorunları konuşuyoruz, gelişmeleri konuşuyoruz. Şu anda zaten Anadolu örgüsü 
diye bir proje yürütüyorum Avrupa Birliği desteğiyle. İnsan hakları ve demokratikleşme 
programı çerçevesinde. Bizim birtakım ilişkilerimiz var, ama bu ilişkilerin yeterli 
olduğunu düşünmüyorum.” “Avrupa Birliği açısından bir sorun yok. Avrupa Birliği 
ilerleme raporlarında da, tek e tek görüşmelerimizde de Alevi sorunları konusunda 
bizim görüşlerimizi paylaşıyor. Bizim sorunlarımızı da aynen kendi kayıtlarına 
yansıtıyor.” “Türkiye’de 3000’e yakın Cem evi var. 3000’i de yasa dışı. Bir sabah 
gittiğinizde bütün Cem evlerinin kapısında iki tane polis biz burayı mühürledik 
diyebilir. Sadece toplumsal konsensüs üstünden açık cem evlerimiz. Bu cem evlerinin, 
cem evi olarak bir tanesinin iskân raporu var. Onun dışında hiçbirinin iskân raporu 
yok. Hiçbirisi kayden cem evi olarak geçmiyor tapu kayıtlarında. Çünkü cem evi diye 
bir şeyi kabul etmiyor devlet.” “Bireyler var. Partiler henüz bunu parti politikası haline 
getirmediler. Bir tek Ecevit bunu parti programına koymuş idi, hükümet programına 
koymuştu galiba. Onun dışındakilerin hepsi Alevilerle yan yana geldiği zaman canım 
cicim oluyor. Ama bir türlü siyasi bir söyleme çeviremiyorlar. CHP’de dâhil. CHP 
Alevi’lere çok yakın falan deniliyor, ama CHP’nin de elle tutulur bir Alevi politikası 
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yoktur.” “Her medeni adam bir iş yaparken nelere ihtiyaç duyuyorsa, Dede de öyle bir 
adam sonuçta. Adam hastalanacak, çocuk okutacak, giyinecek. Bunu bağışlarla mı 
yapacağız. Şuanda öyle yapıyoruz. Türkiye desin ki bütün inanç gruplarına ben bir 
kuruş vermiyorum. Herkes kendi dedesini imamını müezzinini idare etsin. Çünkü bugün 
Türkiye’de durum o.” “Hizmet eden personele maaş istiyoruz.” “Aynı din dersleri gibi 
bugün isterse hükümet Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü’nü kapatabilir, isterse artık Sağlık 
Bakanlığı’na ihtiyaç kalmadı ben kapatıyorum Sağlık Bakanlığı’nı, Sağlık Bakanlığı 
olmayacak diyebilir. Diyaneti kapatamaz. Çünkü Diyanet anayasal bir kurumdur. Böyle 
bir şey olmaz. Bir hizmet kuruluşudur. Ya siz bütün hizmet kurumları anayasal olacak 
dersiniz. Ya da bir hizmet kurumuysa Diyanet, herhangi bir hizmet kurumu, bir bakana 
bağlı kurum olur geçer gider. Anayasal olamaz, olmamalıdır. Diyanet açık kalmış, 
kapalı kalmış o bir siyasal karardır. Devlet inançlara kaynak ayırmaya karar verirse, 
bu ayırdığı kaynağı, Sünniler için olan kısmını Diyanet de kullanabilir. Diyanette Sünni 
olmayan bir tane vatandaş yok.” “Biz şunu istiyoruz bir kere bu kurum anayasal 
olmamalı. Bu kurum lazım mı değil mi sonra konuşuruz.” “Her devletin kendine göre 
bir yapısı olduğu için, Avrupa Birliği’ni henüz ilgilendiren bir şey değil Diyanet İşleri. 
O biraz bizim iç sorunumuz… Komisyon raporlarında, kurumun tavrıyla ilgili görüş 
bildiriliyor. Kurumun yasal statüsü ile ilgili bir şey bildirilemez.” “Din hanesinin 
kalkması lazım. O din hanesi orda boş da olsa mahalle baskısı altındasın. Ermeni’yim 
yazarsan da mahalle baskısı altındasın. Alevi’yim yazarsan da mahalle baskısı 
altındasın. Şafi’yim yazarsan da mahalle baskısı altındasın. Din hanesi diye bir şeye 
ihtiyaç yok orada. Vatandaşlıkla inancın ne alakası var.” “Talebi çıkarıyorsunuz 
ortaya. Sonra talebi paylaşanlar genişliyor. Bu çevre genişledikten sonra bu talep 
herkesin talebi olduktan sonra hükümet direnemiyor daha fazla.” “Alevi çalıştayları 
sürecinde bizim kamuyla doğru iletişimimiz oldu. Ondan önce ve ondan sonra bu 
iletişim yok yahut da çok soft bir iletişim, saçma bir iletişim var. Bir kurumsal iletişim 
yok bir kere. Devlet içerisinde bir kurum yok ki onunla iletişimebilesiniz. Seçilen hangi 
kriterle seçildi, hangi kriterle gitti. Bunların hiçbirisi bir kurumsal devlet politikası 
içinde oluşmuyor. Faruk Çelik’le bir ilişkimiz oldu. Ama şimdi onu sosyal güvenlik 
bakanlığına koydular. Bekir Bozdağ da bakan oldu olalı ne o beni aradı, ne ben onu 
aradım. Tanımıyorum.” 
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İlkkaracan-Ajas, İpek (one of the founders of WWHR, February 18, 2013): 
“KİH-YÇ’de yıllarını hatırlamıyorum… o dönemde büyük bir faks kampanyası 
oldu yani sekreteryasını yürüttüğü. Orada kısmen başarılı oldu, kısmen başarısız oldu 
yani ‘pozitif ayrımcılık’ girmedi ama devlet geçici özel önlemleri… yani ‘kadın erkek 
eşittir, bu devletin sorumluluğudur, yükümlülüğüdür, devlet bunu gerçekleştirmek üzere 
bazı önlemler alır’ şeklinde bir revizyon oldu.” “Yakın zamanda KİH-YÇ ve KEİG 
adına Anayasa Platformu’na ev içerisinde bakım hizmetlerinin eşit paylaşılması 
yönünde ve çocukların kreş hakkı ile ilgili, yani bunun da anayasaya dâhil 
olabileceğine ilişkin bir sunumumuz oldu geçtiğimiz yıl içerisinde. Meclis kayıtlarına 
geçti, meclis anayasa alt komisyonuna.” “Kadın istihdamı ile ilgili diskurun bir parçası 
bile değildi kreş hizmetleri bundan bir yedi sekiz sene öncesine kadar. Hatta, Türk 
hükümeti 2005 yılında sanırım altıncı ya da yedinci raporuydu, Birleşmiş Milletler 
CEDAW komitesine hükümet bir rapor sundu. Hükümet raporunu sundu biz de sivil 
toplum örgütleri olarak kendi raporumuzu sunmakla sorumluyduk ve bu raporun önemli 
bir bölümü Türkiye’de ekonomik alanda eşitsizlikleri, özellikle kadın erkek istihdamı 
arasındaki uçuruma odaklanıyordu ve bunun temel kaynaklarından bir tanesi de 
Türkiye’deki bakım rejiminin tamamıyla kadının ücretsiz emeğine dayalı olan, devlet 
tarafından sorumlulukların üstlenilmediği, okul öncesi eğitime katılım oranlarının son 
derece düşük olduğu gibi bazı argümanlar geliştiriyordu. Birleşmiş Milletler CEDAW 
Komitesi üyelerinden bir tanesi bizim sivil toplum örgütlerinin raporundan bir alıntı 
yaparak, hükümet delegasyonuna şu soruyu yöneltti: ‘sizin ülkenizde resmi raporda 
kadın istihdamı ile ilgili olarak yapılan değerlendirmede ben çocuk kreşlerine ilişkin bir 
şey göremedim. Okul öncesi eğitime ilişkin acaba Türkiye’deki okul öncesi eğitime 
katılım oranlarını bizimle paylaşır mısınız?’ diye ve o dönemki bakan delegasyon bu 
soruya o kadar şaşırdı ki ve resmen kürsüden ‘biz okul öncesi eğitimin kadın istihdamı 
ile ne ilgisi olduğunu anlayamadık, kreşlerin kadın erkek eşitliği ile ilgili ilişkisini 
anlayamadığımız için biz yanımızda böyle bir veri getirmedik ama sayın komite üyesi 
illa isterse Türkiye’ye döndüğümüzde bu verileri toparlayarak sizlere gönderebiliriz.’ 
Yani, diskur 2005 Ocak ayı itibariyle -bu kayıtlara geçmiştir- Türk hükümeti 
delegasyonunun Birleşmiş Milletler CEDAW Komitesine kreş konusundaki cevabı ‘ne 
alakası var’.” “Kadın istihdamı ile ilgili genel diskur: bu bir eğitimsizlik sorunudur, bir 
de ikinci minvalde de bu bir zihniyet sorunudur… Hem hükümete yönelik, hem de bütün 
paydaşlara yönelik lobicilik ve bilinçlendirme çalışması yürüttük. Gitmediğimiz toplantı 
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kalmadı diyebiliriz…” “Bugün 2013 Ocak itibariyle, veya Şubat ayı.. cuma günü ben 
bir toplantıya devlet tarafından davet edilerek gittim. Toplantıyı Çalışma Bakanlığı, 
Aile Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı ve Avrupa Komisyonu’nun ortak bir konferansıydı. 
Konferansın konusu ebeveyn izni ve iş yaşam dengesi için ebeveyn izni ve esnek çalışma 
modelleri. Biz çalışmaya başladığımızda, Türkçe’de böyle bir terminoloji oluşmamıştı 
bile…O günlerden bizim bunu anlatmaya çalıştığımız günlerden devletin bunu 
sahiplenip, Avrupa Komisyonu’na başvurup fon almışlar… Bir yıldan beri Fatma Şahin 
ile birlikte kreş yardımları gündeme geldi. Paydaşlardan en önemlileri kadın örgütleri 
diyordum. KAGİDER’e anlatmaya çalıştık bunu. KAGİDER anladı ve sahiplendi. O 
sahiplenme üzerinden AÇEV ile bir ortaklıkla bir kreş çalışması yaptılar Türkiye’de. 
Kreş kaça mal olur vesaire. Bununla Çalışma Bakanlığı üzerinden bir pilot geliştirmeye 
çalıştılar örneğin. KAGİDER o ucundan sahiplendi. Sonra TÜSİAD başkanı olarak 
Ümit Boyner bütün bunları bizden dinledikten sonra TÜSİAD adına yaptığı 
açıklamalarda kreş önemlidir demeye başladı. Hükümet o zaman birkaç yerden 
duymaya başladı. O anlamda çok başarılı bir lobicilik çalışması oldu.” “Ebeveyn izni 
devlet memurları için çıkarıldı geçen yıl ilk defa. Bunun özel sektöre de uzatılacak 
genişletileceğine dair bir yasal düzenleme olayı. İkincisi Çalışma bakanımızın yine 
geçtiğimiz aylarda iş yerinin kreş açma zorunluluğunun kadın çalışan sayısı üzerinden 
değil, kadın erkek toplam çalışan üzerinden olması gerektiğine dair bir açıklaması oldu 
ve Aile Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı’nın kreş yardımı için çalışmaları var. Çok kapsamlı 
bir çalışma, önerme ile gittiler ama maliye ve ekonomi bakanlığı ‘bütçe şu anda buna 
izin vermez’ diye ket vurmuşlar. Bizim bir sonraki çalışmamız da o bütçeden ayrılacak 
bir payın makroekonomik etkileri üzerine yeni bir çalışma yapmak istiyoruz, çünkü Aile 
Bakanlığı’nın önünü o tıkadı. Bir de KEİG platformu da bu konuyu çok sahiplendi ve 
onunla ilgili kreş çalışması yaptılar. ‘Kadınlar ne istiyor’ diye şu anda bir basın 
bildirisi üzerine çalışıyorduk. O da bu hafta içerisinde KEİG platformu adına 
açıklanacak.” “Türkiye’deki demokratik sürecin tüm aksaklıklarına ve bozukluklarına 
rağmen, kimi noktalarda da yürüdüğüne dair benim için kanıt hani 2005’te ‘bununla ne 
alakası var konumuzla’ dediği bir noktadan 2013’de devletin toplantı yapıp bize akıl 
sormak için ayrıca iş yaşam dengesi ve kadın istihdamı üzerine etkileri üzerine bir 
toplantı düzenleyerek bizi çağırıp sorduğu bir noktaya gelmemiz…” “Soyadı ile de ilgili 
orada da ileriye doğru bir adım atıldı evlilik esnasında başvuruyla nüfuz cüzdanına iki 
soyadıyla birlikte eklenebilmesi. Yani bir mahkeme sürecinden geçmeden basit bir 
formdaki bir şeye tik atmasıyla, kadının iki soyadının kendi soyadının da eşinin 
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soyadının yanında yer alabilmesi. O ileri bir adımdı ama tabi istenen şey diğer 
opsiyonun da açık olmasıydı. Yani sadece kendi soyadını taşıyabilmesi.” “Önce bir 
feminist hukukçular grubu oluşturuldu. Mevcut o dönemdeki ceza kanununun üzerinden 
geçti bu grup. Hangi maddelerin, ne gerekçelerle, ne şekilde değiştirilmesi gerektiği 
yönünde bir doküman hazırlandı ve bu bir yayına dönüştü, bir rapora. Takriben 30 
küsür madde belirlenmişti ve 30 küsür maddede niye değişmesi gerektiği ve nasıl 
değişmesini istediğimizle ilgili çok net talepler oluştu. Bunu bizim bir tek Kadının İnsan 
Hakları Derneği olarak savunmamızın bir anlamı yoktu. Örgütlü olarak yapmamız 
gerekiyordu. Onun için TCK Kadın Platformunu oluşturduk.” “Kadının İnsan 
Hakları’nın KEİG Platformu’na ön ayak olması da bir o kadar önemliydi, çünkü oluşan 
taleplerin arkasında duracak geniş bir platform oluşabiliyor. Aynı şekilde TC 
kampanyası da öyle gelişti. Çok benzer süreçler aslında ikisi. Kadın istihdam 
konusunda yaptığımız çalışma TCK’nın örneğini çok takip eden bir örnekti. Yani 
araştırma taleplerin ne olduğu belirlenerek ve arkasında durulabilinir, ütopik ya da 
slogan vari talepler değil, çok somut, elle tutulur, ‘mevcut durum şu, biz bunun böyle 
olmasını istiyoruz’ diye, hem değişik yasal düzenlemeler, hem de politika uygulamaları 
ile ilgiliydi. Sonra bunun arkasında duracak bir platformun oluşturulması kadın 
örgütlerinden oluşan, feminist örgütlerden oluşan. Ortak bir dil oluşturulması. AB ve 
Birleşmiş Milletler gibi süreçlerin oluşturulması.” “Meclis Komisyonların ya uzman 
çağırılabiliyor ya da gözlemci. TCK Kadın Platformundan sürekli birileri gözlemci 
olarak gitti, oradaki uzmanlarla da bir diyalog ilişkisi oluştu. Komisyonda bilfiil 
bulunan uzmanlar ve kimi daha açık olan milletvekilleri ile bir diyalog mekanizması 
oluştu ve sürekli olarak talepler bu diyalog mekanizması üzerinden meclis komisyonuna 
girmiş oldu böylece.” “4320’nin oluşulması aşamasında bir sıkıntı o dönemde MSP’nin 
koalisyonda olduğu bir hükümetti ve ‘bu koruma emri bizim kültürel altyapımıza uygun 
bir şey değil’ yani ‘şiddet gösteren kocanın evden uzaklaştırılması bizim aile yapımıza 
uygun değil’. İşte o zaman Erbakan başbakandı. Meclis tartışmalarında yapılan 
itiraflardan bir tanesi buydu. İşte ‘Avrupa’ya Amerika’ya uyabilir, ama bizim 
kültürümüze uymaz.’ Biz de o sırada Kadının İnsan Hakları Yeni Çözümler Derneği 
olarak Müslüman Toplumlarda Yaşayan Kadınlar Örgütü diye bir network’ün 
üyesiydik. Bu network’e bir e-mail attık: ‘böyle böyle bir süreçteyiz Türkiye’de, sizin 
olduğunuz ülkelerden herhangi bir tanesinde koruma emri uygulayan var mı?’ Yaşayan 
Malezya’daki arkadaşlardan cevap geldi. Bu da çok ironikti çünkü o anda başbakan 
olan Erbakan sürekli Malezya’yı Türkiye’ye örnek gösteriyordu. Ekonomik açıdan 
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Malezya gibi olacağız’ diye. Biz de oradaki kanunu isteyip bunu arka plandan Kadın 
Bakanlığı üzerinden meclis görüşmelerinde kullanılmak üzere örnek olarak kullanıldı ve 
o gerçekten akan suların durduğu… İşte o ‘bizim kültürümüze uymaz’ argümanı çöktü o 
stratejiyle.” “Kadının insan hakları o kadar kültürel argümanlara takılabilen, 
yerelleştirilebilen bir şey ki bizim zihnimiz buna izin vermez. Müslüman Toplumlarda 
Yaşayan Kadınlar Örgütü de bunun için kurulmuş bir örgüt zaten. İslam dininin ne 
kadar değişik kontekstlerde ne kadar farklı argümanlarla kadınlara karşı dönüştüğünü, 
mesela kadın sünneti Afrika’da yerel bir adet, bunu orada yerel otoriteler bu İslami bir 
şeymiş gibi sunuyorlar. Hâlbuki Arap ülkelerinde kadın sünneti ile ilgili böyle bir 
uygulama yok. Arap ülkelerinde ve bizim ülkemizde namus cinayetleri var, Afrika’da da 
bu duyulmamış bir şey. İşte kadın gitti evlilik öncesi ve dışı enteraksiyonda bulundu diye 
herhangi bir namus cinayetine kurban gitmek gibi bir hak ihlali yok.” “KEİG 
platformunun bir yayını var bununla ilgili. Biraz geç başlandı maalesef SGK reformu 
artık sonuna ulaşmıştı. İyi bir yayındı o ama biraz geç gelen bir yayındı. TCK’da en 
etkin şeylerden bir tanesi oydu. TCK Kadın Platformu çalışmaları TCK reform 
sürecinin en başında başladı zaten, hatta öncesi bile diyebiliriz.” “Bizim dernek içinde 
ortaklaştığımız temel nokta üniversitede başörtüsü yasağına karşı olduğumuzdu çünkü 
üniversitedeki öğrenciler hizmet alandır. Hizmet alan vatandaşlar arasında devlet 
inanca bağlı olarak ayrımcılık yapmamalıdır gerekçesinden yola çıkarak. Ancak kamu 
istihdamında bir ortak duruşumuz olmadı. Başörtüsü yasağı ya da serbestîsi üzerine. 
Biz ikisini hep ayırarak baktık. Yani farklı olduğunu düşünüyoruz.” “Kadın 
Hareketi’nin son dönemin en başarılı sosyal hareketlerinden biri olduğunu 
düşünüyorum. Hükümetle diyalog mekanizmalarını geliştirmek, gerektiği noktalarda 
diyalog içerisinde ama bağımsızlığını –feminist örgütler için- koruyarak, ama 
küsmeden, ya da antigonistik ve polarizasyon üzerinden değil, diyalog mekanizması 
üzerinden taleplerini açıklayarak, ileterek, elindeki araçları da baskı aracı olarak 
gerektiğinde kullanarak, dönüşümü sağlamak üzere ve bence önemli bir güç oldu ve AB 
sürecini de güzel kullandı bence kadın örgütleri.” “Mekanizmalar açısından, Mecliste 
komisyonların kurulması, Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı gibi bir national 
machinery kurumun olması bunlar olumlu şeyler. Ama o süreçte bütün bunlara rağmen 
iyi gitmeyen taraflar da var. Örneğin, bu kurumsallaşmaların içi konuya hâkim, konuyu 
bilen, konuyu çalışan, bu konuda deneyimli kişiler tarafından doldurulmuyor her 
zaman. Örneğin, Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı… Sadece kadın olduğu için oraya 
atanan çok kadın oldu… Tüm bakanlıklarda deneyimi ve birikimi olan kişiler atanırken 
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nedense Aile Bakanlığı’nda sadece kadın olduğu için, bu konuları okumuş mu, çalışmış 
mı bütün bunlara bakılmadan...” 
Karcılıoğlu, Kaan (the secretary general of the Press Council, December 17, 2012): 
 
“Bu hususta bir hazırlığımız yok. Ne bizden oraya doğru, ne oradan bize doğru 
herhangi bir talep de olmadı. Bunun çeşitli sebepleri olabilir. Kişisel görüş olarak bunu 
açıklamak zorundayım. Konsey adına konuşamam bu konuda. Basın özgürlüğü ile ilgili 
akademik geçmişi de olan bir hukukçu olarak, ceza hukukçusu olarak şunu 
söyleyebilirim ki, özellikle anayasal ama aynı zamanda yasal düzlemde bir problem 
yok.” “Problem uygulamayla ilgili bu sebeple ben şahsen bu konuda mutlaka harekete 
geçilmeli ve şu yapılmalı bu yapılmalı diyemiyorum. Buna anayasadaki ilgili 
maddelerin tekrar kaleme alınması da dahil. Şu şekilde söyleyebilirim. İfade özgürlüğü 
ve basın özgürlüğü ile ilgili anayasadaki maddeler üç aşağı beş yukarı Avrupa İnsan 
Hakları Sözleşmesi’nde öngörülen maddelerle paraleldir.” “Şu anda ülkemizde 
yaşanan sorunlar mevcut basın kanunundan kaynaklanan sorunlar olmaktan çıkmış 
durumda. Daha çok Ceza Kanunu ile ilgili sorunlar. Doğrudan Basın Kanunu 
kullanılmıyor, doğrudan Ceza Kanunu ve orada basınla ilgili olmayan maddeler –örgüt 
üyeliği, terör propagandası yapmak, terör faaliyetlerinde bulunmak gibi. Dolayısıyla, 
Basın Kanunu ile ilgili problemler şu anda çıkmıyor. Daha önce söz konusuydu bunlar. 
Mesela sorumlu yazı işleri müdürünün objektif sorumluluğu, yani sorumlu yazı işleri 
müdürü bir haber yapıldığı zaman –Basın Kanunu’nda onun ayrıntılı hükümleri vardı- 
kendisi de bir şekilde sorumlu oluyordu ve o haberi kendisi kaleme almasa bile sorumlu 
oluyordu. Basın Kanunu’yla bu biraz daha yumuşatıldı. 2004 yılındaki Basın 
Kanunu’yla. Yanlış hatırlamıyorsam hapis cezası olmuyor artık, para cezası oluyor. 
Fakat dediğim gibi bunlar şu anki mevcut sorunları tam yansıtmıyor. Yani şu anda 
Türkiye’deki ifade özgürlüğü problemini tartışıyorsanız Basın Kanunu’ndan 
kaynaklanan problemler daha alt maddelerde yer alır.”  “RTÜK’ün kurumsal oluşum 
sürecinin daha demokratik olması lazım. Şimdi bunu RTÜK’e sorduğunuz zaman 
verilen cevap, en son bir RTÜK üyesinin bir konferansta doğrudan söylediği cevap ‘biz 
meclis tarafından seçiliyoruz ve son derece demokratik bir meşruiyetimiz var’ diyordu. 
Ancak bu tip kurumlar sadece meclis tarafından seçilmekle demokratik meşruiyete haiz 
hale gelmiyorlar. Siyasi partilerin dengeli bir dağılımı var, ama RTÜK içerisinde sivil 
toplum kuruluşlarının doğrudan temsil edilmesini sağlayan bir düzenleme yapılması 
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lazım.” “Özellikle ailenin korunması, milli değerlerin korunması gibi kavramlar altında 
gerek sanatsal gerekse haber değeri taşıyan meselelerde bana sorarsanız aşırıya kaçan 
müdahaleleri var. Bunların gözden geçirilmesi lazım. Yine bu öncelik haline gelemiyor 
mevcut durumda. Çünkü ifade özgürlüğünü tartışmaya başladığınızda, daha ağır ve 
mevcut devam eden problemleri tartışmaya başlıyorsunuz. Aslında tutuklu gazeteciler 
problemi olmasaydı, Basın Konseyi’nin ciddi bir şekilde eğildiği meselelerden biri 
olurdu RTÜK meselesi, ifade özgürlüğünü tartıştığımız anlarda, etik meselesinin 
dışında.” “RTÜK’ün problemli olduğunu söylediğim alanları doğrudan haber alma 
hakkıyla ve basınla ilgili değil. Daha çok sanatsal özgürlüklerle ilgili. Dolayısıyla ifade 
özgürlüğü ile ilgili bir problem, fakat basın özgürlüğünün inceleme alanı içinde kalan 
ifade özgürlüğü ile ilgili bir problem değil bu. Bir dizi oluyor, RTÜK bu dizi ile ilgili bir 
ceza veriyor, ağırlıklı olarak bunlarla karşılaşıyoruz. Veya bir magazin programındaki 
bir şeyi aşırı yorumluyor. Bunlarla ilgili. Bunlar da baktığınız zaman, çoğunlukla basın 
özgürlüğü ile ilgili bir mesele değil. Verilen bir haberin, verilip verilmemesi ile ilgili, 
bunun gerekli olup olmadığı ile ilgili RTÜK bir yaptırım uygulamaya kalkarsa bu 
hususta Basın Konseyi de bir söz söyler.” “Bizde adli mercilerin olaya bakışı bir basın 
mensubu ile ilgili olarak bir soruşturma başlatılıp, hatta daha sonra bu iddianamenin 
üzerinden kamu davasına dönüşüp, sonra da beraat kararı çıkarsa; burada bir sıkıntı 
yokmuş gibi algılanıyor. Hâlbuki Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararlarında 
‘chilling effect’ denilen bu maddelerin varlığı dahi, veya bu maddelere ilişkin negatif 
nitelikteki istikrarlı uygulamaların varlığı dahi zaten yeterince zor bir faaliyet olan 
haber yapma özgürlüğünün kullanılmasını iyice kısıtlıyor. Yani insanları yıldırıyor 
özetle.” “Ceza Kanunu ile ilgili bütün meslek örgütlerinin görüşleri ortak.” “Terör 
tanımlamasıyla ilgili daha esaslı daha belirgin bir tanıma gitmek lazım. Bence ihtiyaç 
yok. Çünkü gerek anayasadaki ve anayasanın atıfı ile İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nin 
içtihatları, gerekse zaten kanunlarımızın kendileri herhangi bir basın yayın faaliyetini 
ifade özgürlüğü çerçevesinde değerlendirilmesi gereken faaliyetlerini, gazetecilik 
faaliyetlerini terör faaliyeti olarak tanımlamaya müsaade etmiyor. Ama madem 
uygulama bunun tam tersi bir şekilde gerçekleşti, gazetecilik faaliyeti terörist faaliyet 
olarak algılanmaya müsait hale geldi, çünkü özetle denilen şu: ‘sen iktidarı yıpratmak 
için kitap yazdın’. İnsanlar iktidarı yıpratmak için kitap yazabilirler bu terör eylemi 
sayılmaz. Hukukçu olarak bunu ben zor telaffuz ederim, ama şöyle söyleyebilirim bu 
kadar yanlış uygulama varken bence de o zaman çok açık bir şekilde bunlar bunlar 
kesinlikle terör şeyi teşkil etmez demek lazım. Ama teknik olarak da sakıncalı 
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görüyorum, çünkü şöyle bir sonuç ortaya çıkar. Siz şunlar şunlar terör eylemi değildir 
derseniz onların dışında kalanların terör eylemi olabileceği gibi bir problem ortaya 
çıkacak…” “Mesele Türkiye’de gazeteciler gazetecilik faaliyetinden dolayı 
tutuklanabiliyorlar. Tutuklanabiliyorlar demek bana sorarsanız bu bağlamda mahkûm 
olabiliyorlar demekten daha da ağır bir durum bizim konumuz açısından.” “3. Yargı 
Paketi ile ilgili çok söylenen, hatta benim anlamadığım bir şekilde yurt dışında da 
olumlu bir gelişme olarak ifade edilen bu düzenleme özetle şunu diyor: sen bundan 
sonra gazetecilik faaliyetlerini bu şekilde yapmaya devam edersen ben seni tekrar 
yargılayacağım.” “Genel olarak Türkiye’deki lobicilik hususuna bakış ve bunun 
işlerliği ile ilgili de bir mesele olarak görüyorum ben bunu. En azından şunu diyebiliriz, 
çok aşırı bir alışkanlık yok bu konuda. Özellikle belli bir konuda maddi menfaati 
olanlar bununla ilgili demokratik bir sistemde arzu edilen veya arzu edilmeyen 
şekillerde bu konuda çalışmalar yapabiliyorlar. Ama sivil toplum örgütleri söz konusu 
olduğu zaman tahmin ediyorum istisnalar bir yana yukarıdan bize yönelik olarak iktidar 
–mevcut iktidardan da bahsetmiyorum- establishment tarafında sivil toplum örgütlerine 
yönelik, siz de katılın bu sürece daveti pek olmuyor. Bunu ben kendi tecrübelerim 
açısından şöyle doğrulamaya çalışabilirim. Malum basın özgürlüğü hususunda çok 
ciddi problemler var. Ulusal ve uluslar arası alanda -uluslar arası alanda gittikçe artan 
şekilde- bir takım tepkiler ve şeyler var. Raporlar yayınlandı, CPJ raporu yayınlandı. 
Buna ek olarak CPJ bir sivil toplum kuruluşu ama resmi nitelikte olan Avrupa 
Birliği’nin ilerleme raporunda da Türkiye ile ilgili bu konu ile ilgili çok ciddi tepkiler, 
eleştiriler var. Bu hususta hükümet kanadından veya meclisten veya benzer organlardan 
bir toplantı, resmi bir sivil toplum örgütleriyle bir araya gelip, bu nasıl çözülür şeklinde 
birşey olmadı. Ne kamuoyuna yansıyan oldu, ne bize yansıyan oldu.” “Bugün benzer 
şeyleri her ne kadar adli bir süreç başlamadıysa da sayın başbakanın dizi ile ilgili: ‘işte 
bizim ecdadımız öyleydi, böyleydi’, ‘savcılar niye harekete geçmiyor’ dediğindeki 
örnekler dikkate alındığında sıkıntının sadece belli bir konuda değil, ama birbirine 
benzeyen siyasi sürecin bütün taraflarını kendine has bir takım manevi değerleri var. Ve 
o değerlere yönelen her türlü şey kısıtlanması gereken bir ifade açıklaması gibi 
görünüyor.” 
Özbay, Nuray (the deputy secretary general of KAGİDER, February 14, 2013):  
“Bir önceki anayasa çalışmasında, 2007 yılında, Anayasa Kadın Platformu bir 
taslak hazırladı ve o taslağa KAGİDER de katkı sundu. O dönemde aktif çalışmalar 
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gerçekleştirildi. Ondan sonra eşitlik maddesi, pozitif ayrımcılığın önünü açan süreçte 
de KAGİDER’in lobi faaliyeti oldu ama tabi bu yeterli değil. En son yeni anayasa 
kapsamında KAGİDER bir anayasa çalışma grubu kurdu. Üyelerinin talepleri ve 
ihtiyaçlarına yönelik bir anket gerçekleştirdi. Sonra bir rapor hazırlayıp uzlaşma 
komisyonunu ziyaret etti. Cemil çiçeği ziyaret etti ve rapor çıktılarını sundu. Şu anda 
yeni anayasanın da nereye gideceği pek belli olmadığı için, bu çalışmaları konusu 
geldikçe gündeme getirmeye çalışıyoruz. Bir yandan da komisyonun ve meclisin 
çalışmalarını ve açıklamalarını bekliyoruz. Sürecin tıkanıyor olması vesaire yönündeki 
tartışmaları endişe ile takip ediyoruz. Bir taraftan da denge ve denetleme ağı gibi bir 
yapı oluşturuldu. KAGİDER gibi birçok örgüt bunun paydaşı. Bu yapının içinde de yer 
alıyoruz. Önümüzdeki haftalarda bir meclis ziyareti tasarlanıyor.” “Biz anayasada kota 
savunmadık. Pariteyi tam eşitlik ilkesini savunduk ve bunun anayasal güvence altına 
alınmasını konuştuk. Daha çok üzerinde tıkanılan maddeler kamuoyuna sunulduğu ve 
anlaşılan maddeler çok da medya malzemesi yapılmadığı için, daha fazla anayasal 
vatandaşlık, kimlik vesaire mevzuları üzerinde şu anda dönüldüğü için; daha siyasi 
olarak da bunlar yüklü mevzular. Ama kadının insan hakları temelinde zaten şu anda 
bunun üzerinde uzlaşıldı denen birşey yok -gündemde dönen. Dolayısıyla biz de takip 
ediyoruz. Bir şekilde yapılacak açıklamaları bekliyoruz.” “50-50, geçici bir pozitif 
ayrımcılık ya da geçici bir mekanizma değil; anayasal düzlemde de, kadın ve erkeğin 
sadece teoride değil, pratikte de, bütün mekanizmalarda ve bütün süreçlerde çıkan 
sonuçların da tam eşitlik ilkesine yönelik olması. Bu siyasi temsilde de, eşit istihdama 
katılmada da, her alanda geçerli. Anayasada bunun zaten detaylı tam olarak 
tanımlamak mümkün değil tabiki. Tam eşitlik ilkesi mesela Fransa anayasasında örnek 
var. Tam eşitliğin anayasal düzlemde de benimsenmesi.” “2007’de tam eşitlik olarak 
ifade ediliyordu. Son dönemde özellikle yabancı kaynaklar incelenip parite ilkesi 
üzerinde duruluyor.” “Şiddet KAGİDER’in uzmanlık alanı olan bir konu değil. 
Dolayısyla, o konuda bir uzman görüşü sunmak yada somut bir anayasal madde 
talebinde bulunmak pek mümkün değil. Fakat tabiki, bu süreçler hayati bir konu olduğu 
için diğer örgütlerle birlikte bir takım platformlar aracılığıyla sunulan önerilerin 
farkındalığının arttırılması için KAGİDER’de tabiki destek veriyor. Mesela bu en son 
Ailenin Korunması ve Kadına Yönelik Şiddetle Mücadele Kanunu. Orda tüm bu 
meclisteki tartışmalarda KAGİDER yoktu. Temsilcisi yoktu. Çünkü, çok yoğun bir 
dönem geçirildi. Örgütlerle bakanlık çok yoğun çalıştı. Fakat yinede süreci bir şekilde 
dışarıdan desteklediğini her anlamda ifade etti. Ama dediğim gibi bir uzmalık katkısı 
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sunmadı bu süreçte. Çünkü şiddet alanında çalışan bir örgüt değil. Ancak toplumsal 
farkındalığın artması ve sürece olumlu destek açısından bunu dillendirdi, gündeme 
taşıdı ve katkı sunmaya çalıştı.” “Mevcut İş Yasası tam eşitlik ilkesine dayanıyor 
aslında. Fakat tabiki bu çocuk bakımı, kreş mevzularında, 150 kadın çalışması 
mevzusuna karşı çıktı. Bu kadınları birazcık cezalandıran bir durum söz konusu.” 
“Kadın ifadesinin çıkarılıp çalışan ifadesinin getirilmesi ve tam eşitlik getirilmesi. 
Çünkü böyle bir durumda iş veren kadın istihdam etmekten çekiniyor. Bunun gibi 
öneriler var ama bu tabiki anayasal düzlemdense İş Kanunu’nun altında. Çocuk bakımı 
modeli çalışmalarında da bunlar dillendirildi.” “KAGİDER henüz bu konuda somut bir 
açıklama yapmadı çünkü bunun olası etkilerini hesaplamak mümkün değil. Dünyanın 
birçok ülkesinde nerdeyse 18 aya varan doğum ve analık izinleri söz konusu, aynı 
şekilde ebeveyn izinleri destekleniyor. Ama Türkiye’de zaten destekleyici bir çocuk 
bakım hizimeti olmadığı için, 6 ay izinden sonra o kadın çocuğunu ne yapacak o belli 
olmadığı için bu iznin olumlu veya olumsuz etkisini söylemek mümkün değil. Tam 
tersine olumsuz bir etkisi olmasından da çekiniyoruz. Çünkü 6 ay boyunca bu kadın iş 
piyasasından uzaklaşmış oluyor. Yerine yeni birisi alınabilmiş oluyor ve 6 ay sonunda 
çocuğunu bırakacak devlet tarafından desteklenen bir çocuk bakım merkezi olmadığı 
için kadın muhtemelen iş piyasasından çekiliyor. Dolayısıyla bunun sonuçlarının da çok 
olumlu olacağını bilemiyoruz. Dolayısıyla da bununla ilgili bir açıklama yapmıyoruz. 
Yaptığımız bütün açıklamalar Türkiye’de devlet tarafından finanse edilen bir çocuk 
bakım sistemi oturtmak gereklidir şeklinde.” “Türkiye’de hala kadın istihdamında %58 
oranında bir kayıt dışılık var. Dolayısıyla, birazcık da bu taraftan mücadele etmek 
gerekiyor. Evet ssk dönüştürüldü, evet büyük zarar veriyordu sskya geçit de artık kayıt 
içine alınmaya çalışılıyor vesaire ama hala kadın istihdamında kayıt dışılık çok yüksek. 
Dolayısyla, bunun farklı sistemlerle destekleniyor olması lazım. İstihdam politikasıyla 
paralel ilerlemesi lazım. Bunun için de çocuk bakımı çok önemli.” “Esnek zamanlı 
çalışmanın binlerce tarifi var, ama bunun sosyal güvenlik şemsiyesi altında olması 
apayrı birşey. ‘Kadın istihdamı çok düşük, bunu arttıralım, bütün kadınlar esnek 
zamanlı çalışsın’ demek çok hakkaniyetli bir yaklaşım değil. Esnek zamanlı çalışma 
sosyal güvenceli bir seçenek olarak sunulabilir. Sonuçta seçenek olarak sunulduğunda 
tabiki bunu tercih etmek isteyenler tercih etmelidir… o konuda da KAGİDER esnek 
zamanlı çalışma uygulamalarının gelştirilmesini destekliyor. Ama bunu ancak ve ancak 
sosyal güvenlik şemsiyesi altında tanımlanırsa ve titiz bir yaklaşımla oluşturulursa 
destekliyor.” “Yapısal problemler var. Dünden bugüne değişecek şeyler değil. Hem 
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yasal değişiklik gerekiyor bir de hep bahsedilen meşhur zihniyet değişikliği dönüşümü 
var. Toplumsal dönüşüm gerekiyor ki bu yasalar uygulansın.” “KAGİDER istihdamı ve 
kadın girşimciler için çalışyor ve girişimci kadınları başörtülü, başörtüsüz veya ‘x’, ‘y’, 
‘z’ diye ayırmıyor. Genel bir kadın grubu altında değerlendiriyor ve hepsi için bu 
savunuyu gerçekleştiriyor. Hiçbir zaman da ne üyeleri için ne kadın istihdamı için 
başörtülü çalışanlar, başörtüsüz çalışanlar gibi bir ideolojik ayrıma da hiçbir zaman 
girmedi ve girmeyecek. Zaten ülkede %24 gibi bir kadın istihdamı var ve sadece 6 
milyon kadın istihdam ediliyor ve bu, bütün kadınların ve kadınları da değil bütün 
toplumun problemi.” “Genel olarak kadın istihdamı için savunu yapmalıyız, başörtülü 
kadın istihdamı için değil. Kadınlar burada genel bir grup olarak her türlü dini etnik 
cinsel yönelim tercihlerinin genelinde bir ayrımcılığa maruz kalıyorlar. Bunu içine 
girip, ayrıca da kendi içinde bir din ve dinin günlük yaşama uygulanması temelinde bir 
ayrıma gitmiyoruz. Üniversite tabiki, sonuçta bu bir eğitim hakkıdır, eğitime erişim 
hakkıdır, orada başörtülü başörtüsüz bütün öğrenciler buna dahil olabilmeli. Sonuçta 
birtakım yasal gereklilikler var: kamuda hizmet alan, hizmet veren… Bir yargıcın 
başörtülü olmaması gerektiğini de bir yandan söylüyoruz. Çünkü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 
yasaları çerçevesinde bir takım daha yukarıdaki kapsayıcı ilkeler gereği kamuda hzimet 
veren kişilerin dini herhangi bir simge taşımaması gerekiyor. Dolayısıyla, bu konudaki 
duruşumuz da net. Zaten özel sektörde de birçok alanda din temelinde bir ayrımcılık 
olduğunu da düşünmüyoruz. Başı örtülü diye istihdam edilemeyen bir kadın… Özellikle 
özel sektörde son dönemde bu sıkıntının da ortadan kalktığını düşünüyoruz açıkçası.” 
“İletişim kanallarını gayet açık buluyoruz. Gerek meclisle, gerek ilgili bakanlıklarla 
iletişim kurmakta, çalışmalarımızı paylaşmakta bir sıkıntı çekmiyouz. Dolayısıyla, o 
konuyu da olumlu buluyoruz.” 
Özkan, Özlem (Purple Roof, December 18, 2012): 
“Mal rejimleri 2002’den sonra edinilen mallar ve 2002’den sonraki evlilikler 
üzerinden hep, yani kanun yürürlüğe girdikten sonra yapılan mal edinimleri üzerinde 
duran bir tasarı getirmişti o dönemlerde. Dolayısıyla biz o süreçte diğer kadın 
örgütleriyle şunu söylüyorduk ve savunuyorduk: ‘Türkiye’de ve aslında bütün dünyada 
bütün mülkiyetler paylaşılmış durumda ve yüzde 90’ı erkeklerin üzerinde bu 
mülkiyetlerin. Dolayısıyla, bu büyük bir haksızlık.’ Her şeyden önce var olan evliliği 
devam eden ve 2002’den önce evlenmiş kadınların ve o kadınların bu kanun çıktığında 
Türkiye’deki kadınların yüzde yüzünü oluşturduğunu söyleyebilirsiniz. Maalesef onlar 
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faydalanamayacaktı bu kanundan. Faydalanabilmelerinin tek bir koşulu var, 
kocalarıyla birlikte notere gidip noterden buna rıza göstermeleri kocalarının 
gerekiyordu. Hangi kadın böyle bir şey için acaba eşini ikna edebilirdi. Dolayısıyla, bu 
süreçte en büyük muhalefetimiz buna oldu. ‘Bu bir eşitsizlik yaratıyor’ dedik. ‘Adaletli 
bir yaklaşım değil’ dedik. Ama biliyorsunuz o dönemde de, hele de 2002’de yüzde 
doksan beşi erkekti. Ve erkekler kendi mallarını maalesef kadınlarla paylaşmak 
istemiyorlar.” “Hemen yasanın sonrasında anayasaya aykırılığıyla ilgili başvuruda 
bulunuldu yine o sürece dâhil olan kadın örgütleri tarafından ama bir sonuç 
alınamadı.” “Daha önceden suç tasnifleri biraz daha farklıydı. Biraz daha cinsiyetçi 
bir suç tasnifi vardı. Tecavüzle ilgili, cinsel saldırıyla ilgili suçlarda ifadeler, 
tanımlamalar çok daha farklıydı. Kanun dili o anlamda biraz değişti. O bakış açısı 
cinsiyetçi, toplumsal cinsiyet algısının getirdiği bazı kavramlar biraz daha değişti Ceza 
Kanunu’nda da. Ama her halükarda biz kadının beyanının esas alınması gerektiğini 
düşündüğümüz, hele de cinsel saldırıyla ilgili kısmın tam olarak bizim isteğimiz 
çerçevesinde düzenlendiğini söyleyemeyiz. Çünkü şu anda takip ettiğimiz cinsel saldırı 
davalarında bu sorunla karşı karşıya kalıyoruz. Sürekli bir ispat sorunuyla karşı 
karşıya kalıyoruz. Kadının o tecavüzü ispatlaması gerekiyor, ya da bir takım o delillerin 
ortada olması gerekiyor. Oysaki cinsel suçlar ispatı en zor olan suçlardır. Tanığı 
olmaz.” “Evet kanun maddesi var, ama uygulatamıyorsunuz. 4320 sayılı yasa -Ailenin 
Korunması Kanunu- 1998 yılında yapılmış bir kanundu, ama biz bunu nerdeyse 2004’e 
kadar uygulatamamıştık. Kanun var bakın. Ama hakim uygulamıyor.” “Kürtajla ilgili 
tartışmanın olması ve bakanlığın bu konuyla ilgili bir tek söz söylememesi görüşmenin 
kesilmesine neden oldu. Çünkü yasanın yapış sürecinde görüşlerimizi sunduğumuz, epey 
bir efor sarf ettiğimiz halde; bahsettiğim gibi çok önemli hususlar o kanunda yer 
almadığı için bir hayal kırıklığı da yaşadık açıkçası. Ama Bakanlık ‘kadın örgütleriyle 
birlikte yaptık bu kanunu’ dedi, yani buna rağmen. Oysaki bir sürü eleştirdiğimiz şey 
oldu. Bunları açıkladık, basına da açıkladık ama bakanlık aslında bizim istediğimiz 
şeyleri yaptığını söyledi. Mesela kanundaki şiddet önleme izleme merkezleri. Onun 
içeriğinin kesinlikle netleşmesi gerektiğini söylüyorduk. Adamın tedavi edilmesiyle ilgili 
yine kanunda yer alan bütçe ayrılabileceği. Biz diyoruz ki ‘kadını güçlendiren bütçe 
ayırın. Bu bir hastalık değil. Şiddet.2 Şiddetin toplumsal temelleri var. Cinsiyet 
halkasından da kaynaklanıyor.” “233 kadın örgütünün imzacısı olduğu bir tasarı 
sunuldu bakanlığa. ‘Kadına Yönelik Şiddetin Önlenmesi Kanunu’ydu bizim tasarımızın 
başlığı. Kesinlikle şey değildi ilenin korunması ve kadına yönelik şiddetin önlenmesi 
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değildi… Ve Mor Çatı bu sürecin baş yürütücülerinden de biriydi. Zaten şiddet 
alanında çalışan bir örgütlenme Mor Çatı. Önerilerimizi bakanlığa sunduk, o süreçte 
çok fazla görüşme oldu bakanlığa gidilip gelindi, diğer kadın örgütleriyle görüşmeler 
oldu. Önerilerimizin büyük bir çoğunluğu girmemekle birlikte yasaya, bir kısmı girdi 
diyebiliriz. Birincisi ‘kanunun adı’. Kanunun adı çok önemlidir. Çünkü bir şeyin adı 
onu tanımlayan da bir şeydir aynı zamanda. Nasıl Kadından Sorumlu Devlet 
Bakanlığı’ndan Aile ve Sosyal Politikalar Bakanlığı’na gelindiyse bu da böyle bir şey… 
Kanunda İstanbul Sözleşmesi’ne atıf yapılan maddeler var. Şiddetin tanımı var. 
Ayrımcılık ve toplumsal cinsiyet algısı, yani kadına yönelik şiddetin bir ayrımcılık 
olduğuna dair ifade elbette yer alması için çok uğraşıldı. Bunların bir kısmı bazı 
ifadeler dediğim şekilde girdi. Fakat önerdiğimiz temel şeylerden bir tanesi olan kadına 
yönelik şiddetle mücadelede devletin yükümlülükleri içerisinde olmasını düşündüğümüz 
kadını güçlendirici roller, kadının beyanının esas alınması, kadının şiddetle ilgili 
yaptığı başvuruda herhangi bir delil aranmaması… Şiddet dediğimiz şey sadece fiziksel 
şiddet değil hakaret, aşağılama, her türlü psikolojik baskı, tecrit etme, görüştürmeme –
ailesiyle, başka kişilerle-, ekonomik şiddet, parasına el koyma, çalıştırmama, cinsel 
şiddet, tecavüz, cinsel saldırı, ensest… Tüm bunlarla ilgili bir başvuru yaptığında 
kadının delil aranmaması gerektiğini söylüyoruz. Kanuna da bu girmedi.” “Kolluğa, 
jandarmaya, polise yetki verilmesini istiyorduk. Acil durumda önlem alınması için. 
Çünkü daha önce karakollara başvurulduğunda polis bizim yetkimiz yok alamayız gidip 
adamı koruma kararının çıkması gerekiyor, ondan sonra biz yaparız diyordu, ama 
kanunla birlikte bu değişti. Bu olumlu bir yöndü. Biz bunu önermiştik zaten. Bununla 
ilgili değişiklik yer aldı, sağlandı. Fakat uygulamaya dair bu sefer problem yaşıyoruz. 
Kanunun sonrasında yönetmelik hemen çıkmalıydı. Mart ayında kanun yürürlüğe 
girdiği halde yönetmelik bir kanun yürürlüğe girdiği andan itibaren en geç bir ay 
içerisinde çıkar. Çünkü yönetmelik kanunun nasıl uygulanacağını gösterir. Oysaki 
yönetmelik çıkmadığı için, halen bununla ilgili bir sürü problem yaşanıyor. Yani 
karakol hala diyebiliyor ki ‘yetkim yok.’” “Çözümü onlar böyle bir yerden görüyorlar: 
adamları tedavi ederek, aileyi de parçalamayarak bu işi böyle çözmek gerektiğini 
düşünüyorlar. Biz de bir kere şiddet gören kadınlar yalnızca evli kadınlar değil. 
Dolayısıyla, aileyi parçalamaktan bahsetmek çok saçma. Ve bir kadın ne yapmak 
istediğine karar vermek istiyorsa eğer, o şiddetten uzaklaşıp bununla ilgili ortam 
sağlanması gerektiğini düşünüyoruz. Sığınakların açılması, danışma merkezlerinin 
çoğaltılması ve kadınların güçlendirilebileceği birimlerin ortaya konulmasıyla 
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yapılabileceğini düşünüyoruz. Evet yasada çok iyi pratik önlemler var, ama bir yanıyla 
da çok büyük bir eksik var.” “Yasayı sadece biraz gösterebilmek, göz boyamak, bakın 
ben usulümde, kanunumda değişiklikler yaptım diyerek dışarıya karşı böyle bir şekilde 
gösteriyor. Ama hem Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi’nde verilen kararlar Türkiye 
aleyhine bunun böyle işlemediğini zaten gösteriyor; hem de Türkiye’de her gün en az 
dört kadının öldürüldüğü bir ülkede bunun hiç de böyle olmadığını görüyorsunuz.” 
“Genel Sağlık ve Sosyal Sigortalar Yasa Tasarısına Karşı Kadın Platformu. O 
platformun içinde de yer almıştı Mor Çatı. Yasa değişikliği sürecinde önerilerini 
vermişti platform. Orada en temel şeylerden birisi hiçbir ne kocaya ne babaya bağlı 
olmadan da genel sağlık sigortasından faydalanabilmesi gerektiğini, kadınların ev 
içindeki emeklerinin de ücretlendirilmesi gerektiğini, bunun da bir karşılığı olması 
gerektiği…” “Erkek egemen, kapitalist bir sistemin devam edebilmesi için bunların 
değişmemesi gerekiyor çok da fazla. Evet, biraz haklar verilebilir, ama bu sistemin her 
halükarda devamı için bu yasaların aynen böyle devam etmesi gerekiyor.” “Bir kere 
çok üstten bir dil kullandıklarını söyleyebiliriz. Bir toplantı ya da görüş istendiğinde bir 
hafta gibi bir süre verilebiliyor. Bir hafta içerisinde lütfen görüşlerinizi iletin 
denebiliyor. Bu çok üstten, eril ve direkt iktidar dili.” “Sizin önerdiğiniz şeyi bambaşka 
bir hale dönüşmüş olduğunu da görebiliyorsunuz. Örneği verdim size. Yasa tasarısı 
başka bir hale dönüştü. Ve bunu ama yine de bakan ‘kadın örgütleriyle birlikte yaptık’ 
dedi." 
Takmaz, Hüsniye (the chair of ADF, December 13, 2012): 
“Farklı bakış açıları var. Bu farklı bakış açılarının da Alevi örgütlenmesine farklı 
farklı yansımaları var. Mesela Aleviliğin İslam’ın neresinde yer aldığı gibi, ya da 
Türkiye’deki Aleviler Aleviliği nasıl yaşıyorlar gibi. Fakat Vakıflar Federasyonu’na 
baktığınızda biraz daha devlete çok daha yakın daha doğrusu, diğer Alevi Bektaşi 
Federasyonu’na baktığınızda bunlarda biraz daha Aleviliği inanç bazında çok daha 
yoğun yaşamadığı, fakat bizim kurumumuz tam anlamıyla Aleviliğini uygulamalarında 
teoride ve pratikte yaşanılan bir oluşum olduğu için açıkçası buraya gelen insanların 
Aleviliğe bakış açısı biraz daha yoğun ister istemez çünkü dergâhlar var… Bu iki 
federasyonun birleşmesinde biz önemli bir adımız. o çok önemli. Yani iki kenarda olan 
federasyonu biz ortada durarak ikisini yakınlaştırdık ve bizimle birlikte bu üç 
federasyon bir bütünlük sergilemeye başladı.” “Benim inancımı sorgulayabilecek bir 
merciinin olmadığını düşünüyorum. Bir kurumun olmadığını düşünüyorum. Benim 
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inancımı nasıl yaşadığımı dünyada hiç kimsenin sorgulama hakkı olmadığını 
düşünüyorum. Ama ben Hüsniye Takmaz olarak bunu düşünüyorum.” “Buraya gelen 
insanların yüzde seksenine sorduğunuz zaman ‘biz tamamen İslam’ın içindeyiz, 
merkezindeyiz’ diye cevap vereceklerdir. ‘Bizim referansımız Kuran’ diyeceklerdir.” 
“Alevilerin kendi aralarında sorun noktasında kesinlikle yok. Aleviler arasında Allah 
Muhammet Ali üçlemesi noktasında bir farklılık yok.”“Aleviliği yaşama biçiminde ortak 
olan kurallarda kaidelerde hiçbir farklılık yok.” “Şu anda üç federasyonun özellikle altı 
madde noktasında –ki bizim olmazsa olmaz altı tane madde ana koşulumuz var-, bu 
koşullarda hiçbir görüş ayrılığı yok. Din dersleri noktasında, işte Cemevlerinin statüsü 
noktasında, Diyanetin durumu noktasında. Bunlarda, üç federasyon da farklı 
düşünmüyor.” “Yapacağınız şey din dersini tamamen kaldırmak... Ha eğer illa da din 
dersini koyacaksanız, o zaman din kültürü ahlak bilgisi öğretmenlerinin değil, 
ilahiyatçıların değil; tarihçilerin ve felsefecilerin okutmasını sağlarsınız. Onların 
objektif bakış açısı sorunu ortadan kısmen kaldırır.” “Belediyelerdeki şuanda 
düzenlenen İmar Yasası’yla ilgili koydukları ‘ibadethanedir’ diye bir madde var. O 
bölgede Aleviler çok yoğun yaşıyorsa, Alevilere ibadethane yaparsınız. Sünniler 
yaşıyorsa, Sünnilere yaparsınız. Fakat onu parantez içine alıyor, ‘kilise ve cami’ olarak 
koyuyor. Yani onun içinde cem evi yok. Ben bu hükümetten asla böyle bir şey 
beklemiyorum. Açılmış olanları da kapatmazlarsa iyidir.” “Biz asla dedelere maaş 
verilmesini istemiyoruz. Bizim her kurumumuz dedesinin maaşını verebilecek durumda. 
Ama o kurumlarda çok fazla verecek durumda değil. Bir dedenin parasını veremeyecek 
konumdalarsa, oluşum oluşturmasınlar.” “Dedeye maaş verdiğiniz zaman artık dedeniz 
devlet memuru olacaktır. Ki şuanda devletin dayatmak istediği inancı da uygulamak 
zorunda kalacaksınız.” “Nasıl ki camilere fetva gönderiyor, Cuma bildirisi 
gönderiyorsa; yarın öbür gün o zaman benim cem evime de gönderecektir o bildiriyi.” 
“Laik demokratik bir hukuk devletinde Diyanet İşleri diye bir kurum olmaz. Kaldı ki o 
artık bir kurum değil bir bakanlıktan da daha öte bir şey. Yani üç dört bakanlığın 
bütçesine sahip olan bir oluşuma siz artık başkanlık falan diyemezsiniz. Bakanlığın da 
üstünde başbakanlıkla neredeyse eşdeğer bir kurum haline geldi.” “Aslında çok doğru 
bir şey değil. Siz kimliğinizi birine uzatacaksınız. O bakacak. Alevi mi? Sünni mi? 
Hangi inançtan? Orada görev yapacak olan kişi bununla karşılaştığı zaman nasıl bir 
uygulama içine girecek? Türkiye diğer Avrupa ülkesi veya diğer ülkeler gibi değil.” 
“Örneğin, benim sağlıkla ilgili bir sorunum var. Oradaki o sağlık memurunun eğer 
benim inancıma ters bir insansa oradaki benim işlemimi yaparken ben objektif 
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davranacağını düşünemem.” “Din hanesiyle bizim ne işimiz var kimliklerde. 
Bıraksınlar insanların din haneleri boş kalsın.” “Alevilerin büyük bir kısmının CHP’ye 
oy verdiği bilinir. CHP’nin vermiş olduğu yüzlerce önerge var. Yasal düzenleme, yasal 
çalışma var; ama maalesef gündeme bile alınmadan reddediliyor. O milletvekilleri 
yaptıkları çalışmaları zaman zaman bizlere gösteriyorlar. Aslında sorun çok zor değil. 
Bugün istedikleri kararname istedikleri yasal düzenlemeyi bir gecede çıkarabilen 
hükümet bence isterse bunu çözer ve çıkarır.” 
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APPENDIX 4 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (IN TURKISH) 
 
 
General Questions: 
 Öncelikle, …’nın Türkiye çapında teşkilatlanması ve temsil kapasitesi hakkında ne 
söyleyebilirsiniz? Örneğin: ... kaç tane ilde örgütlenmiş durumda ve kaç tane 
organizasyonu temsil ediyor?  
 … nın diğer sector örgütlenmelerle bağlantıları ve varsa ortaklaşa lobi 
faaliyetinde bulunma amacıyla dâhil olduğu platform yapılarından da 
bahsedebilir misiniz? 
 
Questions about the Lobbying on Gender Mainstreaming: 
 Kadın hakları konusundaki anayasal değişiklikler ile ilgili olarak, … nın lobicilik 
faaliyetlerinden ve yasal içerik önerilerinden bahsedebilir misiniz? (Örneğin: 
cinsiyet eşitliği ve ayrımcılıkla mücadele, pozitif ayrımcılık, kadınların siyasette 
temsilini arttırmak için yasal kota sistemi uygulaması ve diğer konuların 
anayasada düzenlenmesi) 
 … nın Anayasa Kadın Platformu ile ilişkisinden bahsedebilir misiniz? Bu yapı kaç 
tane örgütü temsil ediyor? Bu platformun sivil toplumun diğer unsurlarından 
aldığı destek hakkında bilgi verebilir misiniz? 
 Genel olarak, anayasanın içeriğinin düzenlenmesi konusundaki önerilerinizin 
etkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? (Örnek verebilir misiniz?) 
 Siyasi alanda veya sivil toplum düzeyinde anayasa önerilerinize muhalefet eden 
aktörler var mı? Varsa bu argümanları nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? 
 Anayasa konusundaki önerleriniz ile Avrupa kurumlarının politika önerileri veya 
(varsa) baskıları ne ölçüde örtüşüyor? Bu konu ile ilgili Avrupa kurumlarını 
etkilemeye yönelik faaliyetleriniz oldu mu? 
 2001’de kabul edilen Medeni Kanunu ve bu kanunda geçtiğimiz on yılda yapılan 
değişiklikleri nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? (Örneğin: mülkiyet rejimi ve soyadı ile 
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ilgili değişiklikler.) Bu kanunun değiştirilmesi ile ilgili olarak şimdiye kadar 
gerçekleşmeyen talepleriniz neler? Genel olarak, bu konu ile ilgili kararların 
içeriğinin düzenlenmesinde önerilerinizin etkili olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? 
(Örnek verebilir misiniz?) Kabul görmeyen önerilerinizin kabul görmeme nedeni 
sizce nedir? 
 2001’de yeni Medeni Kanun’un hazırlık sürecinde kadın örgütleri Medeni Kanun 
Platformu adlı bir platform altında örgütlenmişlerdi. Bize bu platformla …nın 
ilişkisinden bahsedebilir misiniz? (Örneğin: Bu platforma kaç tane örgüt 
dahildi?) 
 Medeni Kanun ile ilgili Avrupa kurumlarını karar alma sürecine dâhil etmeye 
yönelik faaliyetleriniz oldu mu? Varsa örneklendirebilir misiniz? 
 Genel olarak Medeni Kanun ile ilgili tercihlerinizin siyasi karar alıcılara 
iletilmesinde ve gerçekleşmesinde Avrupa kurumlarının ne ölçüde etkili olduğunu 
düşünüyorsunuz? Neden? 
 Ceza Kanunu’nda Kadın Hakları ile ilgili olarak 2004 yılında yapılan 
değişiklikleri nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu konudaki mevcut durum ve şimdiye 
kadar yapılan değişiklikler, sizin kurumsal tercihleriniz veya dâhil olduğunuz 
koalisyonun tercihleri ile ne ölçüde örtüşüyor?  
 45 kadar maddede Türk Ceza Kanunu Platformunun değişiklik önerisi olduğunu 
biliyoruz. Bu konularla ilgili olrak lobi faaliyetleriniz devam ediyor mu? Üzerinde 
anlaşmazlık yaşanan maddeler ile ilgili önümüzdeki dönemde bir gelişme 
kaydedileceğini düşünüyor musunuz? (Örneğin: Kadına yönelik şiddetle ilgili 
ceza ve yaptırımlar, töre cinayetleri, zinanın suç kapsamına alınması önerileri, 
kürtaj ile ilgili düzenlemeler) 
 Özellikle bu yasanın hazırlanması sürecinde Türk Ceza Kanunu Kadın Platformu 
kurulduğunu biliyoruz. Bu Platform’a kaç tane örgüt dâhildi. Platformu sivil 
toplumda başka hangi örgütlenmeler destekliyordu? Şu an benzer bir 
yapılanmadan söz edebilir miyiz?  
 Bu konuya yönelik tercihleriniz ile ilgili olarak Avrupa kurumları desteğine 
başvurdunuz mu? Bu konudaki tercihlerinizin siyasi karar alıcılara iletilmesinde 
ve gerçekleşmesinde bu kurumlarının ne ölçüde etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?  
 Kadının şiddetten korunması amaçlı yürürlükte olan yasal düzenlemeleri nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? (Örneğin: Sizin de bildiğiniz üzere, 4320 numaralı Ailenin 
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Korunmasına Dair Kanun’un yerine 2012’de 6284 numaralı Ailenin Korunması 
ve Kadına Karşı Şiddetin Önlenmesine Dair Kanun yürürlüğe girdi)  
 6284 numaralı kanun ile ilgili içeriği etkilemek amacıyla, kadın örgütleri 
arasında kurulan platform yapısından bahsedebilir misiniz? Platform’a kaç örgüt 
dâhil olmuştu?  
 Bu Platform kadının şiddetten korunması ile ilgili hangi değişiklikleri önerdi? Bu 
önerilerden hangileri yeni yasada yer bulamadı? Bazı önerilerinizin dikkate 
alınmama sebebi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
 Kadının şiddetten korunması konusunda Avrupa Birliği’nin politika önerileri veya 
(varsa) baskılarını nasıld eğerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu konuda Avrupa Birliği 
kurumlarınının pozisyonunu etkilemeye yönelik faaliyetleriniz oldu mu? Genel 
olarak bu konuya yönelik tercihlerinizin siyasi karar alıcılara iletilmesinde ve 
gerçekleşmesinde Avrupa Birliği kurumlarının ne ölçüde etkili olduğunu 
düşünüyorsunuz? Neden? 
 Kadınların iş hayatına katılımının arttırılması konusunda ne tip faaliyetler 
yapıyorsunuz? Kadınların iş hayatına katılımının arttırılması konusunda hangi 
yasal düzenlemeleri öneriyorsunuz? (iş hayatında ayrımcılıkla mücadele, kota 
uygulamaları, kadının çalışma şartları, doğum, hamilelik, süt izni konularında 
önerileriniz neler?) 
 Bu konudaki pozisyonunuzdan dolayı desteklediğiniz veya dâhil olduğunuz geçici 
veya devamlı bir koalisyon veya platform var mı? (Bildirilmediyse: 2006 yılında, 
29 kadın örgütü tarafından Kadının Emeği ve İstihdamı Girişimi adı altında bir 
platform kuruldu. Siz de bu platform yapısına dâhilseniz platformun 
çalışmalarından da bahseder misiniz?) 
 AB müktesebatına uyum konusunda iş kanununu nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? 
 2008’de uygulamaya konan Sosyal Güvenlik ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası 
Kanununda toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği ile ilgili olarak yapılan değişiklikleri nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 Sosyal Güvenlik konusundaki talepleriniz doğrultusunda, Kadının Emeği ve 
İstihdamı Girişimi ile ortak çalışmalarınız oldu mu? Bunlardan bahseder misiniz? 
 Sosyal Güvenlik ile ilgili taleplerinizin sizce gerçekleşme(me) sebebi nedir? 
 Sosyal Güvenlik ve kadın konusunda Avrupa Birliği müktesebatını nasıl 
değerlendirirsiniz?  
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 … nın Başörtüsü yasağı/serbestisi ile ilgili yasal düzenlemeler konusundaki 
pozisyonu nedir? 
 Baş örtüsü ile ilgili hak talepleri amacıyla dahil olduğunuz bir platform yapısı 
mevcut mu?  
 Avrupa kurumlarının başörtüsü konusundaki pozisyonunu nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 
Questions about the Lobbying on Alevi Issues: 
 …’nın Aleviliğin devlet tarafından tanımlanması ve son dönemde ders kitaplarına 
girmiş olan Alevilik tanımının içeriği konusundaki görüşü nedir?  
 Devletin benimsediği mevcut Alevilik tanımlamasının olumlu/olumsuz etkilerini 
nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? (Eğer değinilmediyse, Örneğin: Ceza Kanunu Madde 
216 hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?) 
 …’nın genel olarak Aleviliğin farklı şekillerde tanımlanmasından kaynaklanan 
sorunların çözümü ile ilgili önerileri nelerdir? 
 … nın Alevililere azınlık statüsü verilmesi konusundaki görüşü nedir? 
 Farklı Alevi örgütlenmeler içinde, Aleviliğin İslam dini altında bir mezhep olarak 
tanımlanmasını talep edenler de var, Aleviliğin bir mezhep olduğu görüşünün 
yetersiz olduğunu savunanlar da, Aleviliğin İslam inancı dışında ve farklı bir din 
olduğunu savunalar da mevcut. …’nın benimsediği Alevilik tanımını destekleyen 
benimseyen diğer örgütlenmeler, platformlar hakkında bilgi verebilir misiniz? 
Alevi çatı örgütlenmelerinin hangilerinin/kaç tanesinin Alevilik tanımı konusunda 
… ile aynı pozisyonda olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz? 
 Tanımlama ve ilgili sorunların çözümü amacıyla Avrupa kurumlarını sürece dahil 
etmeye yönelik çalışmalarınız oldu mu?  
 Zorunlu din dersleri ve bu derslerin içeriği Alevileri ilgilendiren bir diğer konu.  
Bu derslerden muafiyet, anayasal değişiklik, içerik değişikliği gibi alternatif 
çözüm önerileri mevcut. Bu konuda …’nın benimsediği çözüm önerisi nedir? 
Önerileriniz ne ölçüde gerçekleşti, sorunun çözümünde etkili olduklarını 
düşünüyor musunuz? 
 Diğer Alevi çatı örgütlenmelerin hangileri zorunlu din dersleri sorununun çözümü 
konusunda … ile aynı görüşte? 
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 Zorunlu din dersleri konusundaki taleplerinizi desteklemeyen diğer aktörler ve 
sizce sebepleri hakkında bilgi verebilir misiniz? 
 Zorunlu din dersleri konusunda, Avrupa kurumlarını sürece dâhil etmeye yönelik 
çalışmalarınız varsa örneklendirebilir misiniz? Genel olarak bu konuya yönelik 
tercihlerinizin siyasi karar alıcılara iletilmesinde ve gerçekleşmesinde Avrupa 
kurumlarının ne ölçüde etkili olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?  
 Cem evlerinin statüsü ile ilgili mevcut durumu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu 
konu ile ilgili karar alıcılara … yasa teklifinde bulundu mu? (Bildirilmediyse, 
örneğin: İmar Kanunu’nda Cem evlerinin statüsünün yeniden düzenlenmesi gibi) 
 Sürece dâhil olan farklı görüşteki aktörlerin (sivil toplumun diğer bazı unsurları, 
mecliste temsil edilen bazı siyasi partiler, özellikle hükümet) cem evlerinin statüsü 
sorunu ilgili alternatif çözüm önerileri var mı? Bu önerileri nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 Cem evlerinin statüsü sorununun çözümünde, Avrupa kurumlarının herhangi bir 
etkisi olduğunu/olacağını olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?  
 …’nın Cem evlerine devletten yardım talebi var mı? Devlet yardımı konusunda 
Alevi örgütlenmeler arasında ne gibi görüş farklılıkları var? Bu farklılıkları nasıl 
değerlendirirsiniz? 
 …’nın Devlet tarafından Alevi dedelere maaş ödenmesi gibi bir talebi var mı? Bu 
konudaki farklı görüşleri nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?  
 Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı’nın şu anki statüsü ve hizmetleri konusunda farklı Alevi 
örgütlenmelerin farklı talepleri olduğunu biliyoruz. (Örneğin: Bazı örgütlenmeler 
Diyanet’in tamamen ortadan kaldırılmasını talep ederken, bazıları Diyanet’in 
devlet kurumu özelliğinden özerk bir statüye geçmesini; bazıları da Alevilerin de 
başkanlıkta temsilciliği olmasını ve din işlerine ayrılan bütçeden Alevilere de pay 
ayrılmasını talep ediyor.) Alevi hakları açısından bu kurumun mevcut statüsü ve 
hizmetleri ile ilgili… ‘nın talepleri nelerdir?  
 Diyanet’in statüsü konusunda, Avrupa kurumlarını sürece dahil etmeye yönelik 
çalışmalarınız varsa örneklendirebilir misiniz? Genel olarak bu konuya yönelik 
tercihlerinizin siyasi karar alıcılara iletilmesinde Avrupa kurumlarının bir etkisi 
olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? 
 Bildiğiniz üzere, 2006 yılına kadar kimliklerde din hanesini doldurma zorunluluğu 
vardı. 2006’da yapılan yasal değişikliklerle vatandaşlar kimliklerdeki din 
hanesini boş bırakabiliyor veya değişiklik isteyebiliyorlar. 2006’dan beri 
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yürürlükte olan bu uygulamanın sonuçlarını nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu 
konuda …’nın kurumsal talebi nedir? Kimlik kartlarındaki din hanesi meselesinin 
talepleriniz doğrultusunda çözümleneceğini düşünüyor musunuz? 
 Kimliklerdeki din hanesi konusunda, Avrupa kurumlarına yönelik herhangi bir 
lobi faaliyetiniz oldu mu? Genel olarak bu konuya yönelik tercihlerinizin siyasi 
karar alıcılara iletilmesinde ve gerçekleşmesinde Avrupa kurumlarının etkisi 
olduğunu/olacağını düşünüyor musunuz? 
Questions about the Lobbying on Freedom of the Press: 
 Son dönemdeki yeni anayasa taslağı çalışmaları sürecinde, basın özgürlüğünün 
anayasada tanımlanması, güvence altına alınması, ve sınırlanması konuları ile 
ilgili …’nın lobicilik faaliyetlerinden ve yasal içerik önerilerinden bahsedebilir 
misiniz?  
 Anayasada basın özgürlüğü konusunda, mevcut siyasi partilerin anayasa uzlaşma 
komisyondaki temsilcileri tarafından ileri sürülen farklı içerik önerilerini nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 Sizce, basın özgürlüğünün anayasal çerçevesinin nasıl çizilmesi gerektiği 
noktasında, sektör örgütleri tarafından yapılan önerilere baktığımızda, dikkate 
değer farklılıklar olduğunu söyleyebilir miyiz? 
 Anayasada basın özgürlüğü ile ilgili içeriğin oluşturulması sürecine, Avrupa 
kurumlarını da dâhil etmeye yönelik çalışmalarınız oldu mu?  
 Anayasa ile ilgili hazırlanan taslağa baktığımızda, anayasa konusundaki 
taleplerinizin ne ölçüde gerçekleşeceğini düşünüyorsunuz? 
 2004 yılında yeni bir Basın Kanunu hazırlandı ve sektör örgütleri yeni kanunu 
genel hatlarıyla bir kazanım olarak değerlendirdiler. Basın özgürlüğü açısından, 
mevcut haliyle bu kanunu siz nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu anlamda, …’nın 
2004’teki değişikliklerden bu yana Basın Kanun’unun içeriğine yönelik değişiklik 
önerileri var mı? 
 Basın Kanunu’nun içeriğiyle ilgili bazı parlamenterler tarafından son dönemde 
ilgili komisyonlara sunulan yasa tekliflerini takip ediyor musunuz? (Bunlar 
hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?) 
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 Basın Kanun’unda Basın özgürlüklerinin talepleriniz doğrultusunda düzenlenmesi 
noktasında, Avrupa Birliği müzakereleri sürecinin veya Avrupa kurumlarının bir 
etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? (örneklendirebilir misiniz?) 
 Basın Kanunu’nun içeriği ile ilgili talepleriniz ne ölçüde gerçekleşti? 
 Basın özgürlüğünü ilgilendiren bir diğer yasa da RTÜK Kanunu. Basın 
Özgürlüğü açısından, 2011’de yürürlüğe giren yeni RTÜK Kanunu’nu nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? Bu kanunla kurulan üst kurulun yetki ve kararlarını nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 Yeni RTÜK Kanunu’nun hazırlanması sürecinde,  … siyasi karar alıcılara görüş 
bildirdi mi? 
 Yeni RTÜK Kanunu’yla ilgili kurumsal tercihleriniz ne ölçüde gerçekleşti?  
 Yeni RTÜK Kanunu’nda Avrupa Birliği müktesebatına uyum sağlanması 
açısından eksiklikler olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz? 
 2004’te kabul edilen yeni Ceza Kanunu’nun hazırlanması sürecinde … siyasi 
karar alıcılara görüş bildirdi mi? 
 Ceza Kanunu’nda basın özgürlünü ilgilendirdiğini düşündüğünüz kanun 
maddelerini biraz açar mısınız? …  özellikle hangi maddelerde değişiklik talep 
ediyor?  
 Diğer gazeteci dernekleriyle, sektör örgütleriyle ve sivil toplumun diğer 
unsurlarıyla bu konuda yürüttüğünüz ortak çalışmalar var mı? Bu konuda lobi 
amacıyla kurulmuş bir platform yapısı var mı? 
 Bu taleplerle ilgili Avrupa kurumlarını karar alma sürecine dâhil etmeye yönelik 
çalışmalarınız varsa örneklendirebilir misiniz? 
 Ceza Kanunu ile ilgili değişiklik önerilerinizin gerçekleşeceğini düşünüyor 
musunuz? 
 Basın özgürlükleri açısından gündemde olan bir diğer kanun da Terörle 
Mücadele Kanunu. … bu kanun ile ilgili neler talep ediyor? 
 Diğer gazeteci dernekleriyle, sektör örgütleriyle ve sivil toplumun diğer 
unsurlarıyla Terörle Mücadele Kanun’u konusunda yürüttüğünüz ortak 
çalışmalar var mı? Bu konuda lobi amacıyla kurulmuş bir platform yapısı var mı? 
 Bu taleplerle ilgili Avrupa kurumlarını karar alma sürecine dâhil etmeye yönelik 
çalışmalarınız varsa örneklendirebilir misiniz? 
 Terörle Mücadele Kanunu ile ilgili değişiklik önerilerinizin gerçekleşeceğini 
düşünüyor musunuz?  
 247 
 
 Türkiye’deki tutuklu gazeteciler sorununun çözümüne yönelik getirilen 3. Yargı 
paketini ve bu bağlamda yapılan değişiklikleri/yargı paketinin içeriğini nasıl 
değerlendiriyorsunuz?  
 Adalet Bakanlığı tutuklu gazeteciler sorunu ile ilgili Kasım ayında detaylı bir 
rapor yayınladı. Bu raporu nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? 
 İnternet ortamından yapılan yayınların engellenmesi ve bununla ilgili yasal 
çerçeve basın özgürlüğü kapsamına giren bir diğer konu. Türkiye’de 
websitelerinin engellenme sebepleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
 Internet konusundaki yasal çerçeve ile ilgili olarak …’nın herhangi bir içerik 
önerisi var mı? (Örneğin: Internet Kurulu, 5651 sayılı Internet Kanununun 
düzenlenmesi ile ilgili Ekim, 2011’de bir çalışma başlatmıştı. … bu süreçte yer 
aldı mı?) 
 Internet’in düzenlenmesi ile ilgili bir diğer konu da internet filtreleme sistemine 
geçilmesi. Bilgi Teknolojileri ve İletişim Kurumu Mayıs 2011’de sivil toplum 
kuruluşlarıyla bir toplantı düzenledi ve internet filtreleme sistemi konusunda 
sektör örgütlerinin görüşlerini aldı? .. bu toplantıya temsilci gönderdi mi?  
 Internet alanında yapılan tüm mevcut düzenlemelerle ilgili …’nın 
pozisyonu/talepleri nelerdir? 
 Telekominikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı’nın internet alanını düzenlenmesi ile ilgili 
olarak yetkilendirilmesi ve bu yetkilerin kullanımı konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz? 
 İnternet özgürlüğü konusunda, Avrupa Kurumları’na yönelik lobi faaliyetleriniz 
var mı? Bu konuların ...’nın talepleri doğrultusunda çözümlenmesinde, Avrupa 
kurumlarının bir etkisi olacağını düşünüyor musunuz? 
Some Other General Questions: 
 Görüşlerinizi aldığımız tüm bu konulara ek olarak, …’nın üzerinde çalıştığı başka 
bir yasa/konu var mı? (Görüşmeyi gerçekleştiren kişi ek bir konu/yasa 
bildirildiyse bu konularla ilgili yasal içerik önerisi, kurulan platform yapıları, 
karşıt görüşlerin olup olmadığı ve Avrupa Birliği’nin bu konudaki adaptasyon 
baskıları hakkında da bilgi alacaktır.) 
 Son olarak, yasama organının veya hükümetin sizinle istişarede kullandığı 
yöntemleri nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz? Mevcut istişare mekanizmaların 
geliştirilmesi yönündeki önerileriniz nelerdir? 
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